> Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.
For those who have studied Philosophical Ethics in High School or Undergrad, you'll probably be familiar with the term "deontological" (lit. 'derived from god') but are perhaps not used to the term "consequentialist" or "consequentialism". Per the study, "consequentialism" is Utilitarianism, which may be more familiar to you.
> "...said to be making a “consequentialist” (or “utilitarian”) judgment in line with consequentialist ethical theories (Bentham, 1789/1983; Mill, 1863)."
Strictly, there are other forms of consequentialism besides utilitarianism, though utilitarianism is perhaps the most familiar.
Consequentialism means (duh) judging your morality based on the consequences of your actions. Utilitarianism means making that judgment in terms of some quantifiable "utility" or "value". But there are other ways to make that judgment, including applying intuition or even applying some kind of deontological deity-given rules.
The utilitarian framework is so broad that it can be extended to cover all of this, and to cover deontology for that matter ("utility is defined as following the rules of X ethical framework").
>The utilitarian framework is so broad that it can be extended to cover all of this, and to cover deontology for that matter ("utility is defined as following the rules of X ethical framework").
But for it to be utilitarianism you have to apply this universally. So making someone follow the ethical framework is just as good as following it yourself (something deontologists generally disagree with). The utilitarian calculus had to give actions that make other people follow the ethical framework a negative utility in such a way that you will always come out only following the ethical framework for yourself.
For example, a deontological ethic might say "you must not drive drunk" under a theory of negligence, and "you must not negotiate with terrorists", but a consequentialist ethic might say "you may drive drunk but not kill someone while driving" and "you should acquiesce to terroristic threats to prevent a murder". And a utilitarian ethic would measure how many lives would be lost under each choice, and perhaps assign variable value to those lives (by age or health or potential future productive output)
Hate to nitpick, but 'deont' in deontology does not come from the (latin) root "deus', rather from the Greek root 'deont' - that which pertains to duty.
Hhm, after researching a bit, it appears I was taught incorrectly. Thank you for pointing that out. Nevertheless, isn't that a very subtle distinction? If I define my sense of duty from God's will, isn't the contrast against utilitarianism more or less the same?
> One thing that clearly distinguishes Kantian deontologism from divine command deontology is that Kantianism maintains that man, as a rational being, makes the moral law universal, whereas divine command maintains that God makes the moral law universal.
I was taught that Kant was a devout Christian, but it appears that this is the subject of some debate...
> The nature of Kant's religious ideas continues to be the subject of philosophical dispute, with viewpoints ranging from the impression that he was an initial advocate of atheism who at some point developed an ontological argument for God, to more critical treatments epitomized by Nietzsche, who claimed that Kant had "theologian blood"
"His merit in this respect, therefore, is very great; yet justice requires that we also remember here, firstly that his exposition and argument are often not in keeping with the tendency and spirit ofhis ethics, as we shall see in a moment, and secondly that, even so,he is not the first to have purged virtue of all principles of happiness.For Plato, especially in the Republic, of which the main tendencyis precisely this, expressly teaches that virtue is to be chosen for itsown sake alone, even if unhappiness and ignominy should be in-evitably associated with it. But still more does Christianity preach awholly unselfish virtue, that is also practised not for the sake of thereward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously out of love forGod, inasmuch as works do not justify, but only faith which virtueaccompanies, as its mere symptom so to speak, and which thereforeappears quite gratuitously and of its own accord. See Luther's DeLibertate Christiana. I will not take at all into account the Indians,in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for our works iseverywhere described as the path of darkness which can never leadto the blissful state. However, we do not find Kant's doctrine ofvirtue so pure; or rather the presentation falls far short of the spirit,and has in fact lapsed into inconsistency. In his highest good, whichhe subsequently discussed, we find virtue wedded to happiness. Yetthe ought, originally so unconditioned, does postulate afterwards acondition for itself, really in order to be rid of the inner contradic-tion, burdened with which it cannot live. Now supreme