>RSA sells its own fraud detection systems based on user and account profiling ... They should have applied these techniques to their own internal systems.
As they were using a network observer which wasn't as sophisticated as other tools they make and sell.
I don't know why you ask, it's right next paragraph to your quote. But let's save other people the time to check:
> The irony though with RSA is that they don’t eat their own dog food.
> In other words, they relied on yesterday’s best of breed tools to
> prevent and detect the attack. They gave a lot of credit to NetWitness
> for helping them find the attack in real time but they obviously weren’t
> able to stop the attack in real time, which means the signals and
> scores weren’t high enough to cause a person to shut down the attack
> in real time.
>
> RSA sells its own fraud detection systems based on user and account
> profiling which use statistical Beysian models, and rules, to
> spot abnormal behavior and intervene in real time to re-authenticate
> users and verify the authenticity of suspect access, behavior, or
> transactions. (RSA appears in the leaders quadrant of Gartner’s 2010
> Web Fraud Detection Magic Quadrant). They should have applied these
> techniques to their own internal systems. They need to stay innovative
> and apply the lessons learned from serving their clients to their own
> internal enterprise systems.
I was really hoping it would be something at least somewhat interesting like an SQL injection vulnerability or some kind of 0-day (EDIT: in external facing system/service), for the sake of RSA.
But no, it was email attachments (EDIT: granted, with an Excel 0-day). Email attachments???!! Says a lot about the effectiveness of security awareness training. Fear the APT.
If it's as they describe they did have a 0-day used on them. The email attachments, which were excel spreadsheets with an embedded flash exploit apparently were the source of the 0-day report documented in CVE-2011-0609 and published on Mar 14. The RSA attack was reported on Mar 17.
While there is definitely something to be said for what you're saying about "omg, email attack" the other side of the coin is that spearphishing is the most popular/common attack vector because it works.
It's a good reminder that with ubiquity comes an increased focus on security. I'm much more conscious of the security problems with Flash after a lot of recent news about it. However, it isn't necessarily because it's any less secure than other applications, just that it's ubiquitous and therefore a more likely avenue of attack.
I can't believe the person who wrote this is legitimately knowledgeable about this industry or the relevant tech. Phonetically misspelling "Bayesian" as "Beysian", while hardly a deal-breaker or even worth notice from someone non-technical, is a giant red flag from someone trying to sell themselves as a technically competent analyst.
Skip to the appendix if you don't want to read irrelevant comparisons to U-Boats and stealth aircraft.
Even there, the details are light. They got spearphished with excel files with flash payloads (CVE-2011-0609). Those installed "Poison Ivy" (some remote admin a la vnc/rdp). They spread out from those points attacking other accounts/computers/servers. They looked around for interesting things, put it in passworded RARs and FTPed them out to other compromised (non-RSA) servers (apparently "Good[DOT]mincesur[DOT]com | up82673[DOT]hopto[DOT]org | www[DOT]cz88[DOT]net").
There is very little useful information in their breakdown. Everything they mention is standard fair, certainly not something special to "Advanced Persistent Threats". The flash vuln (with excel files) has been known for weeks. There is no discussion of what the attackers actually managed to get their hands on.
Agreed that all of the "omg, APT" in there comes off pretty badly in light of the reported details. APT has more or less been poisoned as a term lately (see comodo, etc.) and amounts to the latest scapegoat scenario. "See, we can't be blamed! It's an APT!" is what I'm betting the RSA board hopes is the take away here.
Of course they could also know something pretty significant that they're not telling. What was taken and how tough it was to get at internally could be a flag. If there was a really significant or telling element to the attack it may well be that they've been asked not to reveal it. Not that I'd bet on that side of the line.
There is a US-CERT EWIN that makes it seem like either it was, or someone wanted people to think it was. Which does of course not narrow it down a ton, but c'est la vie.
Ah, many thanks :) It was being thrown around all over, but no explanation.
>Threat – means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack, rather than a mindless and automated piece of code. The operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well funded.
Seems odd to specify "mindless and automated piece of code". Does this mean Stuxnet wasn't a "Threat"? I'd say it fit all those requirements - specific goal, wide-ranging tech use, and everyone saw it coming but nobody managed to stop it.
