The issue is not overall scarcity, but scarcity in specific places—the cities responsible for a disproportionate amount of the world’s output. The high price of land in these places is in part an unavoidable concomitant of success. But it is also the product of distortions that cost the world dear
The article is good but the title isn't great; the real story isn't about land per se, but about land-use regulation: the topics are related but quite distinct (and indeed the article says, "The spread of land-use regulation is not hard to understand"). As Matt Yglesias is fond of pointing out, steel-framed construction and elevators are well-understood, century-old technologies (http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/05/03/silicon_valle...).
But laws against deploying them have become important constraints on growth. The problems are really legal and political. The solutions will be (or won't be) as well.
Both land-use regulations, and land owners (ab-)using their oligopoly to drive up rents to insane levels, which combined cripple the rest of the economy by preventing growth.
Where has rent control ever worked favorably for the cities that have implemented it? It's simple economics, as value is derived from a city, the city itself becomes more valuable. A more valuable city has more valuable real estate. More valuable real estate costs more to purchase and develop. "Location, location, location" isn't just some cliche realtors like to use.
In the majority of cases, there's no conspiracy. Rent goes up, because the real value has gone up. It really is that simple.
Define "real value". Prices are driven my many-to-many auctions, and each market (housing) interacts with its supplements (transportation, food, energy, finance,...). The value varies from person to person, and much of the value is parasitic: I derive value from getting paid by my job, and my home, transport, etc enable me to do that job. If I make $100K/yr, is my home providing $10k/yr of value? Or $40k/yr? If I get a raise, is my home more valuable because it supports my higher income? Or is my transportation more valuable? Or is my food more valuable, as it keeps me healthy?
Shockingly absent from this essay was a consideration of the effects of climate change. In a hundred years or so, Miami will be a fairy tale. Where is the factorization of costs associated with high value land that's here today and gone tomorrow?
I assume there is none - Miami and other coastal cities will exist forever and ever (in the minds of those who own its land and properties) :-)
I doubt the people of those Greek cities that sunk thought it would ever happen... or they just turned their heads, plugged their ears and said "everything is fine".
Interestingly denser growth is one of the most effective means we have of reducing the carbon footprint of our cities. Shorter commutes mean less driving. Shared walls mean less heating and cooling energy use.
The estimated sea level rise, assuming current theories and models are correct, is 17-34 centimeters over the next one hundred years. That would make Miami more vulnerable to damage from typical storm surges and hurricanes than it is now, but it is not going to make the city go away.
Are there any examples of new, dense construction in North America that aren't ugly or dispiriting to live in?
Serious question. I live in a very dense neighborhood by North American standards. About 32,000 people per square mile, and it's self contained: people don't have to travel elsewhere to go out, shop, relax, etc. Some leave for work, but a high proportion are here during the day too.
It was built around 1900, and lots of people visit just for the atmosphere.
If we could clone this neighborhood and built it elsewhere, it would be a good thing. But we don't seem to be able to build neighborhoods in this style anymore.
Are there any new developments that are both dense and nice?
Low density of motorized transport (or even "fast" unpowered transport such as bikes) helps with the atmosphere. In some medieval towns which are still inhabited and thriving, the streets are mostly too rough for driving. Having everything you need within walking distance has a huge impact on the quality of life. You get to see more people, there is less noise and life feels less rushed.
He had an article on Tokyo, but I can't find it. Apparently Tokyo meets many of these criteria and is pleasant to be in, despite being new construction.
Which is why I'm wondering if we have any North American examples.
>If we could clone this neighborhood and built it elsewhere, it would be a good thing. But we don't seem to be able to build neighborhoods in this style anymore.
It's not that we're unable, it's that North Americans have chosen not to. Nice dense developments are bad for cars, and car-lifestyles are what North Americans have culturally designated as the marker of success. Therefore you see a false correlation: dense developments are only built to house those too poor to participate in car culture.
Salt Lake City has some experiments built around outdoor shopping malls, but it seems the good apartments are never available and the condominiums are priced for wealthy investors, not residents.
The city has very wide streets around these developments and multi-level underground parking to accommodate cars.
> ...and car-lifestyles are what North Americans have culturally designated as the marker of success.
This is no longer uniformly true. Some of the hottest, highest-priced residential real estate in the US is explicitly tied to more walkable environs. In the urban cores of cities like Portland, OR, Boulder, CO, and Austin, TX, there are definitely extraordinarily expensive ("marker of success") residences that are impractical (or at least very time inefficient) to live in unless one eschews a car-centric lifestyle. The developers have noticed, and there is a boom going on right now in those and similar cities by the developers to increase density; however, often neighborhood associations and land-use regulations tend to hold back the density of the proposed developments.
I think the problem is that kind of high density housing is its hard to sustain out of a handful of high density metros because you can only employ a large fraction [but not all] of the people in it within the neighborhood. So there needs to be high density offices/industrial plants/etc as well.
>> "Are there any examples of new, dense construction in North America that aren't ugly or dispiriting to live in?"
There are a couple of new tall buildings in lower Manhattan that aren't totally hideous, e.g. 8 Spruce (Gehry usually makes me feel ill, but in this one case it sort of works). And it's not particularly dispiriting inside.
And a tiny fraction of the new stuff going up in Williamsburg and parts of Queens is not entirely awful.
There are plenty on Park that would fit the bill if they were divided into more apartments. I also agree with you on 8 Spruce, despite some of the hate, I like it, and it's infinitely preferably to many of the green glass monsters that have gone up.
There are some shitty parts in the suburbs, but lots of nice areas (downtown, Kensington market, Bloor West / Ossington, Summerville, Moore Park, High Park, Entertainment district) and it isn't too pricey ($1500 / month for a 1 bedroom down town).
I agree that festival tower and the entertainment district is nicer, but it is also way louder, and I like quiet when I code so I moved out of that part of town.
But Toronto is currently building 130 towers in multiple neighborhoods, so to pick on the most controversial ones isn't really a rebuttle. Can you show an example of any 40+ story residential building that you like?
Ah, didn't mean to pick a misleading photo. Just searched "toronto new condos" and tried to use one that showed the streetscape.
I was actually talking about what it's like to walk around in neighborhoods - what's it like at street level in your area?
I can't think of 40+ residential buildings that I like, but that's at least partly because there aren't any in my area. My point was that we used to build dense, low rise neighborhoods.
But I like Manhattan, are some of those residential buildings 40+? Manhattan's a great example of a dense, walkable area that's pleasant to be in.
"It was built around 1900, and lots of people visit just for the atmosphere.
If we could clone this neighborhood and built it elsewhere, it would be a good thing. But we don't seem to be able to build neighborhoods in this style anymore."
A few things ...
First, I think there are some decent examples of what you're looking for ... Minneapolis comes to mind, as you stand in the center of Loring Park, which has a fair amount of new, high density surrounding it. Denver, certainly, as you walk to the North end of 16th st. and cross over that weird bridge ... lots of brand new high density office and residential all arranged and balanced in a very pleasing way.
Anyway ...
One of the reasons people like your neighborhood (I'm guessing) is that the built environment is much more substantial (and honest in use of materials). But we can't afford that anymore. 10x10 timbers and big stones and bricks are (relatively) tremendously expensive.
We can only afford stick built 2x4 construction covered with engineered faux-stone facade, and deep down, people know that's crap. That's why they like a neighborhood like yours.
In 1900 people were already building like that. I live in Somerville MA, which is pretty close to what the OP describes, and it's pretty popular despite everything being balloon framed and covered with vinyl siding.
Quite dense, nice to walk through, with nice looking buildings. Not the best mix of retail (few small independent shops) but aside from that it's a pretty good brand new neighbourhood.
Overall I think this is a good article, but there were two things which caught my attention.
Isn't this article just taking a roundabout way of commenting that landowners in highly productive areas are choking growth and more productivity by siphoning too much money off of the non-landowners for use of the land? I understand that they're the Economist so they can't outright say that the rich are hurting the economy by hurting the poor, but come on, at least be a little more clear.
Also, a fallacy: "Where workers can be put to use at high levels of productivity labour scarcity will lead to fast growing pay packets. Those pay packets will attract workers from other cities. When they migrate and find new, high-paying work, the whole economy benefits." This is a theoretical economic concept which doesn't really apply to the macroeconomic reality of today, in which worker productivity and time commitment increases but wages stagnate and later decrease, all as a result of a race to the bottom. The exception is probably the software industry, but I'd argue that in light of the anticompetitive no-poaching agreements from the likes of Google and Apple, software industry wages are still actually much lower than they should be, despite the "labor shortage" and "high levels of productivity". Then there's the bit where they claim that the whole economy will benefit from this sort of behavior, which may be true. Keep in mind that from another perspective, this same action is highly destructive brain drain, leaving destitute cities bleeding their talent to more prosperous ones.