happinessin the highest good should not really be the motive for virtue; yetit is there like a secret article, the presence of which makes all therest a mere sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue,but yet is a voluntary gift for which virtue, after work has beendone, stealthily holds its hand open. We can convince ourselves ofthis from the Critique of Practical Reason (pp. 223-266 of thefourth, or pp. 264-295 of the Rosenkranz edition). The whole ofKant's moral theology also has the same tendency, and on this veryaccount morality really destroys itself through moral theology. ForI repeat that all virtue in any way practised for the sake of a re-ward is based on a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism.Now the purport of the absolute ought, the fundamental law of practical reason, is the famous: "So act that the maxim of your willmight always be valid at the same time as the principle of a uni-versal legislation." This principle gives to the person who demandsa regulation for his own will, the task of seeking a regulation forthe will of all. The question then arises how such a regulation is tobe found. Obviously, to discover the rule of my conduct, I oughtnot to have regard to myself alone, but to the sum-total of all indi-viduals. Then instead of my own well-being, the well-being of allwithout distinction becomes my object and aim. This aim, however,still always remains well-being. I then find that all can be equallywell off only if each makes the egoism of others the limit of his own.It naturally follows from this that I ought not to injure anyone, sothat, since this principle is assumed to be universal, / also may notbe injured. This, however, is the only ground on account of whichI, not yet possessing a moral principle but only looking for one,can desire this to be a universal law. But obviously in this way thedesire for well-being, in other words egoism, remains the source ofthis ethical principle. As the basis of political science it would beexcellent; as the basis of ethics it is worthless. For the man who at-tempts to establish a regulation for the will of all, which is proposedin that moral principle, is himself in turn necessarily in need of aregulation, otherwise everything would be a matter of indifferenceto him. This regulation, however, can only be his own egoism, asthe conduct of others influences this alone. Therefore only by meansof this, and with respect to it, can that ma...
I see a lot more subtlety here than that. This is already a pop summary of work published in the "Journal of Experimental Social Psychology". Do we need to reduce every piece of information to a 10-word summary?
No mention of culture in the article, and apparently the Mechanical Turk population isn't actually that large[0], seems like this is likely to be a pretty WEIRD[1] result.
The WEIRD paper actually references evidence that altruistic behaviour is punished in some cultures (Figure 4), so to do a study of something similar without a good handle on the cultural background of the participants seems pretty trash.
The do have the nicest open science solution I've ever seen though, with very pretty Rweave (or some other notebook) renderings easily available: https://osf.io/xecdt/
This is a huge asterisk. It's hard to generalize the moral leanings of the entire population from mechanical turk. This study really only applies to a specific population of people.
I feel you're splitting some sort of grammatical and/or semantic hair there.
Like, for instance, what is the difference between "obesity is unattractive" and "the fat are unnatractive", really.
In "altruism is unattractive", it looks like there is a rhetorical device being used known as metonymy: referring to a subject indirectly by naming an attribute or adjunct of that subject in its place; it in fact means "altruists are unattractive".
A related piece from Jeremy Waldron on the topic of "moral distance":
"The parable of the Good Samaritan, as it has become known, is cited most often by moral philosophers to open a debate about the duty to rescue [...] We all agree that it was wrong for the thieves to attack the man, and that it would be equally wrong for the Samaritan, the priest, or the Levite to join in such an attack. The hard question is: do the Samaritan, the priest, or the Levite also have an obligation to help the man who fell among thieves?"
Exactly. I know altruists who don't take care of themselves but instead need help from others. They are sort of generous but I always wonder if they are really generous if in turn their lifestyle is not self sufficient. For example if somebody helped somebody else with a big vet bill but now I am being asked to buy a car for that person I feel that actually I am the real giver and the person that thinks she is generous is not giving anything of her own but basically is giving away my money.
I have come to believe that the first duty of an adult is to be self sufficient. Only then you can be truly generous or altruistic in a sustainable way.
