Given the recent problems with collisions on Navy ships I might be a little nervous serving aboard one that is designed to defeat naval radar. It would be pretty embarrassing to sink the newest destroyer because some big cargo ship couldn't see it in the dark and ran over it.
That would be 100% the decision of the Captain who chose to sit in a busy shipping lane showing no lights. The civilians captains going about their legitimate business, in a shipping lane, showing running lights, and restricted in ability to manoeuvre, have been blameless in all collisions to date.
At over $4 Billion each, I'd hope they still get top class skippers. Whatever the training, recruitment, retention etc. costs the Navy it would be worth it.
If you look at pictures of the Zumwalts putting around, you'll see they have standard naval radars mounted atop the deckhouse. Also, with stealth aircraft it's common practice to attach reflectors when not on a mission to go blow someone up. I imagine it's the same for the ships.
No. That'd be like saying the US should stop making carriers because of the new India/Russia BrahMos cruise missile. Or the so called DF21 carrier killer from China.
These systems are primarily for fighting nations not named Russia and China. If China decides to sink a carrier or a Zumwalt, it's WW3, millions will die.
> These systems are primarily for fighting nations not named Russia and China.
But are those "nations not named Russia and China" realistically going to be able to do anything to a destroyer like this? Could they have realistically done anything to the previous generation of destroyers? It seems (to my uninformed eye) that these upgraded destroyers are almost comical in how far ahead of the technology that any adversary has (once again, those not named China and Russia).
Didn’t the attack on the USS Cole (a dinghy loaded with explosives driven by suicidal fanatics) demonstrated that being “comically far ahead” in therms of technology sometimes amounts for precious little?
Okay I understand that, makes sense. So this isn't so much about stealth not being worth pursuing as the Zumwalt having served its purpose as a technology demonstrator and experience/requirements gathering exercise, albeit one that cost more than intended? (We carry on with a new block of the Arleigh Burke class for the time being.)
Yeah. They're adapting the projectile developed by the railgun project to conventional powder guns. It'll end up being a much more affordable and practical approach.
As far as whether they'll end up on the Zumwalts? Who knows. The lack of a missile defense system on the Zumwalts has more or less made them pointless beyond research/development testbeds. We're just going to build more Burkes and upgrade existing ones instead, which is more cost effective on the whole.
It's not a binary thing. But the main limit of the Zumwalts in missile defense is lacking the right radars and the combat management software. There's a kinda long history to all this, and it's a little muddled. My understanding of roughly what happened is originally a larger stealth cruiser design was going to handle missile defense, while the Zumwalts would handle strike. Then the cruiser project got canceled, so they started talking about adding the capabilities to the Zumwalts. That fell through when the development contract for the needed radar went to Raytheon (I don't fully understand why this killed it, seems to be something political?).
What no one in the navy wants to say clearly and openly is: the Zumwalts, as well as the 2 LCS designs, are pretty much useless as built. They won't be used for more than training, development testing, and perhaps mine sweeping duties.
Out of all 3 of those classes, the only fully capable ship anyone is talking about is a new, stretched version of the Freedom class LCS that tries to be a mini-frigate. And that's only getting talked about because foreign customers are interested.
I wouldn't be so negative. The money coming in allowed newbie engineers to get into the field and existing ones to get smarter and increase their skills. Not having such a project would lead to a vacuum in the knowledge required to do those sorts of projects (I don't believe the US has any other project of this sort underway). I'm sure they'll be able to learn from what went wrong to make the next project turn out better.
come on. There's a silver lining, sure. But it's still a massive failure. It's not a comparison between no project and a disastrous project, it's one between disastrous and successful.
Missile (not just, or even primarily) defense by US destroyers is, yes, in part a, but also defense of other assets, both shore assets and other ships, notably carriers and/or amphibious assault ships.
No one is expecting the Navy to have stealth carriers any time soon, even if naval stealth was reliable enough to obviate the need for missile defense.
> No one is expecting the Navy to have stealth carriers any time soon
I watched a lecture by one of the decision makers in the Ford class carrier development program.
They actually looked at a stealth carrier concept. You can shroud the deck and elevators with side walls that screen them from radars. But that creates huge problems with jet engines and acoustics, to the point that being on the deck even with ear protection would be very risky health wise. Also they'd be hideously expensive.