> Isn't this article just taking a roundabout way of commenting that landowners in highly productive areas are choking growth and more productivity by siphoning too much money off of the non-landowners for use of the land? I understand that they're the Economist so they can't outright say that the rich are hurting the economy by hurting the poor, but come on, at least be a little more clear.
I don't know, the article seems to be rather clear on the matter:
> If regulatory limits on building heights and density were relaxed, fewer plots of land would be needed to satisfy a given level of demand. That would reduce the rents collected by landowners, since any uptick in demand could quickly be met by new development. Just as soaring agricultural productivity led to a decline in the relative economic power of rural landowners in the 19th and 20th centuries, the relaxation of strict limits on development would lead to a decline in property wealth relative to the economy as a whole. More of the gains of economic activity would flow to workers and investors.
> [the Economist] can't outright say that the rich are hurting the economy by hurting the poor,...
I don't think that's what the Economist wanted to say in the first place. Rather, it's more a conflict between the capitalist/industrialist rich vs the landowner/aristocratic rich. The poor just find themselves ducking in the middle of cross fire.
According to this world view the landowning rich do not produce any Value Added, they just arbitrage the [arguably artificial] scarcity of real state to bleed the capitalist rich both directly (office space) and indirectly (since employees must demand higher salaries for the same work done just to be able to put a roof over their heads).
These two classes of rich that you are describing probably intersect a lot. Once you make money in business, you need to invest it somewhere that will make you a return. Land is a popular choice.
That's right, this is not about making a witch hunt (you would not expect economists to do that, I think).
But if you think about, let's say, competing aspects or strategies for money management... I think a point can be made that one is more beneficial to society at large than the other. So, it is the same rich people at the end, but maybe you want to incentivize them to put investments in ventures that actually do something, and to tax the arbitraging away.
> Keep in mind that from another perspective, this same action is highly destructive brain drain, leaving destitute cities bleeding their talent to more prosperous ones.
Bluntly put: what of it?
I've left destitute cities for more prosperous ones in the past. Did I have some kind of duty to stay?
>>Isn't this article just taking a roundabout way of commenting that landowners in highly productive areas are choking growth and more productivity by siphoning too much money off of the non-landowners for use of the land?
Ehhhh... yes, but it's contending that the reason landowners are able to do that is the land use regulation that makes the land valuable. So it would be more accurate to say that regulation is choking growth, by handing landowners a bunch of economic rent (unearned profits).
Summary: Building & land-use regulations are creating an artificial scarcity of land in large cities, driving prices up and creating an artificial "shadow tax" that distorts labor markets.
According to a recent study, if the Bay Area got rid of its building/density regulations, the local economy would be able to support 5x the area's current population, which would boost the US' yearly GDP by $2tn. In 2009, the US GDP was 13.5% lower than it otherwise could have been if land-use regulation had been abolished in 1964. [1]
The solution? Dissolve land-use regulation, pay residents to allow developers to build new structures, and distort the market in favor of the renters by levying a land-value tax. Theoretically, this would allow for an increased supply of housing while penalizing the owners of the least-productive parcels of land, such as those who squat on empty plots in New York.
The author hints at the political problem of adopting a land tax near the end: But there are practical problems with a land tax — perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. So we may very well never see this regulation brought up or passed given the current, money-greased machinations of the political machine.
I was disappointed that the author of an otherwise well-researched and informative article did not get to the heart of the issue: who owns the land? Yes, it is obvious that urban landlords are making a killing in this market, but who exactly are these landlords? What percent of real estate in London, SF, NY is owned by actual residents vs. holding companies vs. foreign interests vs. the government? Is it a small, concentrated number of buyers in each city? Is collusion possible?
Also, how are we going to induce growth in sectors other than tech, consulting, and finance? Or do we not care if young talent continues to accrete in these fields, driving the (currently extortionate) growth of the city? Is this the best plan for long-term growth and prosperity?
[1] Perhaps this paper assumes that there is an infinite supply of highly-skilled tech workers who have taken jobs elsewhere due to high costs of rent? Seems a bit far-fetched to me.
>Dissolve land-use regulation, pay residents to allow developers to build new structures, and distort the market in favor of the renters by levying a land-value tax.
I'm not sure what political angles the economist has played to historically, but I find it fascinating how the death of paid-for content is spurring a decline in the quality and scope of news across the board - especially at once-respectable establishments.
When your revenue is driven by ads, which are driven by views, you are incentivized to publish inflammatory articles that play to mass-approved tropes, such as "burn the 1%" and "the police are all evil/out of control". Not to say that these pieces are unmerited, but I've observed their quantity and quality to be moving in opposite directions.
I think Bloomberg Businessweek is killing it right now. They've onboarded some of the best talent (Paul Ford, Matt Levine) and revamped the style of their publication to appeal to the young, ADD, super-exuberant tech/finance crowd (myself included). I believe they are heavily subsidized by Bloomberg's other business ventures, so this seems to be a more viable way to fund and disseminate high quality content.
> I believe they are heavily subsidized by Bloomberg's other business ventures, so this seems to be a more viable way to fund and disseminate high quality content.
How are those incentives less perverse than those engendered by current funding models? I don't imagine reporting on stories that show those other business ventures ina negative light may not been seen favorably at some level of management.
I see it as the patron model, where a wealthy individual bankrolls an artist to do basically whatever the artist pleases as long as the artist paints a nice picture of the patron every once in a while.
Of course, I have no idea how closely the other branches of Bloomberg's empire tie into BusinessWeek, but from many of the articles I have read, I get the feeling that Bloomberg LP is holding off on pushing some annoying agenda until they absorb enough market share from The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Business Insider, etc.
One could easily argue that given revenue is driven by ads, it is a corporate agenda that will be enforced upon people and people will be nudged towards that.
"Or they could heed the advice of Henry George, an American follower of Ricardo who in the 1880s made the case for a land-value tax. It has many theoretical virtues. Most taxes dampen, distort or displace economic activity by changing incentives on the margins. But a land tax cannot reduce the supply of land, and it would stimulate economic activity by penalising those whose land is unproductive. And your tax base is always right there—a city lot cannot be whisked off to Luxembourg.
The mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, hopes that taxing vacant lots by value will help deal with urban blight in the Bronx and elsewhere. But there are practical problems with a land tax—perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. Even fiscally purist Estonia, which adopted a land tax in 1993, has complicated it with multiple bands, including an exemption for homeowners."
As criticism goes, that is so weaksauce it's a 0 on the Scoville scale.
It strikes me that a land-value tax is the opposite of what is needed. To me, cities' great failing is that they so completely destroy the natural environment that they become inhumane and unlivable. This is largely because undeveloped land is seen as an economic inefficiency rather than as an asset. Having green spaces, undeveloped fields, and the like mixed in with the rest softens the harshness of urban life and helps the city seem like somewhere for humans rather than simply cars and concrete to live.
This is the idea of "nature deficit disorder", the idea that exposure to natural environments helps be be more happy/creative/healthy/etc. Governments should subsidize undeveloped land ownership rather than taxing it out of existence.
>The author hints at the political problem of adopting a land tax near the end: But there are practical problems with a land tax — perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. So we may very well never see this regulation brought up or passed given the current, money-greased machinations of the political machine.
You know, neoliberal corruption of government isn't Written in Stone by the Three Fates. We can actually fight it, especially when there's $2 trillion at stake.
>[1] Perhaps this paper assumes that there is an infinite supply of highly-skilled tech workers who have taken jobs elsewhere due to high costs of rent? Seems a bit far-fetched to me.
I don't know about infinite, but I sure as hell know that I personally choose not to live in the Bay Area, despite its having loads of tech opportunities and the nicest climate on the planet, because of its high housing costs and suburban sprawl.
Southern California has a nicer climate than Northern California and is cheaper (since there's less tech). The ''best'' climate in the US is probably San Diego up to Santa Barbara within 5 miles of the coast. San Francisco (the city itself) has infamously frustrating weather.
It's utterly beautiful most of the year, and only gets slightly uncomfortable for a few weeks during summer.
I live 8 miles from the Pacific and this week's forecast is almost sublime, compared to the continental climate I grew up in. Boiling hot summers? No. Sweaty, muggy, mosquito fests from July through late September? No. Freezing winters from late October through early March? No.
It's interesting how similar the temperature is between San Diego and Santa Barbara, despite their distance from each other. I always think of SD as much warmer than SB, but the data doesn't show that to be the case.
I do like the cool nights in the winter that we get in SB.
Woah, woah, woah. This is not okay. San Diegans already pay a "sunshine tax" on our incredibly perfect weather. Telling other people about it only encourages the city to grow larger! Next thing you know, there'll be YC companies in San Diego and Orange County.
IANAPS (I Am Not a Political Scientist), but I consider regulatory capture (outside of anarchy) to be the single most important unsolved problem in policy.
I think, in general, regulation works best as a threat (clean up your act, or we will). But for a threat to be credible, you need to follow-through on it from time-to-time.
