Boeing legal strategy is to maintain litigation for as long as humanly possible to block, wear down, bankrupt and otherwise break upstart competition. In this case it seems they outright stole as well.
Did you forget a /s tag? I feel like the penalties are so small for the big companies that they just become small expense lines that need to be passed on to the consumers (airlines in this case).
If a few people from a company you acquire can seemingly overthrow all principles and radically change the engineering culture, I'd offer that maybe the culture at Boeing wasn't all that strong in the first place. In any case, the acquisition of McDonnell-Douglas was 27 years ago. You can't keep blaming that forever.
My personal observation is that a series of incompetent executives from GE caused a LOT more damage to Boeing than any damage incurred from ex-McDonnell-Douglass executives. Boeing and GE have always had an excessively cozy relationship, predating the McD merger.
For two of the past three decades, the corporate leaders of Boeing were former GE managers: Stonecipher (eight years as CEO and COO), McNerney (ten years) and Calhoun as from 2020 to present. It is fair to say that, because of the number of former GE top managers at Boeing, it almost turned into a division of GE.
If those few people are in management and making hiring/firing decisions then yes, they can completely wipe out a culture.
But also, wiping out a culture does take some time. You wouldn't expect it to completely change overnight.
The 787 Dreamliner was completed in 2003, it was the last plane developed with the old Boeing culture. The 737 max was the first plane developed post merger 13 years later.
The 787 was not even a figment of the imagination in 2003. Boeing had JUST cancelled the Sonic Cruiser at the very end of 2002. The 787 was not launched until mid 2004, a partially complete airframe was rolled out on 07/08/2007, then it was rolled right back in to be completed. First flight was in 2009, first delivery was 2011.
Also note that the 737 MAX launched in 2011. So Boeing was just coming off an airplane program that was completed 4 years late and 14 Billion dollars over budget, and a lot of engineering staff was still busy certifying the derivative (stretch) versions. So Boeing had neither the budget or the staff to launch an all new aircraft, and instead chose to do a quick-and-dirty re-engineing of an existing airframe. The poor quality of the design and manufacturing of the 737 MAX is directly attributable to a failure to execute the 787 program, leading to the MAX being under-resourced.
And let me tell you, the 787 was developed with just as many heritage Mcdonnell-Douglas personnel as Boeing personnel. John Hart-Smith, the Tech Fellow engineer who wrote the famous white paper decrying the level of outsourcing on the 787, always gets described as a "Boeing Engineer." He was at McDonnell-Douglass for nearly 30 years prior to getting a badge with a Boeing logo.
A link to Hart-Smith's paper, "OUT-SOURCED PROFITS –THE CORNERSTONE OF SUCCESSFUL SUBCONTRACTING" It has been posted as a front page article on HN a few times but did not generate much discussion. Interestingly, although it was released 4 years post-merger and has Boeing markings on it, it was released in the heritage McDonnell-Douglas document management system, as indicated by the "MDC 00K0096" document number. https://techrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2022/06/2014130646...
Since the paper's from 2001, did you mean previously to say that it decried the level of outsourcing on the DC-10 rather than the 787, the 787 being at "pre-figment" stage at that point?
A fun little detail, the author approvingly cites a 737 redesign that accounts for additional work being done at the Wichita site in a section about internal outsourcing... of course that site would be spun out into the now-much-maligned Spirit AeroSystems a few years later.
I did not mean to say that. At that time, Boeing was active in the development of the Sonic Cruiser, which was intended to be a high-subsonic M0.96 cruise aircraft. When this project was (thankfully!) cancelled at the end of 2002, all of the material technologies and business models were recycled to create the 787, intended to achieve higher fuel efficiency at standard cruise speeds. One of the recycled business models was an extraordinary degree of outsourcing.