Seems like acoustic tiles would not be an impossible technology if you're already lining the other side with radar absorbent materials.
The bigger issue would be that for this to work you would have to make the entire carrier battle group stealthy, which would be beyond cost prohibitive.
Whats the advantage to these over the Arleigh Burke III's other than that these look cooler? It seems like you could have 2 or 3 of the Burke class for every one of these.
There's the stealth aspect, of course (which is a big difference from conventional ships like the Arleigh Burkes all by itself), and beyond that the Zumwalt class was supposed to incorporate a bunch of other next-generation features too: cutting-edge guns and missile-launch systems, an advanced permanent-magnet powerplant that could generate ten times the electrical power of conventional ones (which in turn would allow mounting things like beam weapons, when they became practical), new automated systems that allowed a crew half the size of a Burke's to operate the ship, and so forth. (See https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Zumwalt-class_destroyer#Design for a good overview.)
Trying to roll so many technical leaps forward into a single ship proved to be a big mistake, though, as many of those advances were never able to be practically realized and some of those that were ended up costing much more to develop than originally anticipated. So the Zumwalts have become kind of a white elephant; the cost overruns caused the Navy to eventually cut its order for the ships from 32 to just three, and those that will be delivered are unlikely to ever be as capable as they were originally planned to be.
> Given the sheer expense of the DDG-1000 class and its lack of certain ballistic missile defense capabilities—not to mention a number of outmoded technologies onboard—the Navy opted not to continue building the Zumwalt class. The three-ship class has cost the Navy $23 billion, with each ship coming in at roughly $4.25 billion per vessel when research and development is not factored in.
> In the medium term, the future of the Navy’s surface fleet lies with the new Flight III Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer—which BIW will start building starting with DDG-126 and DDG-127.
Not just Naval shipbuilding. I can think of a few contractors that could stand to get shaken up. Problem is you probably need an obscene amount of money and connections to get into that space.
I wonder how all these super expensive and complex weapons systems will do if there ever is an all-out war against an enemy who has access to advanced technology. It seems you should be able to bring down a 4 billion ship with a swarm of thousand drones for maybe 1 million each for the total cost of 1 billion. Same for aircraft carriers.
From what I have read about the maintenance needs of systems like the F-22 and B-2 someone who has simpler, easier to maintain airplanes should also have an advantage once things get busy.
> From what I have read about the maintenance needs of systems like the F-22 and B-2 someone who has simpler, easier to maintain airplanes should also have an advantage once things get busy.
Also from a numbers standpoint. They keep buying fewer and fewer airframes as costs rise, which I'd assume means they'd be very vulnerable to attrition against a peer adversary. High-tech planes aren't very helpful if you have none left or too few to risk.
You should read about the millenium wargames challenge. The US fleet was destroyed within the first 24 hours by a former vietnam era general using asymetric warfare and launched his planes via hand signals instead of radio etc.
That was interesting reading. Also a damming account on how the leadership of the U.S forces are not prepared to face the fact that they may be wrong about their capabilities.
A bug? I'm not sure the analogy holds. Why would the techniques used by the bad guy general not be available to a real adversary? Did he win by finding an exploit in the meta war-game (i.e. a cheat), or did he win fairly, entirely in the context of the game? I thought the latter.
The simulator teleported the "Blue Team" fleet right into harbor. They were not ordered to go there and were in fact ordered to stay away, precisely because that would lead to the possibility of boat attacks. I think that counts as a bug. The simulator also didn't account for the capacity of small boats, so allowed the boats to move much faster that reasonable for the amount of explosives they were supposedly carrying. That is probably not a cheat, just an exploitation of bad simulation rules, but also makes the results less demonstrative of the actual results of an engagement with Iran.
This is what’s disturbing about the way we contract these projects: we’re weaker because of cost-plus and an emphasis on expense over efficacy.
Compare the tanks of WWII. American Shermans (at first) were something of a death-trap in terms of armor and carried weaker armaments. But you could churn them out quickly and teach someone with a high school degree how to do maintenance. Germans went the opposite: high-tech behemoths that were fast, heavily armored, and big-gunned. They were hell to fight, but they also couldn’t be produced or maintained at anything close to the speed of a Sherman. And as it turns out, modern war is not just about having the best toy but the one the market can produce and replace reliably.
