The best idea is to have a geographically- and meterologically-diverse network of bases, with enough capacity to shift your flyable assets in case of emergency. Which is basically what we have. And you do want bases as close to your borders as possible to gain the initiative when needed.
The failure here is the F-22 replacement parts supply chain, which is likely exacerbated by cancelling the program after purchasing about half of the promised aircraft.
Given a 2009 flyaway cost of $150 million each [1], 17 F-22s lost is about $3B in todays dollars. Seems like it's worth hardening Tyndall's buildings or scrapping the base and moving inland.
All the talk about flying them away, or not. You're storing billions in hardware next to a beach in hurricane country. Maybe drop 10 million -- hell, even 100 million -- for an elevated bunker rated to survive the strongest possible storm?
Maybe cancel a few band practices -- or, a dumb-ass DC parade -- to pay for it.
The bunker doesn't have to be large enough to be a general working space. Just a safe, to toss the crown jewels in, when warranted. (And elevated, because storm surge, if that's a possible factor.)
I’d have thought that military aircraft hangars could withstand a hurricane. They are supposed to serve in times of war, after all. I’d think they’d be built to survive a somewhat near miss from a nuke.
I might take a snippy tone myself if ignorant people kept sending me the same stupid suggestions and questions. Most of his articles are somewhat "inside baseball" and assume that the reader has a certain baseline knowledge of policy and technology rather than explaining every little thing.
> I might take a snippy tone myself if ignorant people kept sending me the same stupid suggestions and questions.
And in that hypothetical, I guess I'd point out that if you are affected by such things, having a strong Twitter presence and making your web presence a sub-blog on an automotive website might be the wrong way to go about things.
> Most of his articles are somewhat "inside baseball" and assume that the reader has a certain baseline knowledge of policy and technology rather than explaining every little thing.
I didn't exactly feel like I was reading Aviation Week or something when I took a peek at his stuff. Hence my original question.
Yeah, an F-22 isn't a Toyota Camry. Some quick googling shows they require 12 maintenance man-hours for every hour of flight time. Given how quickly Michael ramped up, I wouldn't be surprised if those planes were simply caught in an unflyable state.
Any before/after pictures of the hanger? I guess not due to the sensitivity of the intelligence, but hard to believe hangers holding a few billion of jets weren’t fortified to withstand anything short of a nuclear blast.
This feels like one of those events that historians will look back upon as a signal of the decline of the American Empire that went unnoticed.
Yes, all the reasons listed in the article make sense. These reasons are the proximate cause for why the aircraft could not be saved. However, what we’re effectively saying is that we as a society have a defense system incapable of prioritizing a few million dollars in hangar cost to protect a few hundred million dollars in aircraft cost (think about how many weather events can be expected to happen over the 50yr life of the F22).
When the military industrial complex starts making such poor resource allocation decisions, something has gone horribly wrong. We’re just too afraid to admit it.
Not to mention, what’s the true capacity of the US defense network if there’s a series of bad weather events? What happens if a hurricane hits the east coast shortly after a major earthquake hits the west coast?
Are we training our enemies on our non-nuclear weak points?
Or perhaps something has gone “horribly right.” Now Lockheed gets to sell an additional 17 replacement jets. I would argue that the goal of the MIC isn’t to effectively allocate resources to defend the US (or even to expand US imperialism). It’s to make money for the MIC and keep the system going.
As someone who works for a large defense contractor, in my experience this lack of long-term thinking is endemic to the industry leadership as a whole, down to software developers often having to lobby and push for basic equipment, like workstations with the software required to run their code (not making this up). It's a very efficient business in terms of extracting revenue from the customer, the actual mission is almost always secondary or tertiary, much to the chagrin of the Engineers. And it's very complacent.
In theory there's competition, but in reality all the big contractors are roughly the same company with a different color scheme down to the salary grades. I've had co-workers whose customer shifted the contract from one big contractor to the other and the only thing that changed was his badge and health insurance provider.
It's actually a possible golden opportunity for any aspiring entrepreneurs willing to endure the politics and bullshit of working with the government. Regarding software, providing a better and cheaper product than the incumbents would not be difficult. The barriers would be human, but not necessarily insurmountable.
