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100+ countries have banned cluster ammunition

160+ countries have banned anti-personnel landmines

Of course Russia, the US and China have not signed either of these, but still odd to read about it in a casual tone.

The rules don't apply to russia.

The russians rape. The russians torture. The russians mutilate. The russians mass-murder.

The russians shoot small children at close range in the head.

The russians castrate prisoners of war.

The russians execute their own fighters with rifles or by crushing their skull with a sledgehammer.

The russians use chemical weapons.

The russians use cluster bombs.

The russians use white phosphorus.

The russians cause ecological disaster.

The russians threaten nuclear war.

The russians steal children.

The russians blow up schools.

The russians blow up hospitals.

The russians blow up power plants.

And so on, and so on.

And yet so many westerns will clutch their pearls when we give the Ukrainians the means to defend themselves.

So, are they terrorists you say?

Well, then.

Classify them as such.

=> Any funding of them is now funding of terrorism. Including paying tax in Russia. Which means any and all companies doing business in and with Russia, and the individuals working in and for those companies now have to immediately stop, or else face jail... right?

Seems like it could be super effective way of halting Russia?

cf classification of Iranian's Revoutionary Guard as a terrorist org: https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2023/01/23/eu-faces-growi...

Yes, the russians are absolutely terrorists, and should be classified as such.

The European parliament have declared them as such, which is a start.

Yeah - that seems to be about Russia being a state sponsor of terrorism (e.g. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20221118IP...)

But what I would like to see is a situation where companies paying tax to Russia are seen as sponsoring terrorism. It would have insane reprecussions?

Like AB InBev, Danone, Auchan, Leroy Merlin, Decathlon (last three owned by the same French family, mind you).
The list is INSANELY long.

Most multinationals seem to be operating on a "business as usual" principle in Russia.

If they all risk jail time, things will be different.

Also consider that any purchases of anything from Russia would now also be classified as sponsoring terrorism. So no more Gasprom gas :P

The rationale of not allowing cluster bombs is NOT based on what the enemy is doing, but the effects on the cluster bombs after the war.

I'm not saying they should not be given to Ukraine, but simply pointing out that you're arguing the wrong argument.

Edit: I have seen good arguments for giving the bombs to Ukraine, and tend to agree with them. I.e., their use is rather localized at this point of the war.

The cluster munitions are going to be used against russian defensive positions on agricultural UKRAINIAN territory.

It's entirely up to Ukraine what they do with their own land.

And the options at this point are:

1. Remove russian terrorists with cluster munitions, with the potential for civilian casualties.

2. Allow russian terrorists to continue raping, torturing, and murdering civilians in Ukraine.

The other one I've heard -- no idea how true it is -- is that the DPCIM bomblets that are inside these munitions are shaped charge & frag dual purpose ammunition which would be really really appropriate to drop one by one from a drone.
The number of states ratifying these agreements can be misleading, and the simple majority of states agreeing to do something doesn’t always mean the powerful have stepped up, too. States representing nearly half the world (47/48% of global population) have not signed the Ottawa Treaty on anti-personnel landmines. More than half (+55%) of the world’s population lives in a country that is not covered by the cluster munitions convention. One of the keys to making these treaties useful is to have the most powerful states aligned on their aims and objectives - it matters a lot more to have (as you suggest) the US, Russia, China, India, and Pakistan signing on than it does many other smaller states.
Notably most of Europe is a signatory of both treaties.
Indeed, though also notably Finland was a hold out on the landmine treaty for a long time, and is still not a signatory to the cluster munitions agreement. Having a border with Russia and a history of conflict with Russia is part of the reason why.
The realpolitik of warfare treaties tends to be much more about "What will blunt my potential enemy's strength more than mine?" than ethics.
It's still odd to read "whataboutism" after all what Russia did in Ukraine, breaking any possible war crime law, mass murdering and torturing civilians, using any weapons anywhere they want (except nuclear, although the nuclear power plant is likely mined), causing scorched earth by blowing the dam, etc etc.
Cluster munitions are very dangeorous to civilians, because they can lay unexploded in the ground for years, and, well, there are many of them.

The issue is, what is more dangerous to Ukrainian civilians over the next decade or two - unexploded munitions, which can hopefully be mostly recovered after the war, or the Russians, who rape, burn, pillage, kidnap and murder indiscriminately? Certainly they are happy to create ambiguity over whether they would blow up a nuclear plant.