The recent issue with the FCC and Comcast et. al. is an example of this. 20 years from now, we are going to regret that the FCC has increased authority over ISPs, but the actions of the cable oligopolies left little choice.
> The author hints at the political problem of adopting a land tax near the end: But there are practical problems with a land tax — perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. So we may very well never see this regulation brought up or passed given the current, money-greased machinations of the political machine.
That isn't the actual problem. Its the problem the author imagines.
The real problem with land [and property taxes] is the fact it tends to flow into the cost of rent and homeownership. Everyone in this country is impacted, it is just a question of degree. Similarly, the vast majority sees an item in their basket of purchases goes up by $X and gets angry.
Case in point: The gasoline tax. The vast majority of economists thinks it should go up to cover infrastructure but there is no political will to do so precisely because of how angry it makes their constituents.
People are far less rational than you think they are and if their entire tax burden was shifted into the rent for their house, they'd flip the fuck out.
Good point, the author never discusses what percentage of a tax increase would simply be passed on to the renters of the property. Since demand for these units is so inelastic, it would probably be near 100%.
What to do then? Subsidize construction? Force higher densities?
I have no idea how to solve it other than to educate people so they understand "Okay, I paid $X in taxes this year, now that we switched to land taxes, I pay that $X in rent and my landlord pays the government."
The problem is, in practice, this hasn't really worked.
That's not how it would work. The rents are already at the maximum that the market will bear, and will not increase. A rent tax would simply divert some of that money from the landlord to the local authority.
This makes sense in a free market where housing is a perfectly fungible, liquid good.
In reality, housing/rent is very sticky. If my landlord had his taxes raised, he would simply raise my rent by a corresponding amount. And I would pay, because it would be too much of an issue for me to put my life on hold while I find another place to live. Nobody is paying 100% of their income as rent - there is always room to squeeze more margin out of renters.
You wouldn't need to force higher densities as it would naturally occur for high-value inner-city land. If the government taxes your economic land rents, it increases the opportunity cost of using high value land in unproductive ways.
LVT doesn't affect the supply side. Cities would need to reform zoning laws and deregulate building codes that specify maximum density.
The housing market is far from a self-regulating, equilibrium-seeking free market. It is very heavily regulated. Landlords would love to increase SF density so they could pack more people in while extracting NY-level rents. They can't because it's currently illegal.
Although I agree it doesn't result in increased supply of land, an LVT results in more efficient allocation of existing supply, which is economically equivalent to an increase in supply holding allocative efficiency constant.
And I 100% agree on land-market regulations. It seems to be a similar story in most first-world economies: regulations are artificially constraining land supply, and also causing inefficient use of existing land.
A tax on improvements is always passed on to renters, but a tax on the unimproved value of land cannot be passed on, because the land rent is a pure economic rent.
"A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground."
– Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
"A tax on rent would affect rent only; it would fall wholly on landlords, and could not be shifted to any class of consumers. The landlord could not raise his rent, because he would leave unaltered the difference between the produce obtained from the least productive land in cultivation, and that obtained from land of every quality."
– David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
Again, both of these classical economists are assuming perfect markets and non-sticky rent. In a perfectly rational world where prices are constantly updated as the landlord and tenant are perfectly rational beings who evaluate how much the land is worth to them on a minute-by-minute basis, then yes this theory holds.
In a world where there are significant search and movement frictions, where subsidized housing exists, where landlords and their tenants have relationships beyond renter/rentee, where a home/building has value beyond its ability to be slept in, these theories will not hold.
My hypothesis is that if an LVT was levied in SF, rent would go up by at least 50% of the value of the LVT as a direct effect of the tax.
"The real problem with land [and property taxes] is the fact it tends to flow into the cost of rent and homeownership."
The price of property and rent in popular places will be what the market will bear. So with tax, the rent would stay the same. Price of apartments would go down, because buyers need to pay the tax, so they cannot afford as much.
Apartments in space efficient towers would be grow in value relatively, because they don't need to pay so much tax, so there would be incentive to build more densely.
> The price of property and rent in popular places will be what the market will bear. So with tax, the rent would stay the same. Price of apartments would go down, because buyers need to pay the tax, so they cannot afford as much.
You are ignoring that capital flows to the most efficient RoI it can find.
If rents remained the same, the RoI would drop [due to the tax increase] and it would lead to land abandonment. Land abandonment is one of the largest practical issues with a land value tax.
Increasing housing density isn't efficient when the practical value of the land is low. Yes, it'd be great in SF. But what about Athens, GA? It'd be a terrible idea there. Building upwards isn't free, either.
Yes, its popular with a certain class of economist who makes certain assumptions but the real world behavior of landlords isn't what you think it is.
------
Let us say, for the sake of argument, that you are correct.
$800 rent, tax burden increased by $600 a year.
So everyone unloads their real estate holdings because they are no longer profitable. Prices of land plummet as its abandoned as unprofitable, reducing tax revenue.
If you build alot of high density housing, you need less land, so as such housing finishes...everywhere that is "far" from the new high density area drops in value again. The cycle repeats until the new normal is stable. You've suddenly restructured every major city in the affected area.
However, you've created so much abandoned land that is converted to farming that your tax revenues have dropped. So you have to raise taxes, the cycle repeats.
A land tax depends on the value of the land. In areas without congestion, the value of land is low, so the land tax will be low and thus there will be no problem.
You're assuming that the tax is so onerous as to make rental housing unprofitable. Not just less profitable, but a flat-out cash drain. That's a pretty big assumption.
If you assume that it just captures a fraction of the profit, then the existing stock would remain, because it's still profitable. New build rentals would be affected, and would probably push towards more land-efficient form factors.
Take your example, with the added assumption that the landlord is netting out $200/mo after expenses, repairs, vacancy, etc. If the land tax was 100/mo, he'd still be taking home $100/mo. ROI is cut in half, but it's still positive, so it will probably stay a rental. Certainly some of the marginal units will get turned into for-sale housing, but not all of them, and probably none would be abandoned.
> You're assuming that the tax is so onerous as to make rental housing unprofitable. Not just less profitable, but a flat-out cash drain. That's a pretty big assumption
Many, many landlords in this country are single property landlords or landlords that own a small number of "single family homes" [1-4 unit homes].
The gross cash flow of such properties is ~1% of the property value in cash flow. A 1% property tax equivalent increase wipes out all cashflow and guarantees an overall negative return given real estate stays about even with inflation, barring bubbles/speculation.
However, the positive per-unit cashflow is about $100/month/unit in the real world if you picked a good investment. $100. You raise the tax burden by $1200/year/unit, the unit is worthless and must be sold. Pretty much all "land value tax" proposals require that much of an increase as they replace other revenue streams.
> ROI is cut in half
You've basically admitted the problem. If you cut ROI in half, you are better off investing in the market.
Real estate investing is very, very narrow in its advantage over other forms of investment [if you are good at it and can find good deals] to the tune of fractions of a percentage point. Perhaps as much as a whole percentage point.
If this wasn't the case, everyone would plow their money into real estate instead of stocks/bonds/etc.
Many consider the "1% Rule" as the minimum bar. You're probably right that there are a lot rentals around that level, but those are the marginal rentals that I mentioned would likely become for-sale housing.
Also, since you define the tax increase as 1% of property value, then your math is correct. But I believe the proposition is to charge it on the value of the land, not including the value of the improvements, which is typically a much lower number. For single family homes it would still be a hit, but not as severe as your math indicates. For higher density developments it would be even less onerous - which is pretty much the point.
Tangentially, I believe your estimate on ROI from rentals is inaccurate. Long term average stock returns are in the range of 7%, it's not uncommon to find rentals about 10%. As they should be, given the illiquidity, lack of diversification, various extra risks, and the work involved. All of which explains why stocks are more popular.
> Tangentially, I believe your estimate on ROI from rentals is inaccurate. Long term average stock returns are in the range of 7%, it's not uncommon to find rentals about 10%. As they should be, given the illiquidity, lack of diversification, various extra risks, and the work involved. All of which explains why stocks are more popular.
Let me put it this way, we both agree there are extra risks. I think, after those risks, RE is worth +.5%-1% on equivalent assets in a different asset class. [e.g. Stocks]
You think its worth the "paper value" of 10%.
Fair enough. I just am never going to agree that RE is worth the risk at -1% of what the current real returns is vs. Stocks.
> Many consider the "1% Rule" as the minimum bar. You're probably right that there are a lot rentals around that level, but those are the marginal rentals that I mentioned would likely become for-sale housing.
Yes. Its also the bar used for relatively safe real estate investments. Generally, when you hit 2%+ you are engaging in a greater level of risk. I believe the market prices assets accurately in regards to risk v. reward for the capital.
That being the case, greater than "1% rule" returns are gained through taking on larger risks.
