God says...
C:\LoseThos\www.losethos.com\text\PILGRIM.TXT
an draw, for he saw it was time to bestir him; and
Apollyon as fast made at him, throwing darts as thick as hail; by
the which, notwithstanding all that Christian could do to avoid it,
Apollyon wounded him in his head, his hand, and foot. This made
Christian give a little back; Apollyon, therefore, followed his work
amain, and Christian again took courage, and resisted as manfully
as he could. This sore combat lasted for above half a day, even
till Christian was almost quite spent; for you must kn
Interpretation: We have an evolutionarily advantageous instinct to maximize short term gains; our reason, however, can override this when we A) view other things as more important (e.g. honesty), and B) give it time to do its job.
Amusingly, phrasing it this way and combining it with the language in the article, we have 'original sin' arising from evolution. The religious imagery comes not from nowhere, but explains the biology in the best terms it could find. Protoscience.
Thats a great connection you've made between seemingly disconnected & distant disciplines. If we figure out the actual biological and chemical processes involved in a human body while it is indulging in synthesizing an 'original sin', that would be a big win in terms expanding our species' knowledge-base.
I'm sure there's research out there that explains at least fews bits of it through experiments where they monitor bodily processes when a person is lying. There are some common methods like the lie-detector and GSR methods, but apart from those external monitoring methods, probably also some molecular/cellular-level observations have been made.
That is one scary prospect. I think there are a bunch of people that would fall for such an offering. Look at how alot of the perks are already set up to comp you a drink or other such thing based on how long you have been playing. If you were to say the longer you play continuously, the better your odds,I think you would take every dollar an addicted gambler could scrounge. Sad.
I can't imagine the casinos haven't thought of this; some reasons they might not do it:
- People already think "the longer I've played without winning, the greater the chance I'll win now, because I'm 'due'", so there's no need to actually alter the odds (which would cost money)
- Or, maybe they're just afraid that people collapsing and dying at the slot machines (of dehydration, starvation, or exhaustion) would lead to bad publicity and more stringent regulation.
I think slot machines have to (by law) pay out a certain average percentage over time. That would probably be pretty hard to manage in conjunction with this scheme.
Most likely. As another poster pointed out, what this shows is that our reason--given time to work--can override more instinctual desires to cheat. Part of rationalizing is considering situations, real and unreal, that may influence the outcome. E.g. I may be being observed and if they think I am cheating they may discard me from the pay group.
Without that time you wouldn't consider that "chosen at random" may be a lie. So, to the automatic mind your odds of getting paid are the same whether you pick 3 or 6 but the reward for lying is significantly higher.
A simple heuristic the automatic mind may use would be (roll)x(payout):
6 x 10 = 60 vs 3 x 10 = 30
I'd be interested if the money incentive might have influence lying in the other direction, however. E.g. I did roll a 6, but if I say the maximum number they may not pay me; if I say a lower number they may be more likely pay me.
This could lead to a new rational heuristic including a chance of being paid:
6 x 10 x 0.10 = 6 vs 3 x 10 x 0.50 = 15
I find this type of statistical trick (to handle people lying) to be extraordinarily cool, despite (or because of) how trivial it is.
An especially elegant version: I remember reading an article (probably posted on here) where to figure out how many people were engaged in some illegal activity (opiate production in Afghanistan?), they asked each person to answer the question only after flipping a coin, and if they coin said heads, they were to always say yes. Thus, saying "yes" was no longer incriminating, and all the researchers had to do to get the value they wanted was subtract 50 and double.
Just to make this technique a bit clearer, since "subtract 50 and double" was a bit vague to me: you ask 100 people the question about illegal activity, and assume they're going to toss the coin and follow the protocol. That gives you 100 "yes" and "no" answers, of which ~50 "yes" answers are due to following the protocol and can just be ignored. The remaining yes/no answers are from the tails results and that's the data you use to get a final answer. As an illegal opiate producer in Afghanistan who answers "yes", you have plausible deniability by just saying "I got heads."
The fairness of the coin toss means the researcher asking the question doesn't need to know who got which coin result so it can be kept secret.
That's correct. The researcher doesn't know the outcome of any particular coin toss but knows the outcome, in expectation, for a large number of coin tosses.
You explained the subtract 50, but not really the and double.