Certainly given Russia is already covering the country with cluster munitions, I don't think it's unreasonable for Ukraine to use them, over their own territory. At the very least it's up to them.

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It's not "good". It's bad. You have to figure out what kind of bad though, and what the alternative is. As it happens, alternative may very well be worse.

And I'm glad you agree at least that PUTIN EVIL.

You’re overdramatizing this. The comparison was between the danger imposed on citizens by passive munitions vs an active invading force.
> who rape, burn, pillage, kidnap and murder indiscriminately

Is there any legitimate source for this other than random bad actors or anecdotal propaganda from western news source.

This isn't a 10th century Viking invasion.

> Is there any legitimate source for this other than random bad actors or anecdotal propaganda from western news source.

The UN has documented it pretty well.

> This isn't a 10th century Viking invasion.

Nope but what Russia is doing in Ukraine certainly at least rhymes very heavily with there actions in the.

- First Chechen war

- second Chechen war

- Russo-Georgina war

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Were you complaining when the terrorist state of russia used cluster bombs against civilians in Ukraine? They've been doing it for 500 days.
Apparently you missed the point that Ukrainians using cluster bombs will kill Ukrainians in the future.

The idea that the increased effectiveness of DPCIMs will save lives is a rather theoretical argument. Perhaps it will be comforting to armless children in the future? Because that kind of casualty is a known fact.

We have armless children in Ukraine already today.

You know who removed their limbs?

The fucking russians.

What law are they breaking exactly? And it’s not like Russia is abstaining from using mines and faulty Soviet cluster munitions with a lot of unexpected submunitions. What is your point?
I don't think any law is being broken, and the convention that governs use of cluster munitions does not have the United States (or Russia or Ukraine for that matter) as signatories[1]. Maybe OP is thinking that there's some appropriations rule that this violates, but I doubt it.

The broader point, though, is that this is yet another step up the escalation ladder for the United States and we're inching closer to direct involvement in a territorial dispute that has little strategic value for the US. Many don't like that fact, but it's still true. That we're doing this means we're either running out of things to give Ukraine, their counter-offensive is not going as well as expected or planned, or some combination of both. I can steelman an argument for US involvement, but it pretty much stops at degrading Russian combat power to the point where they can't project force anymore, outside of their nuclear deterrent. We've reached that point. There isn't really a coherent end game to this war as long as the US continues to print money and ship our weapons to Ukraine.

[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convention_on_Cluster_Munition...

Whatever the endgame is, Russia having a thousand fewer tanks, AFVs and artillery guns is better for USA, NATO, and European security.

If we need to perpetually spend like 3% of our defense budget on Ukraine... That's fine? We're not really dedicated to it like the $Trillion/year we spent on Iraq or Afghanistan.

One can even argue that all the data we are getting from Patriot systems and Drones is good for the Taiwan situation. Out defenses and weapons are being tested, while China's are not. We will have upgrades and improvements that we otherwise wouldn't have gotten thanks to Ukrainian war.

From a purely selfish perspective, USA is a big winner of Ukraine/Russia war, much like the Nazi Germany was the winner of the Spanish civil war.

A war in an allied nation where our weapons, doctrine and theories is tested puts us up in ways that money cannot buy.

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We are learning how to spin up 155mm production lines and Stinger missiles thanks to the Ukrainian war. We've learned of the hole in our air defenses that drones pose. We've seen how naval drones work vs the Russian navy (and a preview for how it'd work vs the Chinese Navy). Etc. Etc.

The only reason we are sending these cluster bombs is because we've failed to spin up production of 155mm shells fast enough, and our stockpiles of that shell were too shallow in practice.

We've learned that Switzerland is not a reliable ally. We've learned that Germany's doctrine relies upon Swiss AA ammunition and that Germany is grossly unprepared to ramp up AA defense production.

Good. We learned, our generals will remember and we will be in a better position when a real war hits us. This was all a test and we can use the results of the test to improve ourselves.

And who knows? Maybe we can even keep Ukraine free and prosperous when it all ends. Might as well try our best to help them while getting all this valuable data.

