Interesting... he became the most renowned military commander in European history by relinquishing his command to his subordinates. In effect, he pioneered not micromanaging.
Of course, there's more to it than just saying "do what you think is best" and calling it a day. Napoleon still needed to make high-level strategic decisions, he needed ensure his subordinates' individual initiative was in line with those strategic objectives (even harder if the officers are French aristocrats), and as usual he needed to completely re-invent logistics for his army to be able to take advantage of their flexibility (see also: Kanban). In a very real sense, he wasn't just a great general but invented an entirely new way of waging war.
Military analogies and examples are almost universally terrible when applied to software development (and business in general). That blog post cherry picks a few anecdotes from Napoleon's history and ignores his failure to learn from his mistakes. As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after defeating Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we defeated them in the same old way."
https://secure.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/wiki/Column_%28for...
Interesting...I had not heard the quote you cite. The French did the same as always but it was by no means an easy affair: "It has been a damned serious business... Blücher and I have lost 30,000 men. It has been a damned nice thing — the nearest run thing you ever saw in your life. ... By God! I don't think it would have been done if I had not been there." ("nice" meaning "precise").
I agree that it's not a perfect analogy, and perhaps shouldn't be taken as an analogy at all. That said, I don't think that means there's nothing to be learned from what did and didn't work. It's rather similar to how I like to reference Demming's 14 points in term of how to manage any business: obviously not all apply, but many do, and you can still learn valuable philosophy from the ones that don't.
"As his famed opponent Arthur Wellesley (Wellington) said after defeating Napoleon the final time: "They came on in the same old way and we defeated them in the same old way.""
Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.
Remembering Napoleon for Waterloo rather than Austerlitz, Ulm and Jena would be like remembering Hannibal for Zama. The fact that his name has become synonymous with his unremarkable defeat on that day, and that Wellington, a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, is somehow looked upon with favor in this country (America), even more so than his adversary who was an ally of America, who doubled the size of our country with the Louisiana Purchase and who actually planned on settling here after his second abdication, is a testament to the lasting power of the British anti-Bonapartist propaganda industry. More books were written about Napoleon in the 19th century than about any other man, living or dead, and most English languages books on him were written by Brits, and most of those books vilified him as the Corsican Ogre, the Great Usurper and so on. Were it not for this cottage industry that sprang up during the Napoleonic Era and lingered long after, most Americans would probably still have a favorable view of Napoleon as they did during his lifetime.
Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.
That's true, but Wellington defeated French armies numerous times. Indeed, I think this is why the quote is famous - instead of Napoleon being some magical fairy dust that made the French army invulnerable, Wellington was making the point that he'd defeated them before and the actual fighting at Waterloo unfolded much like it had in all of the other battles Wellington fought (eg, in the Peninsular campaign).
It also ignore just how close the battle was - indeed, most commentators think it is likely the French would have won if Napoleon had attacked Wellington earlier in the morning, instead of parading his army in an attempt to intimidate the British. (The argument is that he could have beaten the British before the Prussians arrived instead of having to split his forces). True or not, it does seem likely this was a mistake by Napoleon.
Wellington was a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, but in many ways he was a better manager of his army than Napoleon was. For example, he always made sure his armies were supplied with food without having to steal from the local population. It was Wellington's logistical innovations in India that allowed the British to subdue the sub-continent - despite French attempts to stop them.
Allow me to point out that anti-democratic in the context of the times (and especially Wellington) really means pro-monarchy. In other words, not for the oppression of the people that anti-democracy perhaps implies to the modern reader, but instead that monarchy is a better, more beneficial system for the people.
But prior to his European campaigns, Wellington served as Chief Secretary for Ireland and in that position was responsible for policies that would be considered very oppressive these days.
There is some evidence that he didn't agree with at least some of these policies (in particular I believe he tried to moderate the treatment on Irish tenants by English landholders).
But yeah.. attitudes really were different then, and you can't just interpret things the same way.
Also shows the problem of first followers in action.
All of Europe got smacked around for a while by this great disrupter, but eventually, they learned from Napoleon, found some weaknesses, and then broke him in the two key battles ending the Napoleonic Wars. He couldn't maintain his 'first mover' advantage.
I would have to think some of his defeat was because France was just depleted. It had undergone what was probably the most violent couple decades in history to that point, starting with the revolution, and during his second run, there wasn't much room for error.
Napoleon was innovative, but only covering his career to 1805 sort of ignores the final punchline. Over the next ten years he was repeatedly defeated by a coalition that could field larger armies, and slowly but surely stole (or improved on) all of his innovations. Thus demonstrating the "innovator's dilemma."