Revised:
"You ask 100 people the question about illegal activity, and explain they're going to toss the coin and follow the protocol. That gives you 100 "yes" and "no" answers, of which ~50 "yes" answers are yes due to the coin being heads, regardless of whether true yes or false positive, so subtract those yesses out. The remaining yes answers are from the tails results and are not false positives. Because heads/tails is 50% chance, half of your true yesses were on tails, and half on heads. To get back the "hidden" half of yesses you tossed out with the 50 heads results, you double the yesses that came up with tails. That's the data you use to get a final answer."
I figured it would be obvious enough from what I outlined that the yes/no answers from the tails results gives you a proportion of "yes" answers, such as, say, 20/50, which is the proportion you want. The doubling is just 20/50 = 20*2/100. But I can appreciate that maybe someone else doesn't quite see it! :)
This description is a bit confusing, so I'll assume that the protocol was this:
100 people are asked a possibly self-incriminating question - "Are you indulging in bad activity X?" They are expected to toss a coin. If the coin said tails, they are expected to give a truthful answer. If the coin said heads, they are expected to say "Yes."
Now, no single person needs to worry about self-incrimination, since they can always claim that their "Yes" answer was the result of a "heads" on the coin toss. But still, you can get an estimate of the percentage of bad activity X going on, by subtracting 50 from the number of "Yes" answers and doubling.
(This is assuming of course that the subjects believe your claim that there is no way for individuals to self-incriminate - which is certainly not a given, IMO.)
Yeah, I think you still have to assume your "yes" count is going to be somewhat low because some number of subjects will not trust you regardless of the coin-flip cover.
In middle school, some of my friends and I discussed systems for transmitting information about crushes. Wouldn't it be nice if some trusted person knew everything, and could tell you whether your crush liked you? But then we faced a certain use case. One of my friends liked a girl; if she liked him back, obviously he would like to know that; but, he said, if she didn't like him back, then he didn't want to know that, and would prefer to keep hope alive.
So, we thought of this: Have some trusted person learn her preferences, and then flip a coin: if heads, then tell him if she likes him (and say nothing otherwise), and if tails, say nothing either way. This seemed to serve pretty well. [This was all hypothetical, of course.]
I think this is a good koan--something to provoke further thought. For example:
1. This is sort of how a scientific investigation may go. Suppose you have some theory, and some test that only yields results sometimes: 50% of the time, the test will yield result A, but 50% of the time, it will work properly, and in that case, if your theory is right, then the test will yield result A, and if your theory is wrong, then the test will yield result B. (Example: "There are no animals in this area", and imagine that they'll try to avoid being caught and that you can conduct an exhaustive search of only half of some area at once. Or: "Bob isn't holding a key in his hands", and he'll only let you look at one hand at a time and can switch from hand to hand between searches.) Repeated testing will let you approach certainty about your theory (but never really reach it).
2. One could talk about Bayesian probability and priors. Especially if one varies the coin's heads/tails probability.
3. I think this sort of thing is an actual trope in human interactions. Some people give "hints" of various sorts; to hint proposition P might be defined as "to decide to do some action X such that, if not-P, then there's a small probability that a generic human in your position would do X, but if P, then there's a high probability that a generic human in your position would do X". Other people (well, probably the same people) may perform tests, to put some other person in a position where he might do X or something else, and if P were true, he would do X with high probability, but if not-P, then he would do X with low probability. And people who resent such "tests" may deliberately randomize (or genericize) their behavior.
Consider this: Imagine that someone has asked me a question to which, if P, then my answer is rather embarrassing, and if not-P, then my answer is not embarrassing; suppose lying is not an option. Suppose I am a naive person. Then, if not-P, I will simply give the non-embarrassing answer, and if P, then I will refuse to answer or something. Now, if everyone knows I am naive, and P is true, then refusing to answer is futile; everyone can see that and deduce P anyway.
Considering the above, I might decide to be a defensive person. I will recognize questions like that, and at least some of the time, I will simply refuse to answer even though the answer is non-embarrassing. It seems people do exactly this: refusing to answer "personal questions", as they are called, seems to be relatively common behavior. Even on the scale of just you and someone else, you can establish yourself as a defensive person by refusing to answer a personal question when the answer is innocuous, and maybe revealing the answer through some other means or at another time (be a bit careful: e.g. if you refuse to answer, he pressures you to answer, and you say the innocuous answer, then it would still seem to make sense next time you are pressured and still refuse to answer to deduce the embarrassing answer); then, the next time you refuse to answer a personal question, you have demonstrated that this doesn't necessarily imply that the answer is embarrassing.
