> Even if the herder wanted to behave as Hardin described, they couldn’t do so unless certain conditions existed. There would have to be a market for the cattle, and herders would have to be focused on producing for that market, not for local consumption. The herder would have to have enough capital to buy the additional cattle and the fodder they would need in winter. The herder would have to be able to hire workers to care for the larger herd, build bigger barns, etc.
Ah yes, the Tragedy of the Commons couldn't have existed because people were too materially poor to damage anything.
Regardless of whether it applies to any specific situation or not, the commons themselves included, the term itself is still a useful philosophical concept. I mean, the irony is not lost on me that you have to be logged in to see or post comments.
But I'm going to go ahead and assume that the fact that farmers commonly established their own informal governance rules over common areas does kind of imply that there were overgrazing problems. This is more Coase than Marx.
> Ah yes, the Tragedy of the Commons couldn't have existed because people were too materially poor to damage anything.
This isn't the main thrust of the article.
> But I'm going to go ahead and assume that the fact that farmers commonly established their own informal governance rules over common areas does kind of imply that there were overgrazing problems.
The article argues that there was the potential for overgrazing problems, but that the informal governance effectively dealt with them.
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[ 2.8 ms ] story [ 24.1 ms ] threadAh yes, the Tragedy of the Commons couldn't have existed because people were too materially poor to damage anything.
Regardless of whether it applies to any specific situation or not, the commons themselves included, the term itself is still a useful philosophical concept. I mean, the irony is not lost on me that you have to be logged in to see or post comments.
But I'm going to go ahead and assume that the fact that farmers commonly established their own informal governance rules over common areas does kind of imply that there were overgrazing problems. This is more Coase than Marx.
This isn't the main thrust of the article.
> But I'm going to go ahead and assume that the fact that farmers commonly established their own informal governance rules over common areas does kind of imply that there were overgrazing problems.
The article argues that there was the potential for overgrazing problems, but that the informal governance effectively dealt with them.