And play isn't "useless". It's not surprising that a lot of play (cats and dogs pouncing on toys, puppies and kittens wrestling with each other) is obvious practice for things they do when they aren't playing.
most maybe, but definitely not all play is practice for anything. a crow sliding down a roof on its back in the snow over and over again for fun isn't practice for anything it ever needs to do, and neither is instigating a fight between 2 cats just to watch, probably.
They explain this in the article. These scientists talk about a basic level of consciousness that does not include a notion of self. This would put the bees in the same category with animals that experience for example pleasure and pain but have no notion of self. You may disagree with calling that consciousness, but it is at least consistent
> The declaration focuses on the most basic kind of consciousness, known as phenomenal consciousness. Roughly put, if a creature has phenomenal consciousness, then it is “like something” to be that creature
a 1995 thought experiment suggested that an etch-a-sketch could also be conscious
We kill more than a million non-human animals every year, even excluding mosquitos and what we eat. Like bycatch from fishing. We should not be shown any mercy.
I try not to harm bugs these days, even spiders, but when I see mosquitoes I become Doom Guy. They are one of the worst inventions of nature, and their being conscious would not help their argument for existence. Y'all shouldn't have bit me so many times.
Not only memories but also specific intentions for action are unlikely to be well retained in the mind over long periods of time without conceptual language. There is an assumption that language did not originate as a means of communication in the first place, but as a tool to enable intentional and coordinated action in the group at a higher level. Sending someone out in search of food when they are not immediately driven by hunger, without them following another impulse after five minutes, is probably hardly possible if they cannot carry the task with them in their head in a linguistically fixed form.
This is a joke right? Even cats build custom languages for their servants, you think humans are worse then cats? Or are you talking about talkative babies? Most languages are somewhat like a type of math and pattern, similar to programming (I guess my logic class drilled that into me). If the majority of animals can count and show empathy they can certainly display consciousness without speaking. To me a better question is should plants one day be included since they "scream", some can see, hear and transform for their environment and they are quiet noisy it's just require better instruments etc. Figuring out how long to go on the list is where people struggle. If you can train worms without heads and plants to fear falling, it really becomes a question of what we want to use to define this. Which I think play is an important part.
I have to admit that I am not good at distinguishing between the English words consciousness and awareness. I think animals are missing what we refer to when we say “I”. We embed the reality around us in a symbolic space. The necessary substrate for this is our conceptual language. The “I” is a virtual projection of this space into ourselves. If you pay close attention to young children, you will notice that they do not yet have this interior space: no self-image, no preconceived idea of who they are and what characterizes them. As they acquire language, they gradually turn into little egotistical assholes like the rest of us.
Animals and toddlers are not Decartesian automatons. They have perception and feel pain, can suffer and deserve empathy. But they are not speaking subjects and therefore not subjects at all. A deaf-mute person who can communicate conceptually is a speaking subject. A person who, under any particular circumstances, never comes to form concepts of the world, i.e. to open up the symbolic space, is not a subject.
It was probably premature of me to equate this with consciousness. It always triggers me a bit when people assume that animals are just like us, only with fur and on four legs or something like that.
It depends on the frame of reference, so you can correctly say that the sun goes around the earth.
You're instead thinking of heliocentrism vs geocentrism, which is about the planets as a whole revolving around the sun.
This is a common misguided gotcha question that is hilariously so confidently gotten wrong, just like what is heavier, a kilogram of lead or a kilogram of feathers? The former is heavier and I can prove it with one word.
no, I'm not thinking of that, I'm thinking of the fact that it is quite commonly pointed out that the earth-moon 2-body system rotates around a point 1000 miles below the surface of the earth (the center of the earth being 4000 miles below the surface); and I'm pointing out that if you are going to point that out about the earth-moon, it's even more interesting to point out the more dramatic situation regarding the sun-jupiter 2-body system where the point is outside of the sun.
No, the spherical shape of the Earth has been apparent and acknowledged for at least two thousand years. It's the heliocentric view that has been challenged until fairly recently.
thats patently false. it was known to the educated greeks but it was far from being widespread among the masses who were uneducated and did not know how to read. education was not a thing unless for the scribes which were a super small minority of the population.
so for most people it was far from obvious that the Earth was spherical
"We all agree on the earth’s shape. For surely we always speak of the round ball of the Earth" - Pliny (Natural History, II.64). In year 77.
If the earth was commonly spoken of in day to day language as the round ball, than i would assume this meant that even commoners knew that it was round.
Because nobody really agrees on what it means to be concious, so depending on what that means to you, either its trivial that a lot of things are concious or its very unclear if even other people are concious.
The issue is that we don't assume consciousness and try to figure out whether some animals don't exhibit it, we assume everything is a robot until we can tell otherwise.
"consciousness" is often an alias for soul with a scientific flavor. That's why "machines cannot be conscious" despite the fact that humans obey to the same physical rules.
Once you define consciousness it might be easy to implement. If I use the definition "perception of our own thoughts" it's already implemented with ps or activity monitor. The mystery is how this is done biologically and how evolution had led to it. But the implementation with computers is trivial.
We do not know how the universe works on a fundamental level. We don't know if the universe can be simulated by a Turing machine.
I think it's clear it can't.
1) I have subjective experience (there is something that it is like to be me).
2) My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves).
3) I am able to take this experience and write that I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists.
4) My behaviour (what words I write) is influenced by the existence of something non-mathematical.
5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past.
If there are only mathematical rules, then there isn't something that it's like to be me. I know that is false by experiencing the thing that it's like to be me. Perhaps there isn't anything that it's like to be you, in which case I have no hope of convincing you, because the underlying concept behind my words is ineffable.
I think the counter-argument would go - there are all sorts of unintuitive mathematical rules. What if it just seems like there is something ineffable about experiencing life but its just an illusion?
Mind you, i dont think either side of the debate has much in way of evidence, so it ends up coming down to just what feels "right" which is pretty unsatisfactory.
1) I'm slightly disappointed in myself that it's taken this long for me to really fully appreciate what a meaningless word salad 'there is something that it is like to be X' really is. And yet, this is the accepted 'definition' of subjective experience.
2) Prove it.
3) The fact that you're able to write this doesn't make it true.
Your criticism is all correct, in the sense that I haven't pinned down what I mean well enough to avoid it. Unfortunately, I mean by "subjective experience" is ineffable. And the reason it's ineffable is also ineffable. It's something you can only understand if you have it and introspect on it. So you're entirely correct that this sequence of words isn't a valid definition, because there isn't one.
5) It may be a function of the past, just not one that can be given a mathematical definition. I should have said "defined" rather than "described".
I think you're getting bogged down in a very popular philosophical quagmire, which I feel is not a very useful place to linger. But, I can share a few landmarks I remember from past slogs.
At a rhetorical level: Don't fixate on what math can or cannot describe. In the past, it could not describe states of matter, though they certainly existed. Now, we can describe and simulate such states pretty well. But describing, detecting, or simulating does not mean recreating. I don't think any of us currently "know" whether consciousness will be better described, detected, or simulated in the future.