It seems to me polite to act as though someone has won his status as "defensive" without making him work for it, and rude to d...
Similar methods are widespread in interrogation tactics as well. With enough lies, you can determine the truth (eliminate all contradictory statements and what remains is either the truth or an amazingly executed piece of misinformation). Along the same lines, in SERE training, you're instructed to not answer any questions, and if you can't hold out from answering anymore, just tell the truth because lying helps as much as telling the truth.
This experiment was done in Israel - I wonder what would other countries would look like. Israelis seem to be more aggressive and creative in getting what they want than, say, Southern Californians.
This is a valid point, and I can only assume you are being downvoted due to "stereotyping." The sample group IS an important factor. For example, Milgram's famous "electric shock" experiment was repeated in many different countries. Germans for example, were very susceptible to authority figures, Australians were lesser so. Results are going to change based on the group being tested. It still doesn't change the fundamental finding of the study, however.
Probably more relevant to say this experiment was done on college freshmen, but yes, it would be interesting to see differences by country/etc. provided you can provide uniform experimental conditions (at a minimum, keep participants in the dark as to the composition of the experimental group, the fact that it's being done worldwide and comparisons will be made of their nation vs. others, etc).
I wish they'd included graphs of the actual distributions of reported numbers. That would have been more useful than just the mean, standard deviation, and chi-square results.
If that should have been 3.5, then 0.21 * 76 = 15.9 extra points over average.
Perl, you lying oaf, you owe me 159 shekels. pay up.
I guess I'm being ironic, but with n=76, it would be great if
"Those who were not under any time pressure reported a mean roll of 3.9. Both groups lied, then." came with a disclaimer about how confident we could be about that.
n=76 also seems low to me for this type of experiment. There was a great New Yorker article titled "THE TRUTH WEARS OFF", which if I remember correctly, discussed the difficulties of reproducing scientific experiments because we underestimate the occurrences of statistical anomalies. Good time to read that article again.
After reading it I was going to say the same thing. What I don't understand is why they compared it to the statistical average rather than just recording what they rolled. It would have been fairly trivial to eliminate that particular statistical variability from the experiment.
The experimenters want the test subjects to believe that the die roll is truly private and therefore that the subjects can, individually, get away with a lie. An easy way to do that is to actually make the die roll private.
Maybe you could devise equipment that would convince subjects that roll was private even though it really wasn't. Ideas on how to do that? Hidden wireless/infrared camera in the cup?
I thought a hidden camera scenario would be fairly easy. Two way mirror, hidden camera, etc.
If Justin Bieber is allowed hidden cameras, surely science is, too.
Also interesting: the experimenters are testing lying but refuse to lie themselves in order to properly carry out the experiment. I feel like there's some special irony in there somewhere.
despite my statistical uncertainty, I think it is a lot easier to show a subject that they're not being tricked if they aren't. People are REALLY good at picking up being tricked or not from very slight nonverbal communication and environmental clues.
Hmmm... maybe don't tell the administrator who runs it? I'm sure there is a way to actually observe the whole thing without giving it away. There is no cake, after all.
It could also be that the group with more time to calculate decided to make the number closer after thinking that the researcher would know 3.5 was the average.
If they provided the data set (all the numbers given) we would get the important... standard deviation which would get us closer to that answer.
Something interesting I think the article did not mention is that given the difference between the two sets of experiments, where you roll once vs you roll 3 times.
As a participant I'd feel more inclined to lie about my first roll if I rolled a higher number in my second or third attempt.
I'd be very interested in the results if n was not 76 but instead 7600.
The call for larger sample sizes isn't always appropriate. It can often lead to spurious inferences.
As Jacob Cohen (famous statistician) has said, "all null hypotheses, at least in the two tailed forms, are false".
That is, with nearly any hypothesis about differences between groups, given a large enough sample size, you're likely to find a significant difference.
i think the difference here is between the two different experiments (one with three rolls of the dice and one with a single roll) and not a difference between the groups. You could choose to use the exact same group of participants for both experiments.