It seems to me that our extreme willingness for expense and new tech fetishism is putting us in the position of the Germans of last century—we’ll win all our short engagements but once we have to start replacing parts and vehicles, we’ll be hamstrung.
EDIT: and so as not to seem like I’m repeating the myth, I’ll link here to a little debunking—the Sherman wasn’t a bad tank, just not a particularly cutting-edge one:
There is a lot of vested interests in the Sherman Debate
Should the USA have fitted the Hot 76.2 and more of the expensive ammo for D day
Or should have they have gone for the Brit conversion using the 17pounder - towards the end Brit doctrine was 50/50 firefly / stock Sherman.
Ok the 76.2 with the right ammo was good but they only had 2/3 rounds per tank of those as opposed to a British troop with 50% 17 pounders
There are rumours of Infantry generals delaying the introduction of the 76.2 as allegedly one had an interest in the factory that made 75's - There is also the NIH aspect in refusing the funnies in American Beaches.
We'll never fight an all out war like that ever again. Future wars will be cold and take place in cyber space and the media. These systems are meant to be deterrents and symbols of financial might.
A war with China over Taiwan, for example, wouldn't be a total war (at first, god willing). But it would be one that would have the US pitted against a foe with better technology than we've ever faced, even if they can't easily project much non-nuclear force into our territory.
People in the 20th century didn't think WWI would happen, because it would be incredibly stupid to blow up yourself and your trading partners. We did it anyway, and underestimating our capacity for self-destruction invites it.
A war with China would be even more destructive for China than for the US.
The entire Chinese economy is oriented around global trade in the neoliberal system built post-WW2. In the scenario you're outlining, the entire country would face massive food shortages and the resulting riots would quickly force the elite from power.
The big difference between now and pre-WW1 is that back then most countries were still able to be self sufficient at their then-current living standards. Trade was more for domination and luxuries, not basic necessities. It's impossible to maintain current living standards without extensive trade.
Edit: Re capacity for self destruction, we have a far higher (IMO 1,000x) risk of permanently dooming our planet via climate change or chemical pollution than armed warfare. The solution is unprecedented global cooperation, which also lowers the risk of a WW type scenario. So I think we're on the same page wrt that.
Operative words being "like that" :) I absolutely believe war is possible, maybe inevitable. My point is it'll be of a veery different kind, so precedent examples may not apply.
SpaceX works because a lot of people want to put satellites in orbit. In a time of unprecedented peace, how many navy ships do we realistically want to be building?
$4.25B/ship is the wrong way to frame it. Think of it as $23B to keep our shipbuilding expertise current, to make sure we have the capability to build navy ships that incorporate a bunch of cutting-edge technologies (some of which have worked out and some of which haven't, as is the nature of cutting-edge technologies). If a shooting war started to look likely we'd be building a lot more than 3 of them and the unit cost would come way down.
F-35 costs have come way down (~80M each for the latest signed contracts, if I recall, definitely below 100M), largely because we are building so so many of them, and tests seem to suggest it is an excellent plane (like the Red Flag tests of last year).
No, the F-35 is the opposite in a way: we're building thousands of them, piling on to the programme cost, in order to make the unit cost number looks smaller. Most of the F-35 isn't really cutting-edge technology; the F-22 is ahead of it in some respects. The lift fan business is cutting-edge, compromising the design even in the variants that don't use it; it would be much more appropriate for a small-production-run high-tech programme like the Zumwalts.
Maybe there was space for a ground attack aircraft for the Navy and Air Force that could replace the F/A-18 and the A-10. But expecting the same plane to also replace the Harrier was a mistake, as was stopping production of the F-22.
Waste is the entire point of the exercise. Massive spending on complex military hardware is the New Deal of the post-Reagan era.
The F-35 is widely regarded as a complete fiasco - massively over-budget, ineffective in most combat roles and plagued with defects. After 20 years and $1.5 trillion in spending commitments, it's still not contributing to the strategic defense interests of the US; many analysts think that the F-35 is simply incapable of being made combat-ready.
