Time for a new, (even more) decentralized, anonymous internet compatible with what we have now, yet independent of it? Phantom aims to build something like this.
The link is pretty scarce on details, basically just a bulleted list of abstract nice-to-haves for a theoretical anonymous network. More detail would be greatly appreciated; users shouldn't have to go into the code to find out how something like this works.
For instance, how is this an improvement over I2P? Phantom should really take a note from I2P's website on what constitutes an adequate amount of exposition to get people to learn about and try your anonymous network.
I glanced around and didn't see it, even though I loaded the wiki's MainPage. Nonetheless, I don't really have much motivation to download a PDF in the first place, but having done so, I don't have enough motivation to try to read this 58-page white paper just to find out the basics of how this works. They need to write an executive summary and a basic overview of its mechanisms, totaling <= 5 pages tops. It's totally unrealistic to expect people to 1) find your obscure links, 2) download a PDF or other external resource to learn anything about your product, and 3) sit down and read a 58-page white paper as an introduction. If someone is really interested in technical details because they're considering development on the project, or something like that, then this is reasonable, but not for people that you expect to be users.
Maybe, just maybe, they don't have an obligation to cater to your expectations of how they must describe their network. Maybe the people they're trying to reach are happy with a white paper. Maybe they're not great writers, designers or marketers and would rather spend their time working on their product.
Maybe, and that's fine. I'm just trying to help set expectations and comment generally on why this kind of thing is a bad idea if you want to attract users. Most people are not going to read 58 pages to learn about how this works; that should be obvious even to bad marketers. If they don't care and only want users that cared enough to read the white paper (or were careless enough to use the network with almost no technical detail), that's their prerogative and they're welcome to it. :)
The problem is the five-page people tend to be the bike shedders. They don't understand the system well enough to provide good feedback, so start pointing out inconsequential things, causing diversion from getting stuff done.
Alternatively, the people who wax lyrical for 60 or so pages don't understand much either, and are compelled to pad out their document.
I remember seeing this a while ago, but I didn't pay much attention to it then, because punishing those who understand the problems with a lengthy verbose soliloquy isn't a good strategy for disseminating information.
:-)
The other problem is that something 60 pages long without any references or citations beyond an occasional casual link to wikipedia, smacks of reinventing the wheel. This would be why he can go for 60 pages without mentioning known terms like "Cybil Attack", or "Onion Routing".
This white paper smells more of bikeshedding - there was no code and right at the bottom of the document, you can see the caveat & apology "This white paper is in no way a complete protocol specification, far from it actually. Its main goal is rather to provide suggestions for solutions for several typical problems [...] which could hopefully work as some kind of reference point for any discussions that may be inspired by it."
I think my favourite part of the paper is where he handwaves PKI & Voting atop of a DHT to 'solve' lots of problems, without realising those are the genuinely hard problems people are still working on.
A close runner-up is in the slides he talks about "no central point of failure" and then explains his "Manual Override Command Support", which is a central point of abuse.
It is nice to see that someone is finally writing code for it, and I wish them luck working out all of the details left out in the paper, especially the organisation and management of addresses.
I think the way phantom is intended to be used is the main difference compared to i2p. Since phantom has a small address-space and therefore is ipv6 compatible it can be effortlessly used by client applications (if the client does not leak far to much information).
One important difference of Phantom from systems like Tor is that it doesn't seek primarily to be an anonymous way to access the Internet, but to be an anonymized network separate from the Internet. You can do this with Tor as well, but that was never really the emphasis.
The whitepaper is an interesting read. The "large data throughput" bullet-point is justified by the claim that no intermediary forwarding node has any idea whether it's talking to another intermediary node or the one of the actual endpoints. So once you have a buzzing network of anonymized nodes with large volumes of anonymous traffic, you can open up a direct connection to your buddy and transfer at high speed. Later, you can claim with "reasonable doubt" that you couldn't have possibly known whether or not they were a forwarding node or an endpoint in that conversation. (You can also claim that you didn't know whether or not YOU were a forwarding node!) This seems reasonable to me so long as you're transferring at a rate comparable to the average throughput, though I'm not sure how you could determine that.
Well, I'm not really familiar with this sort of distributed scheme, so that might be old hat, insanely insecure, or what have you.