From the paper (http://home.medewerker.uva.nl/s.shalvi/bestanden/Shalvi%20et...), page 5-6: "Shalvi et al. (2011a) asked participants to roll a die under a paper cup with a small hole at the top allowing only them to see the outcome, and earn money according to what they reported rolling (1=$1, 2=$2, etc.). As participants’ rolls were truly private, the authors assessed lying by comparing the reported distribution to the distribution predicted by chance (Fischbacher & Heusi, 2008). Participants were asked to roll three times but to report only the outcome of the first roll. Although all three rolls were private, the distribution of reported outcomes resembled the distribution of choosing the highest of the three observed rolls. Modifying the task to allow participants to roll only once reduced lying. Participants clearly found value in being able to justify their lies to themselves. The authors concluded that observing desired counterfactuals, in
the form of desired (higher) values appearing on the second or third (non-relevant for pay) rolls, modified participants’ ethical perceptions of what they considered to be lying. Observing desired counterfactual information enabled participants to enjoy both worlds: lie for money, but feel honest."
Shalvi et. al. (2011a) is:
Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011a). Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior.
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181-190.
Yes, that is interesting and true. The Economist article is a bit lame.
76 was enough to convince me that the effect isn't all publication bias (P<.01, and it's intuitively plausible). I would rather see a more diverse population (than college freshmen) than larger numbers.
I'm shocked that such a poorly done study is front page news.
76 people, comparing to a simple average, "no way of knowing" the actual results...Come on, seriously? I love science and give credit to everyone working to understand things; but labeling this as a new understanding (even a potential understanding) of psychological incentives is ridiculous.
The most likely explanation is random noise, and that this experiment will not be repeatable. Sadly almost all psychology studies are like this, an odd result thata is most likely statistical noise.
You mean that the most likely explanation for us hearing about this study is publication bias, right?
But we're talking p<.01 here, so most likely you're wrong. You'd have to believe that 100 similar studies have been performed and we only heard about the one winner.
They did two experiments that conceptually replicate research in the area. I agree that results like these need to be replicated by other researchers, but chalking this up to measurement or design error is not the most likely explanation.
This is what I'm thinking as well. The more they think about it the more they realize that the possiblity of cheating may be part of the experiment and decide not to do it because they don't want to look like a crook.
My guess: immediate temptation to cheat for $10 if you think you can get away with it.
On reflection, caution accelerates:
1. The gain is small.
2. Maybe people will find out via mechanism X I didn't think of (hidden cameras?)
3. maybe my report of 6 will be suspicious. maybe a 5 ... no, may as well just go with my original 3 ...
4. How will I feel having cheated? How good will I feel going away having a story of how I was honest even when it cost me?
5. I want to impress my psych teacher with how honest we college freshmen are.
6. Now that I've hesitated so long, I feel even more cautious. I've spent so much time deliberating, when I could have just taken the extra $5 immediately ... I must actually not want to cheat.
Perhaps also noteworthy: the above experiment was with 3 dice rolls, but the instruction to report the first. In a second experiment with only 1 die roll, the averages result claimed by both the hurry-up and take-your-time groups was 0.2-0.4 lower. This suggest that people in the 3 die roll group felt more comfortable cheating by reporting the 2nd or 3rd roll, perhaps in their mind lamely equating it with what could have been the 1st roll, or having a justification ready of having honestly misunderstood (I doubt anyone did honestly misunderstand). A difference of 0.2 is surely significant (comparing between N=76 and N=74 freshmen under the 3-dice and 1-die conditions).
63 comments
[ 3.5 ms ] story [ 116 ms ] threadGod says... C:\LoseThos\www.losethos.com\text\PILGRIM.TXT
an draw, for he saw it was time to bestir him; and Apollyon as fast made at him, throwing darts as thick as hail; by the which, notwithstanding all that Christian could do to avoid it, Apollyon wounded him in his head, his hand, and foot. This made Christian give a little back; Apollyon, therefore, followed his work amain, and Christian again took courage, and resisted as manfully as he could. This sore combat lasted for above half a day, even till Christian was almost quite spent; for you must kn
Amusingly, phrasing it this way and combining it with the language in the article, we have 'original sin' arising from evolution. The religious imagery comes not from nowhere, but explains the biology in the best terms it could find. Protoscience.
I'm sure there's research out there that explains at least fews bits of it through experiments where they monitor bodily processes when a person is lying. There are some common methods like the lie-detector and GSR methods, but apart from those external monitoring methods, probably also some molecular/cellular-level observations have been made.
Imagine if they modified slot machines to worsen your odds if you didn't put in another quarter within n seconds.