Right, I'm quite amenable to the idea that this war is functioning as a gigantic test bed for modern 21st century weapons systems, and we are - generally speaking - in a WWI scenario where a lot of new technology is clashing for the first time and we don't know what beats what. That's all well and good, but it has some interesting moral implications because it presupposes that we (the US) are keeping this war going intentionally as a means to allow our defense industrial base to tool up for a war in the pacific and test new technologies against the old Cold War adversary. If that is the reason, we should just be honest about it. Prior to 2016 Ukraine didn't exactly get the "bastion of freedom and democracy" treatment that it gets in the US press today, which has left me pretty skeptical of how its discussed in general. The war goes on if and only if the US continues funding it which suggest to me the opposite of your point, as an active war in Europe should distinctly reduce relative security in Europe. At what point do we "have enough data" and can stop the bloodshed?
> as an active war in Europe should distinctly reduce relative security in Europe

Could you please explain your reasoning?

The fewer tanks Russia has, the less they're able to mess around with other countries. That means fewer Russo-Georgian War (2008) events, because Russia's military is just left weaker overall.

We need to ensure that the Russo-Ukrainian War (2014 to 2023) is the last destabilizing push Russia does in the near future. Sure, they can rebuild later, but we can make that rebuilding as costly as possible (ex: sanctions on chips and other strategic parts that they need to actually build these weapons).

Russia's economy is not like ours. We can certainly outspend them in production. We know that they're using 152mm shells at a rate exceeding 155mm shells (because their shells are less accurate than our shells).

And Russia's wartime economy is weaker than ours, they simply don't have as much production as us either (the combined might of NATO: not just USA but also Germany, Poland, UK, etc. etc). The war-materials they use in Ukraine they cannot use in other countries. This will prevent another Georgia-like or Ukraine-like situation, because Russia simply won't have the strength to mess around anymore.

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EDIT: In particular, we know that Moldova is on Russia's crosshairs. By making sure that Russia is stopped in Ukraine, then we save Moldova. Even if Ukraine is stalemated (or even conquered), the next country down the line has better security the more resistance we put up in Ukraine.

My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European security is increased (or at least stabilized). It's a weird inversion to me to think that prolonging a large land war somehow actually increases this hypothetical security, which it demonstrably doesn't as weapons flood the region and refugees flee their homes.

>By making sure that Russia is stopped in Ukraine, then we save Moldova.

To this point on Moldova ... Probably less than 1% of Americans could find Moldova on a map without googling. Probably less than 5% of congressmen. Pretending that it's existence outside of Russia's sphere of influence is some critical part of this war effort is downright preposterous. Maybe that's how some people steelman it, but I don't buy it. Moreover, pretending that Moldova is a critical part of the US sphere of influence is even more preposterous. Again, I don't disagree that degrading/destroying Russian combat power has some benefits for the US' ability to project power abroad (i.e. in the Pacific), and some benefits for weapons systems evaluation. I just simply don't buy these contortions that the US security sphere extends globally and any country that has weak sovereignty is now a US protectorate.

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Something appears to have happened post Cold War (probably related to 9/11 and the forever wars in Iraq and Afghanistan) that has caused a lot of Americans (apologies if you are not one) to reflexively want to "do something!!" about this war. It's, I think, started to jade a longer term historical perspective about why nations go to war in the first place and leads to situations like this, where we have to actively come up with reasons to continue a war in Europe because ending it would be "bad". If the war ended tomorrow with the current borders as they are today, it's not like the history books would think of Russia as the good guys or a neutral party.

> My reasoning if pretty simple: if a war is actively going on in Europe, European security is reduced. If a war is not actively going on in Europe, European security is increased (or at least stabilized). It's a weird inversion to me to think that prolonging a large land war somehow actually increases this hypothetical security

The thing kind of hinges on whether you consider the Russian invasions of (so far) Georgia and Ukraine separate, narrowly bounded wars with no consequences for each beyond their boundaries, and no context, or if you see them as a single expanding pattern of aggression directly responding to particular opportunities created by perceived lack of willingness of the international community to constrain further aggression.

Did the Munich Peace Agreement avoid a war in 1938 over the Sudetenland? Sure. Did it contribute positively to European stability and security in any but the shortest possible term? I think most would agree the answer is “no,” Chamberlain’s triumphant declaration of “Peace for our time” aside.

The idea that Russia can just march its soldiers into Georgia, Ukraine, or Moldova is bad for European security.

It just is. All you need for proof of that is Finland and Sweden, who reacted very strongly to the invasion of Ukraine to join NATO.

Russia will do what Russia does. And we need to come up with plans to protect our allies. Ideally, Europe would be strong enough to defend themselves but USA's overwhelming military could use less than those 5% or 3% numbers you were talking about there to help our our European friends.