Battle of Austerlitz (1805): defeated the combined armies of the Austrian and Russian empire, which led to the collapse of the Third Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Coalition)
In conclusion, it wasn't larger coalitions improving on Napoleon's tactics that beat him. It was firstly the Russian winter, and secondly the superbly trained and professional British army (which used very different tactics)which first defeated his Marshals in the Peninsular campaign and then joined with the Prussians to beat him at Waterloo.
This article sounds really good at a high level, but it misses an important point.
Prior to the invention of the radio, lower level commanders always had to use their initiative when commanding their troops, because there was no reliable way to quickly communicate with their commanders during a battle.
It's disappointing this was missed, because it's an important point: Control needs to be proportional to communication.
Also:
They also were taught to live off the land by hunting and foraging. This decoupled the soldiers from the slow supply caravans and allowed them to remain independent for long periods of time.
The author probably should have pointed out that this tactic led to his armies in the Iberian peninsular being bled by attacks form the local population sick of having the crops stolen by "foraging" soldiers. It also led to the Russian disaster - the Russians left nothing for the French armies to forage, and so when winter came they ~all died.
100.000 out of 600.000 survived, and a lot of them were not french but from many places. They did not all died of starvation, many were killed fighting cossacks.
> Control needs to be proportional to communication.
First time I've heard of this, and I'm pretty sure there's good insight here somewhere (I don't think I've heard it mentioned anywhere), would be great if you can expand on it.
Thanks. I just made it up.. but I don't think it's anything complicated.
Control should only be exerted over things where you have sufficient knowledge. In a rapidly changing environment - be it business or battle - knowledge can only come via communication.
Strong centralized control can only work well in environments where communication is strong too. Otherwise decisions must be made with less knowledge than other parts of the organisation closer to the action the decision affects.
Napoleon practiced what is now known as Maneuver Warfare.
John Boyd - the guy who originated maneuver warfare formally studied spent his life learning this stuff. Patterns of conflict was a study of 2500 years of conflict and includes Napoleons campaigns.
The current startup culture of fast iteration is a very weak version of what Boyd produced. I'd advise anyone starting or running a business to read up on the subject Boyds' work will tell you what you can and cannot achieve and how to go about doing it.
“Crew resource management” (there’s a good Wikipedia article on it) is another interesting application of Boyd’s ideas. In a nutshell, it’s the training that cockpit crews use to make decisions in quickly-changing environments like emergencies. It has the advantage of lots and lots of testing, which not all Boyd’s ideas do.
Fairly interesting, but a bit surprised that he missed one of the most surprising elements of Napolean's innovations: canned food. Modern war is largely a question of logistics, and canned goods (over foraging) gave them the ability to keep food edible longer over greater distance. Of course, not even canned food could give them victory over the russian winter.
This is only peripherally related. But since we are on the topic of Napoleon...
Charles Joseph Minard created and published a flow map of "Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812"[1]. This graphic is way ahead of it's time. It provides so much information in such a concise and clear form that it's hard to imagine that it was published in 1869.
Also see more information on Tufte's website[2][3]. That is how I originally found out about it.
Utter and complete crock. Armies had always requisitioned food. Hunting could never supply a substantial part of an army's needs. Napoleon drew in part from lessons learned by the French while assisting the Americans during the American Revolution. Etc. etc. etc.
But as business publications go, it's above average.
32 comments
[ 0.18 ms ] story [ 61.8 ms ] threadOf course, there's more to it than just saying "do what you think is best" and calling it a day. Napoleon still needed to make high-level strategic decisions, he needed ensure his subordinates' individual initiative was in line with those strategic objectives (even harder if the officers are French aristocrats), and as usual he needed to completely re-invent logistics for his army to be able to take advantage of their flexibility (see also: Kanban). In a very real sense, he wasn't just a great general but invented an entirely new way of waging war.
Business is not war.
http://books.google.com/books?id=Ni8Mc1b1ygAC&pg=PA185&#...
Cute, except that Waterloo was Wellington's one and only victory over Bonaparte. It was the only time they met on the battle field, and even then, Michel Ney made most of the tactical decisions (and mistakes) on that day.
Remembering Napoleon for Waterloo rather than Austerlitz, Ulm and Jena would be like remembering Hannibal for Zama. The fact that his name has become synonymous with his unremarkable defeat on that day, and that Wellington, a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, is somehow looked upon with favor in this country (America), even more so than his adversary who was an ally of America, who doubled the size of our country with the Louisiana Purchase and who actually planned on settling here after his second abdication, is a testament to the lasting power of the British anti-Bonapartist propaganda industry. More books were written about Napoleon in the 19th century than about any other man, living or dead, and most English languages books on him were written by Brits, and most of those books vilified him as the Corsican Ogre, the Great Usurper and so on. Were it not for this cottage industry that sprang up during the Napoleonic Era and lingered long after, most Americans would probably still have a favorable view of Napoleon as they did during his lifetime.