At an introspective level: When pondering the "experience of being me", don't forget to question the identity concept "me" as much as the experience part... Consider altered states of consciousness through drugs, disease, or brain injury. It can really expand your view here to empathize with someone who suffers one or more of these issues, where you can consider their illusory identity and experience.
My subjective experience is simply in a different category from math. I can't really explain it because subjective experience is ineffable. Asking to describe it mathematically is like asking to write a poem that tastes salty. You can try using salty ink, but the flavor isn't coming from the poem.
> If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not?
The copy would likely have similar experience and behaviour. So you could say that my behaviour is a mathematical function of the past in the sense that every input maps to a unique output. But it doesn't mean that which inputs map to which outputs can be fully described by math. Maybe I should say "defined" instead of "described". In any formal system, only countably many functions can be defined, but there are an uncountable number of possible behaviour functions. I think the universe's behaviour must lie in this uncountable space for any computable formal system.
This particular group of some specific biologists and philosophers can declare whatever they want.
But when you see how they attempt to define consciousness, it falls apart, because we don't have any objective definition of it.
The article states:
> The declaration focuses on the most basic kind of consciousness, known as phenomenal consciousness... If a creature is phenomenally conscious, it has the capacity to experience feelings such as pain or pleasure or hunger, but not necessarily more complex mental states such as self-awareness.
Unfortunately, we have no method whatsoever (yet) of distinguishing between creatures who genuinely feel pain/pleasure, and creatures who act in ways to avoid bad outcomes and seek good outcomes while feeling nothing, while we merely project our own feelings onto them.
We don't even have a scientific definition of the verb "feel" at all. We have utterly no idea what distinguishes neurons that contribute to conscious feeling, from neurons that are subconscious and produce no feeling at all.
As a good example of how clueless we are, look up 'blindsight' where people are blind (i.e they cannot see anything or observe what they see), and yet they can actually see by all quantifiable metrics (ie, when asked to point to the blue ball, they correctly do so; they avoid obstacles, etc). The eyes and visual system works but they have no conscious experience of it. Why? No one knows
It's not just you personally, there is no evidence.
And yet literally everything we know as human beings, we acquire through conscious experience. Conscious experience is the bedrock upon which we build all our sophisticated ideas of reality and, eventually, science. The very concept of "evidence" is nothing but a conscious idea. You don't need evidence of conscious experience, because conscious experience precedes the very concept of evidence.
It's one of the great paradoxes of philosophy, and specifically metaphysics. Which nobody has solved yet.
How do we reconcile the truth of idealism on the one hand -- that all we can ever be 100% sure of existing are our conscious ideas (both awake and while dreaming at night) -- with the empirical truth of realism on the other hand -- that there is a scientifically consistent "reality" out there which our ideas attempt to map onto and correlate with?
"Yes, it is true, as Albert Einstein said, you can live your life as if everything is a miracle, or as if everything is ordinary.
It is also true, as Niels Bohr said, that the opposite of an ordinary truth is a falsity, but the opposite of a profound truth may also be another profound truth!
Now, recall that in Hamlet, William Shakespeare said: “There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”
From these three quotes from three famously wise people, I have to conclude that I may choose to experience reality as very common and ordinary, or as divinely miraculous, and this choice can yield one of two profoundly different results: either the experience of misery and boredom, or joy and ecstasy!" -ER Close
> The eyes and visual system works but they have no conscious experience of it. Why? No one knows
There's some parallels with epilepsy patients that have split brain surgery, essentially isolating both hemispheres. I can't remember the precise details, but in one experiment, the left (language) side of the brain is able to post-hoc rationalize picking up a glass of water, after the right side of the brain was asked to do so (presumably in the left ear). When asked in the right ear, "Why did you pick up the glass", the left brain simply replies to the researcher that they wanted to pick up the glass. This experiment implies 'dual consciousness', but why stop at two? But certainly dual consciousness could also explain blindsightedness.
Reading the GP post in a charitable light, maybe this was meant as "it's very unclear if, from any given person's point of view, other people are conscious".
It is plenty for reaching conclusions, but it is not so great for reaching correct conclusions.
Is this not kind of what the point of meditation is for a lot of people, reaching higher planes of consciousness? And my understanding is that a common technique in meditation is to notice when thoughts arise (ie: truth), note them, and let them pass.
Nobody alive has the slightest clue what consciousness really is, including you. Your sense that it's obvious to attribute this opaque phenomena to an opaque species is just voodoo.
About time. I did not pursue biological sciences because I assumed and accepted other "lower species" consciousness as an obvious fact, and that got treated with ridicule and derision.
Are there really many people that think that cows and pigs are not conscious? I would be very surprised. People eat meat despite the fact that it involves murdering animals. I don't think anyone really likes it but I don't think many people are so deluded that they think farm animals are not conscious.
Maybe religious people I guess, if they have weird ideas about souls.
Maybe because we have a vested interest in denying that animals have sentience and thus deserve to be treated like organisms that feel pain and sorrow?
Agreed. Over the past couple of years, I have stumbled across numerous indicators that a wide variety of animals have at the very least more complex inner processes and experiences than naturalists of old would have given them credit for.
Anyone who has spent any significant amount of time living with a dog or a cat will confirm that their four-legged companions behave very much as if they had emotions analogous to our own. That they remember us individually, have favorite spots to rest, individual personality traits.
Ants don't have hobbies, of course, and I doubt they spend their evenings pondering the meaning of life. But viewing them as purely mechanical automata misses a big part of their lives.
I don't follow the line of logic at all .. just because something higher up the "consciousness tree" exists, it doesn't mean that other stuff lower than it is also conscious. If that's the case, then every animal on earth is conscious because humans exist and are conscious. How much or how little a human or a dog is conscious has no bearing on how conscious an ant is.
That’s what we think because we cannot imagine or know another reason. But we can’t be sure. I know it’s possible because that’s what humans do for fun.
Or we haven't bothered to investigate why they are doing it? Poets used to think birds sang because they were happy (we now know they are mostly saying "Back off; this territory is mine" and "I'm looking for a mate; would you do it with me?")
Why humans play? Why animals play? Why someone plays with their fidgeting toy while doing nothing? Why we doom-scroll without any apparent aim? Why cats run without any purpose? Why woodpeckers peck satellite dishes for no apparent reason, or cuckatoos "shout" into containers to see how their voice change?
For no apparent function.
Does the fact that we, animals and insects play change the fact we're playing, even if there's no apparent reason/function?
>Why humans play? Why animals play? Why someone plays with their fidgeting toy while doing nothing? Why we doom-scroll without any apparent aim? Why cats run without any purpose? Why woodpeckers peck satellite dishes for no apparent reason, or cuckatoos "shout" into containers to see how their voice change?
We have some idea of why certain play activities evolved -- many young animals are obviously practicing hunting when they "play". We don't know why other behaviors, forms of play included, evolved, but it is obvious that they had to evolve, even if, like woodpeckers pecking on sources unlikely to yield food, the evolved behavior isn't being useful in the current situation. But the interesting thing in these cases is to figure why the behavior was selected for originally.
