So the article says:
"For every federalist in Brussels who thinks a common defense force is what Europe needs to boost its standing in the world, there are those in London and elsewhere who recoil at the notion of a potential NATO rival."
The question I have is if 'elsewhere' is as irrelevant to a EU politician as London is?
Since only NATO countries seem to be in a position to "recoil at the notion of a potential NATO rival", the "elsewhere" probably does include a fair number of EU politicians, including Germans. I believe "rival" isn't meant in the sense of a potential armed conflict between the EU and NATO (which would be ridiculous), but simply as competition for mindshare and organisational resources.
> competition for mindshare and organisational resources.
This is how I interpreted it as well.
The First World seems to be concerned right now with the apparent rise of Russian power. In the previous order (during the Cold War), NATO was the counterbalance to Russia's empire. If NATO is divided in two by the creation of the EU, then a reinvigorated Russia would be able to act against each entity separately, giving them a great advantage in international diplomacy.
For every federalist with a say in what the EU needs to do about a common defense force there is a federalist without any say in that or a federalist from somewhere unnamed who may or may not have a say in that.
I mean I understand that the somewhere unnamed federalist may in fact be someone who has a say in the matter in some way, but if that is what one is trying to say why lead off with an example named federalist that doesn't have any say.
Also a non NATO member might recoil at a potential NATO rival if they feel they can exploit some weakness in NATO and fear the rival would not have the same weakness.
I think in 10-20 years we could see something like an European Union army. Some countries will opt-out (Ireland? Sweden? Austria?) but the main internal opposition (the UK) is not an issue anymore.
I wonder if this will make countries more or less likely to stay in the EU. I would lean towards "more" because they probably wouldn't want to be on EU's bad side in the future. Tough luck for UK, I suppose.
I don't know why anybody would be surprised about this. The threat of Russia to Eastern Europe, the fact that one Western European country has already voted to leave the EU, and having a United States that doesn't seem like a country you can count on is going to lead smaller countries to come closer to Germany as the strongest nation in the region.
> having a United States that doesn't seem like a country you can count on
In what way? A Russian attack on Germany or a NATO ally is something the US would definitely go to war over. I know it's popular now to freak out because Trump is president, but nothing has changed in this regard.
Words have meaning, and there's no denying that Trump has, quite literally, questioned the US' commitment to the common defence doctrine. It's not like there's some court of law somewhere that would make Latvia whole again if Trump decided not to fulfil the US' treaty obligations after the "Latvian association of I-am-just-a-farmer–oh-look-I-found-a-Russian-tank" wins the referendum to join Russia.
Questioned, but I don't think that means the US is ready to abandon countries like Germany. I think Latvia is an interesting case because, frankly, should the US go to war over Latvia if Russia invaded? I think we would because of the treaty, but idk if the US (absent NATO) should do it. At one point is it worth the risk? That's the thing with Russia. At one point do you say no and go to war with them over a land grab? Germany is a clear case of going to war, same with other Tier 1 US allies, but Latvia?
You can't decide who to go to war for under NATO, it's all or nothing.
Not to mention that ssignaling to Russia that the US might not intervened under Article 5 is a good way to start WW3.
NATO works because the fate of a the Baltics is equal to the fate of Germany.
The problem is that Europe has enjoyed the umbrella that the US provides under NATO too long without owning to its own obligated defense commitments under the treaty.
I don't understand why people are calling out the Trump administration because of this.
Sec def Gates had much more damning things to say about NATO under Obama and the EU's unwillingness to commit its obligated military spending goes as back as Reagan.
I don't really disagree, my larger point was that I question whether the US would go to war over the baltics, but I don't question that they would go to war over Germany. The alliance may fall apart if they didn't go to war over the baltics, but there is no question in my mind that, if instead of attacking the baltic, the Russians attacked Germany that the US would be full-on in Germany's defense.
It definitely would because not honoring Article 5 means that the US loses its relevance in its entirety in the region leaving Europe for Russia if nothing else then purely in the geopolitical landscape for the taking.
No, it doesn't. There's a huge mess associated with Article 5, but not defending Lativa is not the same thing as unwilling to defend Germany, or France, or the UK, etc....
If article 5 is invoked and the US doesn't do anything then NATO is gone.
After that US influence in the region is going to be pretty much gone.
EU plotitians are going to be much more open to Russian world views since they will not gamble their security on US internal politics.
The exact same thing happened in the Middle East under the previous administration moving Russia from a loud but mostly sidelined actor to the main stage.
It could be argued that the US's (lack of) reaction to Russian occupation of Crimea and its lack of involvement in the situation between Russia and Turkey has eroded the guarantee that NATO is supposed to provide.
Not much the Us can do about Turkey. Crimea is far more complicated than can be discussed reasonably here.
Germany though, is a whole different ball game. There are different tiers of countries in the view of the US. Countries like Germany, are in the tier of "we will go to war if you declare war against them". Even if Trump is president. He is right to question the alliances, though.
Note that Foreign Policy is a niche publication. If you would follow similar German sites you would have noticed.
Regular news hasn't reported much (it's a very slow moving process, not so ideal for a news website) but it's mentioned occasionally, e.g. the FAZ had a very similar article a few months ago. But you are right, a regular citizen with no particular interest in that field would almost surely never have heard about it.