I've been taking money from government, family, or wealthy friends most of my life. Yet I've also given more than I've received to most of the friends I've known. I've thought much about how selfish or generous I was. You can get really cynical and say that altruism doesn't exist at all if you really get cynical and that people are just trying to fire off pleasure receptors in their brains.
Ultimately though yes people who give to others are altruistic. Some people you will give money to will keep every penny, some will give away every cent they can. The former are selfish the latter altruistic and there is no need to overcomplicate things.
I've only become more self-sufficient over time and today am a net "giver". Did I just become less selfish over time? No I've actually started valuing selfishness MORE over time because it became more appealing as I became stronger. Focusing on results confuses things because people in bad situations CAN'T be as giving as somebody in a good one. Somebody in a good situation can be generous enough to change people's lives without any meaningful personal sacrifice.
A person who is a taker and has no desire to stop being one is not truly altruistic though. Selfishly taking from others and being performatively charitable is selfishness in the veil of altruism. The desire to be seen as the "real giver" is also selfish.
Deontological agents are the most predictable because they can tell you their moral rules, and if they aren't too complicated, you can "compute" them yourself if you're wondering what they are about to do. Consequentialists aren't predictable unless you know them so well that you can forecast all of their utility calculations, value judgements, and mistakes. Being able to predict someone's behaviors makes them a lot more trustworthy.
Nailed it. I'd go so far as to suggest that mere reliability - and not deontological ethics - is probably where all the effect is coming from. In the article's example, the problem with the anti-hawaii-trip partner is not that they care about victims of malaria, it's that they seem to be reneging on an agreement.
It comes down to trust. You trust those who are in your group, and whom you believe will consistently act in the interests of your group.
Consequentialists are distrusted because they deliberately choose to disregard social group weighting and circles of loyalty in their moral decisions.
That's not to say that all consequentialist actions are disliked; only those that come at significant cost to your group (of any size - even 2).
The article says that people like a consequentialist political leader, but that's not entirely correct. They like a political leader who is consequentialist for entirely "in-group" decisions. The moment he prioritizes outside peoples welfare at a high cost to his own, no matter how much objective "good" it brings, he'll soon find himself out of office. A leader who is too deontologist with his in-group decisions will be seen as corrupt for helping out his cronies.
In fact, this whole "consequentialist vs deontologist" kind of misses the point. Deontologists ARE consequentialists for entirely in-group decisions, and that's how social creatures like it, and how evolution would have shaped social animals.
Trump's appeal comes in a large part due to his motto: "America First", even if it's at the cost of everything else.
Also note how the label "do-gooder" is particularly often applied to people who care too much about foreigners or animals, but rarely to people who care too much about their friends.
They are probably not a utilitarian. They are probably suffering distorted deontology of an anti-self sort.
Pure consequentialism is computationally implausible. There are seven and a half billion humans. How can you consider them equally? How could you even have enough knowledge to try? I think that people who try to be consequentialist are emulating it and generally poorly.
You can't know exactly what is best, but you can act to the best of your knowledge. Just because you can't do something perfectly doesn't mean you shouldn't do it as well as possible.
Altruism is almost always false. It's usually selfish. People do things which are, on the surface, selfless and benevolent. But they do them because it makes them feel better in some way, or to assuage guilt, due to peer pressure, or increasingly due to pathological virtue signalling.
It's not necessarily bad when someone does something "altruistic" for these reasons, but the people who are the most visible and vocal about it are the ones who are the least honest about it. They are gaining (or at least think they are gaining) the most social credit, and they expect the most reciprocation. If you do something "kind" but expect or demand recognition, you're not altruistic; you're just taking your payment in other ways.
This manifests in myriad ways we've all seen: church bake sale tyrants, celebrity cause-o-holics, corporate misdirectors, activism tourists, etc. It's only altruism if it costs you something and you gain nothing in return. Even if you quietly and anonymously help others, but in turn sleep better at night and feel beatific, you're gaining something. If you think it'll get you into heaven or some other incorporeal reward, you're being selfish.
In almost all cases, this is a good thing, but true altruism doesn't exist.