A fun detail for you, one of the reasons that Spirit was spun off was that when they were still a part of Boeing, they were forced to bid against external suppliers for contracts on the 787, including the design and fabrication of the engine installation. (Bare engines are procured from engine manufacturer, but the airframe manufacturer is typically responsible for the inlet cowl, fan cowls, thrust reverser, exhaust system, mounting strut, and a whole bunch of other claptrap such as fire detection and extinguishing.) They had done this quite successfully for all four different engine installations on the 777. An external supplier significantly underbid them, and Wichita did not receive the contract. What of course happened is that Boeing had full visibility of the Wichita bid and could evaluate their numbers to ensure that their estimate was valid, while the external supplier lied through their teeth about their capability and capacity, and successfully underbid and won the contract, then went late and over budget. This and several other contract losses spelled the end for Boeing Wichita. If Spirit is to be maligned, the blame needs to be placed at Boeing's feet.
I was at a recruiting tech conference where a HR person from Boeing was talking about their impending age-out problem. Their average employee age was close to retirement.
Gotta buy some guys out and bring up some fresh faces in those cases I think. Can't have everyone go home all at once.
A local school district actually did that when they had a massive glut of older teachers. They offered buyouts to get a % of new younger teachers in the door so that it wasn't just one huge wave of new people just trying to get their footing all at once.
You're right, it really wasn't that strong to begin with. Everyone talks about Boeing's engineering culture but this all took place in the context of the 1990s after the DoD started to unwind its anti-Soviet doctrine and retooling the armed forces for other enemies. There was less money to go around in the defense industry and everyone was downsizing so the engineering culture at Boeing was at risk if not already undermined by layoffs. The 1990s also brought a global slump in aircraft sales which hit their commercial aviation divisions really hard and Boeing tried to age-out the most expensive workers that would have been the backbone of the culture.
Lockheed had just merged with Martin Marietta to become Lockheed Martin and that goaded Boeing's leadership to blunder into a FOMO merger with McDonnell-Douglas. On top of that, the US government itself actually paid bonuses to the executives who got the LM deal done so the incentives were rotten from the start.
I've also heard rumors that Boeing execs received pressure from the DoD to acquire McDonnell-Douglas to prevent it from going bankrupt so they might not have been entirely willing from the start. The latter had just lost some pretty large contracts to competitors and was at risk of going bust entirely which was an unacceptable vendor risk to the DoD. The DoD didn't have the money to prop it up directly so instead might have used a third party.
If Boeing’s product was something less necessary, and held in lower esteem, like military aircraft, a lot of these QA issues (and clear lack of ethics) would fall by the wayside in terms of press coverage. Boeing is not the only company that has wrung itself dry with goals of growth-over-growth in terms of stock dividends.
Planes require so much validation and Boeing aircraft were held in very high esteem, but these attributes are just cows to milk in the eyes of the “smartest” investor. Boeing is the canary, the first to erode, because they set high standards for themselves and have to meet stringent regulatory standards. I won’t be at all surprised when other companies with less important products begin to display fraying edges.
The initial batches of F-35 rusted to pieces in 3 months of service. The Sikorsky MH-53E has a kapton defect and has been dropping out of the sky for decades. Commercial aircraft aren’t filled with well paid people who signed a waiver saying they’re OK with the risk of dying. It’s a completely different space. A fighter pilot crashing isn’t anything compared with a plane going down with a hundred souls aboard
> Commercial aircraft aren’t filled with well paid people who signed a waiver saying they’re OK with the risk of dying.
Neither are military aircraft (especially ones that carry more than just a pilot and navigator/RIO), generally, unless “well-paid” is defined broadly enough to be equivalent to just “paid”.
Incorrect conflation between hierarchal politics and amorphous culture. The management of Boeing was essentially replaced during the merger. It's not the "strength" of Boeing's culture that matters, but the quality of its work.
Interesting that Boeing acquired a failing company, and someone(s) thought using the failing company's management team was a good idea.
Long ago I worked at a company that was acquired by a competitor. Our management team was a clown show. We had some strong competitive advantages product wise, but our company's management team had no clue what they were doing. They were busy renaming departments and sending company wide emails about the process and how many hours HR spent deciding what to rename HR.... it was like they were trying to make a joke, but they were serious.
After acquiring us the acquiring company CEO drew a line and anyone at our company who didn't have direct reports who did a thing (not another manager) were laid off (a few engineering and support exceptions).
He later visited our location and bluntly noted "You guys should have beaten us. You were two years ahead of us with some of your tech, but the management team was so bad you didn't have a chance. I didn't want any of them infecting our company." CEO won a lot of fans that day. Lots of folks hoping to get laid off / severance were suddenly relived and happy to stay.