Its very cheap from the USA perspective, and provides plenty of assurances of raw, brutal defense. The kind of which Russia (and China) cannot ignore.

And ignore they will. No amount of signatures on the Budapest Memorandum prevented Putin from invading Ukraine.

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There's nothing "unstable" about Ukraine fighting for its survival. The unstable part is Russia invading Ukraine. The question is how to stop Russia from invading other countries.

The answer is to stop Russia in Ukraine. If Russia is stopped here, they won't attack other countries. Its really that simple.

We're venturing into tautology territory here, I think, but I can see where we agree.

I think getting the European NATO members to pony up and develop their own defense capabilities is long overdue, because there's been a bit of a free-rider problem since the end of the Cold War. Partially this is the result of a general failure of US leadership to posit what, exactly, NATO is supposed to be absent an Iron Curtain in Europe. I also vehemently agree that, in terms of dollars spent, this has been probably the greatest return on R&D dollars spent by US defense since WWII and has exposed pretty wide gaps in procurement (in fairness many have known and been screaming about these gaps for a while, but now they can't be explained away as not important "because War on Terror").

Where I think we part ways is probably at the definition of "stop". We've basically stalemated, with Russia getting no support from abroad and Ukraine getting extensive support from NATO and the US especially. Is a stalemate a "stop"? Is it "return to pre-war borders"? Is it "Crimea is back under control of Ukraine"? Is it "Ukraine is in NATO"? No one can really say, and that's where the unknown unknowns exist. For what it's worth, I actually agree with some who say that Ukraine is a de facto member of NATO already, but making them a de jure member must, absolutely must mean that all members wish to fight WWIII over the Donbass. That's a hard sell for normal people.

With only a few dozen billion/year being spent on this, I don't see any reason why USA should think of stopping.

Even if this goes on for the next 20 years, we'd have spent less on the Ukrainian war than a single year of Afghanistan.

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We still man the South Korean line, hold drills and protect them because protecting the South Koreans from the North Koreans is in our interests (and in the interests of pretty much every Android developer)

South Korea is a bad example because there's an enormous amount of physical and human capital on that peninsula that is actually critical to our interests. The Korean War also had nothing to do with NATO.

>With only a few dozen billion/year being spent on this, I don't see any reason why USA should think of stopping.

In a nutshell, that's my problem here. There really is no end game. We could evaporate 25% of Ukrainian and Russian fighting age men in this conflict, and you could still make the argument that "we just gotta test that new weapons system" or "to Sevastopol, or Moldova will be next, I promise".

We just got out of a pointless 20 year conflict, and now the best steelman we can come up with is "this time a forever war is good actually".

There really is no end game.

And elsewhere:

What is the stop? No one can really say.

This seems like a strange thing to say, given this war has a very clear and obvious metric (apart from people or materiel). Which has been, since after the 3rd week or so, moving monotonically in Ukraine's favor; sometimes slowly like now, at other times very quickly; but never oscillating or swinging back in Russia's favor.

There's also the matter of Putin's own impending demise or convalescence, not too far off -- and the inevitable consequences this will bring.

So not only does the war have a clear "stop" -- it has a built-in expiration date.

There are still unknowns, and things could go either way. But it's not like there's no very clearly defined "goal", especially for Ukraine. Or no way to measure velocity towards that goal.

What is this metric? The line on the map, I assume?

What is this "built-in expiration date"?

I don't doubt that you seriously believe these numbers exist, but I think you're imagining that they're tied to a specific event you want to see (Putin dropping dead of a heart attack or something). People have been predicting both the Russian and Ukrainian military "collapse" to be "any day now" for almost a year. Indeed, they also predicted that the Russian government itself would collapse not 3 weeks ago.

As an aside, one thing I learned from the Afghanistan war is that when your leaders - political and military - are not giving you clear, concise, specific, and measurable objectives in a conflict (e.g. amorphous bullshit like "increase host nation capacity") it's a recipe for nothing getting done for a long time. I see a similar phenomenon here, but the stakes are dramatically higher.

Yup, something to do with that line on the map.

The one that never applied to Afghanistan. I definitely concur about non-measurable metrics. But the metrics in Ukraine are very specific and absolutely measurable. Essentially the exact opposite of the situation in that conflict, in this regard.

Putin's croaking soon isn't a requirement for this thing to stop. The main point is that not something that's going to happen in the far off future. Which means that most likely this conflict has similar bounds time-wise as well.

