This is the thing that mystifies me the most about the ideas of consciousness and the soul. If we are more than our mind, then how do we explain how changes to our brain, artificial or natural, can drastically change who we are. What does that mean for an afterlife, if we can't even really say who we are in this life.
The null hypothesis is this: "There is a 'self' which persists through time and is the locus of one's identity."
It is this 'self' that people generally mean when they talk about the soul. We have a hard time giving a metaphysical analysis of what this soul is, but that does not mean it does not exist. As it is, the soul (in this functional sense) provides an explanation for too many things that would otherwise be inexplicable.
It is certainly included in most people's definition of the soul, and it is difficult to satisfy the definition I provided above and still be a material reductivist.
Your afterlife starts when your physical brain is revived in the distant future, or when you deviate from the branch of the universe in which you die. In this case some people see you die but you continue living in a different universe. Crossing universes doesn't just happen when you die, it is happening every instant. Obviously when you die your consciousness won't cross into the next instantaneous universe in which you are dead (by definition your consciousness does not exist there anymore so it's not a possible reality to cross into).
See https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Quantum_suicide_and_immortal... for more details.
We aren't more than our physical brains, at least not when you include the encoded set of experiences in your brain.
has been disproven by Bell's theorem. But I it's still a "pick two" kind of choice.
I, personally think that by Occam's razor, the Everett interpretation ("Many Worlds") makes the most sense, because it's simplest. And actually it retains all of the above three, but it introduces "self-locating uncertainty" (http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907), which effectively has the same kind of effect from our perspective.
If you subscribe to many-worlds, then you subscribe to quantum theory, which means you subscribe to quantum indeterminacy. Non-determinism is literally the name of the principle.
Yes and no. I think when most people say "determinism" they actually mean "probabilitism". You can't deterministically define the outcome of events, but you can assess the probabilities of outcomes.
"After some years we will die. If we just think that it is
the end of our life, this will be the wrong understanding.
But, on the other hand, if we think that we do not die, this
is also wrong. We die, and we do not die. This is the right
understanding. Some people may say that our mind or soul
exists forever, and it is only our physical body which dies.
But this is not exactly right, because both mind and body
have their end. But at the same time it is also true that they
exist eternally. And even though we say mind and body,
they are actually two sides of one coin. This is the right
understanding." - Zen Mind, Beginner's Mind
Wonderful quote, great wisdom. Interestingly, the passage speaks to ideas that exist across cultures, and throughout the centuries. It's remarkably similar to the philosophy of Spinoza, particularly embodied in his seminal work, the Ethics published in 1677.
For example, in the Ethics Spinoza wrote (roughly translated) "eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time". I puzzled over this idea for many years, extending to decades. More recently I've thought it prescient, in a way anticipating the concept of "space-time". Indeed that may not be coincidental given Einstein's statement that he was strongly influenced by Spinoza.
So it's not a surprise, in fact even reassuring that such insights permeate human thought, as the Zen Mind nicely demonstrates.
These questions are among the questions that the Buddha refused to answer one way or the other because he considered them distractions from the meditative life.[i]
The real goal of Buddhism is the elimination of suffering in oneself and others and is purposefully silent on the 'big questions.'
Discouraging certain questions is at the core of most/all religions/cults/belief systems, it's how you maintain group integrity and subservience to leaders and deities/pseudo-deities. Questions are ultimately disruptive. I don't just mean spiritual beliefs, I mean anything that isn't hard science.
The goal of many religions also happens to help it's followers lead a peaceful life, and you're right certain questions are ultimately disruptive, and that's exactly why many religions are vague on certain questions - they distract you from being able to lead a peaceful life.
By the way, one religion without leaders and without deities is fundamental Taoism. There's no one who can lead you on the path but you.
Stephen Hawking has concluded in his book "The Grand Design": "So it seems that we are no more than biological machines and that free will is just an illusion." [1]
Machines don't have afterlife. So, enjoy every moment you live right now! :)
I don't buy the we're smarter than we've ever been argument. It sounds very much like the religious people who feel certain of witnessing the end of the world.