> Also, since you define the tax increase as 1% of property value, then your math is correct. But I believe the proposition is to charge it on the value of the land, not including the value of the improvements, which is typically a much lower number. For single family homes it would still be a hit, but not as severe as your math indicates. For higher density developments it would be even less onerous - which is pretty much the point.
In major metro areas with heavy zoning, the land is worth more than the improvements on it. Literally every piece of residential real estate I have rental income from, this is the case. Sometimes its as high as 2:1 [land:improvement].
In situations where land is the "lower number", you have to recoup the losses from removing improvements from the equation which effectively makes the "tax on real estate" equivalent to the government as a source of revenue. You can't say "Well, we'll just take in 33% of the revenue we did before because the land is only worth 1/3rd of the value of the improvement." You've got to keep the tax revenue roughly the same, so its a tax swap.
Yes, you'll get better returns under a land value tax with highly dense construction...however, if you double the density of a city, that means the land outside that denser urban center is going to lose value and that compaction is going to require higher land taxes to recoup the loss from the less valuable land.
Ultimately, even the proponents of a LVT agree that land abandonment is a concern [although they in theory can fix this with a properly designed LVT regimee] when introducing into an area that previously only had a property tax and/or the LVT is used to replace other taxes. [e.g. income, sales]
So...I get you don't agree but until someone proves me wrong in practice, I don't have faith in it.
"The real problem with land [and property taxes] is the fact it tends to flow into the cost of rent and homeownership."
That's simply not true in the case of rent payments to landlords if we're talking about a land-value tax (i.e. taxing a proportion of the unimproved value of land). Land-supply is effectively fixed in the short-run (and pretty damn inelastic in the long-run thanks to over-regulation, zoning etc.). Therefore, tenant rents are determined solely by what the demand-side of the market will bear, meaning landlords can't pass LVT on (so they bear the economic incidence of the tax). Just to clarify terminology, by land-value tax (LVT), I mean taxing the proportion of unimproved land value that represents capitalisation of future economic rents (unearned profits) from land.
It's plausible a LVT would actually decrease rents paid by tenants, as it would increase the elasticity of dwelling supply in the long-run (land-owners would have stronger incentives to use land more productively). A properly designed LVT only taxes economic-rents (unearned profits) that currently accrue to private land-owners: if the local council builds a park near some land, the increased amenity for the surrounding area translates to increased economic rents, as the increased amenity is captured in the form of increased unimproved land values.
As for home-owners (existing land-owners), theoretically if people are unable to move houses then LVT would increase the cost of home-ownership: directly from increased tax and indirectly from decreased value of their land holding (as future economic rents from land is capitalised into land values). However, this is an unlikely scenario. More likely, the revenue raised from LVT would hopefully be used to cover reductions in property transfer taxes (i.e. ad valorem/stamp-duty taxes), which have absurd efficiency costs. This would reduce the cost of home-ownership overall.
People would pay less transfer tax over their lifetime, and property and land prices would fall due to increased allocative efficiency: reduced transaction taxes mean more efficient allocation of existing housing and land stock, as the tax disincentive to reallocate is reduced or eliminated. Also, under an LVT existing land would also be used more efficiently (e.g. medium-high density inner-city dwellings) as there would be higher opportunity costs of using high-value land unproductively (e.g. building a 1 bedroom shack on a big plot of land in the CBD).
In my opinion, the real problem is that these dynamics aren't immediately evident, are difficult to explain, and it's very easy to (mistakenly) conflate legal incidence with economic incidence of taxation. It's interesting you bring up gasoline taxes as this is the classic example: the Carter administration attempted to increase gas tax and hand the revenue back out through tax-cuts. It didn't happen because many thought it was simply taking with one hand and giving with the other.
In actual fact, given the aim was to reduce US oil consumption, it was pretty sound policy. Even though people would have ended up with the same amount of money (neutral income effect), gasoline consumption would have been reduced due to substitution effects: gas would have become relatively more expensive in comparison to every other consumption possibility, meaning people would substitute away.
"The solution? Dissolve land-use regulation, pay residents to allow developers to build new structures, and distort the market in favor of the renters by levying a land-value tax."
Small nitpick.
Land markets are generally distorted by default: improvements in the immediate area generate 'privately captured positive externalities' for land-owners in the form of increased unimproved land-value: in other words, pure economic rents that are capitalised into increased private land values. Taxes (like LVTs) that transfer some of this value from private to public hands reduce this distortion: they actually enhance allocative efficiency.
It's a fascinating dynamic, and IMHO this uncorrected distortion is a major driver of boom-bust cycles in the macro-economy. Mark my words: the economic depression that will occur in the next 5 years will be started by bubbles popping in residential property markets (China's first, most likely). Consequently, we'll be looking at financial system collapse when this is transmitted to banks via insolvent residential property speculators (to whom they've loaned significant amounts of money).
How will this be different from the 2007/2008 financial crisis? Although subprime no longer seems to be the catalyst, won't the government and federal reserve use the same playbook? Namely they will bailout banks, investment firms (either directly or indirectly), fannie mae/freddie mac, and engage in new rounds of QE?
Imo 2008 is probably not the best comparison. What I believe is happening now is the China crash is the catalyst of a regional Asian/emerging market crisis on a parallel with 1997. Note this was 18 years ago, and this not coincidentally is the average length of land price cycles. These divide roughly into 3-5 year depressions, then an upswing of just over 14 years usually punctuated around year 7 by a mid cycle recession and then an exponential ponzi period leading up to the crash.
What is significant is that despite globalization broadly Asia and the West still seem to have separate land cycles. Weak as the recovery in the West has been, it is unlikely the Asian crisis will have a significant enough effect outside of the stock markets, indeed it is cities like London and New York that will attract much of the capital flight from the region. The time period for the Western cycle is likely to be 2019 mid cycle, 2026 crash.
I would also look at Australia and Canada however, as their markets did not correct after 2008 due in part to links to China so as well as being they may have become linked to the Asian cycle. And areas such as San Francisco which popped in the dot com boom are already in the 'it's different this time' denial phase so it may well be this region will not survive the mid cycle.
For the US specifically (I'm an Australian), I'm not entirely sure. I must admit I'm a few months out of date information-wise as I stopped reading the news about half a year ago. It was just too damn depressing to watch these trends unfolding and no-one seeming to give a crap.
On the hopeful side, countries like the US, Ireland and Iceland who 'took their medicine' during the GFC (sustained heavy property price declines or significant bank collapses), will be closer to fundamental values already. So they may have less distance to fall, even though there will probably be some overshoot. Also, OPEC flooding the world market with oil (to try and kill the US shale oil industry in the crib) and the likelihood that China will run down its foreign currency reserves to pay for stimulus (depreciating the US dollar) will mean US export industries (excluding oil and natural gas) become very competitive indeed.
Countries like China, Australia, Canada and the UK on the other hand, who staved off significant property market corrections during the GFC (especially Australia), are in for a very bad time (http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/11/global-hou... ). Like worse than 1920s depression bad time (closer to 1890s depression).
On government response, it's hard to predict. Frankly, in both the US and Australia, our legislatures are now controlled by even crazier and stupider politicians than during the GFC, so I don't hold out much hope for sensible fiscal responses. There's also less room to move fiscally, as we used up most of our powder during the GFC and won't be able to fire as strong a shot this time around. The thing that truly worries me is that government underwriting of financial system liabilities will therefore be less credible, so there is an increased probability of bank-runs causing a complete financial system collapse.
Our central banks also have less room for more traditional responses (i.e. reducing the cash rate), as they'll be starting from a much lower initial rate (and so will hit the zero lower bound much quicker). QE will therefore be deployed more rapidly and in greater quantity. Even though the Fed Reserve may have appeared confident re: QE, I'll bet they were privately shitting themselves because QE was (and still is) uncharted and risky territory. This time around they'll have to go much harder and earlier. At this point, I really have no clue what could happen.
On the bright-side, at least we'll be able to settle the question of whether theorised 'liquidity traps' truly exist...
All this is just my best guess. A more positive but still plausible theory is that China will manage their economy into a 'slow-melt', and will experience a long period of economic stagnation similar to what Japan has gone through in the last two decades. In this scenario, the damage might be contained and the US could come out relatively unscathed. I think Australia's screwed either way though...
> But for the tight limits on construction in California’s Bay Area, they reckon, employment there would be about five times larger than it is.
This is farcical. One reason people flock to the Bay Area is precisely because of the tight limits on construction. People like sprawled-out, low-density development. They like to have yards. They like spacious homes. They like to see the sky and the mountain vistas and the water.
You could lift the limits on land use and densify the area like Manhattan. But there are only so many workers who will flock to a Manhattan-like locale...and those workers are already flocking to Manhattan itself. Many American workers simply do not want to live in dense environments like Manhattan.
Like an earlier Economist article I think this one misses the possibility that tight controls on land use can make those places more desirable while driving some jobs elsewhere. Maybe some jobs simply do not exist due to tight Silicon Valley land controls. But other jobs simply move elsewhere, just as all finance jobs are not in NYC and London.