In 1952, 2/3 of the B-36 bomber force of USA knocked out in less than 30 minutes by tornados. And I'm pretty sure B-36 was the only strategic nuclear weapon delivery system at the time, as this was before nuclear powered submarines or ICBMs.
The B-29 wasn't strategic in terms of Cold War capability against the USSR, in fact SAC had downgraded it to 'medium bomber' in classification.
SAC did modify a few dozen with inflight refueling as the B-29MR but that required stripping off nearly all defensive armament and giving over half of the bomb capacity to fuel tanks. And even then the missions would be one-way:
http://b-29.org/charlie/charlie1.html
The developed B-50 was semi-strategic and had inflight refuelling capability from the outset.
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[ 3.3 ms ] story [ 54.5 ms ] threadThe failure here is the F-22 replacement parts supply chain, which is likely exacerbated by cancelling the program after purchasing about half of the promised aircraft.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Lockheed_Martin_F-22_Raptor
Maybe cancel a few band practices -- or, a dumb-ass DC parade -- to pay for it.
The bunker doesn't have to be large enough to be a general working space. Just a safe, to toss the crown jewels in, when warranted. (And elevated, because storm surge, if that's a possible factor.)
In 2016, the Air Force estimated $9.9 billion in non-recurring start-up costs. [^1]
[1]: https://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/06/21/the-f22-fight...
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24204/setting-the-recor...
I am also surprised The Air-force did not move the entirety of the fleet as it normally does when extreme weather is imminent.
http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24204/setting-the-recor...
And in that hypothetical, I guess I'd point out that if you are affected by such things, having a strong Twitter presence and making your web presence a sub-blog on an automotive website might be the wrong way to go about things.
> Most of his articles are somewhat "inside baseball" and assume that the reader has a certain baseline knowledge of policy and technology rather than explaining every little thing.
I didn't exactly feel like I was reading Aviation Week or something when I took a peek at his stuff. Hence my original question.
Fair. Technically correct would be 9% of Raptor airframes in the USAF inventory. Appreciate the correction.
The caveat is that the damaged airframes could be trainers, as many combat ready jets were moved prior to the storm.
Many of the aircraft were flown away: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=gGHKLfXTwvc
The aircraft that remained were likely unable to be evacuated: http://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/24204/setting-the-recor...
packed in pretty good.
AFter https://pbs.twimg.com/media/DpRVHdvVAAADoHd.jpg:large
I see couple of F16 with orange marking, but in top left corner, there is F22 tail
Wow, that hanger was completely destroyed. Unbelievably destructive storm. Those planes are toast.
Yes, all the reasons listed in the article make sense. These reasons are the proximate cause for why the aircraft could not be saved. However, what we’re effectively saying is that we as a society have a defense system incapable of prioritizing a few million dollars in hangar cost to protect a few hundred million dollars in aircraft cost (think about how many weather events can be expected to happen over the 50yr life of the F22).
When the military industrial complex starts making such poor resource allocation decisions, something has gone horribly wrong. We’re just too afraid to admit it.
Are we training our enemies on our non-nuclear weak points?
ATM there is no nation in the world with the ability to launch a conventional invasion of the USA, let alone have a chance of succeeding
In theory there's competition, but in reality all the big contractors are roughly the same company with a different color scheme down to the salary grades. I've had co-workers whose customer shifted the contract from one big contractor to the other and the only thing that changed was his badge and health insurance provider.
It's actually a possible golden opportunity for any aspiring entrepreneurs willing to endure the politics and bullshit of working with the government. Regarding software, providing a better and cheaper product than the incumbents would not be difficult. The barriers would be human, but not necessarily insurmountable.
http://www.tailsthroughtime.com/2010/06/prior-to-arrival-of-...
The 1952 Carswell AFB Tornado
In 1952, 2/3 of the B-36 bomber force of USA knocked out in less than 30 minutes by tornados. And I'm pretty sure B-36 was the only strategic nuclear weapon delivery system at the time, as this was before nuclear powered submarines or ICBMs.
SAC did modify a few dozen with inflight refueling as the B-29MR but that required stripping off nearly all defensive armament and giving over half of the bomb capacity to fuel tanks. And even then the missions would be one-way: http://b-29.org/charlie/charlie1.html
The developed B-50 was semi-strategic and had inflight refuelling capability from the outset.