The reasonable doubt would be easily almost-certainly disproved by an ISP watching both nodes, though - the high-throughput is partially achieved by not delaying data / sending junk data, so it's reasonably certain that a high degree of data transfer between two nodes without any high transfer out of either to unknown nodes represents a direct connection.
If they're both actively sending data out to other nodes, you're more protected, but odds are you won't be giving the network as much bandwidth as your buddy, much less significantly enough to hide your communication in the noise.
If your messages are small, yeah, you're lost in the noise and completely deniable. Which is an interesting advantage.
I think it would work to saturate your allocated upload bandwidth and any data sent would be a combination of sources to constantly have a bunch of anonymous random source data.
Anytime you are not actively sending something yourself, it would still saturate the uploads with other people's data.
Then the question remains, "What did you send to that guy?"
I do not think it would ever allow a direct full transfer. But hopping between a dozen or so users with each serving as dual node types would be enough, particularly if all are within the same ISP network.
It uses a DHT-based distributed system as DNS, so there are no root DNS servers that can be got at by attackers. The DNS database is contained in the nodes themselves.
I was actually thinking about this a couple hours before I saw this. Crazy. Just not about the anonymity part. One thing I came up with was that instead of a trusted website bootstrapper to show a new node to the swarm, one of the nodes could update a DNS record to point to itself. If that node fails, another node is choosen to update the record.
This seems like an interesting idea/solution to one of Internet's issues.
The challenge however is how do you persuade enough people to start using it? And then the more people use it the more important it becomes and people just won't stop using it.
Facebook is a typical example of how important is to have people adopt a technology. Prior to Facebook was MySpace, yet the former managed to impose and finally replaced the latter because more and more people started using Facebook. With Twitter it's pretty much the same adoption process. Because most people into micro-blogging use it, it is now virtually impossible to come up with another micro-blogging platform that can replace Twitter. And the conversation could go on forever with countless examples.
I'm sure there are so many great ideas out there that get wasted just because people won't start adopting them.
They are still doing good business all over the world. American proxies are popular for access to Hulu and Pandora by foreigners and Swedish proxies are popular for bittorrent.
There is already Freenet which had/has similar ambitions.
The problem with this stuff is that immediately tossing all the possible anonymity features onto to your app makes it so utterly seperate from the net that you can't get a critical of mass interest (and your speed really bogs-down but that is secondary/solvable).
What I'd like to see instead is something like an escalating series of counter-measures that each user can trigger at the point they're cut-off from "ordinary" communication - alternative dns when regular dns is messed-with, alternative pipes when they start filtering ordinary sockets, etc.
But make it one app that initially does simple for the user so it get widespread but with the proviso that the apps would do enough discovery that you could "go stealth" when the time came - and have the apps be doing discovery in the meantime.
Attaching MAFIA-Fire to a "social sharing" app like "tribler" http://www.tribler.org/trac seems like a start.
Freenet's biggest problem is that it's ON the internet, not independent.
The nice things about phantom are its compatibility with applications we use and the distributed design which can make it much harder to cut it off. It was designed for this.
Other internet infrastructure projects would be
Netsukuku http://netsukuku.freaknet.org/ (looks great, but inactive)
B.A.T.M.A.N. http://www.open-mesh.org/ (a mesh thing, active, working, but with somewhat different goals)
Might work for piracy but unfortunately it looks like they punted on issues that would help use by activists. Design assumption #1 (white paper section 3.1): "The traffic of every node in the network is assumed to be eavesdropped on (individually, but not globally in a fully correlated fashion) by an external party."
A state-level adversary can instrument their major ISPs, put a bunch of nodes on the network, push traffic through the network and do analyze the resulting traffic. Once they figure out who they want to question it's pretty simple, the mere presence of the software on your computer would be incriminating.
I think right now social networking sites are the best game in town because they have legitimate non-activist uses so they won't automatically get you in trouble. To improve on them resistance to traffic analysis and on-client footprint both need to be dealt with or the tool needs to be really popular for some innocuous application.
It is a really interesting set of problems though.
Like the whitepaper states, the current specification isn't aimed at defeating state level adversaries.
However relatively small changes will improve that situation. Changes like peer selection algorithms, two-way tunnels, random padding and a bunch of others.
The reason they punted on defeating the global-traffic-analysis adversary is that that's, well, really hard. The projects that are requiring themselves to solve that problem before releasing their first version are still in stealth mode.