> They like to have yards. They like spacious homes. They like to see the sky and the mountain vistas and the water.
People flock to the Bay Area to have a yard and a spacious home? The lack of those things is the reason I left!
Maybe the very wealthy have yards and large houses in the Bay Area, but most everybody else is living in Manhattan-sized apartments without the benefits of living in a high density area like Manhattan (more walkability, public transit, etc).
You are making my point. If you left to get more space, why would the Economist think that the place could have five times more workers if they lifted building restrictions? The Bay Area with no building restrictions would be even less desirable.
The Bay Area with no building restrictions turns into Manhattan. I'd rather live in Manhattan than the Bay Area. If I'm not going to have much space, I'd rather the city be designed for that kind of life.
Manhattan is dense, but plenty of people commute every day from suburbs with yards and spacious homes. The Economist doesn't really go into transportation except for a brief mention at the end. New York has a better transportation hub than the Bay Area. At 3 AM on a weekday or weekend, I can catch trains going to New Jersey, or Long Island, or upstate New York, or Connecticut, or the subway which runs all night. In the Bay Area, the last Caltrain headed to the peninsula leaves at midnight, and there are no more trains until 5 AM! There are plenty of places to live which are a 30 minute commute from Manhattan (by subway, train, ferry etc.)
Wasn't San Francisco destroyed in an earthquake in 1906? Weren't 63 people killed, and thousands injured, by the 1989 earthquakes? Instead of better public transport, the Economist suggest building up, up, up. I suggest reading this - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - if you never saw the damage done by the 1989 earthquake. Remember the 1906 earthquake as well.
>>People like sprawled-out, low-density development.
Some people like those things. Other people actively dislike and avoid those things. Certainly there are enough of the latter that the Bay Area could be much more dense than it is, and still contain mostly people that like that density.
The article doesn't talk about quality of life at all, phrasing everything in terms of housing prices.
> "Disbursing some of the tax revenue earned as a result of new development to landowners within a small area around that development to compensate for short-term hardship would reduce opposition to new building."
With 5x as many people, traffic in the Bay Area would be 100x worse.
Or, say you magically install a perfect public transportation system. Still, are you going to clear 5x as much land for parks? (No.) Where are you going to find five Muir Woods?
I don't want to live in Manhattan. The basic problem is overpopulation. Even if we relaxed rules to allow denser construction, you'll just have the same problem again in a decade or two. (How much denser can you make Manhattan?) But with a lower quality of life for everyone.
This is farcical. The basic problem cannot possibly be overpopulation in a country with as much land per person as the United States of America.
There's a contradiction here: you want a very, very active economy, but you don't want the population required to sustain that economy.
You can't be rich without servants, and you can't have industries without workers. How do you propose to run tech companies with even fewer people per dollar-of-revenue than they already employ?
I feel like land is such a good example of the destructive powers of a good with a heavily deflationary value (deflationary due to policies and not by nature). It just leads to hoarding and benefits the early buyers, while at the same time hindering innovation because people who can make better use of the land cannot afford it. Land use regulations are probably one of the biggest blunders in modern capitalist economies. And the worst of it: The problem is not even visible to a lot of people: Very restrictive building codes in European city centers are rarely ever questioned - this wouldn't be of much concern if we talked about single digits km^2, but usually they affect huge districts. Incidentally land ownership was for many historically despised "capitalists" the goto way of acquiring wealth: If you have an emerging company which requires lots of labour, the best investment you can make is building company housing for your employees, that way a part of the salary you pay ends up right back in your pocket. All you have to do then is lobby for restrictive building regulations and your family's wealth and estate is secured for centuries to come.
The really sad thing is that we build on our best farmland. If you want to grow apricots, the best place is San Jose. That whole area in fact is mighty good for farming.
People need to eat! Californians ought to be living in the foothills of the Sierra mountains. This puts them close to water and saves the more farmable land for farming.
Good farmland is flat, is not full of annoying boulders, and has nice weather. We thus pour slab foundations for giant 1-story McMansions and dig holes for giant swimming pools. Doing that in the foothills would be a short-term expense, so instead we'll destroy our best farmland forever.
Well, farmland exists to support the population, not the other way around. If farmland exists in adequate and sustainable quantities now, which it does, there's no need to push people to live in less pleasant locations to make room for more of it.
I wonder why cars don't come up in this debate. A typical car space is 20 m². Usually the amount of parking spaces needed is greater than one (parking at several shopping locations, at work, ...). Parking often uses vertical space just once. So with a multi-storey house these 20 m² become enough for a flat housing a few people. And this still ignores public and non-public (like driveways) roads.
Yep, land has a vertical supply curve. Although, valuable land is what is truly in high demand. There's lots of land, but not a lot of valuable land. But the lack of a commons of any quality is quite concerning. One cannot just exist without owning land or paying rent.
We pay the biggest chunks of our income to the gatekeepers over that valuable land, which you need access to in order to get a job or do business.
Let us just be thankful that these landowners worked so hard to produce this land, ex nihilo.
The final paragraph mentions "Virtual reality and social networking" as something that might eventually abolish the problem, and this rings true to me. Several years ago, it seemed that perhaps Second Life would accomplish this, but I suppose it wasn't immersive enough.
Perhaps next year's commercial launches of the Oculus Rift and Vive would finally allow for sufficient presence to begin making daily VR telecommuting a reasonable option.
Oh yes. A big mystery to me is why New Hampshire (and I suppose the rest of New England) is so expensive. We are in a rural setting, and there is plenty of land, we are an hour from Boston, but even if you go farther a way, the house prices are very high. The problem are the lot sizes. Houses are around 1,200 square feet, but the lot sizes are 20,000 square feet. Compare that to cities like Austin where the lot sizes are around 3,000 square feet. The land is clearly underutilized; many houses are old; and people just keep going farther and farther away. The high house prices also drive up the rest of prices. It is a lose, lose for every body, and the problem has existed for generations. It even destroys the forests, because big areas are cut down to build just one house.
New England is more forested now than it has been in at least 100 years, possibly since before the Civil War. Between the industrial revolution and the shift of agriculture westward to the Mississippi and beyond, due to railroads, industrial food processing and refrigeration, the vast majority of the land that used to be cleared for farming has grown back up as woods.
Why do innovators like to congregate in Silicon Valley? Because other innovators like to congregate there. VCs and other people feeding off the phenomenon end up there because they can find innovators there. In other words, there is no resource whatsoever that attracts anybody there. They are only attracted by each other. The inclination of congregating there costs a lot of money. Housing prices and rents are very high in the area. In other words, these innovators are forking over way too much money to other people for no good reason at all. At the same time, they are not stupid either. My take is that at some point they will start moving elsewhere.
107 comments
[ 3.1 ms ] story [ 179 ms ] threadThe article is good but the title isn't great; the real story isn't about land per se, but about land-use regulation: the topics are related but quite distinct (and indeed the article says, "The spread of land-use regulation is not hard to understand"). As Matt Yglesias is fond of pointing out, steel-framed construction and elevators are well-understood, century-old technologies (http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/05/03/silicon_valle...).
But laws against deploying them have become important constraints on growth. The problems are really legal and political. The solutions will be (or won't be) as well.
In the majority of cases, there's no conspiracy. Rent goes up, because the real value has gone up. It really is that simple.
I doubt the people of those Greek cities that sunk thought it would ever happen... or they just turned their heads, plugged their ears and said "everything is fine".
Serious question. I live in a very dense neighborhood by North American standards. About 32,000 people per square mile, and it's self contained: people don't have to travel elsewhere to go out, shop, relax, etc. Some leave for work, but a high proportion are here during the day too.
It was built around 1900, and lots of people visit just for the atmosphere.
If we could clone this neighborhood and built it elsewhere, it would be a good thing. But we don't seem to be able to build neighborhoods in this style anymore.
Are there any new developments that are both dense and nice?
He had an article on Tokyo, but I can't find it. Apparently Tokyo meets many of these criteria and is pleasant to be in, despite being new construction.
Which is why I'm wondering if we have any North American examples.
It's not that we're unable, it's that North Americans have chosen not to. Nice dense developments are bad for cars, and car-lifestyles are what North Americans have culturally designated as the marker of success. Therefore you see a false correlation: dense developments are only built to house those too poor to participate in car culture.
The city has very wide streets around these developments and multi-level underground parking to accommodate cars.
This is no longer uniformly true. Some of the hottest, highest-priced residential real estate in the US is explicitly tied to more walkable environs. In the urban cores of cities like Portland, OR, Boulder, CO, and Austin, TX, there are definitely extraordinarily expensive ("marker of success") residences that are impractical (or at least very time inefficient) to live in unless one eschews a car-centric lifestyle. The developers have noticed, and there is a boom going on right now in those and similar cities by the developers to increase density; however, often neighborhood associations and land-use regulations tend to hold back the density of the proposed developments.