Boeing had QA and Engineering issues long before 1997, it was just largely covered up by the pro-US propaganda whenever airbus were considered a rival.
And they did it a year late and over budget (thankfully they had to absorb the loss), despite submitting a much higher bid than their competitor. So it may not be a total failure since they did eventually launch, but I would hardly call this a success.
No, because I don't have another data point to compare. In the case of Starliner, there was a competitor, with a lower bid, that launched 4 years prior and did not suffer a billion dollar loss to top it all.
Nothing constructive to add here… just think it’s awesome you got to hang out with your kid and… I never knew that guac benefits from sitting in the fridge. I always thought it was the opposite.
When I first make my guacamole, it often tastes too strongly of fruitiness (from the limes), salt, or garlic. Any/all of those seem to mellow out after a few hours in the fridge.
For context, here's my recipe: 5 avocados, 3-4 limes, ~1 tsp of minced garlic, 1 tomato, a few dashes of cayenne, and salt (to taste).
MBAs really is just a cult or I guess based on the amount of people it can be considered a religion?. They got a bunch of little equations they threat as universal laws of science all in an effort to 'maximize' profits in the short term and ruin the whole company in the medium/long term.
They are a plague that infects every business. Remember that spot you used to visit that was good but now it's shitty and expensive?. Where instead of going back to what used to sell they double down on making it shittier and or smaller. They employ any and all cost cutting strategies imginable, they have less staff, go cashless, etc.. yet they will keep charging the same or more than before.
It's interesting to me that Boeing did all that ... for a company with 35 employees tops and a company that never produced an airplane.
Also I thought the feasibility of electric aircraft is largely known to be (at best) limited to small planes. I wonder if Boeing's lack of engineering talent at the top lead executives to over estimate the risks of this start up?
My guess is that Boeing as a whole had very little interest in Zunum's work, but one plausible consequence of that might be increased pressure (real or perceived) on the the small number of people working on this niche concern to give the impression that they were achieving something, even if (or especially if) they themselves were not achieving much on their own.
To be clear, my only basis for positing this is that it happens in other organizations - academic plagiarism, for example.
Not Bush. Not Obama. Not any of that political noise.
These injuries are largely self inflicted. To the extent that there were political decisions, it was the one fatal decision to get high paying jobs in the south by moving the manufacture of unbelievably complex airliners to South Carolina. There was obviously some political pressure that made that happen, but that was long before the Trump/Obama era, and involved mostly state level politicians and senators.
But even that required the collaboration of Boeing executives, who somehow believed that engineers were cogs in a wheel. And an industrial engineer in South Carolina, where they never built airliners and schools consistently rank in the bottom 10 states of the notoriously horrible US educational system; would somehow be just as good as an industrial engineer in Washington state, which has been the center of aviation for over a century, and has schools that consistently rank in the top 15 states in the US.
Setting aside the hundred years of institutional knowledge base you are throwing away when you make hare-brained moves like that; it's not possible to just swap one engineer for another and get the same results. The executives of an aviation company like Boeing should have known that.
The article doesn't say what proof was shown or what actions were actionable.
This is a very, very common scenario where BigCo X invests in SmallCo X' to get a board seat and a peek at the technology. SmallCo X' wants not only money but industry validation and the chance to dance with a potential suitor.
But when SmallCo X' has failed (after taking both public and private money), it has nothing left than to sell its technology and any assets, including legal judgments. Because it's no longer viable, it has no problem burning relations with an investor, potential buyer, and market leader.
So the proof and what's actionable matters. If the law is ambiguous here, it would disincentivize any investments by any BigCo x, and make it harder for any SmallCo x to get money or keiretsu involvement.
And when an industry (like aviation) has only a few big fish, any trouble at one can affect everyone, ruining careers and setting back progress for decades.
This may have been part of Boeing’s acquisition strategy; sue the company to put them in financial distress, and buy them at a discount (this is a fairly common strategy).
The facts seem kind of light here. Sounds like Boeing essentially did further "due diligence" using privileged information, decided the whole concept wasn't viable and wasn't afraid to share that information.