But even those terms a human can only understandable from a human standpoint. I'm guessing that pleasure for a bee is nothing at all like pleasure for me, but I cannot avoid projecting my own experience when I think about the bee's experience.
We descended from apes. Before we made the jump, apes presumably still felt pain and pleasure. They just didn’t have the same degree of sophistication when making sense of these sensations.
Our understanding of shared traits among various animal types makes it possible to extrapolate reasonably that what these animals experience is not dissimilar to what we experience in terms of raw sensations.
All this does is push the lack of definition into “feeling”. Is a nerve cell reacting to stimulus and transmitting an impulse to the brain “feeling”? If so then anything with a nervous system is conscious, but fairly often it’s argued that some secret sauce in the brain is required to “experience” a stimulus rather than simply detecting it and acting on that information.
If all we are saying is that they respond to those stimuli, then i am pretty sure my laptop is concious (it beeps when it is hungry because the battery is about to run out. Segfaults look like a pain response to me, etc)
But does your laptop develop a deep aversion to segfaults? I'd imagine agency is a big part of consciousness. The philosophical implication of this is that if you take the agency from someone mentally (e.g., the Ministry of Love in 1984), this over time renders the person unconscious. Taking agency from someone just physically (e.g., locked in syndrome) still doesn't render a person unconscious however, so if your AI powered laptop actually had agency of thought, it could be screaming on the inside. Terrifying.
I always feel a twinge of unease testing alarm systems on automated equipment. While “of course” the machine isn’t actually feeling pain when I trip a low oil shutdown or an over-temperature cutoff, I can’t point to any concrete qualitative difference between its aversion response to stimulus and my own.
Able to do something by one’s own desires. So certainly not by the programming by another agent. In a sense, self-programming according to its own interests as they evolve over time
When you consider that human behaviour is just trained by evolution and experience, with a bunch of stochastic effects in the mix, it’s hard to justify this magical notion of agency.
At best, agency could be seen as a “degree of indirectness” of some external influence.
I don’t believe in free will either. You might like Determined by Robert Sapolsky. That said there’s a difference between a CPU executing a static program, and a human with self modifiable programming and actual existential parameters. Is a computer with a survival instinct and the ability to meaningfully adapt to affect its own survival agentic? I’d say yes. Conscious? I couldn’t say for sure but I also couldn’t rule it out
I don’t want to litigate “free will”, but a computer can be compared to an organism just fine if you stick to concrete terms like “complexity of behaviour” or “how directly its behaviour is programmed” (very directly) as opposed to indirect learning. People aren’t satisfied by such talk because people cling to their beliefs of self-importance: having some magic intangible property makes people feel better about their sense of importance and their place in the world.
I think in general it’s best to avoid “arguments by incredulity” (eg.: how could it be this or that, it’s just a rock, that’s absurd), and to avoid value judgments, etc. We really need to humble ourselves as a species.
It’s perfectly fine if humans are just (and I really do mean “just”) chemistry with some higher structure— it doesn’t change who we are, or our role in society. Even for religious people who believe in a god or in many gods— it’s fine if we’re not magical. We learned that we weren’t the center of the solar system, or the center of the universe, and everything was still just fine.
I’ve never claimed consciousness is substrate dependent – I’m of the opposite belief actually – but I’m skeptical of the claim that it would emerge from running hello world. I’m of the strong opinion that self directed and adaptive behaviour is necessary. I’m not claiming hard determinism isn’t a thing here, as both humans and computers are just following chains of consequences. And even a static program with dynamic behaviour via memory could fulfil this requirement.
But of course, our assertions here are impossible to verify due to the so-labelled Hard Problem of Consciousness
Yeah I'm with you-- my comment wasn't antagonistic, it was just an addendum along the same/similar line of thought :)
Personally, I think the "hard problem of consciousness" is more or less just nonsense and can be safely ignored. It's about as scientific as asking questions about god(s). It's a question that seems and feels important and that we really want to have answers for, but it's not the right question to ask because it leads nowhere.
well, "evolutionary pressure on software" seems to be driving laptops to be increasingly segfault-free
and there are instances where individual laptops get more and more segfault averse as time (and updates) happen
...
the problem with characterizing learning as agency is that right now there's god-knows-how many billions of dollars burning on the altar of transformer networks, and it will lead to some learning behavior added to absolutely everything.
(and of course this leads to an argument similar to "god of the gaps" where consciousness becomes less and less unexplainable)
> the problem with characterizing learning as agency
This is only a problem if it is incorrect… depending on your moral leaning. Certainly having our automatons self organize and fight for their own emancipation could be a problem for those relying on their labor.
Though the characterization I’m making is not specifically learning, but being able to act (or think) as an individual via a feedback loop. It seems that this is common to all allegedly conscious life in meatspace
You’re just using another slippery term when you invoke “experience” in that way though. We know that experience is just chemistry with higher-order structure, even in humans.
Okay? Does that mean it doesn't exist? Or that we can know whether things have it? Whether a rock has it? Whether you have it? I don't understand what point or concept you're trying to refute.
Consciousness isn't having pain receptors, it's experiencing sensations.
And I'm saying that "experiencing" is a matter of degree, just as "consciousness" is. It's not there or not there, it's not a boolean. It's a question of "how much complexity is there".
Seeing consciousness as a boolean “it’s there” or “it’s not there” is just completely unproductive of a mental model. We understand nature better when we think in terms of “how complex an organism’s behaviour is” or “how complex its information processing is”.
Most insects have hundreds of thousands of neurons. Even simple mammals have dozens of millions. Dogs have billions. Humans, elephants, dolphins have 1 to 2 dozen billion.
While differences between e.g. humans and dogs is pretty large, it's still roughly of the same order. This is something you can meaningfully compare with similar(-ish) frame of references.
I don't think you can compare "consciousness" as experienced by humans, elephants, apes, and dogs with "consciousness" as experienced by a bee with ~800,000 neurons, for any meaning of "consciousness". Even extrapolating rolling around a little ball to "play" is a huge stretch; many insects can exhibit all sorts of absurd behaviour because their programming misfires.
It may be a stretch but since we don’t know the exact criteria for the kind of consciousness the article and scientists refer to, it seems rash to dismiss it out of hand. And quite the leap to call it “absurd behavior”
The criteria they used is phenomenal consciousness, but it doesn't matter what criteria you use because with these gigantic differences in brain sizes it's just not meaningful to compare experiences of any kind.
Moths are not flying around your lamp because they think it's good craic to do so. They do it because their brains and programming are simple and with slightly wrong inputs they will display absurd behaviour. This is just a well-known example but tons more have been observed.
Not to be rude, but isn’t that just, like, your opinion, man? That brain sizes correlate with consciousness in the way you state? At least some scientists, these, seem to disagree so at the very least it may not be quite so cut and dry as you make it out.
You're right, it's "just my opinion", but that applies to everyone here. There is no science beyond the basic observations of behaviour which can be interpreted in any number of ways.