There are a couple of new tall buildings in lower Manhattan that aren't totally hideous, e.g. 8 Spruce (Gehry usually makes me feel ill, but in this one case it sort of works). And it's not particularly dispiriting inside.
And a tiny fraction of the new stuff going up in Williamsburg and parts of Queens is not entirely awful.
There are plenty on Park that would fit the bill if they were divided into more apartments. I also agree with you on 8 Spruce, despite some of the hate, I like it, and it's infinitely preferably to many of the green glass monsters that have gone up.
http://plumber.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/toronto-3.jpg
https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/9/9b/Dundas_S...
http://www.mymetcondo.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/10/TheMet_...
There are some shitty parts in the suburbs, but lots of nice areas (downtown, Kensington market, Bloor West / Ossington, Summerville, Moore Park, High Park, Entertainment district) and it isn't too pricey ($1500 / month for a 1 bedroom down town).
Toronto's new neighborhood, the condos by the waterfront, is hideous: http://urbantoronto.ca/sites/default/files/imagecache/displa...
https://i.imgur.com/RKAhkqO.jpg is my view (I just took this photo now) and http://vikpahwa.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/06/20140606_5407... is my condo (second from the right of the four main condos).
I agree that festival tower and the entertainment district is nicer, but it is also way louder, and I like quiet when I code so I moved out of that part of town.
But Toronto is currently building 130 towers in multiple neighborhoods, so to pick on the most controversial ones isn't really a rebuttle. Can you show an example of any 40+ story residential building that you like?
I was actually talking about what it's like to walk around in neighborhoods - what's it like at street level in your area?
I can't think of 40+ residential buildings that I like, but that's at least partly because there aren't any in my area. My point was that we used to build dense, low rise neighborhoods.
But I like Manhattan, are some of those residential buildings 40+? Manhattan's a great example of a dense, walkable area that's pleasant to be in.
A few things ...
First, I think there are some decent examples of what you're looking for ... Minneapolis comes to mind, as you stand in the center of Loring Park, which has a fair amount of new, high density surrounding it. Denver, certainly, as you walk to the North end of 16th st. and cross over that weird bridge ... lots of brand new high density office and residential all arranged and balanced in a very pleasing way.
Anyway ...
One of the reasons people like your neighborhood (I'm guessing) is that the built environment is much more substantial (and honest in use of materials). But we can't afford that anymore. 10x10 timbers and big stones and bricks are (relatively) tremendously expensive.
We can only afford stick built 2x4 construction covered with engineered faux-stone facade, and deep down, people know that's crap. That's why they like a neighborhood like yours.
In 1900 people were already building like that. I live in Somerville MA, which is pretty close to what the OP describes, and it's pretty popular despite everything being balloon framed and covered with vinyl siding.
Quite dense, nice to walk through, with nice looking buildings. Not the best mix of retail (few small independent shops) but aside from that it's a pretty good brand new neighbourhood.
Isn't this article just taking a roundabout way of commenting that landowners in highly productive areas are choking growth and more productivity by siphoning too much money off of the non-landowners for use of the land? I understand that they're the Economist so they can't outright say that the rich are hurting the economy by hurting the poor, but come on, at least be a little more clear.
Also, a fallacy: "Where workers can be put to use at high levels of productivity labour scarcity will lead to fast growing pay packets. Those pay packets will attract workers from other cities. When they migrate and find new, high-paying work, the whole economy benefits." This is a theoretical economic concept which doesn't really apply to the macroeconomic reality of today, in which worker productivity and time commitment increases but wages stagnate and later decrease, all as a result of a race to the bottom. The exception is probably the software industry, but I'd argue that in light of the anticompetitive no-poaching agreements from the likes of Google and Apple, software industry wages are still actually much lower than they should be, despite the "labor shortage" and "high levels of productivity". Then there's the bit where they claim that the whole economy will benefit from this sort of behavior, which may be true. Keep in mind that from another perspective, this same action is highly destructive brain drain, leaving destitute cities bleeding their talent to more prosperous ones.
I don't know, the article seems to be rather clear on the matter:
> If regulatory limits on building heights and density were relaxed, fewer plots of land would be needed to satisfy a given level of demand. That would reduce the rents collected by landowners, since any uptick in demand could quickly be met by new development. Just as soaring agricultural productivity led to a decline in the relative economic power of rural landowners in the 19th and 20th centuries, the relaxation of strict limits on development would lead to a decline in property wealth relative to the economy as a whole. More of the gains of economic activity would flow to workers and investors.
I don't think that's what the Economist wanted to say in the first place. Rather, it's more a conflict between the capitalist/industrialist rich vs the landowner/aristocratic rich. The poor just find themselves ducking in the middle of cross fire.
According to this world view the landowning rich do not produce any Value Added, they just arbitrage the [arguably artificial] scarcity of real state to bleed the capitalist rich both directly (office space) and indirectly (since employees must demand higher salaries for the same work done just to be able to put a roof over their heads).
But if you think about, let's say, competing aspects or strategies for money management... I think a point can be made that one is more beneficial to society at large than the other. So, it is the same rich people at the end, but maybe you want to incentivize them to put investments in ventures that actually do something, and to tax the arbitraging away.
Bluntly put: what of it?
I've left destitute cities for more prosperous ones in the past. Did I have some kind of duty to stay?
Ehhhh... yes, but it's contending that the reason landowners are able to do that is the land use regulation that makes the land valuable. So it would be more accurate to say that regulation is choking growth, by handing landowners a bunch of economic rent (unearned profits).
According to a recent study, if the Bay Area got rid of its building/density regulations, the local economy would be able to support 5x the area's current population, which would boost the US' yearly GDP by $2tn. In 2009, the US GDP was 13.5% lower than it otherwise could have been if land-use regulation had been abolished in 1964. [1]
The solution? Dissolve land-use regulation, pay residents to allow developers to build new structures, and distort the market in favor of the renters by levying a land-value tax. Theoretically, this would allow for an increased supply of housing while penalizing the owners of the least-productive parcels of land, such as those who squat on empty plots in New York.
The author hints at the political problem of adopting a land tax near the end: But there are practical problems with a land tax — perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. So we may very well never see this regulation brought up or passed given the current, money-greased machinations of the political machine.
I was disappointed that the author of an otherwise well-researched and informative article did not get to the heart of the issue: who owns the land? Yes, it is obvious that urban landlords are making a killing in this market, but who exactly are these landlords? What percent of real estate in London, SF, NY is owned by actual residents vs. holding companies vs. foreign interests vs. the government? Is it a small, concentrated number of buyers in each city? Is collusion possible?
Also, how are we going to induce growth in sectors other than tech, consulting, and finance? Or do we not care if young talent continues to accrete in these fields, driving the (currently extortionate) growth of the city? Is this the best plan for long-term growth and prosperity?
[1] Perhaps this paper assumes that there is an infinite supply of highly-skilled tech workers who have taken jobs elsewhere due to high costs of rent? Seems a bit far-fetched to me.
Is The Economist starting to support Georgism?
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Georgism
When your revenue is driven by ads, which are driven by views, you are incentivized to publish inflammatory articles that play to mass-approved tropes, such as "burn the 1%" and "the police are all evil/out of control". Not to say that these pieces are unmerited, but I've observed their quantity and quality to be moving in opposite directions.
I think Bloomberg Businessweek is killing it right now. They've onboarded some of the best talent (Paul Ford, Matt Levine) and revamped the style of their publication to appeal to the young, ADD, super-exuberant tech/finance crowd (myself included). I believe they are heavily subsidized by Bloomberg's other business ventures, so this seems to be a more viable way to fund and disseminate high quality content.
How are those incentives less perverse than those engendered by current funding models? I don't imagine reporting on stories that show those other business ventures ina negative light may not been seen favorably at some level of management.
Of course, I have no idea how closely the other branches of Bloomberg's empire tie into BusinessWeek, but from many of the articles I have read, I get the feeling that Bloomberg LP is holding off on pushing some annoying agenda until they absorb enough market share from The Economist, The Wall Street Journal, Business Insider, etc.
"Or they could heed the advice of Henry George, an American follower of Ricardo who in the 1880s made the case for a land-value tax. It has many theoretical virtues. Most taxes dampen, distort or displace economic activity by changing incentives on the margins. But a land tax cannot reduce the supply of land, and it would stimulate economic activity by penalising those whose land is unproductive. And your tax base is always right there—a city lot cannot be whisked off to Luxembourg.
The mayor of New York City, Bill de Blasio, hopes that taxing vacant lots by value will help deal with urban blight in the Bronx and elsewhere. But there are practical problems with a land tax—perhaps the largest of which is that by its very nature it hits the well-connected rich hardest. Even fiscally purist Estonia, which adopted a land tax in 1993, has complicated it with multiple bands, including an exemption for homeowners."
As criticism goes, that is so weaksauce it's a 0 on the Scoville scale.