At FAZ I would follow the author Johannes Leithäuser. A few other suggestions would be the publictions of Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, Gesellschaft für Sicherheitspolitik, IPG Journal, the newsletter Sicherheitspolitische Presseschau, and the blog Augen Geradaus. But all those are pretty specialized. Unfortunately I don't know any mainstream source where one would have noticed this story. There are also some interesting political science journals but I don't follow any.
If I could only add one thing to my daily reading list it would be that mentioned newsletter. And of course I would read the Bundeswehr Weißbuch.
> “Gaps” in the Bundeswehr is an understatement. In 1989, the West German government spent 2.7 percent of GDP on defense, but by 2000 spending had dropped to 1.4 percent
One man's gap is another's peace dividend. 0% should be the standard to judge against, and the unfortunate necessity to go above that shouldn't be mistaken for anything but a giant drain of productivity that could be spent on almost anything else with better results.
I also don't get how military spending is indexed to GDP. Surely what matters first is the actual power of an alliance's militaries compared to realistic threats. Only then could GDP be a useful yardstick to distribute the burdens among the members of that alliance.
In the specific case, it's a completely rational decision to lower investments in Europe considering the US continues to fund its military at levels that can only be explained by some sort of chauvinist fascination with guns, bombs, and golden toilet seats. It's even beneficial for the US if Europe instead invests in soft-power resources, something that has actually happened since 1990.
It's easy to hate on the military industrial complex, but it's hard to deny the positive technologies borne from military r&d. Microwave ovens, space ships, the internet, Tor, GPS, canned food...
Title sounds a bit too clickbaity IMO, but I guess who would want to read an article titled "German Bundeswehr cooperates more closely with European Allies".
An European army, especially nowadays, won't work without finalizing all the rules. If a far-right government wins in a EU country, will the army be used to bring the country under liberal control?
37 comments
[ 0.21 ms ] story [ 92.6 ms ] threadThe question I have is if 'elsewhere' is as irrelevant to a EU politician as London is?
This is how I interpreted it as well.
The First World seems to be concerned right now with the apparent rise of Russian power. In the previous order (during the Cold War), NATO was the counterbalance to Russia's empire. If NATO is divided in two by the creation of the EU, then a reinvigorated Russia would be able to act against each entity separately, giving them a great advantage in international diplomacy.
For every federalist with a say in what the EU needs to do about a common defense force there is a federalist without any say in that or a federalist from somewhere unnamed who may or may not have a say in that.
I mean I understand that the somewhere unnamed federalist may in fact be someone who has a say in the matter in some way, but if that is what one is trying to say why lead off with an example named federalist that doesn't have any say.
Also a non NATO member might recoil at a potential NATO rival if they feel they can exploit some weakness in NATO and fear the rival would not have the same weakness.
It would be interesting to see the UK build a closer relationship with the Commonwealth, instead of doing so with the EU.
In what way? A Russian attack on Germany or a NATO ally is something the US would definitely go to war over. I know it's popular now to freak out because Trump is president, but nothing has changed in this regard.
You can't decide who to go to war for under NATO, it's all or nothing.
Not to mention that ssignaling to Russia that the US might not intervened under Article 5 is a good way to start WW3.
NATO works because the fate of a the Baltics is equal to the fate of Germany.
The problem is that Europe has enjoyed the umbrella that the US provides under NATO too long without owning to its own obligated defense commitments under the treaty.
I don't understand why people are calling out the Trump administration because of this.
Sec def Gates had much more damning things to say about NATO under Obama and the EU's unwillingness to commit its obligated military spending goes as back as Reagan.
After that US influence in the region is going to be pretty much gone.
EU plotitians are going to be much more open to Russian world views since they will not gamble their security on US internal politics.
The exact same thing happened in the Middle East under the previous administration moving Russia from a loud but mostly sidelined actor to the main stage.
Germany though, is a whole different ball game. There are different tiers of countries in the view of the US. Countries like Germany, are in the tier of "we will go to war if you declare war against them". Even if Trump is president. He is right to question the alliances, though.
Regular news hasn't reported much (it's a very slow moving process, not so ideal for a news website) but it's mentioned occasionally, e.g. the FAZ had a very similar article a few months ago. But you are right, a regular citizen with no particular interest in that field would almost surely never have heard about it.
If I could only add one thing to my daily reading list it would be that mentioned newsletter. And of course I would read the Bundeswehr Weißbuch.
One man's gap is another's peace dividend. 0% should be the standard to judge against, and the unfortunate necessity to go above that shouldn't be mistaken for anything but a giant drain of productivity that could be spent on almost anything else with better results.
I also don't get how military spending is indexed to GDP. Surely what matters first is the actual power of an alliance's militaries compared to realistic threats. Only then could GDP be a useful yardstick to distribute the burdens among the members of that alliance.
In the specific case, it's a completely rational decision to lower investments in Europe considering the US continues to fund its military at levels that can only be explained by some sort of chauvinist fascination with guns, bombs, and golden toilet seats. It's even beneficial for the US if Europe instead invests in soft-power resources, something that has actually happened since 1990.