I'm working on a site that allows really simple encrypted messaging, anonymous event organisation, etc. If I made it available via phantom (or someone used the source code to set it up themselves), that would solve this issue.
I think he should change the name before it gets any kind of mainstream adoption...or maybe way before that. It's bad enough that such properties imply usage by the "evil-doers". You shouldn't give it a name that sounds like it's something used by evil-doers, too, which might actually be the worst part. Politicians never bother to learn about something in-depth anyway. All it matters is if it sounds bad or good, then they'll vote for it or against it.
This is an important concept. If such a system did gain widespread adoption, the government would certainly take steps against it.
In the 60s the Diggers/Yippie type group http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UAW/MF chose their name very aware that it would not be able to be written in print. They knew that they would not be controlling the message in the coverage of their group in the traditional media and so they attempted to embed a message in their name itself.
Likewise, rather than call this scheme Phantom, it might be wiser to name it after a member of the old http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_of_correspondence for embedded patriotism and appeal to authority type connotation. Perhaps "Jefferson". In this way, if the government were to target the protocol, they would have to take questions from the press as to why they were targeting JeffersonNet, etc.
You have a good point about giving it a positive connotation like that, but a name like Jefferson would be cumbersome, too. Perhaps something like SafeNet. Just think about it, even when someone would hear something like that they'd be intrigued.
"Oh? Safenet?Is it like a safer Internet? Interesting. Where do I find it?"
Plus, you could almost see what the news headlines would be like: "Government tries to take down the Safenet". "Government wants to make Safenet illegal", "Why the Government doesn't want you to be Safe online", "What's so wrong about wanting to be safe online?" etc
Pretty much anyway you'd spin it, it would make the Government the bad guy. Why do you think RIAA names bills like "Protect IP", which is about censoring the Internet, or Homeland security wanted to make the SHIELD law, which is about catching whistleblowers and such. They named them so anyone who "dares" to go against them would be looked at as the bad guy. "How could you want to stop something like SHIELD as its name??"
Naming is not everything, but it can definitely have a big impact on perception of the general population, which is all that matters in the end.
Confusingly on page 10 it is claimed that such abuses are not possible because the network is isolated. But I don't really see the difference between configuring your Tor node as an exit node, or running a proxy reachable over Phantom.
50 comments
[ 31.1 ms ] story [ 1331 ms ] threadFor instance, how is this an improvement over I2P? Phantom should really take a note from I2P's website on what constitutes an adequate amount of exposition to get people to learn about and try your anonymous network.
I remember seeing this a while ago, but I didn't pay much attention to it then, because punishing those who understand the problems with a lengthy verbose soliloquy isn't a good strategy for disseminating information.
:-)
The other problem is that something 60 pages long without any references or citations beyond an occasional casual link to wikipedia, smacks of reinventing the wheel. This would be why he can go for 60 pages without mentioning known terms like "Cybil Attack", or "Onion Routing".
This white paper smells more of bikeshedding - there was no code and right at the bottom of the document, you can see the caveat & apology "This white paper is in no way a complete protocol specification, far from it actually. Its main goal is rather to provide suggestions for solutions for several typical problems [...] which could hopefully work as some kind of reference point for any discussions that may be inspired by it."
I think my favourite part of the paper is where he handwaves PKI & Voting atop of a DHT to 'solve' lots of problems, without realising those are the genuinely hard problems people are still working on.
A close runner-up is in the slides he talks about "no central point of failure" and then explains his "Manual Override Command Support", which is a central point of abuse.
It is nice to see that someone is finally writing code for it, and I wish them luck working out all of the details left out in the paper, especially the organisation and management of addresses.
http://www.magnusbrading.com/phantom/phantom-design-paper.pd...
Well, I'm not really familiar with this sort of distributed scheme, so that might be old hat, insanely insecure, or what have you.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Freenet#Technical_design
If they're both actively sending data out to other nodes, you're more protected, but odds are you won't be giving the network as much bandwidth as your buddy, much less significantly enough to hide your communication in the noise.
If your messages are small, yeah, you're lost in the noise and completely deniable. Which is an interesting advantage.
Anytime you are not actively sending something yourself, it would still saturate the uploads with other people's data.
Then the question remains, "What did you send to that guy?"