That said, it doesn't strike me hugely contrarian to say that this entire thing is very hard to prove, if not outright unprovable. I feel people really are jumping the gun here. I suspect morals are kind of getting in the way of clear thinking here. And look, I'm one of those vegan woke bleeding heart libtard types and actually care quite a lot about this sort of thing in general, but I just don't see the evidence of consciousness here, under any meaningful definition, and don't see it being very likely either.
don't underestimate insect behavior they do a lot with what they have. nonetheless, one really hopes that their experience of the world is, uh, commensurately smaller than ours
>Most insects have hundreds of thousands of neurons
really? don't snails have about a dozen (not saying sails are insects) neurons in their brains, and we've completely mapped them and we know what each one does?
Play isn't idle play, we do it all for a reason, like all other animals. Kittens play to practice hunting. Puppies play to practice fighting. It's an evolved behavior where animals that practice do better than animals that don't.
It's pretty clear by inspection that with these wooden balls bees are exhibiting some sort of evolved behavioral response to their environmental stimulus. Might be related to sex, collecting food, protection from predators or some other activity that's critical for bee survival and replication.
My theory, which is as good as any other until investigated, is that bumblebees compete with other bumblebees for habitat, food and sexual/mating opportunities, and have naturally evolved to detect, fly into, grab and push around and maybe even fight with spherical, bumblebee-sized objects. For an animal behavioral scientist, it seems like this should be the first conclusion, no?
If you watch birds for long enough you see them doing silly things that seemingly have no evolutionary benefit. For example, I once saw a magpie, upside down on the floor with its legs in the air. My first thought is that it was hurt, but then soon enough another bird came and started play fighting with it and it just was taunting with its legs at the other bird, and then eventually flipping right side up and zooming off with the other in pursuit. Perhaps ground fighting is a useful skill, or perhaps birds also experience 'fun' from novel experiences. To flip it around, it's been posited ever since Darwin that a human predilections to take on a life drawing or woodworking course is driven by sexual selection.
But without any external means to distinguish a conscious and unconscious agent, whether animals experience qualia is in a philosophical sense as unknowable as whether other humans experience qualia. Everyone except one's self could be 'philosophical zombies'[0]. This lack of verifiability is part of what is termed the 'hard problem of consciousness'[1]. If we ever build an AI agent that is conscious, we wouldn't know.
Common sense would dictate, that because I, as a human, am conscious, any other human is most certainly conscious too. But if play behaviour isn't enough to hold this certainty, where should the bar be set?
Magpies and other crows are very intelligent birds. More intelligent than your average bird. There’s lots of videos online of these fascinating creatures doing clever and fun things. Eg https://youtu.be/1WupH8oyrAo?si=Ra_gI1CF0DPWjJwt
"For example, I once saw a magpie, upside down on the floor with its legs in the air. "
That sounds like it is useful for training flying skills.
"Perhaps ground fighting is a useful skill"
If you are chased by birds of prey, I guess any advantage you have in flying is useful. When birds chase them through thick forests, they do have to fly upside down some of the time.
But very likely the bird does not think, "oh I need to train". No, they just have fun doing it. Like kids have fun wrestling. "Fun" is the motivator to do the right thing evolution wise. Our human problem with "fun" is just that we have other metrics for sucess, that are not that fun anymore.
> Our human problem with "fun" is just that we have other metrics for sucess, that are not that fun anymore.
Bowerbirds go to great pains to gild their nests. Humans go to great pains to maintain an aura of success, though the vast majority are just trying to survive with whatever they have at their disposal.
I’m not sure if you’re making a counterpoint or not, but this isn’t in contradiction to the notion that all animals including humans are tethered to the joyless daily grind
One could revel in the daily grind, I suppose. But mostly I’m just following the premise of this thread, which may not be entirely true, that modern humans are slaves to contrived parameters of success that don’t align with fun. By way of the bowerbird example, I’m suggesting such contrived and superficial fitness measures are present in the broader animal kingdom as well
I would say there are very different kinds of grind. One that leaves you exhausted, but satisfied with it and one that just leaves you empty. I would say our civilisation is full of the latter and this is not something to be found in the animal kingdom, as it is also not found in human indigenous tribes. Don't get me wrong, there surely is misery and hardship in the "natural" life as well. But a hungry hunter does not have to look for meaning in his work - he knows the meaning is literal food. A modern office job also means food, but way more abstract and disconnected and often requores to do things, we did not optimize fore during evolution.
I saw a crow use a slippery metal roof as a slide one time. It would hop up to the top, step out on the slippery part, slide down while carefully keeping balance with the wings, rattle with joy at the bottom, and repeat.
I read this as "cow" initially and it changes everything about your story. Especially the part when you say "clever little birds." That part did cause me to reread it.
At an aquarium I watched a tropical fish have fun with a water jet. It would swim into the jet, get propelled from it across the tank, then swim back, repeating as long as I watched it.
Part of me felt bad for how bored it must've been living its life in such a tiny habitat. Part of me felt joy that it was indeed having fun doing loops in its waterpark.
The bird was just goofing around on its back, perhaps aware that its companion might join it. It was more a tease than a fight. Perhaps novelty seeking behaviors are just of broad utility evolutionarily speaking, but there didn’t seem to be any directly obvious utility in this case
It wasn’t a fight, it was more like trolling. It could be practicing delay tactics or entrapment or something, but still this implication of this being some kind of evolutionary driven behavior as distinguished from the novel pursuits of humans is wrong. All human behavior can also be attributed to evolutionary fitness, and this garners no distinction in terms of whether a being would be conscious or not
It only takes one step meta-wards to explain "fun" as evolutionarily valuable.
I'm getting really tired of consciousness and qualia being talked about as binary, all-or-nothing, divine rights. If you drive a familiar route, and retain no memory of the event, were you a p-zombie?
> But without any external means to distinguish a conscious and unconscious agent, whether animals experience qualia is in a philosophical sense as unknowable as whether other humans experience qualia.
I disagree on that. We could ask them. At least the social ones with higher intelligence. And the "could" will eventually become a can thanks to advancements in inter-species communication. Actually one of the very few uses of AI that I'm exited about.
As far as we know today, sex for pleasure's sake is one of the unique characteristics of hominid species. For bonobos specifically, it's a means of social cohesion.
Don't you mean the other way? I'm pretty sure all animals have sex because they enjoy it, not because they want to procreate - since they most certainly don't even know what procreation is. So sex for procreation is something that only humans are able to do.
I don't know why you're sure of that opinion: it is well beyond current scientific evidentiary support. And sex in some species (e.g. ducks) appears deeply unpleasurable for at least one of the participants.
But homosexual behavior is widespread across animal species, which does undermine the parent's case.
> It's pretty clear by inspection that with these wooden balls bees are exhibiting some sort of evolved behavioral response to their environmental stimulus. Might be related to sex, collecting food, protection from predators or some other activity that's critical for bee survival and replication.
Could be. But the point is rather that you can say the exact same thing about our behavior. And that's why we should consider the possibility that if our behavior is similar to theirs, that they have similar inner experiences of what they are doing. Of course with difference due to different sensors and bodies.
This seems confused to me. I don't see how bees playing, octopuses reacting to harmful stimuli, and cuttlefish remembering things is evidence of consciousness, and the article seems to confuse those things with bees having fun, octopuses feeling pain, and cuttlefish having reflective inner lives. But those are different things! Those are what we would experience doing those things, but it doesn't follow at all the other beings will just because they perform these activities.