Given that buying companies is the only way such a calcified company can expand its product base, you'd expect them to be better at it...
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[ 4.4 ms ] story [ 135 ms ] threadWait.
Was that sarcastic?
Who could say. /s is just the same as using a sarcastic vocal tone, eye roll, or hand gesture. Surely you aren't against those?
Challenge yourselves to write something that 5-10% of people wouldn't spot as sarcasm. I'm sure you can manage that!
Other people can do whatever they want, I'm not against anything. And I'm well familiar with Poe's law.
Now try not being against how I like to communicate on the internet, or OP, and everyone's happy.
For two of the past three decades, the corporate leaders of Boeing were former GE managers: Stonecipher (eight years as CEO and COO), McNerney (ten years) and Calhoun as from 2020 to present. It is fair to say that, because of the number of former GE top managers at Boeing, it almost turned into a division of GE.
Sores: https://www.managerism.org/images/Thinkpiece38-Boeing-Part2....
But also, wiping out a culture does take some time. You wouldn't expect it to completely change overnight.
The 787 Dreamliner was completed in 2003, it was the last plane developed with the old Boeing culture. The 737 max was the first plane developed post merger 13 years later.
Also note that the 737 MAX launched in 2011. So Boeing was just coming off an airplane program that was completed 4 years late and 14 Billion dollars over budget, and a lot of engineering staff was still busy certifying the derivative (stretch) versions. So Boeing had neither the budget or the staff to launch an all new aircraft, and instead chose to do a quick-and-dirty re-engineing of an existing airframe. The poor quality of the design and manufacturing of the 737 MAX is directly attributable to a failure to execute the 787 program, leading to the MAX being under-resourced.
And let me tell you, the 787 was developed with just as many heritage Mcdonnell-Douglas personnel as Boeing personnel. John Hart-Smith, the Tech Fellow engineer who wrote the famous white paper decrying the level of outsourcing on the 787, always gets described as a "Boeing Engineer." He was at McDonnell-Douglass for nearly 30 years prior to getting a badge with a Boeing logo.
A fun little detail, the author approvingly cites a 737 redesign that accounts for additional work being done at the Wichita site in a section about internal outsourcing... of course that site would be spun out into the now-much-maligned Spirit AeroSystems a few years later.
A fun detail for you, one of the reasons that Spirit was spun off was that when they were still a part of Boeing, they were forced to bid against external suppliers for contracts on the 787, including the design and fabrication of the engine installation. (Bare engines are procured from engine manufacturer, but the airframe manufacturer is typically responsible for the inlet cowl, fan cowls, thrust reverser, exhaust system, mounting strut, and a whole bunch of other claptrap such as fire detection and extinguishing.) They had done this quite successfully for all four different engine installations on the 777. An external supplier significantly underbid them, and Wichita did not receive the contract. What of course happened is that Boeing had full visibility of the Wichita bid and could evaluate their numbers to ensure that their estimate was valid, while the external supplier lied through their teeth about their capability and capacity, and successfully underbid and won the contract, then went late and over budget. This and several other contract losses spelled the end for Boeing Wichita. If Spirit is to be maligned, the blame needs to be placed at Boeing's feet.
A local school district actually did that when they had a massive glut of older teachers. They offered buyouts to get a % of new younger teachers in the door so that it wasn't just one huge wave of new people just trying to get their footing all at once.
Lockheed had just merged with Martin Marietta to become Lockheed Martin and that goaded Boeing's leadership to blunder into a FOMO merger with McDonnell-Douglas. On top of that, the US government itself actually paid bonuses to the executives who got the LM deal done so the incentives were rotten from the start.
I've also heard rumors that Boeing execs received pressure from the DoD to acquire McDonnell-Douglas to prevent it from going bankrupt so they might not have been entirely willing from the start. The latter had just lost some pretty large contracts to competitors and was at risk of going bust entirely which was an unacceptable vendor risk to the DoD. The DoD didn't have the money to prop it up directly so instead might have used a third party.
Planes require so much validation and Boeing aircraft were held in very high esteem, but these attributes are just cows to milk in the eyes of the “smartest” investor. Boeing is the canary, the first to erode, because they set high standards for themselves and have to meet stringent regulatory standards. I won’t be at all surprised when other companies with less important products begin to display fraying edges.
