While it's minor compared to the message from the article, there's a tech angle too: Swiss Crypto AG was the provider of backdoored encryption tech for Indonesia, which ultimately allowed the black propaganda to be so effective.
Well it was a Swiss company with mainly Swiss engineers run by a Swede and formerly jointly owned by the German and American intelligence agencies. The CIA eventually bought out the German stake.
Copying my comment from the other highly similar submission:
Hmm, not a fan of how they completely
a) minimise the terror perpetrated on civilians by Indonesian infiltrators during Sukarno's Konfrontasi
b) deny the Indonesians' agency, it's rather colonial to think that the anti-communist purges were predicated on British agitprop, when in reality the military and Islamists were highly fearful of PKI, especially when Sukarno wanted to arm them as an almost Red Guard style militia.
I mean, I know it's The Guardian, but they're normally better than this.
Terrorists were created and armed by the CIA. CIA planes even bombed ports. Sukarno was overthrown (he was not a communist at all). Every government in the non-white world that was to be overthrown by military juntas were accused by the western media as being communist etc including the overthrown democratically elected Mossadegh in Iran.
The British played second fiddle to the Americans in killing more than 3 million Indonesians to overthrow Sukarno.
It is considered a success in the CIA and was called the Jakarta Method. The successful playbook was then exported to other areas and regions like Africa, Asia and Latin America.
CIA failed coup attempt of 1958
Following President Eisenhower's September 25, 1957 order to the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government, Soviet intelligence learned of the plans almost instantly, publicizing the "American Plot to Overthrow Sukarno" three days later in an Indian newspaper, Blitz, which Soviet intelligence controlled. Despite Soviet awareness, the CIA began planning the coup, and set up operational bases primarily in the Philippines. The CIA then employed veteran Filipino CIA paramilitary officers to make contact with Indonesian military forces on Sumatra and Sulawesi. Working in tandem with the Pentagon, deliveries of weapons packages were prepared for distribution to rebel military forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA also financed rebel forces with radio stations that issued anti-Sukarno broadcasts in an act of psychological warfare.[10] The American involvement, which was meant to remain a secret, was discovered when a United States air man was shot down. After the pilot was shut down, communist activists used Western intervention as a main point in his speech for communism rule.[12] The next political campaigns to occur would incite a great propaganda war to gain citizen support.
In an effort to try to justify the interference by the United States, the CIA stated that in the time leading up to the coup, Indonesian economic development was severely impacted by the government's failure to unify the country. As a result, the outlying island population, which was responsible for most of the country's exports and tax revenues, became discontent with receiving little in return for their large contributions. In addition, the government began to nationalize foreign-owned plantations and mines, investing in the industries of rubber, copra, and tin, however the facilities were noted to be ill-maintained, which ultimately harmed Indonesia's economy under Sukarno. The islands began to set up semi-autonomous governments until a rebellion finally broke out a year later, staggering production and devastating government revenues due to the loss of exports. Progress was set forth and it was expected that the population would not have famine issues. These economic sanctions eventually became a strategy for throughout their campaign for a free government, albeit these measures proved to be costly in the end.[13]
Back in the United States, at an OCB (Operations Coordination Board) Luncheon on January 8, 1958, the memorandum for the record states: "Mr. Dulles gave a brief report on the latest developments in Indonesia. He referred particularly to indications that the Bandung Council proposes to establish a Free Government of Indonesia, and said that while he believes a move of this sort would be premature, there is little we can or should do to try and stop it. It was agreed it would be unwise to supply arms so long as the possibility exists that the government might become communist dominated."[14]
Nevertheless, the dissidents of Sumatra were anticipated to issue a demand for the establishme...
This should invalidate any argument that the UK does not need to accept Indonesian immigration because it's not their problem. Clearly the political and economic situation in many countries is shaped by powerful countries. That does not make the UK responsible for all problems, but it does not acquit it either.
The article fills in a little of the background to the massacres starting in October 1965. A little earlier, in mid-1965, "an attempted coup by leftwing army officers and, secretly, by agents of the PKI, in which seven generals were murdered,..."