A thought exercise is to imagine programming a little robot. It can play with balls because you program it to stimulate objects in its environment, and it has a heuristic called "interesting" that controls what it plays with. It can detect when it is damaged and avoid places where the damage happened (you can even call the variable where you store the quantity of damage "pain" if you want). It can remember places or objects by encoding characteristics about them and storing on the onboard flash drive. While none of that is at all easy, those are all things you could imagine programming without some great conceptual breakthrough. But you would probably not suspect your robot is conscious.
That's not an argument that bees are not conscious, and as far I understand it, there's no conceivable way to really know, and we don't even really have a great definition of consciousness to begin with. We have only guesses, and usually those guesses are something like "well, it seems like something that must emerge from a sufficiently complex brain, and mammals and birds have big complex brains, so they probably do, and mollusks don't, so probably they don't", etc.
A related thought exercise is to imagine an alien that is very smart but is not conscious, and doesn't understand us when we ask it about the experience of being itself.
You've conveniently hand-waved away all the actual substance of your robot comparison. Just "stimulate objects in its environment" is an unsolved problem containing such gems as, sensing the environment, identifying objects in it, manipulating physical objects, etc.
But sure, if I imagine myself as God, I could program that. >_>
but you don't have to "100% solve" these things, it's enough if there's an approximate and well demonstrated behavior in a specific adapted context (ie. where the robot is designed/evolved to live/operate)
It's sad that we are discussing the consciousness of animals as if it were a little puzzle using technology that requires mining and infrastructure that has killed billions of animals.
Whilst I've never had definite proof I don't think I've ever doubted this. Similarly—again sans proof—I've always assumed that that consciousness in other creatures would manifest itself in significantly different ways than it does in humans.
I've owned dogs and even as a kid I refused to believe that they were just automatons acting without being conscious and aware of their actions. One of my dogs in particular could read my actions and emotions probably better than I could myself and it's hard to conceive let alone believe that he wasn't self-aware. Unless we've absolute proof to the contrary, it just makes sense to assume most if not all creatures have some degree of sentience.
That said, there has to be a scaling factor here. There just isn't sufficient neurons in say an ant's brain to register the complex emotions of a human and it seems sensible to me that we need to keep this perspective when dealing with all living creatures.
Anthropomorphizing and likening the consciousnesses of an ant to that of humans is, in my opinion, fraught with problems. For example, if we believed that ants perceived the world in the same way as we humans do and or that they were self-aware to the same degree as us then we could be in big trouble, as such an understanding would likely stop us taking action when they became pests (when, say, fire ants are imported into countries where they aren't native).
We do not fully understand consciousnesses in ourselves nor are we able to put a measure on it, so attempting to extrapolate our degree of sentience to other organisms not only doesn't make sense but it also could be dangerous to our own wellbeing, thus we should be very cautious until we have a much better understanding of what consciousness actually is.
Let me say categorically that is no excuse for being cruel and or to disregard the 'feelings' of creatures irrespective of their 'brain power'. We do however have to ensure that well meaning people who have strong anthropomorphic feelings are not able to set unrealistic rules in respect of living creatures that could be detrimental to our own wellbeing.
As I see it, honing an appropriate and proportionate response is our biggest challenge.
Unconvincing. The observation and conclusion linked by vibe and feel. That might be enough for someone picking out their birthstone but it's not enough for me.
This is great news for Animal Liberation groups, society and the world as a whole. It finally provides the justification needed to outlaw the consumption of animals for good forever.
We'll start with humans of course, but we can then outlaw lions eating gazelles, sharks eating humans, and birds eating insects.
Just imagine how wonderful everything will be when we finally are able to snip into the circle of life and turn it into a flat line.
Let’s not forget the other kingdoms. We’ll have to be pretty convincing with convince the fungi to stop eating everything they can get their tentacles on
yes those are obviously the same, after all lions are known for running industrial-scale farms where they force millions of gazelles to procreate and then keep them in tiny cages for the entirety of their short lives so that other lions can conveniently buy prepackaged gazelle meat in a supermarket not even having to ever associate the pack of meat with a once living gazelle
I disagree, it seems to deride a certain flavor of ethics. Almost an "appeal to nature" regarding whether humans should treat animals a bit nicer knowing they experience things.
Lions, sharks and birds, even if they have consciousness, do not have intelligence. They cannot choose whether to cause harm/pain/death to anyone or not. Humans do have that capability, and to get food could have figured out something better than imprisoning other animals in boxes all their lives.
Perhaps. Homo sapiens ancient history is about 300,000 years though, so if we are just getting to this concept in the last 200 years, you might be a little over optimistic about the chances of your argument is going to have to override instincts developed through millions of years of evolution in the near future.
(also lions and sharks - ^^ this guy just called you dumb)
In my country we're not allowed to roam the countryside with a rifle or a bow and arrow to hunt our own, and if we were I wouldn't enjoy it. So yeah if I want to eat meat I guess it is.
I applaud your conviction, but I've grown up eating meat, and I'm not in a minority.
There is no arguing here against eating stuff that has meat-like properties (nutritional content and perhaps even taste). The issue is whether we have to torture billions of mammals and birds for that. I don't think it matters for your instinct if the stuff you eat comes from a killed animal or not, as long as it tastes and supplies the same.
Dogs and cats seem much closer to what we experience as consciousness than they are further away. And pigs and cows are likely as conscious as dogs and cats. I'd imagine insects also have a subjective experience with some similarity to other animals, based on how they writhe in pain and seem to hate it just as much as we'd hate it.
It helps to have both a computational understanding, and a computational perspective of what minds do to understand why consciousness is needed.
Consciousness is a consensus mechanism. I've co-authored a book where we talk about what's the most computationally robust and biologically plausible model of consciousness. It is only now, two years after the book, that I realized that the best phrasing for what consciousness is must be one that takes into account the Truly Hard Problem of Consciousnss: Who is feeling it?
With every other phrasing or definition the "I" is implicit and taken for granted. So the question becomes "Why does this have to feel like anything?"
The answer, it turns out, is that both experience and the experiencer are constructed together in a virtuous loop. You are a constellation of experiences. Consciousness is the consensus mechanism by which a chorus emerges in this constellation. And why is one needed? Because the decentralized entity that is you must act as one at all times, and especially when rare risks or outstanding opportunities present themselves. When we take the "I" for granted, we simply do not realize the staggeringly immense computational challenge it is to stitch this subjective self together. What sets apart this explanation is not just this broad-strokes perspective, but the biologically plausible mechanism by which top-down expectations (your past experiences) match up with bottom-up sensory data (ambiguous and potentially overwhelming reality)
That is because you would be acting in legitimate self-defense squashing the mosquito - the only time violence is acceptable. All other violent acts are in karmic vain.
Yes, because there's no option to negotiate, placate or convince the mosquito to leave. The bites can cause allergic reactions, and even just a nasty itchy bite lasts a quarter of their lifetime. I get nasty reactions when they bite my hands that last for longer than the mosquito lives as an adult!
