In the comment's zip attachment you can have a look at the certificate.
Subject Name
C (Country): RU
O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications
CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA
Issuer Name
C (Country): RU
O (Organisation): The Ministry of Digital Development and Communications
CN (Common Name): Russian Trusted Root CA
Issued Certificate
Version: 3
Serial Number: 10 00
Not Valid Before: 2022-03-01
Not Valid After: 2032-02-27
Certificate Fingerprints
SHA1: 8F F9 15 CC AB 7B C1 6F 8C 5C 80 99 D5 3E 0E 11 5B 3A EC 2F
MD5: 7F BB 1F BB D1 29 47 E7 28 DC BF A4 56 8C 64 CD
Seemingly they did not prepare early enough like the French [1] at the time. IMHO the whole cert trust chain is broken. Is there actually a services that serves cert fingerprints seen from another place in the world that can help detect a MITM?
> If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it.
That's the problem. There is no "authority who approved it", beyond the Russian government agency that created the certificate. The certificate is self-signed, and users are being asked to install it manually.
This is a root ca that can issue as many unauthorized certs as they wish. It is critical that this thing is added to every other explicitly untrusted list in all OSes and Browsers, to protect millions of innocent internet users.
No, so the Russian government cannot intercept every https (TLS) connection out of the country. With this they could attack every user on ruNET and capture every password, every email, every message… it is critical that it be blocked for the safety of the internet.
Centralized trust is the mechanism used by the current version of the web. It is a broken system by design. Who says I can trust verisign or any other CA. Russia creating their own CA and asking it to be installed just emphasize how broken the current mechanisms are. Its not new, its always been broken.
It’s a lot more complex than you may realize. We have a transparency solution known as Certificate Transparency. For a “verisign” issued cert to be trusted in the browser, there must be an append only record of the cert stored in a blockchain. If Russia overrides a local trusted root, all bets are off an CTlog is not used. You can trust the CA because malicious issuance is a death sentence. And we have logs for all eternity.
Hmm I had never heard of Certificate Transparency, looks like its a relatively newish tech added onto how SSL/TLS certs work. It seems only Google Chrome & Safari require SCT chains (not used by Firefox). Maybe I've never heard of it because I'm a Firefox user? You mentioned blockchain, does that mean there is a public blockchain for these Certs? I didn't see that mentioned anywhere but it does seem like blockchain features overlap with the desired features of "Certificate Transparency".
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[ 55.8 ms ] story [ 783 ms ] thread[1] https://www.mozilla.org/en-US/security/advisories/mfsa2013-1...
If the certificate is being misused, I think it should be revoked by the authority who approved it.
That's the problem. There is no "authority who approved it", beyond the Russian government agency that created the certificate. The certificate is self-signed, and users are being asked to install it manually.
The block chain is different for each CT operator, it just allows you to validate the issued certs.