This is the idea of "nature deficit disorder", the idea that exposure to natural environments helps be be more happy/creative/healthy/etc. Governments should subsidize undeveloped land ownership rather than taxing it out of existence.
You know, neoliberal corruption of government isn't Written in Stone by the Three Fates. We can actually fight it, especially when there's $2 trillion at stake.
>[1] Perhaps this paper assumes that there is an infinite supply of highly-skilled tech workers who have taken jobs elsewhere due to high costs of rent? Seems a bit far-fetched to me.
I don't know about infinite, but I sure as hell know that I personally choose not to live in the Bay Area, despite its having loads of tech opportunities and the nicest climate on the planet, because of its high housing costs and suburban sprawl.
You should give us another look. Our long term plan to reduce the number of rainy days per year is finally paying off!
It's utterly beautiful most of the year, and only gets slightly uncomfortable for a few weeks during summer.
I live 8 miles from the Pacific and this week's forecast is almost sublime, compared to the continental climate I grew up in. Boiling hot summers? No. Sweaty, muggy, mosquito fests from July through late September? No. Freezing winters from late October through early March? No.
> Freezing winters from late October through early March? No.
Some of us find freezing cold and snow to be pros rather than cons.
San Diego would be uninhabitable without environmentally destructive and ill-conceived federal irrigation of the southwest.
I do like the cool nights in the winter that we get in SB.
I think, in general, regulation works best as a threat (clean up your act, or we will). But for a threat to be credible, you need to follow-through on it from time-to-time.
The recent issue with the FCC and Comcast et. al. is an example of this. 20 years from now, we are going to regret that the FCC has increased authority over ISPs, but the actions of the cable oligopolies left little choice.
That isn't the actual problem. Its the problem the author imagines.
The real problem with land [and property taxes] is the fact it tends to flow into the cost of rent and homeownership. Everyone in this country is impacted, it is just a question of degree. Similarly, the vast majority sees an item in their basket of purchases goes up by $X and gets angry.
Case in point: The gasoline tax. The vast majority of economists thinks it should go up to cover infrastructure but there is no political will to do so precisely because of how angry it makes their constituents.
People are far less rational than you think they are and if their entire tax burden was shifted into the rent for their house, they'd flip the fuck out.
What to do then? Subsidize construction? Force higher densities?
The problem is, in practice, this hasn't really worked.
In reality, housing/rent is very sticky. If my landlord had his taxes raised, he would simply raise my rent by a corresponding amount. And I would pay, because it would be too much of an issue for me to put my life on hold while I find another place to live. Nobody is paying 100% of their income as rent - there is always room to squeeze more margin out of renters.
The housing market is far from a self-regulating, equilibrium-seeking free market. It is very heavily regulated. Landlords would love to increase SF density so they could pack more people in while extracting NY-level rents. They can't because it's currently illegal.
And I 100% agree on land-market regulations. It seems to be a similar story in most first-world economies: regulations are artificially constraining land supply, and also causing inefficient use of existing land.
"A tax upon ground-rents would not raise the rents of houses. It would fall altogether upon the owner of the ground-rent, who acts always as a monopolist, and exacts the greatest rent which can be got for the use of his ground."
– Adam Smith, Wealth of Nations
"A tax on rent would affect rent only; it would fall wholly on landlords, and could not be shifted to any class of consumers. The landlord could not raise his rent, because he would leave unaltered the difference between the produce obtained from the least productive land in cultivation, and that obtained from land of every quality."
– David Ricardo, On the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
In a world where there are significant search and movement frictions, where subsidized housing exists, where landlords and their tenants have relationships beyond renter/rentee, where a home/building has value beyond its ability to be slept in, these theories will not hold.
My hypothesis is that if an LVT was levied in SF, rent would go up by at least 50% of the value of the LVT as a direct effect of the tax.
The price of property and rent in popular places will be what the market will bear. So with tax, the rent would stay the same. Price of apartments would go down, because buyers need to pay the tax, so they cannot afford as much.
Apartments in space efficient towers would be grow in value relatively, because they don't need to pay so much tax, so there would be incentive to build more densely.
This means more apartments and cheaper prices.
You are ignoring that capital flows to the most efficient RoI it can find.
If rents remained the same, the RoI would drop [due to the tax increase] and it would lead to land abandonment. Land abandonment is one of the largest practical issues with a land value tax.
Increasing housing density isn't efficient when the practical value of the land is low. Yes, it'd be great in SF. But what about Athens, GA? It'd be a terrible idea there. Building upwards isn't free, either.
Yes, its popular with a certain class of economist who makes certain assumptions but the real world behavior of landlords isn't what you think it is.
------
Let us say, for the sake of argument, that you are correct.
$800 rent, tax burden increased by $600 a year.
So everyone unloads their real estate holdings because they are no longer profitable. Prices of land plummet as its abandoned as unprofitable, reducing tax revenue.
If you build alot of high density housing, you need less land, so as such housing finishes...everywhere that is "far" from the new high density area drops in value again. The cycle repeats until the new normal is stable. You've suddenly restructured every major city in the affected area.
However, you've created so much abandoned land that is converted to farming that your tax revenues have dropped. So you have to raise taxes, the cycle repeats.
If you assume that it just captures a fraction of the profit, then the existing stock would remain, because it's still profitable. New build rentals would be affected, and would probably push towards more land-efficient form factors.
Take your example, with the added assumption that the landlord is netting out $200/mo after expenses, repairs, vacancy, etc. If the land tax was 100/mo, he'd still be taking home $100/mo. ROI is cut in half, but it's still positive, so it will probably stay a rental. Certainly some of the marginal units will get turned into for-sale housing, but not all of them, and probably none would be abandoned.
Many, many landlords in this country are single property landlords or landlords that own a small number of "single family homes" [1-4 unit homes].
The gross cash flow of such properties is ~1% of the property value in cash flow. A 1% property tax equivalent increase wipes out all cashflow and guarantees an overall negative return given real estate stays about even with inflation, barring bubbles/speculation.
However, the positive per-unit cashflow is about $100/month/unit in the real world if you picked a good investment. $100. You raise the tax burden by $1200/year/unit, the unit is worthless and must be sold. Pretty much all "land value tax" proposals require that much of an increase as they replace other revenue streams.
> ROI is cut in half
You've basically admitted the problem. If you cut ROI in half, you are better off investing in the market.
Real estate investing is very, very narrow in its advantage over other forms of investment [if you are good at it and can find good deals] to the tune of fractions of a percentage point. Perhaps as much as a whole percentage point.
If this wasn't the case, everyone would plow their money into real estate instead of stocks/bonds/etc.
Also, since you define the tax increase as 1% of property value, then your math is correct. But I believe the proposition is to charge it on the value of the land, not including the value of the improvements, which is typically a much lower number. For single family homes it would still be a hit, but not as severe as your math indicates. For higher density developments it would be even less onerous - which is pretty much the point.
Tangentially, I believe your estimate on ROI from rentals is inaccurate. Long term average stock returns are in the range of 7%, it's not uncommon to find rentals about 10%. As they should be, given the illiquidity, lack of diversification, various extra risks, and the work involved. All of which explains why stocks are more popular.
Let me put it this way, we both agree there are extra risks. I think, after those risks, RE is worth +.5%-1% on equivalent assets in a different asset class. [e.g. Stocks]
You think its worth the "paper value" of 10%.
Fair enough. I just am never going to agree that RE is worth the risk at -1% of what the current real returns is vs. Stocks.
> Many consider the "1% Rule" as the minimum bar. You're probably right that there are a lot rentals around that level, but those are the marginal rentals that I mentioned would likely become for-sale housing.
Yes. Its also the bar used for relatively safe real estate investments. Generally, when you hit 2%+ you are engaging in a greater level of risk. I believe the market prices assets accurately in regards to risk v. reward for the capital.
That being the case, greater than "1% rule" returns are gained through taking on larger risks.
> Also, since you define the tax increase as 1% of property value, then your math is correct. But I believe the proposition is to charge it on the value of the land, not including the value of the improvements, which is typically a much lower number. For single family homes it would still be a hit, but not as severe as your math indicates. For higher density developments it would be even less onerous - which is pretty much the point.
In major metro areas with heavy zoning, the land is worth more than the improvements on it. Literally every piece of residential real estate I have rental income from, this is the case. Sometimes its as high as 2:1 [land:improvement].
In situations where land is the "lower number", you have to recoup the losses from removing improvements from the equation which effectively makes the "tax on real estate" equivalent to the government as a source of revenue. You can't say "Well, we'll just take in 33% of the revenue we did before because the land is only worth 1/3rd of the value of the improvement." You've got to keep the tax revenue roughly the same, so its a tax swap.
Yes, you'll get better returns under a land value tax with highly dense construction...however, if you double the density of a city, that means the land outside that denser urban center is going to lose value and that compaction is going to require higher land taxes to recoup the loss from the less valuable land.