> Einstein had a strong feeling for the presence of awe and wonder at the far horizon of the cosmos and saw evidence for the existence of a unifying, rational presence in the mathematical order of the cosmos. But since then the universe of theoretical physics has become random, complex, paradoxical, and barren of divine presence.
At least the atheist brigade remains constant. That's a comfort.
Hawking makes a careful statement and employs the word "seems" not as a padding but intentionally. I take his statement at face value and still don't get to the confident deductions you make. For one "seems" is allowing room to account for something currently or forever invisible. And then how can you assert that machines don't have an afterlife?
I mean i relation to our mind. If I took a hammer to your skull, I could fundamentally alter your personality. So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment?
How do you measure a personality? What are its constraints?
It appears to me that I am more than my brain. I have a body that I think I can control. If you define "you" as a sequence of states of matter, then the rest of your body should count too.
>So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment?
A: "it seems the evidence of the prosecution overwhelmingly identifies you as the robber of the convenience store. What evidence do you provide in your defense?"
B: " 'I' am nothing other than my present brain state. Since the entity that robbed the convenience store possessed a different brain state, we cannot be the same person."
Not sure how that would fly. Maybe there is a meaningful concept of personhood that transcends specific brain states?
My comment was in reply to a scenario involving a crime. In this case you would be accountable to society/law enforcement.
Unless you live in a cave, we're all accountable to many others, employers, loved ones etc, and, finally even to ourselves. After all haven't we all felt embarrassed or ashamed of something we did in a 'prior brain state'.
> Who can examine your actual brain states anyway?
Much can be inferred from actions.
> This sounds like mind police
A hyperbolic term. Aren't we all in a sense policing each other's minds? Part of living in a functional society involves creating and reinforcing social norms so that we can live in a slightly less chaotic world.
I think it would be fair to say that actions are a result of brain state, but not all brain states result in actions.
> Are their brain states that shouldn't be allowed?
Seems you've gone for a more philosophical angle. Of course your secret heat of hearts is yours and yours alone. We don't yet have the technology to decipher your thoughts, and even if/when we do we probably(hopefully) won't police them.
In a more practical sense, when policing your own thoughts there certainly are thought patterns and by extension brain states that you should avoid because they have negative side-effects. Some examples are OCD, depression etc. For these there are medications and therapies designed to help correct aberrant brain states.
FreedomToCreate's point, as I read it, is that our identity as a person is nothing more than our brain state at the present moment. That is, from moment to moment we are a different person as our brain states change.
If 'I' am nothing more than my brain state at this precise moment, then any previous brain states that preceded this are separate persons. How then can I be held responsible for something "other people" (i.e. my previous brain states) did?
Of course, we could say that the legal and philosophical definitions of 'person' are different, but what purpose is the philosophical definition if not to inform our definitions in other domains like law?
I wouldn't say it is proven yet, but I think the possibility that our whole consciousness might be a based on biology is loaded with a lot more fear that is justified.
For the sake of the argument, let's assume it is true - there is no metaphysical soul, and all aspects of the self we asdociate with it - memories, character, consciousness, etc... - are the product of electrochemical reactions inside the body. In other words, we are "deterministic" and whatever we do could be perfectly predicted by following the laws of physics.
I think this wouldn't actually devalue the consciousness very much. "Cogito ergo sum" still applies. There still exists a phenomenon called "consciousness" and there still exist entities who can choose an action, given their memories and the impressions of the world they experience.
Technically, yes, humans would be reduced to "mere machines", however machines which are incredibly more complex and nuanced than everything we are capable to build or understand as of now. Also machines who are thinking about themself and have performed all the accomplishments of human history. And I don't think any of this would be going.
The need to consider subjective experiences and well-being wouldn't go either, btw. The need to have a solid ethical foundation and sound morals would be as strong as ever. If anything it could become broader and give more justification for e.g. animal rights. But I can't see anything bad with that.
Yes. The claim that explaining consciousness as purely a result of biology (physicalism) devalues consciousness is the same as the claim that explaining the color red as result of photons released when electrons settle into lower energy states devalues redness.