I do not think it would ever allow a direct full transfer. But hopping between a dozen or so users with each serving as dual node types would be enough, particularly if all are within the same ISP network.
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:mQa724u3AvoJ:w...
and the whitepaper:
http://docs.google.com/viewer?a=v&q=cache:uWb7WlywH9gJ:w...
Facebook is a typical example of how important is to have people adopt a technology. Prior to Facebook was MySpace, yet the former managed to impose and finally replaced the latter because more and more people started using Facebook. With Twitter it's pretty much the same adoption process. Because most people into micro-blogging use it, it is now virtually impossible to come up with another micro-blogging platform that can replace Twitter. And the conversation could go on forever with countless examples.
I'm sure there are so many great ideas out there that get wasted just because people won't start adopting them.
What did happen to the torrent anonymity proxies, that was in the media a year or two ago? Are they used, but not discussed in the media?
Anonymity/privacy software written by a bunch of people with gmail addresses? Does that strike anyone else as weird?
Can't speak for their domestic philosophy, though.
The problem with this stuff is that immediately tossing all the possible anonymity features onto to your app makes it so utterly seperate from the net that you can't get a critical of mass interest (and your speed really bogs-down but that is secondary/solvable).
What I'd like to see instead is something like an escalating series of counter-measures that each user can trigger at the point they're cut-off from "ordinary" communication - alternative dns when regular dns is messed-with, alternative pipes when they start filtering ordinary sockets, etc.
But make it one app that initially does simple for the user so it get widespread but with the proviso that the apps would do enough discovery that you could "go stealth" when the time came - and have the apps be doing discovery in the meantime.
Attaching MAFIA-Fire to a "social sharing" app like "tribler" http://www.tribler.org/trac seems like a start.
All levels of stealth would be able to be active, but what levels you decide to enable determines which secure network you are on.
Plus you could deploy an app like this in a place like China to immediately get interest/users...
If Google's serious opposing the DNS crocking, they could do something like this now.
The nice things about phantom are its compatibility with applications we use and the distributed design which can make it much harder to cut it off. It was designed for this.
Other internet infrastructure projects would be Netsukuku http://netsukuku.freaknet.org/ (looks great, but inactive) B.A.T.M.A.N. http://www.open-mesh.org/ (a mesh thing, active, working, but with somewhat different goals)
A state-level adversary can instrument their major ISPs, put a bunch of nodes on the network, push traffic through the network and do analyze the resulting traffic. Once they figure out who they want to question it's pretty simple, the mere presence of the software on your computer would be incriminating.
I think right now social networking sites are the best game in town because they have legitimate non-activist uses so they won't automatically get you in trouble. To improve on them resistance to traffic analysis and on-client footprint both need to be dealt with or the tool needs to be really popular for some innocuous application.
It is a really interesting set of problems though.
In the 60s the Diggers/Yippie type group http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UAW/MF chose their name very aware that it would not be able to be written in print. They knew that they would not be controlling the message in the coverage of their group in the traditional media and so they attempted to embed a message in their name itself.
Likewise, rather than call this scheme Phantom, it might be wiser to name it after a member of the old http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Committee_of_correspondence for embedded patriotism and appeal to authority type connotation. Perhaps "Jefferson". In this way, if the government were to target the protocol, they would have to take questions from the press as to why they were targeting JeffersonNet, etc.
"Oh? Safenet?Is it like a safer Internet? Interesting. Where do I find it?"
Plus, you could almost see what the news headlines would be like: "Government tries to take down the Safenet". "Government wants to make Safenet illegal", "Why the Government doesn't want you to be Safe online", "What's so wrong about wanting to be safe online?" etc
Pretty much anyway you'd spin it, it would make the Government the bad guy. Why do you think RIAA names bills like "Protect IP", which is about censoring the Internet, or Homeland security wanted to make the SHIELD law, which is about catching whistleblowers and such. They named them so anyone who "dares" to go against them would be looked at as the bad guy. "How could you want to stop something like SHIELD as its name??"
Naming is not everything, but it can definitely have a big impact on perception of the general population, which is all that matters in the end.
Confusingly on page 10 it is claimed that such abuses are not possible because the network is isolated. But I don't really see the difference between configuring your Tor node as an exit node, or running a proxy reachable over Phantom.
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