Neither are military aircraft (especially ones that carry more than just a pilot and navigator/RIO), generally, unless “well-paid” is defined broadly enough to be equivalent to just “paid”.
Culture is not magic, it is determined from top.
Long ago I worked at a company that was acquired by a competitor. Our management team was a clown show. We had some strong competitive advantages product wise, but our company's management team had no clue what they were doing. They were busy renaming departments and sending company wide emails about the process and how many hours HR spent deciding what to rename HR.... it was like they were trying to make a joke, but they were serious.
After acquiring us the acquiring company CEO drew a line and anyone at our company who didn't have direct reports who did a thing (not another manager) were laid off (a few engineering and support exceptions).
He later visited our location and bluntly noted "You guys should have beaten us. You were two years ahead of us with some of your tech, but the management team was so bad you didn't have a chance. I didn't want any of them infecting our company." CEO won a lot of fans that day. Lots of folks hoping to get laid off / severance were suddenly relived and happy to stay.
If you want to care about the schedule or cost, you’re welcome to.
Well, I'm currently unemployed, and my new job doesn't start for a few more weeks.
So my accomplishments for today include:
* I hung out with my kid before he went out to the school bus
* I made the guacamole for tonight's dinner, because it benefits from sitting in the fridge for a few hours.
* I partially caught up on today's new Crunchyroll episodes. But Konosuba season 3 just isn't amusing me the way the first two seasons did.
* Played "Endless Space 2" and "Age of Darkness: Final Stand" for a while, because I'm short on sleep today and my brain wasn't good for much else.
---
So, I didn't put anyone in orbit today, but I think I'm doing pretty okay, thank you :)
I'm sure it's subjective, but see my sibling comment for the details.
For context, here's my recipe: 5 avocados, 3-4 limes, ~1 tsp of minced garlic, 1 tomato, a few dashes of cayenne, and salt (to taste).
They are a plague that infects every business. Remember that spot you used to visit that was good but now it's shitty and expensive?. Where instead of going back to what used to sell they double down on making it shittier and or smaller. They employ any and all cost cutting strategies imginable, they have less staff, go cashless, etc.. yet they will keep charging the same or more than before.
Also I thought the feasibility of electric aircraft is largely known to be (at best) limited to small planes. I wonder if Boeing's lack of engineering talent at the top lead executives to over estimate the risks of this start up?
To be clear, my only basis for positing this is that it happens in other organizations - academic plagiarism, for example.
Not Bush. Not Obama. Not any of that political noise.
These injuries are largely self inflicted. To the extent that there were political decisions, it was the one fatal decision to get high paying jobs in the south by moving the manufacture of unbelievably complex airliners to South Carolina. There was obviously some political pressure that made that happen, but that was long before the Trump/Obama era, and involved mostly state level politicians and senators.
But even that required the collaboration of Boeing executives, who somehow believed that engineers were cogs in a wheel. And an industrial engineer in South Carolina, where they never built airliners and schools consistently rank in the bottom 10 states of the notoriously horrible US educational system; would somehow be just as good as an industrial engineer in Washington state, which has been the center of aviation for over a century, and has schools that consistently rank in the top 15 states in the US.
Setting aside the hundred years of institutional knowledge base you are throwing away when you make hare-brained moves like that; it's not possible to just swap one engineer for another and get the same results. The executives of an aviation company like Boeing should have known that.
This is a very, very common scenario where BigCo X invests in SmallCo X' to get a board seat and a peek at the technology. SmallCo X' wants not only money but industry validation and the chance to dance with a potential suitor.
But when SmallCo X' has failed (after taking both public and private money), it has nothing left than to sell its technology and any assets, including legal judgments. Because it's no longer viable, it has no problem burning relations with an investor, potential buyer, and market leader.
So the proof and what's actionable matters. If the law is ambiguous here, it would disincentivize any investments by any BigCo x, and make it harder for any SmallCo x to get money or keiretsu involvement.
And when an industry (like aviation) has only a few big fish, any trouble at one can affect everyone, ruining careers and setting back progress for decades.
Given that buying companies is the only way such a calcified company can expand its product base, you'd expect them to be better at it...