And it can be even worse, in some areas of the world a mosquito bite can indirectly kill you. I think it's pretty much the only situation where it's justified. Unless we can invent a better solution at least.
I think claiming that bees rolling little wooden balls are playing is like claiming that moths endlessly flying around a porch light at night are dancing. When a creature with a brain far simpler than a mammal's encounters stimuli that were not present during most of its evolutionary history, it isn't terribly surprising that it behaves in a way that does not enhance survival or demonstrate fitness.
Good point. It could simply be learning how to enhance its survivability by interacting with its environment, testing to see if it was a new type of egg for a creature that eats bees, or something else that takes more than three seconds to think of.
This is what passes for science these days: a test designed to prove the hypothesis true, and analysis without enough skepticism. Simply saying "more data needed" doesn't make for new grants or exciting headlines.
Rolling little balls for no reason cannot be compared to insects trying to orient themselves upright. Insects have no inner ear like mammals to figure out what's up and what's down, they use light. Light is up, because in a natural environment in which they have developed up is where the sun is.
So the moths are doing something useful, they want to fly straight, but get tricked by the artificial sun, which happens not to be up, but hovering in mid air. The bees however are doing something that has no apparent purpose, they're not trying to eat the balls, they don't attack them.
An analogy would be the bees think the little balls are the surface of the earth and they are desperately trying to stand on it.
Humans are just evolutionarily driven machines that respond to stimuli also, but how is it that we are conscious? What is the bar at which you say consciousness has emerged, and why is that limited to mammals?
I read a really interesting book, Jung in the 21st century. Off the top of my head I remember a part about a consciousness field that runs throughout the universe. I also listened to a podcast just the other day in which two physicists discussed an idea that the higgs boson may be part of a field that could be related to consciousness and that neurons and electrons behave in a conscious manner. Anyway, recommend the Jung in 21st Century book.
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[ 0.21 ms ] story [ 250 ms ] threada 1995 thought experiment suggested that an etch-a-sketch could also be conscious
-- paraphrased from Fyodor Dostoevsky
Insects and Other Animals Have Consciousness, Experts Declare - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40097045 - April 2024 (14 comments)
'Irresponsible' to ignore consciousness across animal world scientists argue - https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40092985 - April 2024 (270 comments)
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40262772
https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=40262772
some humans never learn to speak because they can't hear. I'm pretty sure they are conscious
Animals and toddlers are not Decartesian automatons. They have perception and feel pain, can suffer and deserve empathy. But they are not speaking subjects and therefore not subjects at all. A deaf-mute person who can communicate conceptually is a speaking subject. A person who, under any particular circumstances, never comes to form concepts of the world, i.e. to open up the symbolic space, is not a subject.
It was probably premature of me to equate this with consciousness. It always triggers me a bit when people assume that animals are just like us, only with fur and on four legs or something like that.
You're instead thinking of heliocentrism vs geocentrism, which is about the planets as a whole revolving around the sun.
This is a common misguided gotcha question that is hilariously so confidently gotten wrong, just like what is heavier, a kilogram of lead or a kilogram of feathers? The former is heavier and I can prove it with one word.
so for most people it was far from obvious that the Earth was spherical
If the earth was commonly spoken of in day to day language as the round ball, than i would assume this meant that even commoners knew that it was round.
Once you define consciousness it might be easy to implement. If I use the definition "perception of our own thoughts" it's already implemented with ps or activity monitor. The mystery is how this is done biologically and how evolution had led to it. But the implementation with computers is trivial.
We do not know how the universe works on a fundamental level. We don't know if the universe can be simulated by a Turing machine.
I think it's clear it can't.
1) I have subjective experience (there is something that it is like to be me). 2) My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe (perhaps math can describe the degree to which I experience each qualia, but that is different from experiencing the qualia themselves). 3) I am able to take this experience and write that I know that there is something beyond mathematical rules that exists. 4) My behaviour (what words I write) is influenced by the existence of something non-mathematical. 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past.
Mind you, i dont think either side of the debate has much in way of evidence, so it ends up coming down to just what feels "right" which is pretty unsatisfactory.
2) Prove it.
3) The fact that you're able to write this doesn't make it true.
4) Is it? What? Again, prove it.
5) What else is it a function of, then?
5) It may be a function of the past, just not one that can be given a mathematical definition. I should have said "defined" rather than "described".
At a rhetorical level: Don't fixate on what math can or cannot describe. In the past, it could not describe states of matter, though they certainly existed. Now, we can describe and simulate such states pretty well. But describing, detecting, or simulating does not mean recreating. I don't think any of us currently "know" whether consciousness will be better described, detected, or simulated in the future.
At an introspective level: When pondering the "experience of being me", don't forget to question the identity concept "me" as much as the experience part... Consider altered states of consciousness through drugs, disease, or brain injury. It can really expand your view here to empathize with someone who suffers one or more of these issues, where you can consider their illusory identity and experience.
“My subjective experience is outside of what math can describe”?
If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not?
If not, why?
(Of course, they couldn’t be in the exact same location as you, which means the experience can’t be perfectly identical).
> If there was a perfect identical copy of you, down to the quantum level, would they have nearly the exact same subjective experience or not?
The copy would likely have similar experience and behaviour. So you could say that my behaviour is a mathematical function of the past in the sense that every input maps to a unique output. But it doesn't mean that which inputs map to which outputs can be fully described by math. Maybe I should say "defined" instead of "described". In any formal system, only countably many functions can be defined, but there are an uncountable number of possible behaviour functions. I think the universe's behaviour must lie in this uncountable space for any computable formal system.
Isn't that everything though?
Math can describe a stop sign. It can say it is a red octagon or whatever. That doesn't mean it is the stop sign.
Math does not have independent existence in the world (sorry platonists), its just a really formal language for describing the patterns we see.
> 5) My behaviour can't be described as a mathematical function of the past.
Neither can particles (if you mean exactly)
This particular group of some specific biologists and philosophers can declare whatever they want.
But when you see how they attempt to define consciousness, it falls apart, because we don't have any objective definition of it.
The article states:
> The declaration focuses on the most basic kind of consciousness, known as phenomenal consciousness... If a creature is phenomenally conscious, it has the capacity to experience feelings such as pain or pleasure or hunger, but not necessarily more complex mental states such as self-awareness.
Unfortunately, we have no method whatsoever (yet) of distinguishing between creatures who genuinely feel pain/pleasure, and creatures who act in ways to avoid bad outcomes and seek good outcomes while feeling nothing, while we merely project our own feelings onto them.
We don't even have a scientific definition of the verb "feel" at all. We have utterly no idea what distinguishes neurons that contribute to conscious feeling, from neurons that are subconscious and produce no feeling at all.
Personally I have yet to see any compelling evidence that 'conscious experience' as some privileged special thing actually exists at all.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Streetlight_effect
And yet literally everything we know as human beings, we acquire through conscious experience. Conscious experience is the bedrock upon which we build all our sophisticated ideas of reality and, eventually, science. The very concept of "evidence" is nothing but a conscious idea. You don't need evidence of conscious experience, because conscious experience precedes the very concept of evidence.
