Blame Dennis Muilenburg. In his (successful) efforts to get the Boeing stock price up, he got rid of all the senior engineers who would have known better than to make a non-redundant control system responsible for human flight safety.
(The MCAS used input from only one AOA sensor.)
I have a commercial pilot rating and followed MCAS very closely (I was one of the few persons to say it would not be resolved for at least a year because of the number of engineering domains involved.)
The video is pretty good, especially the quantity of first-person interviews. The one of most interest to me was the engineer discussing the design issue with one external AoA sensor, and mgmt. refusal to acknowledge it - "group think."
External AoA sensors are vulnerable and can be damaged by bird strikes, mechanics ladders, jetways, etc.
I think it's light on the importance of filing FAA paperwork accurately, as that's one of the main oversight methods that the FAA uses. They did cover the other method, which is FAA contract inspection staff who are paid by the mfg. (Boeing paid a $2.5 billion FAA fine.)
Blaming foreign pilots has some validity, as the Indonesian NTSB assigned responsibility equally to pilots, mechanics and Boeing. However, not when there's no manual pages, available sims or annunciators, and MCAS is so severe that there is no time to recover immediately after takeoff.
Note that aerobatic pilots would have been able to roll inverted and save the plane, but airline pilots rarely practise airline acro. (Airline pilots are not test pilots, and most aren't acro pilots. Any passenger without a seat belt would suffer a neck injury though, but these were under 10,000 feet.)
There is one US airline company recovery procedure that does use an acro maneuver for stopping an uncommanded climb, basically a wingover:
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[ 5.7 ms ] story [ 15.7 ms ] threadThe video is pretty good, especially the quantity of first-person interviews. The one of most interest to me was the engineer discussing the design issue with one external AoA sensor, and mgmt. refusal to acknowledge it - "group think."
External AoA sensors are vulnerable and can be damaged by bird strikes, mechanics ladders, jetways, etc.
I think it's light on the importance of filing FAA paperwork accurately, as that's one of the main oversight methods that the FAA uses. They did cover the other method, which is FAA contract inspection staff who are paid by the mfg. (Boeing paid a $2.5 billion FAA fine.)
Blaming foreign pilots has some validity, as the Indonesian NTSB assigned responsibility equally to pilots, mechanics and Boeing. However, not when there's no manual pages, available sims or annunciators, and MCAS is so severe that there is no time to recover immediately after takeoff.
Note that aerobatic pilots would have been able to roll inverted and save the plane, but airline pilots rarely practise airline acro. (Airline pilots are not test pilots, and most aren't acro pilots. Any passenger without a seat belt would suffer a neck injury though, but these were under 10,000 feet.)
There is one US airline company recovery procedure that does use an acro maneuver for stopping an uncommanded climb, basically a wingover:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wingover