If by "people" you mean random Youtubers -- yeah, "people" have been predicting all kinds of stuff. But very few of the analysts with actual expertise in these things have been making catastrophic predictions of the sort you're talking about (not even about the mutiny, or whatever it was 3 weeks ago). They've been quite level-headed and consistent in what they've been saying, actually.

With that - I think we can find our own "stop", also. We don't have to agree about where this thing is ultimately heading.

For my own part, I'll leave deliberations on that topic -- to those who are actually fighting it or living through it.

You went from declaring that you knew a specific date and quantifiable metric back to a fuzzy interpretation of numerous, dynamic factors for reaching a conclusion about when the war would end. With respect, you don't know.

That's the problem here, you are arguing deliberately for a forever war and writing it off as "no trust me this time it's actually a good idea". You aren't even developing that justification from first principles ("democracy good, Russians bad" would at least be consistent if not repetitive and circular) I think that's at a minimum unusual, and at maximum downright crazy because deliberately seeking to maximize a war a) obviously maximizes the human cost and b) in this case edges very close to an actual World War.

I absolutely did not say I knew a specific date. Only that the goal itself is easily quantifiable.

And no, just because one doesn't know the end date (or even a range) doesn't put a conflict in the "forever" category. Do you think the Western powers knew how long it would get that job finished, back around '41-'42?

So, no, I don't need to take the "forever war" bait.

This is getting boring. You can keep on playing that game if you like. Just not with me.

Not just the line on the map, but number of Russian tanks destroyed. Number of Russian artillery destroyed.

Unlike the Taliban who fought with incredibly cheap weapons, Russia has a limited amount of sophisticated artillery, tanks, and missiles.

Every tank, missile, airplane, helicopter Russia loses is one that will never threaten a European nation ever again

As long as the hard metrics are moving in our favor, it's good. The thing about Afghanistan is that we reached the point of minimal Taliban army in like December 2001 and didn't know what to do after that.

Russia's army is much bigger. So we have to spend months or even years corroding their army. After that, it will take decades for Russia to rebuild. It's a very different situation than Afghanistan.

It's not like Russia's army is infinite here. It's large but finite.

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But let's talk about lines on the map. Should Russia keep control of Crimea? Should we let Russians expand their territory at their leisure?

How does letting Russia annex territory help European security?

Mind you, this is the exact opposite situation than Afghanistan. All we Americans are doing are funding a rebellion inside of Crimea or Donetsk and hoping the territory gets returned eventually.

If not, we make the Russians pay for their mistake to discourage future annexation of territory.

This is closer to us funding the Taliban in 80s, rather than fighting the Taliban in the 00s. We have plenty of weapons and weapon production. The local population has high morale and is motivated. Our objectives align and unlike the Taliban/Mujhadeen we have better long term assurances that the Ukrainians will be a better ally with us in the long term.

Like what is the downside for supporting the Ukrainians or Koreans for the next 50 years? Like $50 Billion/year? We absolutely can pay that.

You are comparing/contrasting to Afghanistan which cost more than 20x the money and directly risked US lives, that had obviously fewer gains.

You're misinterpreting my Afghanistan comment. I'm not talking about the tactical situation on the ground, but the kind of human folly that happens with overconfidence at the strategic level when you aren't actually clear about what the national objective is. You are also continuing to sidestep why it's actually in the US' national interest to keep this war going as long as possible. I can see why it would be in, say, Poland's. You make it sound like we're just giving some upstart rebels some M4s and M995 and letting them have at it, but what we're really doing is building them an modern military from scratch, complete with modern air defense and (last gen) fixed wing.

>Like what is the downside for supporting the Ukrainians or Koreans for the next 50 years? Like $50 Billion/year? We absolutely can pay that.

This, right here, is the kind of folly I'm talking about. As the war progresses do you not see how we have to keep walking up the escalation ladder as Russia - correctly! - sees this conflict as one that is more and more a direct one with the United States? There isn't even the pretense of balancing the human cost and escalation risk with what our security objectives even are, because the latter are left nebulous or undefined and the former is written off as just a cost of doing business (perhaps literally). Indeed, that seems to be the tone of our "elites" who wish to bring a country actively in a war into NATO, perhaps with the intention of immediately invoking Article 5 - all without any debate among the citizens of member states who would have to bear that cost. Never thought I'd see it, but "forever wars are good now" is I suppose the natural progression of how Americans (I am one) would deal with losing.