That's true, but Wellington defeated French armies numerous times. Indeed, I think this is why the quote is famous - instead of Napoleon being some magical fairy dust that made the French army invulnerable, Wellington was making the point that he'd defeated them before and the actual fighting at Waterloo unfolded much like it had in all of the other battles Wellington fought (eg, in the Peninsular campaign).
It also ignore just how close the battle was - indeed, most commentators think it is likely the French would have won if Napoleon had attacked Wellington earlier in the morning, instead of parading his army in an attempt to intimidate the British. (The argument is that he could have beaten the British before the Prussians arrived instead of having to split his forces). True or not, it does seem likely this was a mistake by Napoleon.
Wellington was a reactionary, anti-democratic, ennobled aristocrat, but in many ways he was a better manager of his army than Napoleon was. For example, he always made sure his armies were supplied with food without having to steal from the local population. It was Wellington's logistical innovations in India that allowed the British to subdue the sub-continent - despite French attempts to stop them.
But prior to his European campaigns, Wellington served as Chief Secretary for Ireland and in that position was responsible for policies that would be considered very oppressive these days.
There is some evidence that he didn't agree with at least some of these policies (in particular I believe he tried to moderate the treatment on Irish tenants by English landholders).
But yeah.. attitudes really were different then, and you can't just interpret things the same way.
All of Europe got smacked around for a while by this great disrupter, but eventually, they learned from Napoleon, found some weaknesses, and then broke him in the two key battles ending the Napoleonic Wars. He couldn't maintain his 'first mover' advantage.
Napoleon repeatedly defeated larger coalitions.
Battle of Austerlitz (1805): defeated the combined armies of the Austrian and Russian empire, which led to the collapse of the Third Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Third_Coalition)
Battle of Jena-Auerstedt (1806): defeated the Prussians, which led to the collapse of the Fourth Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fourth_Coalition)
Battle of Wagram (1809): defeated the Austrian army, which collapsed the Fifth Coalition (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/War_of_the_Fifth_Coalition)
In conclusion, it wasn't larger coalitions improving on Napoleon's tactics that beat him. It was firstly the Russian winter, and secondly the superbly trained and professional British army (which used very different tactics)which first defeated his Marshals in the Peninsular campaign and then joined with the Prussians to beat him at Waterloo.
[1] I guess they didn't get defeated, and the "bad Russian weather" was much better than the Mongolian weather they were used to
[2] And to some extent, the Rus tribe which founded Russia. Being Vikings, they probably found the "bad Russian weather" quite reasonable, too.
Prior to the invention of the radio, lower level commanders always had to use their initiative when commanding their troops, because there was no reliable way to quickly communicate with their commanders during a battle.
It's disappointing this was missed, because it's an important point: Control needs to be proportional to communication.
Also:
They also were taught to live off the land by hunting and foraging. This decoupled the soldiers from the slow supply caravans and allowed them to remain independent for long periods of time.
The author probably should have pointed out that this tactic led to his armies in the Iberian peninsular being bled by attacks form the local population sick of having the crops stolen by "foraging" soldiers. It also led to the Russian disaster - the Russians left nothing for the French armies to forage, and so when winter came they ~all died.
First time I've heard of this, and I'm pretty sure there's good insight here somewhere (I don't think I've heard it mentioned anywhere), would be great if you can expand on it.
Control should only be exerted over things where you have sufficient knowledge. In a rapidly changing environment - be it business or battle - knowledge can only come via communication.
Strong centralized control can only work well in environments where communication is strong too. Otherwise decisions must be made with less knowledge than other parts of the organisation closer to the action the decision affects.
It's a nice phrase and concept. If you could fluff it up a few hundred pages, you could get a business book of your own out of it...
The current startup culture of fast iteration is a very weak version of what Boyd produced. I'd advise anyone starting or running a business to read up on the subject Boyds' work will tell you what you can and cannot achieve and how to go about doing it.
http://radio-weblogs.com/0107127/stories/2003/02/08/oodaAndB...
Charles Joseph Minard created and published a flow map of "Napoleon's disastrous Russian campaign of 1812"[1]. This graphic is way ahead of it's time. It provides so much information in such a concise and clear form that it's hard to imagine that it was published in 1869.
Also see more information on Tufte's website[2][3]. That is how I originally found out about it.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Charles_Joseph_Minard and http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/29/Minard.pn...
[2] http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard
[3] http://www.edwardtufte.com/tufte/minard-obit
But as business publications go, it's above average.