... one of them being narcissism and the rationale is that self-centered people have higher chances of survival, therefore they're a good "genetic match."
> Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important.
I think that impartial beneficence applies as much to deontology as it does to consequentialism though, doesn't it? If I'm not mistaken, impartial beneficence is categorical under the Kingdom of Ends. Conversely, the assumption that consequentialism always leads to altruism mainly applies for utilitarianism, but not necessarily for all forms of consequentialism.
So I don't think it's a good idea to conflate deontology with in-group favoritism and vice versa as the article seems to imply.
47 comments
[ 2.6 ms ] story [ 89.2 ms ] threadAbstract:
> Previous work has demonstrated that people are more likely to trust “deontological” agents who reject harming one person to save many others than “consequentialist” agents who endorse such instrumental harms, which could explain the higher prevalence of non-consequentialist moral intuitions. Yet consequentialism involves endorsing not just instrumental harm, but also impartial beneficence, treating the well-being of every individual as equally important. In four studies (total N = 2086), we investigated preferences for consequentialist vs. non-consequentialist social partners endorsing instrumental harm or impartial beneficence and examined how such preferences varied across different types of social relationships. Our results demonstrate robust preferences for non-consequentialist over consequentialist agents in the domain of instrumental harm, and weaker – but still evident – preferences in the domain of impartial beneficence. In the domain of instrumental harm, non-consequentialist agents were consistently viewed as more moral and trustworthy, preferred for a range of social roles, and entrusted with more money in economic exchanges. In the domain of impartial beneficence, preferences for non-consequentialist agents were observed for close interpersonal relationships requiring direct interaction (friend, spouse) but not for more distant roles with little-to-no personal interaction (political leader). Collectively our findings demonstrate that preferences for non-consequentialist agents are sensitive to the different dimensions of consequentialist thinking and the relational context.
> "...said to be making a “consequentialist” (or “utilitarian”) judgment in line with consequentialist ethical theories (Bentham, 1789/1983; Mill, 1863)."
Consequentialism means (duh) judging your morality based on the consequences of your actions. Utilitarianism means making that judgment in terms of some quantifiable "utility" or "value". But there are other ways to make that judgment, including applying intuition or even applying some kind of deontological deity-given rules.
The utilitarian framework is so broad that it can be extended to cover all of this, and to cover deontology for that matter ("utility is defined as following the rules of X ethical framework").
But for it to be utilitarianism you have to apply this universally. So making someone follow the ethical framework is just as good as following it yourself (something deontologists generally disagree with). The utilitarian calculus had to give actions that make other people follow the ethical framework a negative utility in such a way that you will always come out only following the ethical framework for yourself.
From wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Deontological_ethics)
> One thing that clearly distinguishes Kantian deontologism from divine command deontology is that Kantianism maintains that man, as a rational being, makes the moral law universal, whereas divine command maintains that God makes the moral law universal.
I was taught that Kant was a devout Christian, but it appears that this is the subject of some debate...