Studies on twins, especially those that observe separated ones, pretty much show how much bodies behave in a deterministic way, from diseases, to relationships, names, jobs, wishes.
If you break your leg, you will change the way your walk, but not the brain (of course it will change adapting to what has happened, but that's not he point here).
Going up a level: if you change your brain you will change the way you think, but not the fact you can think. Going up another level: by changing your mind, you might not change your consciousness.
It may be the case that a healthy brain is necessary for a healthy personality. It is not clear, however what follows from this.
If a person's brain stops functioning normally, does he become less human? If a dolphin or monkey can demonstrate more intelligent actions than the brain-damaged person, does this make them more human than they are? More worthy of life?
These are the kind of questions they ask in your local philosophy department.
Almost no philosophers today (who specialize in the philosophy of mind) believe in an immaterial soul. They believe that there is nothing beyond the physical when it comes to consciousness.
Perhaps, like the rest of the body, the brain is more an interface between the physical world and the "true self" (call it "soul" if you prefer). That includes relationships with others' interfaces.
In this view, changing the brain merely changes how we perceive the world, our behavior in it and, thus, how we are perceived by and relate to others. Interestingly, it can also change our sense of our own self in relation to the world.
When you consider disorders like depersonalization and derealization, they seem to be exactly a defect in this sensory system. The nature of who you are hasn't changed, but your sense of who you are has.
There's zero evidence of an afterlife or souls of any kind. And overwhelming evidence that your behavior is controlled entirely by your brain. You are your brain. Nothing more. This life is the only one you will get!
Meh. I always hate these articles about neuroscientists having non-ordinary experiences. Either heterophenomenology is valid or it isn't, whether or not you're a neuroscientist should be largely irrelevant.
If her training as a neuroscientist was providing some sort of special insight into her subjective experiences then that would be one thing, but that's never actually the case with these articles, other than intermittently having some basic awareness of what might be going on.
By privileging the experiences of people whose backgrounds don't have any real epistemological relevancy, I feel like these articles epitomize the hegemonic aspects of science, which is troubling on multiple levels.
Thanks! In future I'm sure we'll all be extra careful to run checks ensuring folks' backgrounds have real epistemological relevancy before privileging their experiences in publication.
Agreed. I find her experiences interesting, but there really isn't anything in her description that is novel when compared to a "lay" person's description.
Metaphors are always a bit tricky, but you might say it's like someone asking a computer hardware engineer how to use software on their computer[1]. Perhaps this experience did give her some new insight, but if so it was more contextual and related specifically to her work, rather than a general insight into human nature. Of course, it is good for people to share these kinds of experiences, but we should ask ourselves why it matters to us that it was a scientist who experienced them.
The special status of science comes directly from the fact that it relies on objective observation and experimentation rather than subjective experience, consensus, or authority. Emphasizing any of the latter three simply because they come from scientists, suggests that we are trying to treat science as a priesthood, rather than addressing it on its own terms. It also means we've given "science", as a social institution, more power than it merits.
Exactly. I feel like these sorts of things generally fuel systemic racism and oppression, which is why I try to point them out when I see them. (Even if most other people give me shit for it.)
My concern comes more from the angle of scientific integrity rather than systematic oppression, but I thought your point was sound and it made me ask myself "why do we, as readers, care that this subjective experience comes from a scientist?".
As an article designed for an educated but non-scientific audience, it's only nominally about neuroscience, but really about conceptions of self. I think the point of the article is that despite considering herself an expert, she has no particular insight into her own disease. This is intended as a parable for other experts, suggesting that they may be wiser to trust in the collective wisdom of others rather than assuming they understand the world better than others. It's not quite an anti-science article, but it seeks to "cut science down to size", by (correctly) showing that its practitioners are all too fallible and human.
What are the specific ways in which you find it troubling?
I suppose this isn't as egregious as, say, some guy writing a book saying that God is real because of a dream he had and you should totally believe him because he's an MD.
That said, what's to say that her experiences (which perhaps highlight the limits of science) are more valid than anyone else's experiences which do the same.