Stuxnet definitely fits the definition (with a bullet).
It's wikipedia with all the associated baggage. I'd guess what they meant to draw a distinction from was the automated bots/worms out there that just rattle the windows of hundreds of thousands of sites with for known vulnerabilities. Then they install something relatively innocuous like an ad for scareware AV similar to the current huge SQLi attack.
What RSA's SecurID customers really want to know is what specific information regarding SecurID got compromised, and what are the implications for the security of SecurID itself. Which neither RSA's official post[1], nor Gartner's writeup, seems to tell me.
(Knowing the details of how RSA got spearphished is interesting, I suppose, but it leaves out the really important bits.)
Is this another reason to laud Apple for not shipping Flash on their Macs (or iOS devices for that matter)?
Having a fully scriptable, ubiquitous environment like Flash installed systemwide just increases your attack vectors. I'm not blaming Adobe here as much as recognizing that 0-day vulnerabilities will always exist.
Microsoft office aside (if you need to use, it's going to be installed), perhaps there will now be pressure to remove and ban Flash from work environments.
25 comments
[ 2.6 ms ] story [ 86.4 ms ] threadI don't think she understands what eating your dogfood means.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Eating_your_own_dog_food
As they were using a network observer which wasn't as sophisticated as other tools they make and sell.
But no, it was email attachments (EDIT: granted, with an Excel 0-day). Email attachments???!! Says a lot about the effectiveness of security awareness training. Fear the APT.
https://www.adobe.com/support/security/advisories/apsa11-01....
While there is definitely something to be said for what you're saying about "omg, email attack" the other side of the coin is that spearphishing is the most popular/common attack vector because it works.
Anatomy of an Attack
http://blogs.rsa.com/rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/
Skip to the appendix if you don't want to read irrelevant comparisons to U-Boats and stealth aircraft.
Even there, the details are light. They got spearphished with excel files with flash payloads (CVE-2011-0609). Those installed "Poison Ivy" (some remote admin a la vnc/rdp). They spread out from those points attacking other accounts/computers/servers. They looked around for interesting things, put it in passworded RARs and FTPed them out to other compromised (non-RSA) servers (apparently "Good[DOT]mincesur[DOT]com | up82673[DOT]hopto[DOT]org | www[DOT]cz88[DOT]net").
There is very little useful information in their breakdown. Everything they mention is standard fair, certainly not something special to "Advanced Persistent Threats". The flash vuln (with excel files) has been known for weeks. There is no discussion of what the attackers actually managed to get their hands on.
Of course they could also know something pretty significant that they're not telling. What was taken and how tough it was to get at internally could be a flag. If there was a really significant or telling element to the attack it may well be that they've been asked not to reveal it. Not that I'd bet on that side of the line.
Domains used in the attack included:
www .usgoodluck .com
obama .servehttp .com
prc .dynamiclink .ddns .us
http://krebsonsecurity.com/2011/03/domains-used-in-rsa-attac...
>Threat – means that there is a level of coordinated human involvement in the attack, rather than a mindless and automated piece of code. The operators have a specific objective and are skilled, motivated, organized and well funded.
Seems odd to specify "mindless and automated piece of code". Does this mean Stuxnet wasn't a "Threat"? I'd say it fit all those requirements - specific goal, wide-ranging tech use, and everyone saw it coming but nobody managed to stop it.
It's wikipedia with all the associated baggage. I'd guess what they meant to draw a distinction from was the automated bots/worms out there that just rattle the windows of hundreds of thousands of sites with for known vulnerabilities. Then they install something relatively innocuous like an ad for scareware AV similar to the current huge SQLi attack.
(Knowing the details of how RSA got spearphished is interesting, I suppose, but it leaves out the really important bits.)
[1] http://blogs.rsa.com/rivner/anatomy-of-an-attack/
Having a fully scriptable, ubiquitous environment like Flash installed systemwide just increases your attack vectors. I'm not blaming Adobe here as much as recognizing that 0-day vulnerabilities will always exist.
Microsoft office aside (if you need to use, it's going to be installed), perhaps there will now be pressure to remove and ban Flash from work environments.