Whenever I read pieces like this on these nuts in the CIA, I start to think that if they weren't the ones creating the conspiracies, they'd be in some asylum imagining them anyway.
The CIA at times both imagines and acts on non-existent conspiracies and dismisses very real intrigues, e.g. the belief that Soviets can't have a mole in the CIA instead the soviets must be detecting CIA sources using secret spy dust. The burden of proof is much lower in intelligence work than police work and given the nature of counter deception campaigns evidence which contradicts an organizationally important narrative can be dismissed as misinformation. This is a recipe is self-delusion, but if one believes that intelligence agencies are necessary I'm not sure such problems can be all together avoided.
Do you have much familiarity with those inner workings and workplace tendencies in the intelligence agencies? What are your thoughts on Richards Heuer's work[0] on empirical methodologies to eliminate as much cognitive bias from analysts' assessments as possible (I've read a few techniques from his most recent book "Structured Analytic Techniques for Intelligence Analysis" but haven't read any of his earlier "Psychology of Intelligence Analysis" book). You mention burden of proof being lower for them than in police work, which might make sense given that it's a field where deception and operational secrecy are practically situational constants, but I guess I haven't gotten that impression from reading his work. I'm curious to hear what went into your conclusions.
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[ 4.3 ms ] story [ 15.0 ms ] thread[0]: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Richards_Heuer