6 comments

[ 3.4 ms ] story [ 17.8 ms ] thread
I wouldn't mind seeing sources for some of the theories posited here. For example, I searched briefly for other sites that mention William Howard Taft's use of blackmail and wasn't able to find any. It wasn't an exhaustive search, to be sure, but the lack of information reduces credibility in my eyes.
The article cites an academic book, Policing America’s Empire: The United States, the Philippines, and the Rise of the Surveillance State, (https://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780299234133) by professor Alfred W. McCoy (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alfred_W._McCoy)

Taft was governor of the Philippines, and later Secretary of War, during the Philippine-American War.

According to Alfred McCoy (http://www.tomdispatch.com/blog/175724/):

"Starting in 1901, the first U.S. governor-general (and future president) William Howard Taft drafted draconian sedition legislation for the islands and established a 5,000-man strong Philippines Constabulary. In the process, he created a colonial surveillance state that ruled, in part, thanks to the agile control of information, releasing damning data about enemies while suppressing scandals about allies.

When the Associated Press’s Manila bureau chief reported critically on these policies, Taft’s allies dug up dirt on this would-be critic and dished it out to the New York press. On the other hand, the Division of Military Information compiled a scandalous report about the rising Filipino politician Manuel Quezon, alleging a premarital abortion by his future first lady. Quezon, however, served the Constabulary as a spy, so this document remained buried in U.S. files, assuring his unchecked ascent to become the first president of the Philippines in 1935."

He was overseeing America's counterinsurgency operations in the Phillipines. Of course there was blackmail involved.

    MacArthur declared martial law and implemented General Order 100, a
    Civil War-era directive on the law of war that, among other tough
    provisions, subjected combatants not in uniform, and their supporters,
    to execution. This program forced civilians to take sides and served
    to increasingly isolate guerillas from popular support.
    
    The United States employed collective punishments that involved
    families and communities.22 Municipal officials or principales were
    held responsible for events that occurred in their towns. Prisoners
    were held until they—or family or friends—provided information,
    weapons, or both. Crops, buildings, and other property could be
    confiscated or destroyed as punishment.  General Order 100 lifted some
    restrictions on courts, resulting in more prisoners being executed.
    
    When General Order 100 was implemented, it was proclaimed in English,
    Spanish, and Tagalog. It clarified that civic works were a secondary
    priority to “punitive measures against those who continued to
    resist.”29 Over time, information operations convinced an increasing
    number of Filipinos that their interests were best served by the
    American administration and not the principales
    
    The weapon collection policy also merits a mention. When implemented
    in 1899, a 30-peso bounty was initially a dismal failure, with only a
    few dozen weapons turned in nationwide. By 1901, when coupled with
    other successful pacification policies, it was common for hundreds of
    rifles to be surrendered by disbanding insurgent groups. The lesson is
    that any given tactic, technique, or procedure employed in isolation
    may fail, but as part of a comprehensive mix of carrots and sticks can
    be part of an effective program.
The BBC says that phone calls were also first tracked in Iraq in 2005 during the surge, and that this technique was then brought to the US in 2006; that would be somehow similar with the story of the Philippines as playground for new surveillance techniques.

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-22804547

looks like a pattern: the trick is introduced in some far away colony where judicial oversight is weaker, in the colonies it turns out to be a big success; the success story is then used to sell the same trick at home.

Sounds like exactly what Noam Chomsky described in Manufactured Consent. Same tools perfected in war and brought back and used at home.