Again from Wikipedia (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Immanuel_Kant):
> The nature of Kant's religious ideas continues to be the subject of philosophical dispute, with viewpoints ranging from the impression that he was an initial advocate of atheism who at some point developed an ontological argument for God, to more critical treatments epitomized by Nietzsche, who claimed that Kant had "theologian blood"
"His merit in this respect, therefore, is very great; yet justice requires that we also remember here, firstly that his exposition and argument are often not in keeping with the tendency and spirit ofhis ethics, as we shall see in a moment, and secondly that, even so,he is not the first to have purged virtue of all principles of happiness.For Plato, especially in the Republic, of which the main tendencyis precisely this, expressly teaches that virtue is to be chosen for itsown sake alone, even if unhappiness and ignominy should be in-evitably associated with it. But still more does Christianity preach awholly unselfish virtue, that is also practised not for the sake of thereward in a life after death, but quite gratuitously out of love forGod, inasmuch as works do not justify, but only faith which virtueaccompanies, as its mere symptom so to speak, and which thereforeappears quite gratuitously and of its own accord. See Luther's DeLibertate Christiana. I will not take at all into account the Indians,in whose sacred books the hope of a reward for our works iseverywhere described as the path of darkness which can never leadto the blissful state. However, we do not find Kant's doctrine ofvirtue so pure; or rather the presentation falls far short of the spirit,and has in fact lapsed into inconsistency. In his highest good, whichhe subsequently discussed, we find virtue wedded to happiness. Yetthe ought, originally so unconditioned, does postulate afterwards acondition for itself, really in order to be rid of the inner contradic-tion, burdened with which it cannot live. Now supreme happinessin the highest good should not really be the motive for virtue; yetit is there like a secret article, the presence of which makes all therest a mere sham contract. It is not really the reward of virtue,but yet is a voluntary gift for which virtue, after work has beendone, stealthily holds its hand open. We can convince ourselves ofthis from the Critique of Practical Reason (pp. 223-266 of thefourth, or pp. 264-295 of the Rosenkranz edition). The whole ofKant's moral theology also has the same tendency, and on this veryaccount morality really destroys itself through moral theology. ForI repeat that all virtue in any way practised for the sake of a re-ward is based on a prudent, methodical, far-seeing egoism.Now the purport of the absolute ought, the fundamental law of practical reason, is the famous: "So act that the maxim of your willmight always be valid at the same time as the principle of a uni-versal legislation." This principle gives to the person who demandsa regulation for his own will, the task of seeking a regulation forthe will of all. The question then arises how such a regulation is tobe found. Obviously, to discover the rule of my conduct, I oughtnot to have regard to myself alone, but to the sum-total of all indi-viduals. Then instead of my own well-being, the well-being of allwithout distinction becomes my object and aim. This aim, however,still always remains well-being. I then find that all can be equallywell off only if each makes the egoism of others the limit of his own.It naturally follows from this that I ought not to injure anyone, sothat, since this principle is assumed to be universal, / also may notbe injured. This, however, is the only ground on account of whichI, not yet possessing a moral principle but only looking for one,can desire this to be a universal law. But obviously in this way thedesire for well-being, in other words egoism, remains the source ofthis ethical principle. As the basis of political science it would beexcellent; as the basis of ethics it is worthless. For the man who at-tempts to establish a regulation for the will of all, which is proposedin that moral principle, is himself in turn necessarily in need of aregulation, otherwise everything would be a matter of indifferenceto him. This regulation, however, can only be his own egoism, asthe conduct of others influences this alone. Therefore only by meansof this, and with respect to it, can that ma...
People like you if you wouldn't sacrifice them for the benefit of the group.
They also say you like people more who spend their time and money on you and not on some strangers who need those resources more than you.
Anyway, I just wrote this "summary" because I had the impression the diction was a bit heavy for mere mortals :)
The WEIRD paper actually references evidence that altruistic behaviour is punished in some cultures (Figure 4), so to do a study of something similar without a good handle on the cultural background of the participants seems pretty trash.
The do have the nicest open science solution I've ever seen though, with very pretty Rweave (or some other notebook) renderings easily available: https://osf.io/xecdt/
[0]: https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2016/06/psychologists-grow-i... [1]: https://www2.psych.ubc.ca/~henrich/pdfs/WeirdPeople.pdf
https://www.reddit.com/r/philosophy/comments/cx7me3/morality...
Definition of altruism:
>unselfish regard for or devotion to the welfare of others charitable acts motivated purely by altruism
>behavior by an animal that is not beneficial to or may be harmful to itself but that benefits others of its species
edit after skimming the article: Perhaps they meant to say "Altruists are not always attractive"
Like, for instance, what is the difference between "obesity is unattractive" and "the fat are unnatractive", really.
In "altruism is unattractive", it looks like there is a rhetorical device being used known as metonymy: referring to a subject indirectly by naming an attribute or adjunct of that subject in its place; it in fact means "altruists are unattractive".
