"I’ve been a controller for 26 years now and this incident has left me absolutely speechless. There is no defence for what I can only describe as one of the most horrifying displays of non-controlling you will ever see.
First, its CATIII conditions with very limited visibility. The plan to depart SWA ahead of FDX would have been a bit ‘sporting’ on a clear VFR day – Generally you’d not want to depart anyone holding short with inbound traffic any less than 4 miles away. In full blown low vis operations its absolutely ridiculous. Second on a CATIII approach the ILS needs to be protected because signal interference from objects within the ILS sensitive area can result in loss of accurate guidance from the localiser and glideslope. On an autoland that could cause crash because the autopilot is following that guidance all the way to touchdown. This is why CATIII holds are further back from the regular holding points.
Similarly on runways where there a mixed mode of operation extra spacing is required between arrivals to ensure that any departures in the gaps are airborne and past the end of the runway before the inbound gets to a certain distance from touchdown – which off the top of my head I think is at least 2 miles. This is why when fog hits and we go to CATIII ops the delays build up because the runway capacity goes down massively.
In this case there was zero hope of the SWA being airborne and past the end of the runway before the FDX was 2 miles from touchdown, so the moment he lined SWA up the FDX approach was compromised. You can run it tight on a visual or CATI approach but absolutely not on a CATIII.
What I found more disturbing than anything besides the gross error of judgement in his initial plan was once it became apparent that the plan was not working he simply gave up controlling at that point and allowed the aircraft to sort themselves out. Once he identified the SWA was slow to roll (totally understandable given the low vis) it should have been blindingly obvious that this needed to be fixed immediately. SWA, cancel takeoff clearance and hold position. FDX go-around. That was the only option at that point.
He would have been unable to see either of the aircraft given the reported RVR, so relying on a visual separation solution was out of the question. Instead he did absolutely nothing which is unforgivable. Even more so given that none of the pilots could see each other and would effectively be flying blind in regards to what the other was doing. Also at that low height TCAS would be inhibited so that would not offer them any help either.
Mercifully the FDX crew seemed to be several steps ahead of everyone else and they absolutely saved this situation from being catastrophic. They should be commended and awarded for their excellent airmanship. The only thing I would say about the SWA crew is they should frankly have refused the takeoff clearance hearing landing traffic was only 3 miles out in those conditions. It was an unnecessarily risky clearance from the get go.
This incident makes me feel sick honestly. Every controller at some point in their career makes an error of judgement, which is why we have safety margins. When you make one though its critical you recognise it and then do something about it. Doing nothing really is an unforgivable sin. This unfortunately was appalling ‘controlling’ from start to finish. The initial plan was bad – it was never going to work in those conditions and then he somehow managed to make it all worse by doing nothing to fix it.
I also can’t believe that the controller was apparently not relieved from position immediately because he was talking to the FDX again on its 2nd approach. A just safety culture requires the immediate removal from position of anyone involved in an OI on a no blame basis so that the facts can be looked into and the individual involved can gather themselves.
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[ 3.9 ms ] story [ 17.1 ms ] thread"I’ve been a controller for 26 years now and this incident has left me absolutely speechless. There is no defence for what I can only describe as one of the most horrifying displays of non-controlling you will ever see.
First, its CATIII conditions with very limited visibility. The plan to depart SWA ahead of FDX would have been a bit ‘sporting’ on a clear VFR day – Generally you’d not want to depart anyone holding short with inbound traffic any less than 4 miles away. In full blown low vis operations its absolutely ridiculous. Second on a CATIII approach the ILS needs to be protected because signal interference from objects within the ILS sensitive area can result in loss of accurate guidance from the localiser and glideslope. On an autoland that could cause crash because the autopilot is following that guidance all the way to touchdown. This is why CATIII holds are further back from the regular holding points.
Similarly on runways where there a mixed mode of operation extra spacing is required between arrivals to ensure that any departures in the gaps are airborne and past the end of the runway before the inbound gets to a certain distance from touchdown – which off the top of my head I think is at least 2 miles. This is why when fog hits and we go to CATIII ops the delays build up because the runway capacity goes down massively.
In this case there was zero hope of the SWA being airborne and past the end of the runway before the FDX was 2 miles from touchdown, so the moment he lined SWA up the FDX approach was compromised. You can run it tight on a visual or CATI approach but absolutely not on a CATIII.
What I found more disturbing than anything besides the gross error of judgement in his initial plan was once it became apparent that the plan was not working he simply gave up controlling at that point and allowed the aircraft to sort themselves out. Once he identified the SWA was slow to roll (totally understandable given the low vis) it should have been blindingly obvious that this needed to be fixed immediately. SWA, cancel takeoff clearance and hold position. FDX go-around. That was the only option at that point.
He would have been unable to see either of the aircraft given the reported RVR, so relying on a visual separation solution was out of the question. Instead he did absolutely nothing which is unforgivable. Even more so given that none of the pilots could see each other and would effectively be flying blind in regards to what the other was doing. Also at that low height TCAS would be inhibited so that would not offer them any help either.
Mercifully the FDX crew seemed to be several steps ahead of everyone else and they absolutely saved this situation from being catastrophic. They should be commended and awarded for their excellent airmanship. The only thing I would say about the SWA crew is they should frankly have refused the takeoff clearance hearing landing traffic was only 3 miles out in those conditions. It was an unnecessarily risky clearance from the get go.
This incident makes me feel sick honestly. Every controller at some point in their career makes an error of judgement, which is why we have safety margins. When you make one though its critical you recognise it and then do something about it. Doing nothing really is an unforgivable sin. This unfortunately was appalling ‘controlling’ from start to finish. The initial plan was bad – it was never going to work in those conditions and then he somehow managed to make it all worse by doing nothing to fix it.
I also can’t believe that the controller was apparently not relieved from position immediately because he was talking to the FDX again on its 2nd approach. A just safety culture requires the immediate removal from position of anyone involved in an OI on a no blame basis so that the facts can be looked into and the individual involved can gather themselves.
This whole incident just boggles my mind."