It looks like the demo they do with the reporter leaves out a the part where the "landing page" for the wifi prompts the user to install a new root certificate on the device so that his proxy can listen in on all of the traffic.
This is the smartphone version of fake pirated media that asks you to download a special desktop "media player" that ends up just being malware. The average user will just accept whatever prompts they are given for free access to wifi. Certificate pinning will be much more important once this becomes mainstream.
That depends. I'm not sure what iOS or Android do here, but Chrome (as an example, since its behavior is well-documented) does not perform pin validation when the presented certificate chains up to a private trust anchor (i.e. a user-installed root cert) [1]. This was a deliberate choice on the part of the Chrome team, to allow this type of MITM (presumably because it's not uncommon in enterprise environments).
> Certificate pinning will be much more important once this becomes mainstream.
On the flip side, certificate pinning prevents an end user from seeing what data an app is transmitting. Standard Man-in-the-Middle solutions like Burp no longer work when an app is cert pinning.
The only way (to my knowledge) to overcome this isto attach a debugger to the app and manually strip the ssl or view the packets prior to being sent.
> The only way (to my knowledge) to overcome this isto attach a debugger to the app and manually strip the ssl or view the packets prior to being sent.
And that is the very intention.
Both as a user and a software engineer I find this perfectly natural. The app developer could have implemented this himself or just used public-key encryption on top of his HTTPS enabled but not certificate-pinned application.
14 comments
[ 135 ms ] story [ 483 ms ] thread"Rep. Ted Lieu: They could hear any call of pretty much anyone who has a smartphone. It could be stock trades you want someone to execute."
Yeah, you wouldn't want the public to know about the insider gravy train you hopped on when you were elected, huh Ted?
God says... hood spermatozoa dotage's hermit's quarreling blends paraplegic's Kanchenjunga's arrest scuttles Giza's transmits assiduousness Kieth's phenomenon's liquefaction's administer junkyard's trotter's song's rattlesnake corpse's élan grudged stomp's satiated frail suggesting planetaria defection's Seders commonly
-----
God is on the side of light human dignity.
Satan wants man to be dumb cattle. Satan likes to herd billions of dumb cattle.
http://www.9jumpin.com.au/show/60minutes/stories/2015/august...
See also "The news is controlled" -- anchors from different stations using the same lines.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=kip2w-DceV0
https://www.sans.org/reading-room/whitepapers/critical/fall-...
This is the smartphone version of fake pirated media that asks you to download a special desktop "media player" that ends up just being malware. The average user will just accept whatever prompts they are given for free access to wifi. Certificate pinning will be much more important once this becomes mainstream.
[1] http://www.chromium.org/Home/chromium-security/security-faq#...
On the flip side, certificate pinning prevents an end user from seeing what data an app is transmitting. Standard Man-in-the-Middle solutions like Burp no longer work when an app is cert pinning.
The only way (to my knowledge) to overcome this isto attach a debugger to the app and manually strip the ssl or view the packets prior to being sent.
And that is the very intention.
Both as a user and a software engineer I find this perfectly natural. The app developer could have implemented this himself or just used public-key encryption on top of his HTTPS enabled but not certificate-pinned application.