To see the actual point of the program, you need to look at Lockheed Martin's Economic Impact Report. 32,000 direct and 138,000 indirect jobs. 1,400 suppliers across 46 states and Puerto Rico. It's not a multi-role fighter aircraft, it's a pork barrel with wings. It's politically unstoppable - a Democrat legislator can vote against wasteful military spending, a Republican legislator can vote against expensive job creation schemes, but nobody can vote against both.
It's even worse than what you're saying here, because the Initial Operational Test & Evaluation that will tell if the F-35 is actually effective for combat hasn't begun yet (scheduled to begin later in 2018).
Because of a recent "Software Engineering Daily" episode about modern warfare, I just finished reading "Ghost Fleet", a fictional book from a few years ago which features this Zumwalt-class destroyer in a war between the US and a joint China-Russia alliance. It was a fun read.
I wonder what would have happened if they took all that development money, didn't worry at all about stealth, and just tried to make it as unsinkable as possible.
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[ 5.1 ms ] story [ 112 ms ] threadThese systems are primarily for fighting nations not named Russia and China. If China decides to sink a carrier or a Zumwalt, it's WW3, millions will die.
But are those "nations not named Russia and China" realistically going to be able to do anything to a destroyer like this? Could they have realistically done anything to the previous generation of destroyers? It seems (to my uninformed eye) that these upgraded destroyers are almost comical in how far ahead of the technology that any adversary has (once again, those not named China and Russia).
So that _nations_ can have access to pretty advanced technologies.
As far as whether they'll end up on the Zumwalts? Who knows. The lack of a missile defense system on the Zumwalts has more or less made them pointless beyond research/development testbeds. We're just going to build more Burkes and upgrade existing ones instead, which is more cost effective on the whole.
What no one in the navy wants to say clearly and openly is: the Zumwalts, as well as the 2 LCS designs, are pretty much useless as built. They won't be used for more than training, development testing, and perhaps mine sweeping duties.
Out of all 3 of those classes, the only fully capable ship anyone is talking about is a new, stretched version of the Freedom class LCS that tries to be a mini-frigate. And that's only getting talked about because foreign customers are interested.
It's an incredible waste of taxpayers money.
I wouldn't be so negative. The money coming in allowed newbie engineers to get into the field and existing ones to get smarter and increase their skills. Not having such a project would lead to a vacuum in the knowledge required to do those sorts of projects (I don't believe the US has any other project of this sort underway). I'm sure they'll be able to learn from what went wrong to make the next project turn out better.
No one is expecting the Navy to have stealth carriers any time soon, even if naval stealth was reliable enough to obviate the need for missile defense.
I watched a lecture by one of the decision makers in the Ford class carrier development program.
They actually looked at a stealth carrier concept. You can shroud the deck and elevators with side walls that screen them from radars. But that creates huge problems with jet engines and acoustics, to the point that being on the deck even with ear protection would be very risky health wise. Also they'd be hideously expensive.
The bigger issue would be that for this to work you would have to make the entire carrier battle group stealthy, which would be beyond cost prohibitive.
Trying to roll so many technical leaps forward into a single ship proved to be a big mistake, though, as many of those advances were never able to be practically realized and some of those that were ended up costing much more to develop than originally anticipated. So the Zumwalts have become kind of a white elephant; the cost overruns caused the Navy to eventually cut its order for the ships from 32 to just three, and those that will be delivered are unlikely to ever be as capable as they were originally planned to be.
but:
> Given the sheer expense of the DDG-1000 class and its lack of certain ballistic missile defense capabilities—not to mention a number of outmoded technologies onboard—the Navy opted not to continue building the Zumwalt class. The three-ship class has cost the Navy $23 billion, with each ship coming in at roughly $4.25 billion per vessel when research and development is not factored in.
> In the medium term, the future of the Navy’s surface fleet lies with the new Flight III Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer—which BIW will start building starting with DDG-126 and DDG-127.
Flight III Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyer: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arleigh_Burke-class_destroyer#...
Naval shipbuilding needs a SpaceX.
Not just Naval shipbuilding. I can think of a few contractors that could stand to get shaken up. Problem is you probably need an obscene amount of money and connections to get into that space.