> You are also continuing to sidestep why it's actually in the US' national interest to keep this war going as long as possible.

The strategic interest is that we punish Russia for taking Crimea and annexing swaths of land.

Any other country that makes this mistake will be punished by the USA. We cannot let countries just take over huge swaths of land of other countries like Hitler did Poland, (formerly called) Czechoslovakia, Austria or France.

When power-hungry dictators think that its in their interest to conquer land, they'll continue to conquer land. If they see that the world's largest military is willing and able to come to the defender's aid, then those countries around the world will stop thinking about attacking smaller nations.

This is in our strategic interest because China is eyeing Taiwan. If China decides to attack Taiwan, then they know that the might of the US Military stands against them. If not directly, then at very least indirectly.

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The fact remains: the "plan" was that Russia took over Ukraine and then USA supports an insurrection over the next decade with anti-tank Javelins. Ukraine overperformed: their army still stands, their leader survived the assassination attempts. Its only natural we USA reward them for their efforts.

We're giving Ukraine more arms than we ever expected to give them, but that's because they're doing so, so so so much better than anyone in the USA could have dreamed or planned for. There's a chance Ukraine actually kicks Russia out, and if _THEY_, the Ukrainians, are willing to fight for that I say we let them. Its really not that much money that we're giving them. And its in our strategic interests to defend the 1994 Budapest memorandum. (we _HAVE_ to show the world that disarming from nuclear weapons gives them a security guarantee / benefit from the United States. We want more countries disarming from nukes).

The $50 Billion or so we're spending on the Ukrainians this past year have been so much better than the $10+ Trillions we spent on the Afghanis. If this deal remains this cheap, its not even going to make me blink. I think you're not realizing how tiny the Ukrainian war budget really is.

Yes, the goals are vague. But the goals are vague because the Ukrainians are overperforming so much better than our stated goals.

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So strategic interest?

1. Punishing those who annex other territory

2. Supporting the 1994 Budapest Memorandum and showing the world that nuclear disarmament works, maybe not on the Russian/Soviet side but at least on the USA side of the agreement.

3. Permanently reducing the Russian military through the atrophy of this war.

4. Testing our weapons in support of Taiwan should China be stupid enough to do anything in the next decade.

Little strategic value? The largest country in Europe (besides Russia) that stopped supposedly the second best army in the world? Russia taking over Ukraine will have pretty grim strategic implication for the US. Russia had come back from worse? If you want Germany under Russian control in 30 years stopping giving Ukraine better weapons is the way to go.
Can you actually articulate anything beyond vaguely waiving at the size of the Ukrainian land mass? Is there some hyper critical mineral they have that no one else has?

>If you want Germany under Russian control in 30 years stopping giving Ukraine better weapons is the way to go.

I'm struggling to understand how this would happen, given Russia is at the point where they're pulling out mothballed T-34s for this and Germany has its own defense industry with modern weapons systems across all levels of war. "If we don't start WWIII over the Donbass, it's on to Berlin for the Russians!" isn't a statement grounded in any evidence or reality.

Is there some hyper critical mineral they have that no one else has?

Actually the main concern in Ukraine is stopping the mass murder, rape and torture of civilians.

Bet you didn't think of that.

Unfortunately, stopping mass murder, rape and torture is not a very compelling argument for pragmatists. As it was with WWI and WWII.

Fortunately, there is a very good pragmatic argument for helping Ukraine win.

Indeed - there are plenty of obvious pragmatic reasons for Europe's not wanting to have to put up with a recidivist bully on its doorstep, long-term. On top of the stench of all the bodies in Bucha, Mariupol, etc.

It's not like it's a big head-scratcher.

In 2008 the world did nothing to stop Russia from invading Georgia. In 2014 the world did next to nothing to stop Russia’s expansion into Ukraine. Even in 2022 the West waited for a while before supplying Ukraine with heavy equipment. Russia is not pulling mothballed T-34s, they don’t have them aside from museum exhibits. Given enough time they can fix their command and manufacturing problems. Contrary to the popular belief Russia learns and is getting better at war as we speak. In 2022 the whole front collapsed, now they can keep holding against Ukrainians armed with western tanks and cruise missiles.

Russia will have a generation raised during this war and war propaganda. Right now Russians sabotage the war by inaction and evasion because not that many people actually want to actively participate. That will change over time if the new generation is indoctrinated. This can’t be allowed to happen.

