I don't understand how this would solve the counterfeiting problem. What prevents the counterfeiters from getting a legitimate device, reading whatever is displayed on this temporary chip, then putting that value on their own counterfeit's temporary chips?
What prevents someone who's tampering with a device to rewrite the chip using the previously displayed value (or replace the chip) as to reset the time limit?
I don't see what kind of attack vector this mitigates.
It sounds like the "barcode" is damaged if you open it. So, assuming it's something you need to open to make a copy, it's "anti-counterfeiting". If the chip is copyable from external connections, it's "anti tamper".
This seems like old EPROM tech where (UV) light would erase the chip: https://hackaday.com/2018/01/17/improvising-an-eprom-eraser/ -- Credit Card reader terminals had these chips inside of them so upon disassembly, it'd delete the encryption keys inside of the machine.
They also had a battery that if it ran out, would wipe temporary keys.
Great! So in the future, chances are, I'll brick my laptop or have a permanent message on POST if I replace their Wi-Fi card with a better one or if I replace the screen at home.
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[ 3.3 ms ] story [ 23.2 ms ] threadWhat prevents someone who's tampering with a device to rewrite the chip using the previously displayed value (or replace the chip) as to reset the time limit?
I don't see what kind of attack vector this mitigates.
They also had a battery that if it ran out, would wipe temporary keys.
This seems like similar tech.
Wait… what? What's the point of this if you can re-write the original message on it after tampering with the chip?