- People already think "the longer I've played without winning, the greater the chance I'll win now, because I'm 'due'", so there's no need to actually alter the odds (which would cost money)
- Or, maybe they're just afraid that people collapsing and dying at the slot machines (of dehydration, starvation, or exhaustion) would lead to bad publicity and more stringent regulation.
Without that time you wouldn't consider that "chosen at random" may be a lie. So, to the automatic mind your odds of getting paid are the same whether you pick 3 or 6 but the reward for lying is significantly higher. A simple heuristic the automatic mind may use would be (roll)x(payout): 6 x 10 = 60 vs 3 x 10 = 30
I'd be interested if the money incentive might have influence lying in the other direction, however. E.g. I did roll a 6, but if I say the maximum number they may not pay me; if I say a lower number they may be more likely pay me. This could lead to a new rational heuristic including a chance of being paid: 6 x 10 x 0.10 = 6 vs 3 x 10 x 0.50 = 15
An especially elegant version: I remember reading an article (probably posted on here) where to figure out how many people were engaged in some illegal activity (opiate production in Afghanistan?), they asked each person to answer the question only after flipping a coin, and if they coin said heads, they were to always say yes. Thus, saying "yes" was no longer incriminating, and all the researchers had to do to get the value they wanted was subtract 50 and double.
The fairness of the coin toss means the researcher asking the question doesn't need to know who got which coin result so it can be kept secret.
http://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=3810854
Revised:
"You ask 100 people the question about illegal activity, and explain they're going to toss the coin and follow the protocol. That gives you 100 "yes" and "no" answers, of which ~50 "yes" answers are yes due to the coin being heads, regardless of whether true yes or false positive, so subtract those yesses out. The remaining yes answers are from the tails results and are not false positives. Because heads/tails is 50% chance, half of your true yesses were on tails, and half on heads. To get back the "hidden" half of yesses you tossed out with the 50 heads results, you double the yesses that came up with tails. That's the data you use to get a final answer."
100 people are asked a possibly self-incriminating question - "Are you indulging in bad activity X?" They are expected to toss a coin. If the coin said tails, they are expected to give a truthful answer. If the coin said heads, they are expected to say "Yes."
Now, no single person needs to worry about self-incrimination, since they can always claim that their "Yes" answer was the result of a "heads" on the coin toss. But still, you can get an estimate of the percentage of bad activity X going on, by subtracting 50 from the number of "Yes" answers and doubling.
(This is assuming of course that the subjects believe your claim that there is no way for individuals to self-incriminate - which is certainly not a given, IMO.)
So, we thought of this: Have some trusted person learn her preferences, and then flip a coin: if heads, then tell him if she likes him (and say nothing otherwise), and if tails, say nothing either way. This seemed to serve pretty well. [This was all hypothetical, of course.]
I think this is a good koan--something to provoke further thought. For example:
1. This is sort of how a scientific investigation may go. Suppose you have some theory, and some test that only yields results sometimes: 50% of the time, the test will yield result A, but 50% of the time, it will work properly, and in that case, if your theory is right, then the test will yield result A, and if your theory is wrong, then the test will yield result B. (Example: "There are no animals in this area", and imagine that they'll try to avoid being caught and that you can conduct an exhaustive search of only half of some area at once. Or: "Bob isn't holding a key in his hands", and he'll only let you look at one hand at a time and can switch from hand to hand between searches.) Repeated testing will let you approach certainty about your theory (but never really reach it).
2. One could talk about Bayesian probability and priors. Especially if one varies the coin's heads/tails probability.
3. I think this sort of thing is an actual trope in human interactions. Some people give "hints" of various sorts; to hint proposition P might be defined as "to decide to do some action X such that, if not-P, then there's a small probability that a generic human in your position would do X, but if P, then there's a high probability that a generic human in your position would do X". Other people (well, probably the same people) may perform tests, to put some other person in a position where he might do X or something else, and if P were true, he would do X with high probability, but if not-P, then he would do X with low probability. And people who resent such "tests" may deliberately randomize (or genericize) their behavior.
Consider this: Imagine that someone has asked me a question to which, if P, then my answer is rather embarrassing, and if not-P, then my answer is not embarrassing; suppose lying is not an option. Suppose I am a naive person. Then, if not-P, I will simply give the non-embarrassing answer, and if P, then I will refuse to answer or something. Now, if everyone knows I am naive, and P is true, then refusing to answer is futile; everyone can see that and deduce P anyway.