The reason I find it troubling is because it fits into a multi-hundred year paradigm of, say, indigenous people not being believed about their medical knowledge until some white guy flies down to South America and puts his stamp of approval on it. Or, say, some western religious studies scholars flying to Japan and teaching them what their religious beliefs really are, or whatever.
I'm all for experts when they have real expertise and something to add. But what I find troubling is when a supposed lack of credentials is used to systematically invalidate the knowledge and experiences of certain groups of people, especially when those credentials have no actual relevance to the issue(s) at hand.
There were a lot of false indigenous beliefs. If people just listened to some random native dude and took his stories at face value, they would have been convinced of a lot of wrongness.
Basically you need a big institution that can exert quality control over issued statements. Not necessarily a white one.
Sure. There's a lot of false non-indigenous beliefs also. I realize that a lot of the time there is a real value add happening.
But there are research universities down there also that can do the same work. And as often as not the research done up here isn't really any better than the research that's already been done.
I feel like these articles de-epitomize the hegemonic aspects of science, by pointing out that perceived epistemological relevancy does not contribute to actual real-world utility.
Interestingly, I could accurately describe my experience of mania due to bipolar disorder using the exact same words / description as the author. The similarity of the subjective symptoms is overwhelming. And yet, the pathology seems very different.
Suppose you created a machine which, in the style of Solomonoff induction (sorta), was designed to find as short or as "elegant" (in whatever sense of that word) of a (computation based) description of the world (so, it makes a model of the inputs it receives, and it receives many inputs, including from the internet, etc.)
Further, pretend that it has arbitrarily large computational resources.
Even if it could completely predict the inputs it receives (modulo quantum mechanics based randomness), would you expect that it's internal model of the world includes some description of consciousness, of an internal experience?
I do not mean, would it have some sort of a model of agents, entities that act in a way that tends to optimize some things or other,
Rather, I specifically mean the internal experience of things, not just being able to predict that people would say that they experience.
I do not think that it would come up with a model of internal experience,
And yet, I experience, and so do you.
So, I think an understanding of reality based only on computation about physical objects, is incomplete.
Yes. If you ran Solomonoff induction on the world, it would generate (countably infinite!) many simulations of people in the world, each of which would act exactly as they do in the world. They would experience the same things, say the same things, behave exactly the same way in every respect. Including having the same thoughts and feelings you are right now, and typing the exact same comment.
1) I didn't necessarily mean exactly Solomonoff induction, as what I was describing would be for finding a single good description, rather than making good predictions using a weighted combinations of many descriptions.
2)Well, whether they would have experiences is a topic which is of some debate I think. They would behave as if they did, but, would they? If the simulation is run twice concurrently, are the experiences had twice as much?
There are all sorts of potential complications with things like computation with secret sharing schemes, and so I don't think the question is really settled.
____
My point was that even if something describes what occurs, what particles end up in what configurations, that doesn't seem to be a description of what is experienced, even if it predicts how people will self report their experiences, and give causal explanations for their self reporting of their internal experience.
66 comments
[ 3.9 ms ] story [ 244 ms ] threadIt is this 'self' that people generally mean when they talk about the soul. We have a hard time giving a metaphysical analysis of what this soul is, but that does not mean it does not exist. As it is, the soul (in this functional sense) provides an explanation for too many things that would otherwise be inexplicable.
We aren't more than our physical brains, at least not when you include the encoded set of experiences in your brain.
1) local 2) realist 3) determinism
has been disproven by Bell's theorem. But I it's still a "pick two" kind of choice.
I, personally think that by Occam's razor, the Everett interpretation ("Many Worlds") makes the most sense, because it's simplest. And actually it retains all of the above three, but it introduces "self-locating uncertainty" (http://arxiv.org/abs/1405.7907), which effectively has the same kind of effect from our perspective.
It's a space-time graph (tree?) with a root at the start of time and leaves at infinity.
[1] - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Superdeterminism
Determinism does work retrospectively though.
The Zen master replied: "I don’t know.”
The monk said: “What do you mean. Aren’t you a Zen master?”