The article doesn't say how many generals Indonesia had before the attempted coup. Obviously seven fewer after the attempted coup. I wonder what the surviving generals thought of the recent murders of their colleagues?
The article is written as though the surviving generals sat around afterwards waiting for Britain to incite them to mount a response. That seems unlikely. It would be more usual for the surviving generals to take the murders of their colleagues personally and to attempt a response on a kill-or-be-killed basis, without waiting for British incitement to rouse them to action.
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[ 2.7 ms ] story [ 48.3 ms ] threadHmm, not a fan of how they completely
a) minimise the terror perpetrated on civilians by Indonesian infiltrators during Sukarno's Konfrontasi
b) deny the Indonesians' agency, it's rather colonial to think that the anti-communist purges were predicated on British agitprop, when in reality the military and Islamists were highly fearful of PKI, especially when Sukarno wanted to arm them as an almost Red Guard style militia.
I mean, I know it's The Guardian, but they're normally better than this.
The British played second fiddle to the Americans in killing more than 3 million Indonesians to overthrow Sukarno.
It is considered a success in the CIA and was called the Jakarta Method. The successful playbook was then exported to other areas and regions like Africa, Asia and Latin America.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Jakarta_Method
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CIA_activities_in_Indonesia
CIA failed coup attempt of 1958 Following President Eisenhower's September 25, 1957 order to the CIA to overthrow the Sukarno government, Soviet intelligence learned of the plans almost instantly, publicizing the "American Plot to Overthrow Sukarno" three days later in an Indian newspaper, Blitz, which Soviet intelligence controlled. Despite Soviet awareness, the CIA began planning the coup, and set up operational bases primarily in the Philippines. The CIA then employed veteran Filipino CIA paramilitary officers to make contact with Indonesian military forces on Sumatra and Sulawesi. Working in tandem with the Pentagon, deliveries of weapons packages were prepared for distribution to rebel military forces in Sumatra and Sulawesi. The CIA also financed rebel forces with radio stations that issued anti-Sukarno broadcasts in an act of psychological warfare.[10] The American involvement, which was meant to remain a secret, was discovered when a United States air man was shot down. After the pilot was shut down, communist activists used Western intervention as a main point in his speech for communism rule.[12] The next political campaigns to occur would incite a great propaganda war to gain citizen support.
In an effort to try to justify the interference by the United States, the CIA stated that in the time leading up to the coup, Indonesian economic development was severely impacted by the government's failure to unify the country. As a result, the outlying island population, which was responsible for most of the country's exports and tax revenues, became discontent with receiving little in return for their large contributions. In addition, the government began to nationalize foreign-owned plantations and mines, investing in the industries of rubber, copra, and tin, however the facilities were noted to be ill-maintained, which ultimately harmed Indonesia's economy under Sukarno. The islands began to set up semi-autonomous governments until a rebellion finally broke out a year later, staggering production and devastating government revenues due to the loss of exports. Progress was set forth and it was expected that the population would not have famine issues. These economic sanctions eventually became a strategy for throughout their campaign for a free government, albeit these measures proved to be costly in the end.[13]
Back in the United States, at an OCB (Operations Coordination Board) Luncheon on January 8, 1958, the memorandum for the record states: "Mr. Dulles gave a brief report on the latest developments in Indonesia. He referred particularly to indications that the Bandung Council proposes to establish a Free Government of Indonesia, and said that while he believes a move of this sort would be premature, there is little we can or should do to try and stop it. It was agreed it would be unwise to supply arms so long as the possibility exists that the government might become communist dominated."[14]
Nevertheless, the dissidents of Sumatra were anticipated to issue a demand for the establishme...
The article doesn't say how many generals Indonesia had before the attempted coup. Obviously seven fewer after the attempted coup. I wonder what the surviving generals thought of the recent murders of their colleagues?
The article is written as though the surviving generals sat around afterwards waiting for Britain to incite them to mount a response. That seems unlikely. It would be more usual for the surviving generals to take the murders of their colleagues personally and to attempt a response on a kill-or-be-killed basis, without waiting for British incitement to rouse them to action.