If it was Germany on Russian border and without NATO article 5 instead of Ukraine, Berlin would have been taken in 3 days, no amount of modern manufacturing will save you from not having a standing army with proper equipment.

No one can seem to keep their story straight in this thread. Russia is at the same time a weakend-to-the-point-of-collapse war economy, but also able to conjure up new manufacturing infrastructure from nowhere that would make them able to blitzkrieg their way to Berlin in 3 days. If the US can't replenish their 155mm stockpiles until ~2025, I would love to know what the Russians have figured out about weapons manufacturing that we ostensibly can't. I'm still not seeing why this particular conflict is so critical to the US strategic position that we'd walk ourselves up to direct NATO involvement and WWIII. I suppose if we sleepwalk into WWIII the 155mm problem will solve itself.

>If it was Germany on Russian border and without NATO article 5 instead of Ukraine, Berlin would have been taken in 3 days, no amount of modern manufacturing will save you from not having a standing army with proper equipment.

Sure, if you posit a bunch of things as true that are not true, you can make any analogy you want.

Russia has encountered significant problems especially compared to the expectations of the US analysts that said it will take over Kyiv in 3 days. But I’m still sure they would have no trouble with taking over modern demilitarized Germany if not for NATO.

But it’s far from being defeated. It’s not on the brink. It did not even mobilize the economy. The average guy in Moscow lived as well as before the war or better.

About the manufacturing: this is not new technology, you just need to commit to it. US was never ready for an artillery war, US is air and sea power. The US does not have a lot of things Russians have just because they have a different doctrine. The doctrine Ukraine can’t use because it does not have modern planes and aircraft carriers. Russia had so much ammo stockpiled (many times more than all the West combined) that it was not ready for it to start running out.

Russia is not pulling mothballed T-34s, they don’t have them aside from museum exhibits.

Right - people need to get their model numbers straight. What they're pulling up are mothballed T-54/55s, a.k.a. "mammoth poo":

https://www.kyivpost.com/post/19229

I notice you complain about US breaking the law, but not about Russia breaking international law.

You "America bad" people are disgusting.

Yeah, I'm not happy about the provision of cluster munitions, neither is my government.

My opposition is on the grounds of the human and economic cost of land contaminated with unexploded submunitions.

But if Russia's already using them in their usual profligate manner, and they'll help the Ukrainian war effort, then my objections fade to a reluctant sigh.

>Just fucking lovely!

Well I'll be damned, Max Verstappen is on HN.

The west needs to start blowing up Russia's capacity to make stuff. We keep sending stuff to Ukraine, but it seems that Russia's capacity to replace it's own stuff isn't degrading... This way this will drag on forever.
If any other countries start bombing Russian territory then that's a massive escalation that risks triggering their nuclear doctrine and ruining everything. So don't hold your breath for that one.
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> 3. Russia will not back down having gained nothing (but the gain likely does not have to be physical).

Idea is that they will coup and back down.

It almost happened like 2 weeks ago. It is really boiling inside Russia.
That seems like a rather false hope. Russia doesn't have much of a track record for backing down.

We can discuss the Prigozhin incident but no one outside of Wagner supported him. Nor does he seem to be in favor of withdrawing from Ukraine but rather assigning blame for mismanagement of the war. In fact, there are a whole host of vocal Russians ("ultranationalists") who seem to think Russia (and therefore Putin?) is not putting in enough effort.

If there is a coup, the rest of the civilized world really may not like whoever replaces Putin.

USSR fell apart, when the people saw their government and system as a complete fraud. Much to the surprise of Kremlin watchers. There is still hope for the Russian people
One would hope but I recently watched a YouTube video of an Australian touring a shopping mall / grocery store in Moscow. It looked practically identical to a western version. Contrast that to the USSR where grocery shelves were routinely empty and there was no variety of items.

Now maybe this is some kind of well funded information operation and sanctions really are working but there is no way the level of austerity is anywhere near the USSR's terminal levels. Until the Russian people's daily lives are adversely affected in a huge way, the comparative dissolution is not happening.

Will you give up your home forever to any robber showing up? You can find a new home in worse neighbourhood pretty easily after all.
~26,200 Ukrainian draft dodgers / deserters in Romania[1] don't seem to share your sentiment.