Considering the above, I might decide to be a defensive person. I will recognize questions like that, and at least some of the time, I will simply refuse to answer even though the answer is non-embarrassing. It seems people do exactly this: refusing to answer "personal questions", as they are called, seems to be relatively common behavior. Even on the scale of just you and someone else, you can establish yourself as a defensive person by refusing to answer a personal question when the answer is innocuous, and maybe revealing the answer through some other means or at another time (be a bit careful: e.g. if you refuse to answer, he pressures you to answer, and you say the innocuous answer, then it would still seem to make sense next time you are pressured and still refuse to answer to deduce the embarrassing answer); then, the next time you refuse to answer a personal question, you have demonstrated that this doesn't necessarily imply that the answer is embarrassing.
It seems to me polite to act as though someone has won his status as "defensive" without making him work for it, and rude to d...
I wish they'd included graphs of the actual distributions of reported numbers. That would have been more useful than just the mean, standard deviation, and chi-square results.
And yes, the data should be available for download.
Perl, you lying oaf, you owe me 159 shekels. pay up.
I guess I'm being ironic, but with n=76, it would be great if "Those who were not under any time pressure reported a mean roll of 3.9. Both groups lied, then." came with a disclaimer about how confident we could be about that.
http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2010/12/13/101213fa_fact_...
http://www.math.usu.edu/~schneit/CTIS/LawOfAverages/
Maybe you could devise equipment that would convince subjects that roll was private even though it really wasn't. Ideas on how to do that? Hidden wireless/infrared camera in the cup?
If Justin Bieber is allowed hidden cameras, surely science is, too.
Also interesting: the experimenters are testing lying but refuse to lie themselves in order to properly carry out the experiment. I feel like there's some special irony in there somewhere.
Was anyone else surprised to see "bunch"? Why did they use that, when "group" would be a much better word?
If they provided the data set (all the numbers given) we would get the important... standard deviation which would get us closer to that answer.
As a participant I'd feel more inclined to lie about my first roll if I rolled a higher number in my second or third attempt.
I'd be very interested in the results if n was not 76 but instead 7600.
As Jacob Cohen (famous statistician) has said, "all null hypotheses, at least in the two tailed forms, are false".
That is, with nearly any hypothesis about differences between groups, given a large enough sample size, you're likely to find a significant difference.
Shalvi et. al. (2011a) is: Shalvi, S., Dana, J., Handgraaf, M. J. J., & De Dreu, C. K. W. (2011a). Justified ethicality: Observing desired counterfactuals modifies ethical perceptions and behavior. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 115, 181-190.
76 was enough to convince me that the effect isn't all publication bias (P<.01, and it's intuitively plausible). I would rather see a more diverse population (than college freshmen) than larger numbers.
76 people, comparing to a simple average, "no way of knowing" the actual results...Come on, seriously? I love science and give credit to everyone working to understand things; but labeling this as a new understanding (even a potential understanding) of psychological incentives is ridiculous.
But we're talking p<.01 here, so most likely you're wrong. You'd have to believe that 100 similar studies have been performed and we only heard about the one winner.
On reflection, caution accelerates:
1. The gain is small.
2. Maybe people will find out via mechanism X I didn't think of (hidden cameras?)
3. maybe my report of 6 will be suspicious. maybe a 5 ... no, may as well just go with my original 3 ...
4. How will I feel having cheated? How good will I feel going away having a story of how I was honest even when it cost me?
5. I want to impress my psych teacher with how honest we college freshmen are.
6. Now that I've hesitated so long, I feel even more cautious. I've spent so much time deliberating, when I could have just taken the extra $5 immediately ... I must actually not want to cheat.
Perhaps also noteworthy: the above experiment was with 3 dice rolls, but the instruction to report the first. In a second experiment with only 1 die roll, the averages result claimed by both the hurry-up and take-your-time groups was 0.2-0.4 lower. This suggest that people in the 3 die roll group felt more comfortable cheating by reporting the 2nd or 3rd roll, perhaps in their mind lamely equating it with what could have been the 1st roll, or having a justification ready of having honestly misunderstood (I doubt anyone did honestly misunderstand). A difference of 0.2 is surely significant (comparing between N=76 and N=74 freshmen under the 3-dice and 1-die conditions).