And the Zen Master replied: “Yes, but I’m not a dead one.”
For example, in the Ethics Spinoza wrote (roughly translated) "eternity cannot be defined in terms of time, or have any relation to time". I puzzled over this idea for many years, extending to decades. More recently I've thought it prescient, in a way anticipating the concept of "space-time". Indeed that may not be coincidental given Einstein's statement that he was strongly influenced by Spinoza.
So it's not a surprise, in fact even reassuring that such insights permeate human thought, as the Zen Mind nicely demonstrates.
Edit: grammar
The real goal of Buddhism is the elimination of suffering in oneself and others and is purposefully silent on the 'big questions.'
[i] http://www.faculty.umb.edu/michael_lafargue/104/204/budd/rdn...
By the way, one religion without leaders and without deities is fundamental Taoism. There's no one who can lead you on the path but you.
Machines don't have afterlife. So, enjoy every moment you live right now! :)
[1] http://www.huffingtonpost.com/deepak-chopra/stephen-hawkings...
> Einstein had a strong feeling for the presence of awe and wonder at the far horizon of the cosmos and saw evidence for the existence of a unifying, rational presence in the mathematical order of the cosmos. But since then the universe of theoretical physics has become random, complex, paradoxical, and barren of divine presence.
At least the atheist brigade remains constant. That's a comfort.
It appears to me that I am more than my brain. I have a body that I think I can control. If you define "you" as a sequence of states of matter, then the rest of your body should count too.
>So the person you are right now is variable, depending on the state of your brain. So with that has a fundamental fact, who are you really but the state of your brain at the moment?
This feels a bit circular to me.
B: " 'I' am nothing other than my present brain state. Since the entity that robbed the convenience store possessed a different brain state, we cannot be the same person."
Not sure how that would fly. Maybe there is a meaningful concept of personhood that transcends specific brain states?
Unless you live in a cave, we're all accountable to many others, employers, loved ones etc, and, finally even to ourselves. After all haven't we all felt embarrassed or ashamed of something we did in a 'prior brain state'.
Much can be inferred from actions. A hyperbolic term. Aren't we all in a sense policing each other's minds? Part of living in a functional society involves creating and reinforcing social norms so that we can live in a slightly less chaotic world.In a more practical sense, when policing your own thoughts there certainly are thought patterns and by extension brain states that you should avoid because they have negative side-effects. Some examples are OCD, depression etc. For these there are medications and therapies designed to help correct aberrant brain states.
FreedomToCreate's point, as I read it, is that our identity as a person is nothing more than our brain state at the present moment. That is, from moment to moment we are a different person as our brain states change.
If 'I' am nothing more than my brain state at this precise moment, then any previous brain states that preceded this are separate persons. How then can I be held responsible for something "other people" (i.e. my previous brain states) did?
Of course, we could say that the legal and philosophical definitions of 'person' are different, but what purpose is the philosophical definition if not to inform our definitions in other domains like law?
For the sake of the argument, let's assume it is true - there is no metaphysical soul, and all aspects of the self we asdociate with it - memories, character, consciousness, etc... - are the product of electrochemical reactions inside the body. In other words, we are "deterministic" and whatever we do could be perfectly predicted by following the laws of physics.
I think this wouldn't actually devalue the consciousness very much. "Cogito ergo sum" still applies. There still exists a phenomenon called "consciousness" and there still exist entities who can choose an action, given their memories and the impressions of the world they experience.
Technically, yes, humans would be reduced to "mere machines", however machines which are incredibly more complex and nuanced than everything we are capable to build or understand as of now. Also machines who are thinking about themself and have performed all the accomplishments of human history. And I don't think any of this would be going.
The need to consider subjective experiences and well-being wouldn't go either, btw. The need to have a solid ethical foundation and sound morals would be as strong as ever. If anything it could become broader and give more justification for e.g. animal rights. But I can't see anything bad with that.
If a person's brain stops functioning normally, does he become less human? If a dolphin or monkey can demonstrate more intelligent actions than the brain-damaged person, does this make them more human than they are? More worthy of life?