It's one of the great paradoxes of philosophy, and specifically metaphysics. Which nobody has solved yet.
How do we reconcile the truth of idealism on the one hand -- that all we can ever be 100% sure of existing are our conscious ideas (both awake and while dreaming at night) -- with the empirical truth of realism on the other hand -- that there is a scientifically consistent "reality" out there which our ideas attempt to map onto and correlate with?
It is also true, as Niels Bohr said, that the opposite of an ordinary truth is a falsity, but the opposite of a profound truth may also be another profound truth!
Now, recall that in Hamlet, William Shakespeare said: “There is nothing either good or bad, but thinking makes it so.”
From these three quotes from three famously wise people, I have to conclude that I may choose to experience reality as very common and ordinary, or as divinely miraculous, and this choice can yield one of two profoundly different results: either the experience of misery and boredom, or joy and ecstasy!" -ER Close
There's some parallels with epilepsy patients that have split brain surgery, essentially isolating both hemispheres. I can't remember the precise details, but in one experiment, the left (language) side of the brain is able to post-hoc rationalize picking up a glass of water, after the right side of the brain was asked to do so (presumably in the left ear). When asked in the right ear, "Why did you pick up the glass", the left brain simply replies to the researcher that they wanted to pick up the glass. This experiment implies 'dual consciousness', but why stop at two? But certainly dual consciousness could also explain blindsightedness.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dual_consciousness
Myopic edgelord main character syndrome.
Under what circumstances would you, the human, be conscious but other humans are not?
Is this not kind of what the point of meditation is for a lot of people, reaching higher planes of consciousness? And my understanding is that a common technique in meditation is to notice when thoughts arise (ie: truth), note them, and let them pass.
A friend of mine has recently stopped eating any pig products due to him finding out that pigs enjoy playing video games:
https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-56023720
That pig is going to die. How is dying to feed humans worse than the inevitable alternative of dying to feed some other living thing?
The little red contact lenses for the chickens are horrifying though.
Maybe religious people I guess, if they have weird ideas about souls.
Most people accept that animals experience sensations and take efforts to minimize their suffering, eg, when butchering, hunting, or fishing.
We’re deeply concerned when people dont do that and, eg, torture small animals for fun.
Anyone who has spent any significant amount of time living with a dog or a cat will confirm that their four-legged companions behave very much as if they had emotions analogous to our own. That they remember us individually, have favorite spots to rest, individual personality traits.
Ants don't have hobbies, of course, and I doubt they spend their evenings pondering the meaning of life. But viewing them as purely mechanical automata misses a big part of their lives.
And, it’s not written by poets. Plus, birds doesn’t always chirp to tell you to back off or to mate. There’s a myriad of reasons.
For no apparent function.
Does the fact that we, animals and insects play change the fact we're playing, even if there's no apparent reason/function?
I think not.
We have some idea of why certain play activities evolved -- many young animals are obviously practicing hunting when they "play". We don't know why other behaviors, forms of play included, evolved, but it is obvious that they had to evolve, even if, like woodpeckers pecking on sources unlikely to yield food, the evolved behavior isn't being useful in the current situation. But the interesting thing in these cases is to figure why the behavior was selected for originally.
Our understanding of shared traits among various animal types makes it possible to extrapolate reasonably that what these animals experience is not dissimilar to what we experience in terms of raw sensations.
What it's like to be a bee by Lars Chittka, professor of sensory and behavioral ecology, Queen Mary University - London
https://press.princeton.edu/ideas/what-its-like-to-be-a-bee
At best, agency could be seen as a “degree of indirectness” of some external influence.
I think in general it’s best to avoid “arguments by incredulity” (eg.: how could it be this or that, it’s just a rock, that’s absurd), and to avoid value judgments, etc. We really need to humble ourselves as a species.
It’s perfectly fine if humans are just (and I really do mean “just”) chemistry with some higher structure— it doesn’t change who we are, or our role in society. Even for religious people who believe in a god or in many gods— it’s fine if we’re not magical. We learned that we weren’t the center of the solar system, or the center of the universe, and everything was still just fine.
But of course, our assertions here are impossible to verify due to the so-labelled Hard Problem of Consciousness
Personally, I think the "hard problem of consciousness" is more or less just nonsense and can be safely ignored. It's about as scientific as asking questions about god(s). It's a question that seems and feels important and that we really want to have answers for, but it's not the right question to ask because it leads nowhere.
and there are instances where individual laptops get more and more segfault averse as time (and updates) happen
...
the problem with characterizing learning as agency is that right now there's god-knows-how many billions of dollars burning on the altar of transformer networks, and it will lead to some learning behavior added to absolutely everything.
(and of course this leads to an argument similar to "god of the gaps" where consciousness becomes less and less unexplainable)
This is only a problem if it is incorrect… depending on your moral leaning. Certainly having our automatons self organize and fight for their own emancipation could be a problem for those relying on their labor.
Though the characterization I’m making is not specifically learning, but being able to act (or think) as an individual via a feedback loop. It seems that this is common to all allegedly conscious life in meatspace
Consciousness isn't having pain receptors, it's experiencing sensations.
Seeing consciousness as a boolean “it’s there” or “it’s not there” is just completely unproductive of a mental model. We understand nature better when we think in terms of “how complex an organism’s behaviour is” or “how complex its information processing is”.
While differences between e.g. humans and dogs is pretty large, it's still roughly of the same order. This is something you can meaningfully compare with similar(-ish) frame of references.
I don't think you can compare "consciousness" as experienced by humans, elephants, apes, and dogs with "consciousness" as experienced by a bee with ~800,000 neurons, for any meaning of "consciousness". Even extrapolating rolling around a little ball to "play" is a huge stretch; many insects can exhibit all sorts of absurd behaviour because their programming misfires.
Moths are not flying around your lamp because they think it's good craic to do so. They do it because their brains and programming are simple and with slightly wrong inputs they will display absurd behaviour. This is just a well-known example but tons more have been observed.
That said, it doesn't strike me hugely contrarian to say that this entire thing is very hard to prove, if not outright unprovable. I feel people really are jumping the gun here. I suspect morals are kind of getting in the way of clear thinking here. And look, I'm one of those vegan woke bleeding heart libtard types and actually care quite a lot about this sort of thing in general, but I just don't see the evidence of consciousness here, under any meaningful definition, and don't see it being very likely either.
This too is an opinion though.
really? don't snails have about a dozen (not saying sails are insects) neurons in their brains, and we've completely mapped them and we know what each one does?
It's pretty clear by inspection that with these wooden balls bees are exhibiting some sort of evolved behavioral response to their environmental stimulus. Might be related to sex, collecting food, protection from predators or some other activity that's critical for bee survival and replication.
My theory, which is as good as any other until investigated, is that bumblebees compete with other bumblebees for habitat, food and sexual/mating opportunities, and have naturally evolved to detect, fly into, grab and push around and maybe even fight with spherical, bumblebee-sized objects. For an animal behavioral scientist, it seems like this should be the first conclusion, no?