"The parable of the Good Samaritan, as it has become known, is cited most often by moral philosophers to open a debate about the duty to rescue [...] We all agree that it was wrong for the thieves to attack the man, and that it would be equally wrong for the Samaritan, the priest, or the Levite to join in such an attack. The hard question is: do the Samaritan, the priest, or the Levite also have an obligation to help the man who fell among thieves?"
https://eportfolios.macaulay.cuny.edu/menonfall16/files/2016...
The ideal, surely, is someone who looks after themselves, their partner and their friends foremost and the group after that.
When those two things come into conflict, however...
I have come to believe that the first duty of an adult is to be self sufficient. Only then you can be truly generous or altruistic in a sustainable way.
Ultimately though yes people who give to others are altruistic. Some people you will give money to will keep every penny, some will give away every cent they can. The former are selfish the latter altruistic and there is no need to overcomplicate things.
I've only become more self-sufficient over time and today am a net "giver". Did I just become less selfish over time? No I've actually started valuing selfishness MORE over time because it became more appealing as I became stronger. Focusing on results confuses things because people in bad situations CAN'T be as giving as somebody in a good one. Somebody in a good situation can be generous enough to change people's lives without any meaningful personal sacrifice.
A person who is a taker and has no desire to stop being one is not truly altruistic though. Selfishly taking from others and being performatively charitable is selfishness in the veil of altruism. The desire to be seen as the "real giver" is also selfish.
Consequentialists are distrusted because they deliberately choose to disregard social group weighting and circles of loyalty in their moral decisions.
That's not to say that all consequentialist actions are disliked; only those that come at significant cost to your group (of any size - even 2).
The article says that people like a consequentialist political leader, but that's not entirely correct. They like a political leader who is consequentialist for entirely "in-group" decisions. The moment he prioritizes outside peoples welfare at a high cost to his own, no matter how much objective "good" it brings, he'll soon find himself out of office. A leader who is too deontologist with his in-group decisions will be seen as corrupt for helping out his cronies.
In fact, this whole "consequentialist vs deontologist" kind of misses the point. Deontologists ARE consequentialists for entirely in-group decisions, and that's how social creatures like it, and how evolution would have shaped social animals.
Trump's appeal comes in a large part due to his motto: "America First", even if it's at the cost of everything else.
Pure consequentialism is computationally implausible. There are seven and a half billion humans. How can you consider them equally? How could you even have enough knowledge to try? I think that people who try to be consequentialist are emulating it and generally poorly.
It always happens and is a fact of life. That's how you can gauge how "lawful" someone is - using simple D&D model of morality.
The other axis is altruism vs egoism.
So lawful good is deontological altruist, while chaotic evil is non-deontological egoist. There are decent stereotypical descriptions in SRD.
https://open5e.com/characters/background.html
It's not necessarily bad when someone does something "altruistic" for these reasons, but the people who are the most visible and vocal about it are the ones who are the least honest about it. They are gaining (or at least think they are gaining) the most social credit, and they expect the most reciprocation. If you do something "kind" but expect or demand recognition, you're not altruistic; you're just taking your payment in other ways.
This manifests in myriad ways we've all seen: church bake sale tyrants, celebrity cause-o-holics, corporate misdirectors, activism tourists, etc. It's only altruism if it costs you something and you gain nothing in return. Even if you quietly and anonymously help others, but in turn sleep better at night and feel beatific, you're gaining something. If you think it'll get you into heaven or some other incorporeal reward, you're being selfish.
In almost all cases, this is a good thing, but true altruism doesn't exist.
... one of them being narcissism and the rationale is that self-centered people have higher chances of survival, therefore they're a good "genetic match."
I think that impartial beneficence applies as much to deontology as it does to consequentialism though, doesn't it? If I'm not mistaken, impartial beneficence is categorical under the Kingdom of Ends. Conversely, the assumption that consequentialism always leads to altruism mainly applies for utilitarianism, but not necessarily for all forms of consequentialism.
So I don't think it's a good idea to conflate deontology with in-group favoritism and vice versa as the article seems to imply.