From what I have read about the maintenance needs of systems like the F-22 and B-2 someone who has simpler, easier to maintain airplanes should also have an advantage once things get busy.
Also from a numbers standpoint. They keep buying fewer and fewer airframes as costs rise, which I'd assume means they'd be very vulnerable to attrition against a peer adversary. High-tech planes aren't very helpful if you have none left or too few to risk.
Compare the tanks of WWII. American Shermans (at first) were something of a death-trap in terms of armor and carried weaker armaments. But you could churn them out quickly and teach someone with a high school degree how to do maintenance. Germans went the opposite: high-tech behemoths that were fast, heavily armored, and big-gunned. They were hell to fight, but they also couldn’t be produced or maintained at anything close to the speed of a Sherman. And as it turns out, modern war is not just about having the best toy but the one the market can produce and replace reliably.
It seems to me that our extreme willingness for expense and new tech fetishism is putting us in the position of the Germans of last century—we’ll win all our short engagements but once we have to start replacing parts and vehicles, we’ll be hamstrung.
EDIT: and so as not to seem like I’m repeating the myth, I’ll link here to a little debunking—the Sherman wasn’t a bad tank, just not a particularly cutting-edge one:
http://knowledgeglue.com/dispelling-myths-surrounding-m4-she...
Or should have they have gone for the Brit conversion using the 17pounder - towards the end Brit doctrine was 50/50 firefly / stock Sherman.
Ok the 76.2 with the right ammo was good but they only had 2/3 rounds per tank of those as opposed to a British troop with 50% 17 pounders
There are rumours of Infantry generals delaying the introduction of the 76.2 as allegedly one had an interest in the factory that made 75's - There is also the NIH aspect in refusing the funnies in American Beaches.
We knew this once - hence the F16. But it has been forgotten, while there are F16s still flying!
People in the 20th century didn't think WWI would happen, because it would be incredibly stupid to blow up yourself and your trading partners. We did it anyway, and underestimating our capacity for self-destruction invites it.
The entire Chinese economy is oriented around global trade in the neoliberal system built post-WW2. In the scenario you're outlining, the entire country would face massive food shortages and the resulting riots would quickly force the elite from power.
The big difference between now and pre-WW1 is that back then most countries were still able to be self sufficient at their then-current living standards. Trade was more for domination and luxuries, not basic necessities. It's impossible to maintain current living standards without extensive trade.
Edit: Re capacity for self destruction, we have a far higher (IMO 1,000x) risk of permanently dooming our planet via climate change or chemical pollution than armed warfare. The solution is unprecedented global cooperation, which also lowers the risk of a WW type scenario. So I think we're on the same page wrt that.
I am not so sure about that. People said the same after WW1. Looking back at history we'll probably smash the planet again sometime in the future.
$4.25B/ship is the wrong way to frame it. Think of it as $23B to keep our shipbuilding expertise current, to make sure we have the capability to build navy ships that incorporate a bunch of cutting-edge technologies (some of which have worked out and some of which haven't, as is the nature of cutting-edge technologies). If a shooting war started to look likely we'd be building a lot more than 3 of them and the unit cost would come way down.
Maybe there was space for a ground attack aircraft for the Navy and Air Force that could replace the F/A-18 and the A-10. But expecting the same plane to also replace the Harrier was a mistake, as was stopping production of the F-22.
Waste is the entire point of the exercise. Massive spending on complex military hardware is the New Deal of the post-Reagan era.
The F-35 is widely regarded as a complete fiasco - massively over-budget, ineffective in most combat roles and plagued with defects. After 20 years and $1.5 trillion in spending commitments, it's still not contributing to the strategic defense interests of the US; many analysts think that the F-35 is simply incapable of being made combat-ready.
To see the actual point of the program, you need to look at Lockheed Martin's Economic Impact Report. 32,000 direct and 138,000 indirect jobs. 1,400 suppliers across 46 states and Puerto Rico. It's not a multi-role fighter aircraft, it's a pork barrel with wings. It's politically unstoppable - a Democrat legislator can vote against wasteful military spending, a Republican legislator can vote against expensive job creation schemes, but nobody can vote against both.