Ultimately, even the proponents of a LVT agree that land abandonment is a concern [although they in theory can fix this with a properly designed LVT regimee] when introducing into an area that previously only had a property tax and/or the LVT is used to replace other taxes. [e.g. income, sales]
So...I get you don't agree but until someone proves me wrong in practice, I don't have faith in it.
That's simply not true in the case of rent payments to landlords if we're talking about a land-value tax (i.e. taxing a proportion of the unimproved value of land). Land-supply is effectively fixed in the short-run (and pretty damn inelastic in the long-run thanks to over-regulation, zoning etc.). Therefore, tenant rents are determined solely by what the demand-side of the market will bear, meaning landlords can't pass LVT on (so they bear the economic incidence of the tax). Just to clarify terminology, by land-value tax (LVT), I mean taxing the proportion of unimproved land value that represents capitalisation of future economic rents (unearned profits) from land.
It's plausible a LVT would actually decrease rents paid by tenants, as it would increase the elasticity of dwelling supply in the long-run (land-owners would have stronger incentives to use land more productively). A properly designed LVT only taxes economic-rents (unearned profits) that currently accrue to private land-owners: if the local council builds a park near some land, the increased amenity for the surrounding area translates to increased economic rents, as the increased amenity is captured in the form of increased unimproved land values.
As for home-owners (existing land-owners), theoretically if people are unable to move houses then LVT would increase the cost of home-ownership: directly from increased tax and indirectly from decreased value of their land holding (as future economic rents from land is capitalised into land values). However, this is an unlikely scenario. More likely, the revenue raised from LVT would hopefully be used to cover reductions in property transfer taxes (i.e. ad valorem/stamp-duty taxes), which have absurd efficiency costs. This would reduce the cost of home-ownership overall.
People would pay less transfer tax over their lifetime, and property and land prices would fall due to increased allocative efficiency: reduced transaction taxes mean more efficient allocation of existing housing and land stock, as the tax disincentive to reallocate is reduced or eliminated. Also, under an LVT existing land would also be used more efficiently (e.g. medium-high density inner-city dwellings) as there would be higher opportunity costs of using high-value land unproductively (e.g. building a 1 bedroom shack on a big plot of land in the CBD).
In my opinion, the real problem is that these dynamics aren't immediately evident, are difficult to explain, and it's very easy to (mistakenly) conflate legal incidence with economic incidence of taxation. It's interesting you bring up gasoline taxes as this is the classic example: the Carter administration attempted to increase gas tax and hand the revenue back out through tax-cuts. It didn't happen because many thought it was simply taking with one hand and giving with the other.
In actual fact, given the aim was to reduce US oil consumption, it was pretty sound policy. Even though people would have ended up with the same amount of money (neutral income effect), gasoline consumption would have been reduced due to substitution effects: gas would have become relatively more expensive in comparison to every other consumption possibility, meaning people would substitute away.
Small nitpick.
Land markets are generally distorted by default: improvements in the immediate area generate 'privately captured positive externalities' for land-owners in the form of increased unimproved land-value: in other words, pure economic rents that are capitalised into increased private land values. Taxes (like LVTs) that transfer some of this value from private to public hands reduce this distortion: they actually enhance allocative efficiency.
It's a fascinating dynamic, and IMHO this uncorrected distortion is a major driver of boom-bust cycles in the macro-economy. Mark my words: the economic depression that will occur in the next 5 years will be started by bubbles popping in residential property markets (China's first, most likely). Consequently, we'll be looking at financial system collapse when this is transmitted to banks via insolvent residential property speculators (to whom they've loaned significant amounts of money).
This ain't going to be pretty.
On the hopeful side, countries like the US, Ireland and Iceland who 'took their medicine' during the GFC (sustained heavy property price declines or significant bank collapses), will be closer to fundamental values already. So they may have less distance to fall, even though there will probably be some overshoot. Also, OPEC flooding the world market with oil (to try and kill the US shale oil industry in the crib) and the likelihood that China will run down its foreign currency reserves to pay for stimulus (depreciating the US dollar) will mean US export industries (excluding oil and natural gas) become very competitive indeed.
Countries like China, Australia, Canada and the UK on the other hand, who staved off significant property market corrections during the GFC (especially Australia), are in for a very bad time (http://www.economist.com/blogs/dailychart/2011/11/global-hou... ). Like worse than 1920s depression bad time (closer to 1890s depression).
On government response, it's hard to predict. Frankly, in both the US and Australia, our legislatures are now controlled by even crazier and stupider politicians than during the GFC, so I don't hold out much hope for sensible fiscal responses. There's also less room to move fiscally, as we used up most of our powder during the GFC and won't be able to fire as strong a shot this time around. The thing that truly worries me is that government underwriting of financial system liabilities will therefore be less credible, so there is an increased probability of bank-runs causing a complete financial system collapse.
Our central banks also have less room for more traditional responses (i.e. reducing the cash rate), as they'll be starting from a much lower initial rate (and so will hit the zero lower bound much quicker). QE will therefore be deployed more rapidly and in greater quantity. Even though the Fed Reserve may have appeared confident re: QE, I'll bet they were privately shitting themselves because QE was (and still is) uncharted and risky territory. This time around they'll have to go much harder and earlier. At this point, I really have no clue what could happen.
On the bright-side, at least we'll be able to settle the question of whether theorised 'liquidity traps' truly exist...
All this is just my best guess. A more positive but still plausible theory is that China will manage their economy into a 'slow-melt', and will experience a long period of economic stagnation similar to what Japan has gone through in the last two decades. In this scenario, the damage might be contained and the US could come out relatively unscathed. I think Australia's screwed either way though...
Wow, color me surprised.
This is farcical. One reason people flock to the Bay Area is precisely because of the tight limits on construction. People like sprawled-out, low-density development. They like to have yards. They like spacious homes. They like to see the sky and the mountain vistas and the water.
You could lift the limits on land use and densify the area like Manhattan. But there are only so many workers who will flock to a Manhattan-like locale...and those workers are already flocking to Manhattan itself. Many American workers simply do not want to live in dense environments like Manhattan.
Like an earlier Economist article I think this one misses the possibility that tight controls on land use can make those places more desirable while driving some jobs elsewhere. Maybe some jobs simply do not exist due to tight Silicon Valley land controls. But other jobs simply move elsewhere, just as all finance jobs are not in NYC and London.
People flock to the Bay Area to have a yard and a spacious home? The lack of those things is the reason I left!
Maybe the very wealthy have yards and large houses in the Bay Area, but most everybody else is living in Manhattan-sized apartments without the benefits of living in a high density area like Manhattan (more walkability, public transit, etc).
Because the people attracted by the massive drop in rents would more than offset those who leave because of the increased density.
Wasn't San Francisco destroyed in an earthquake in 1906? Weren't 63 people killed, and thousands injured, by the 1989 earthquakes? Instead of better public transport, the Economist suggest building up, up, up. I suggest reading this - https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/1989_Loma_Prieta_earthquake - if you never saw the damage done by the 1989 earthquake. Remember the 1906 earthquake as well.
That's what happens when a populated and earthquake-prone region has poor building codes for coping with earthquakes.
Some people like those things. Other people actively dislike and avoid those things. Certainly there are enough of the latter that the Bay Area could be much more dense than it is, and still contain mostly people that like that density.
> "Disbursing some of the tax revenue earned as a result of new development to landowners within a small area around that development to compensate for short-term hardship would reduce opposition to new building."
With 5x as many people, traffic in the Bay Area would be 100x worse.
Or, say you magically install a perfect public transportation system. Still, are you going to clear 5x as much land for parks? (No.) Where are you going to find five Muir Woods?
I don't want to live in Manhattan. The basic problem is overpopulation. Even if we relaxed rules to allow denser construction, you'll just have the same problem again in a decade or two. (How much denser can you make Manhattan?) But with a lower quality of life for everyone.
This is farcical. The basic problem cannot possibly be overpopulation in a country with as much land per person as the United States of America.
There's a contradiction here: you want a very, very active economy, but you don't want the population required to sustain that economy.
You can't be rich without servants, and you can't have industries without workers. How do you propose to run tech companies with even fewer people per dollar-of-revenue than they already employ?
People need to eat! Californians ought to be living in the foothills of the Sierra mountains. This puts them close to water and saves the more farmable land for farming.
Good farmland is flat, is not full of annoying boulders, and has nice weather. We thus pour slab foundations for giant 1-story McMansions and dig holes for giant swimming pools. Doing that in the foothills would be a short-term expense, so instead we'll destroy our best farmland forever.
We pay the biggest chunks of our income to the gatekeepers over that valuable land, which you need access to in order to get a job or do business.
Let us just be thankful that these landowners worked so hard to produce this land, ex nihilo.
Perhaps next year's commercial launches of the Oculus Rift and Vive would finally allow for sufficient presence to begin making daily VR telecommuting a reasonable option.