These are the kind of questions they ask in your local philosophy department.
http://www.spectator.co.uk/2012/03/brain-drain/
In this view, changing the brain merely changes how we perceive the world, our behavior in it and, thus, how we are perceived by and relate to others. Interestingly, it can also change our sense of our own self in relation to the world.
When you consider disorders like depersonalization and derealization, they seem to be exactly a defect in this sensory system. The nature of who you are hasn't changed, but your sense of who you are has.
If her training as a neuroscientist was providing some sort of special insight into her subjective experiences then that would be one thing, but that's never actually the case with these articles, other than intermittently having some basic awareness of what might be going on.
By privileging the experiences of people whose backgrounds don't have any real epistemological relevancy, I feel like these articles epitomize the hegemonic aspects of science, which is troubling on multiple levels.
Metaphors are always a bit tricky, but you might say it's like someone asking a computer hardware engineer how to use software on their computer[1]. Perhaps this experience did give her some new insight, but if so it was more contextual and related specifically to her work, rather than a general insight into human nature. Of course, it is good for people to share these kinds of experiences, but we should ask ourselves why it matters to us that it was a scientist who experienced them.
The special status of science comes directly from the fact that it relies on objective observation and experimentation rather than subjective experience, consensus, or authority. Emphasizing any of the latter three simply because they come from scientists, suggests that we are trying to treat science as a priesthood, rather than addressing it on its own terms. It also means we've given "science", as a social institution, more power than it merits.
[1]http://xkcd.com/1588/
As an article designed for an educated but non-scientific audience, it's only nominally about neuroscience, but really about conceptions of self. I think the point of the article is that despite considering herself an expert, she has no particular insight into her own disease. This is intended as a parable for other experts, suggesting that they may be wiser to trust in the collective wisdom of others rather than assuming they understand the world better than others. It's not quite an anti-science article, but it seeks to "cut science down to size", by (correctly) showing that its practitioners are all too fallible and human.
What are the specific ways in which you find it troubling?
That said, what's to say that her experiences (which perhaps highlight the limits of science) are more valid than anyone else's experiences which do the same.
The reason I find it troubling is because it fits into a multi-hundred year paradigm of, say, indigenous people not being believed about their medical knowledge until some white guy flies down to South America and puts his stamp of approval on it. Or, say, some western religious studies scholars flying to Japan and teaching them what their religious beliefs really are, or whatever.
I'm all for experts when they have real expertise and something to add. But what I find troubling is when a supposed lack of credentials is used to systematically invalidate the knowledge and experiences of certain groups of people, especially when those credentials have no actual relevance to the issue(s) at hand.
Basically you need a big institution that can exert quality control over issued statements. Not necessarily a white one.
Sure. There's a lot of false non-indigenous beliefs also. I realize that a lot of the time there is a real value add happening.
But there are research universities down there also that can do the same work. And as often as not the research done up here isn't really any better than the research that's already been done.
Further, pretend that it has arbitrarily large computational resources.
Even if it could completely predict the inputs it receives (modulo quantum mechanics based randomness), would you expect that it's internal model of the world includes some description of consciousness, of an internal experience?
I do not mean, would it have some sort of a model of agents, entities that act in a way that tends to optimize some things or other,
Rather, I specifically mean the internal experience of things, not just being able to predict that people would say that they experience.
I do not think that it would come up with a model of internal experience, And yet, I experience, and so do you.
So, I think an understanding of reality based only on computation about physical objects, is incomplete.
1) I didn't necessarily mean exactly Solomonoff induction, as what I was describing would be for finding a single good description, rather than making good predictions using a weighted combinations of many descriptions.
2)Well, whether they would have experiences is a topic which is of some debate I think. They would behave as if they did, but, would they? If the simulation is run twice concurrently, are the experiences had twice as much? There are all sorts of potential complications with things like computation with secret sharing schemes, and so I don't think the question is really settled.
____
My point was that even if something describes what occurs, what particles end up in what configurations, that doesn't seem to be a description of what is experienced, even if it predicts how people will self report their experiences, and give causal explanations for their self reporting of their internal experience.