Very disappointing that this article, like almost all the ones being written right now, focus on exactly the wrong issue. Yes, robots and police psychology are fun to think about, but the heart of the matter in the Dallas case is whether the suspect posed an imminent threat which could not be addressed any other way besides lethal force. The reason the robot raises worries is not that it's shiny and represents the scary future, it's that robots are slow and unreliable, and it's hard to imagine a situation where lethal force is warranted and the robot is useful. In other words: If you can use the robot, you probably have the gunman contained. If the gunman is posing an imminent risk to the lives of others, the robot is probably useless.
The author doesn't even touch on it until one sentence all the way to the end.
> The ability for police to remotely kill suspects raises due process concerns. If a shooter is holed up and alone, can they be qualified as an imminent threat to life?
There have been lots of quotes by the police about how they "didn't want to risk the life of another officer", but no quotes I've seen about "the gunman was about to escape and go on to hurt others". Why wasn't the suspect containable? Why don't any of the journalists raise this issue, either in their interviews or articles? Hopefully this will eventually all be public as part of the investigation, but the public conversation about this is pretty much useless right now.
The comparisons to the military are not helpful:
> Brown raises an obvious question that the US military has grappled with: If a shooter is holed up in a building, who do you send, a person or a bot?
Unlike the military, the police operate in an environment where simply containing the suspect and waiting him out are very viable options.
> (...) but the heart of the matter in the Dallas case is whether the suspect posed an imminent threat which could not be addressed any other way besides lethal force.
At that time, the assailant already stated his purpose of killing as many police officers he could, and during his rampage he already had killed 5 police officers and gunned down dozen or so victims.
The assailant planned for this sort of attack for some time, he purposely took military training in private weekend warrior schools specifically to conduct the attack he was planning, and he even planned and mobilized himself to use explosives.
The assailant's plans were all suicide missions, and their goal was to inflict the most damage possible.
I'm not an american, and I live in a country where there isn't a single police-involved death for years, and even I am well aware that going with such a radical option was quite obviously the only way the police could ensure that the assailant would cease to be a threat to the public.
None of your points fully address what's needed to justify lethal force.
The Police Executive Research Forum emphasizes that the police are not authorized to start executing someone who was engaged in active, suicidal shooting once that person is contained:
> Many [police department] policies note that Active Shooter protocols should not be used as a response to “barricaded gunman” situations. And some policies note that active shooter incidents are dynamic, and that an incident may go in and out of active shooter status in ways that could alter the police response. For example, a situation may begin as an active shooter incident, but if the shooter barricades himself in a room where he no longer has access to potential victims, and the police can secure that room and contain the shooter, the police response should shift accordingly.
The police had him trapped for two hours before they blew him up. Perhaps there really was a new development that forced them to take action, but it's not a call we can make merely knowing how bad the guys was. It depend on the details of the situation.
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[ 3.1 ms ] story [ 23.0 ms ] threadThe author doesn't even touch on it until one sentence all the way to the end.
> The ability for police to remotely kill suspects raises due process concerns. If a shooter is holed up and alone, can they be qualified as an imminent threat to life?
There have been lots of quotes by the police about how they "didn't want to risk the life of another officer", but no quotes I've seen about "the gunman was about to escape and go on to hurt others". Why wasn't the suspect containable? Why don't any of the journalists raise this issue, either in their interviews or articles? Hopefully this will eventually all be public as part of the investigation, but the public conversation about this is pretty much useless right now.
The comparisons to the military are not helpful:
> Brown raises an obvious question that the US military has grappled with: If a shooter is holed up in a building, who do you send, a person or a bot?
Unlike the military, the police operate in an environment where simply containing the suspect and waiting him out are very viable options.
At that time, the assailant already stated his purpose of killing as many police officers he could, and during his rampage he already had killed 5 police officers and gunned down dozen or so victims.
The assailant planned for this sort of attack for some time, he purposely took military training in private weekend warrior schools specifically to conduct the attack he was planning, and he even planned and mobilized himself to use explosives.
The assailant's plans were all suicide missions, and their goal was to inflict the most damage possible.
I'm not an american, and I live in a country where there isn't a single police-involved death for years, and even I am well aware that going with such a radical option was quite obviously the only way the police could ensure that the assailant would cease to be a threat to the public.
The Police Executive Research Forum emphasizes that the police are not authorized to start executing someone who was engaged in active, suicidal shooting once that person is contained:
> Many [police department] policies note that Active Shooter protocols should not be used as a response to “barricaded gunman” situations. And some policies note that active shooter incidents are dynamic, and that an incident may go in and out of active shooter status in ways that could alter the police response. For example, a situation may begin as an active shooter incident, but if the shooter barricades himself in a room where he no longer has access to potential victims, and the police can secure that room and contain the shooter, the police response should shift accordingly.
http://www.policeforum.org/assets/docs/Critical_Issues_Serie...
The police had him trapped for two hours before they blew him up. Perhaps there really was a new development that forced them to take action, but it's not a call we can make merely knowing how bad the guys was. It depend on the details of the situation.