[1]: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-65792384

Don't forget most of Russians. They don't share my sentiment either. Many of them are even convinced that Ukrainians want to take their land, so they are in fact defending from Ukrainians. This doesn't change anything.
It is incredibly disingenuous to imply people who fled the war must necessarily support your position that Ukraine should make concessions to Russia. That is straight up trolling.
No, incredibly disingenuous would be:

1. Ukrainian military age males, legally required by their government to serve in the armed forces, fleeing 2. AND THEN insisting the war not end while their countrymen are dying on their behalf

I might assume you were trolling but instead I'll assume you don't understand what a Ukrainian draft dodger / deserter is in this situation.

> 2. AND THEN insisting the war not end while their countrymen are dying on their behalf

I wish the war ended as soon as possible too and that no one dies anymore. Most of those fighting on the front want to stop this war as soon as possible so that they don't die (if they wanted to die, they could just storm Russian positions without weapons). Ukraine giving up doesn't look like a valid answer. They gave up some territories in 2014 but Russia still came with tanks and started shooting at everything and killing (often in gruesome ways) civilians.

I bet that if Russians could just go home, this war would be stopped pretty soon, but alas they don't want to go home. Why?

Desperate people make desperate decisions, ergo, might makes right and Russia should be appeased? And when did we establish that they're insisting on the war to continue? This is a knot of false assumptions: that people who flee the conflict have some uniform opinion; that this in any way justifies concessions; that people who flee the conflict have a particular unstated but heavily implied moral character.

You can make as much of a show of extending me good will add you please, this is not a good faith argument and I have no hangups about calling it a spade.

You never answered the question, I'll pose a similar one but my guess is you will never directly answer.

If someone came to your house, raped your child, castrated your bother and was occupying your kitchen.

Would you given, you have the capability to fight back, fight back, or would you roll over and give your attacker your kitchen as part of 'negotiations'.

> The Ukrainian government stubbornly refuses any negotiation.

Odd that a country that isn't losing doesn't want to negotiate with an invader who has expressed as a bottom line that "we'll keep the bits we've occupied".

Perhaps this is a better phrasing:

The Russian government stubbornly won't relinquish occupied sovereign Ukrainian territory.

They aren't winning either. After weeks of "counteroffensive"[1], the situation on the ground has hardly changed. Even the Institute for the Study of War (which seems to be one of the few sources for unadulterated Western reporting) had to give a little pep talk the other day about "interdiction" in the face of a lack of results.

Considering there has been no negotiations, I don't see how Russia's position can be resolutely that they are going to keep all the land they've occupied.

Consider the fact that in 2008, Russia overran Georgia in a matter of days. Today Georgia is a sovereign and independent state with no Russian troops present (discounting Abkhazia which was previously occupied and complicated).

Russia must want something other than simply conquering its neighbors?

[1] This operation cannot be considered a counteroffensive because the Russians had been conducting a defense for months. However, Ukraine conducting an offensive is quite bad for PR because it makes them sound like the aggressor, which obviously is not the case.

You miss a key point... Not sure if deliberately or due to distance from all of that.

Allow Russia to back down with positive land gains today and you create a precedent that any invasion on a non-NATO non-nuclear country is possible and viable just because you're a large world superpower.

This should not be the case, and a large part of Europe understands that. Hopefully, you will too.

But NATO didn't oppose Russia's invasion of Georgia in 2008. So that precedent was already set?
> 2. If Russian forces are pushed back to the pre-February 2022 borders (and/or even out of Crimea), then what? They can still lob artillery, missiles, and drones with impunity.

Counter battery fire is a thing. And Ukrainians have no problem to shoot into Russia itself. They will just say that it was Russian Freedom legion or Russian partisans. While everyone knows that it won't be true, nobody can also proof that they were Ukrainians. It is just use of Maskirovka against its inventor.

Drones and missiles are more difficult to intercept, but there must be somebody on the other side to control them and Ukraine is starting to adapt Mossad-like techniques to execute whoever is doing that. [0] is Captain of Russian submarine launching Kalibr missiles, shot dead yesterday.

[0] https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2023/07/11/russia-ukr...

Counter battery fire[1] into Russia isn't going to end the war, just the opposite. I guess Russia will blame the mushroom clouds on the Russian partisans too?

[1] And we'll ignore issues with ranging, disproportionate numbers, ammunition, etc

Interesting article but any particular submarine captain getting schwacked on his morning run isn't going to affect the overall Russian war effort.