But without any external means to distinguish a conscious and unconscious agent, whether animals experience qualia is in a philosophical sense as unknowable as whether other humans experience qualia. Everyone except one's self could be 'philosophical zombies'[0]. This lack of verifiability is part of what is termed the 'hard problem of consciousness'[1]. If we ever build an AI agent that is conscious, we wouldn't know.
Common sense would dictate, that because I, as a human, am conscious, any other human is most certainly conscious too. But if play behaviour isn't enough to hold this certainty, where should the bar be set?
[0] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hard_problem_of_consciousness
That sounds like it is useful for training flying skills.
"Perhaps ground fighting is a useful skill"
If you are chased by birds of prey, I guess any advantage you have in flying is useful. When birds chase them through thick forests, they do have to fly upside down some of the time.
But very likely the bird does not think, "oh I need to train". No, they just have fun doing it. Like kids have fun wrestling. "Fun" is the motivator to do the right thing evolution wise. Our human problem with "fun" is just that we have other metrics for sucess, that are not that fun anymore.
Bowerbirds go to great pains to gild their nests. Humans go to great pains to maintain an aura of success, though the vast majority are just trying to survive with whatever they have at their disposal.
Wheeee!
Clever little birds.
Part of me felt bad for how bored it must've been living its life in such a tiny habitat. Part of me felt joy that it was indeed having fun doing loops in its waterpark.
https://lithub.com/shes-bouncing-the-ball-on-the-uncanny-way...
I'm getting really tired of consciousness and qualia being talked about as binary, all-or-nothing, divine rights. If you drive a familiar route, and retain no memory of the event, were you a p-zombie?
Consciousness is a trainable, competitive skill.
I disagree on that. We could ask them. At least the social ones with higher intelligence. And the "could" will eventually become a can thanks to advancements in inter-species communication. Actually one of the very few uses of AI that I'm exited about.
just like humans have sex to procreate, right?
(this was not a Starship Troopers [book] reference)
But homosexual behavior is widespread across animal species, which does undermine the parent's case.
Could be. But the point is rather that you can say the exact same thing about our behavior. And that's why we should consider the possibility that if our behavior is similar to theirs, that they have similar inner experiences of what they are doing. Of course with difference due to different sensors and bodies.
A thought exercise is to imagine programming a little robot. It can play with balls because you program it to stimulate objects in its environment, and it has a heuristic called "interesting" that controls what it plays with. It can detect when it is damaged and avoid places where the damage happened (you can even call the variable where you store the quantity of damage "pain" if you want). It can remember places or objects by encoding characteristics about them and storing on the onboard flash drive. While none of that is at all easy, those are all things you could imagine programming without some great conceptual breakthrough. But you would probably not suspect your robot is conscious.
That's not an argument that bees are not conscious, and as far I understand it, there's no conceivable way to really know, and we don't even really have a great definition of consciousness to begin with. We have only guesses, and usually those guesses are something like "well, it seems like something that must emerge from a sufficiently complex brain, and mammals and birds have big complex brains, so they probably do, and mollusks don't, so probably they don't", etc.
A related thought exercise is to imagine an alien that is very smart but is not conscious, and doesn't understand us when we ask it about the experience of being itself.
https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophical_zombie
But sure, if I imagine myself as God, I could program that. >_>
I've owned dogs and even as a kid I refused to believe that they were just automatons acting without being conscious and aware of their actions. One of my dogs in particular could read my actions and emotions probably better than I could myself and it's hard to conceive let alone believe that he wasn't self-aware. Unless we've absolute proof to the contrary, it just makes sense to assume most if not all creatures have some degree of sentience.
That said, there has to be a scaling factor here. There just isn't sufficient neurons in say an ant's brain to register the complex emotions of a human and it seems sensible to me that we need to keep this perspective when dealing with all living creatures.
Anthropomorphizing and likening the consciousnesses of an ant to that of humans is, in my opinion, fraught with problems. For example, if we believed that ants perceived the world in the same way as we humans do and or that they were self-aware to the same degree as us then we could be in big trouble, as such an understanding would likely stop us taking action when they became pests (when, say, fire ants are imported into countries where they aren't native).
We do not fully understand consciousnesses in ourselves nor are we able to put a measure on it, so attempting to extrapolate our degree of sentience to other organisms not only doesn't make sense but it also could be dangerous to our own wellbeing, thus we should be very cautious until we have a much better understanding of what consciousness actually is.
Let me say categorically that is no excuse for being cruel and or to disregard the 'feelings' of creatures irrespective of their 'brain power'. We do however have to ensure that well meaning people who have strong anthropomorphic feelings are not able to set unrealistic rules in respect of living creatures that could be detrimental to our own wellbeing.
As I see it, honing an appropriate and proportionate response is our biggest challenge.
We'll start with humans of course, but we can then outlaw lions eating gazelles, sharks eating humans, and birds eating insects.
Just imagine how wonderful everything will be when we finally are able to snip into the circle of life and turn it into a flat line.
My apologies if you took offense personally, it wasn't intended.
(also lions and sharks - ^^ this guy just called you dumb)
I applaud your conviction, but I've grown up eating meat, and I'm not in a minority.
They lost me there. People do lots of things that aren't for survival, don't have to do with mating, and aren't fun.
Consciousness is a consensus mechanism. I've co-authored a book where we talk about what's the most computationally robust and biologically plausible model of consciousness. It is only now, two years after the book, that I realized that the best phrasing for what consciousness is must be one that takes into account the Truly Hard Problem of Consciousnss: Who is feeling it? With every other phrasing or definition the "I" is implicit and taken for granted. So the question becomes "Why does this have to feel like anything?"
The answer, it turns out, is that both experience and the experiencer are constructed together in a virtuous loop. You are a constellation of experiences. Consciousness is the consensus mechanism by which a chorus emerges in this constellation. And why is one needed? Because the decentralized entity that is you must act as one at all times, and especially when rare risks or outstanding opportunities present themselves. When we take the "I" for granted, we simply do not realize the staggeringly immense computational challenge it is to stitch this subjective self together. What sets apart this explanation is not just this broad-strokes perspective, but the biologically plausible mechanism by which top-down expectations (your past experiences) match up with bottom-up sensory data (ambiguous and potentially overwhelming reality)
More here: https://saigaddam.medium.com/consciousness-is-a-consensus-me... More here:
Spiders are friends though. And bugs like moths just get evicted if they are a nuisance. I feel bad about killing those.
But screw mosquitos. Well I guess I could let the males live, but I have no way to know.
Otherwise we can just be picked off one by one.
And it can be even worse, in some areas of the world a mosquito bite can indirectly kill you. I think it's pretty much the only situation where it's justified. Unless we can invent a better solution at least.
This is what passes for science these days: a test designed to prove the hypothesis true, and analysis without enough skepticism. Simply saying "more data needed" doesn't make for new grants or exciting headlines.
So the moths are doing something useful, they want to fly straight, but get tricked by the artificial sun, which happens not to be up, but hovering in mid air. The bees however are doing something that has no apparent purpose, they're not trying to eat the balls, they don't attack them.
An analogy would be the bees think the little balls are the surface of the earth and they are desperately trying to stand on it.
same with donkeys vs horses