First ICBM Launch in Combat?
Impact video (low quality): https://bsky.app/profile/drfranksauer.bsky.social/post/3lbhiz45bik2u
Russian spokesperson being instructed to not comment on it: https://bsky.app/profile/kevinrothrock.me/post/3lbha3zcxxk2p
Alleged missile type: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RS-26_Rubezh
What do you think about this launch, could this maybe have been something else entirely?
If not, what is the objective behind it, is this a sort of warning to Europeans specifically?
Do you think we are going to see more ICBMs repurposed for conventional strikes, possibly to avoid cruise missile defenses?
Personally, I found the impact video very impressive despite the low quality, and very different from how I would have pictured a missile impact before.
We live in interesting times indeed.
49 comments
[ 4.4 ms ] story [ 99.4 ms ] threadAs far as I can tell this was more like a warning for the Westerners that next time those ICBMs will be carrying real nuclear warheads, because otherwise it doesn't make sense to use them in a conventional manner, the cost vs. combat benefits ratio doesn't make it worth it.
But, I agree, that impact video was really something, hope it pulls to sleep the opinions of those (very stupid) people saying things like "Russian nukes don't even work!".
When you run out of cruise missiles you might switch to ballistic missiles. I don't know about the state of Russian missiles, but looking at storage sites Russia seems to run out of quite a lot of equipment [0].
[0]: https://www.youtube.com/@CovertCabal/videos
Come on, we're all grown-ups here, let's stop the charade like we're back in March or April of 2022. I'm too lazy to even link to all the Western magazine covers telling us how Russia has run out of a lot of stuff during the last two and a half years.
It would be beyond naive to assume that Russia would just announce "we're out of tanks, gonna call of the war now!". That is not how supply shortages affect a military.
What you instead expect to see is that the use of scarce weapon platforms and ammunition types becomes rarer, and that militarily undesirable compromises and alternatives have to be made and found (which is more costly, less effective or both).
Instead of taking massive ground in a tank offensive, the military might be forced into slowly advancing trenches and artillery; long-range guided shells might be reserved for high value targets only (instead of being blanket fired at every somewhat promising target in range). You would expect to see significantly older and less effective equipment, instead of more modern variants, more conservative use of bombardment, etc.
These are all things that can actually be observed! But they don't mean that Russia is going to lose, obviously-- this is just going to make continuing the offense more and more difficult, expensive and less effective.
You do not need to take my word for this, and you don't even need to keep up with lengthy OSINT reports and analysis to track this yourself, just consider the following: There has been significant use of Iranian drones and ammunition and lately even North Korean conscripts. I find it very hard to believe that Russian leadership pursued this as a desirable choice-- rather, it seems the exact kind of necessary alternative/compromise that you are forced into when you can not properly supply the war effort on your own (just like how the Ukraine was from day 1 forced into relying on western systems). This is especially glaring because Russia is a proud exporter of both weapons and mercenaries-- having to fall back on foreign stuff is just a bad look here.
The West has been repeating the mantra of "the Russians are out of [insert Russian weapon here]" for two and a half years now, but objectively judging by what happens on the field (which is the main thing that counts during the phase of active war) that is demonstrably false. Unless you think the Russians are winning this war (which they are) with shovels.
Other than that I'm sure that the Germans themselves must have thought that the Soviets didn't have enough tanks to pass the Vistula or the Oder back in the day, not after Kursk.
Which is suggestive of some form of difficulties with supply and materiel.
This is a war of attrition. The progress is not linear, and it's not about how much territory is held by each side. The defender holds the line until it collapses because they've exhausted manpower and weapons. We've seen the first signs in the past few months, and that's why Ukraine invaded Kursk. They knew very well that simply holding the line was a lost cause for them, due to attrition.
The question was never "How long will it take for Russia to get to Kiev", but "How long can Ukraine hold the line before it's out of steam".
Or the aggressor gives up because the cost is simply too high, and the whole thing was completely optional for them to begin with, anyway.
As all colonial powers do eventually.
The thing is, very few have quite as much of an obsession with their former status, and such a strong revanchist axe to grind (or to be as stuck in such an archaic form of "empire" mode generally) as Russia's current regime does/is.
See also: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dolchstoßlegende
Now you're claiming that Russia is losing because they will exhaust their resources before Ukraine. Even this argument is weak, as proven by Ukraine's invasion of Kursk.
If every response to what you say is considered an "escalation", then that's your mindset, I suppose.
For which you were provided some helpful feedback.
Once again, as I see you're clearly out of arguments I consider this discussion resolved.
Well I don't see it that way, and it seems you're reading a dynamic into the situation that just isn't there.
But we agree in any case that the discussion has been dead for several iterations now.
No, it's objectively true. Modern tanks like T-90 peaked a long time ago in visually confirmed losses. The share of all types of tanks has been diminishing in favor of ancient models like T-62 and even T-55, which Russia did not use at the start of the invasion. Stockpiles of modern tanks have run dry. Refurbishment nor new production can keep up with losses.
The effect is seen on the battlefield too. Russian losses - for both tanks and people - are the highest that they've been in the war so far, and are among the highest for anyone in the world since the urban combat at Stalingrad in 1942-43. North Korean slaves have been brought in to plug the holes and keep Ukraine from intruding further into Russia. Is this how success is supposed to sound?
Western observers see this as a phenomenal failure, and if they make mistakes in their forecasts, then mainly because they can't believe Russia would keep on burning through Soviet stockpiles at such a high rate and throwing away people in such a wasteful way, more than thousand a day, month after month, with nothing to show for it.
"throwing away people in such a wasteful way, more than thousand a day"
I wonder why "the West" can't believe it, the high number of Russian troop losses in WW2 where exactly for the same reason - and in WW1. That is how Russia operates since Iwan IV.
How does this incident relate to the issue of the Russians having nuclear capability? All we see here are missiles delivering a conventional payload (or probably no payload at all) next door.
The point about Russia possibly testing that their ICBMs reliably avoid missile defense is also a very interesting perspective, though.
The Soviets didn't use nuclear weapons because they've never been in the situation we're trying to put Russia in now.
In which their leadership ultimately chose to do the only right and pragmatic thing. Rather than bleed the country's resources out indefinitely over a conflict which (all their bluster at the time notwithstanding) it knew perfectly well to be in no way existential, and, exactly like the current conflict -- entirely symbolic.
> and that's how they feel whether you think it's legitimate or not
Whether you accept its statements at face value is up to you.
I'm not going to risk a bite by forcing my hand; I'll make it feel safe first. That will only work if I have good intentions, obviously.
You know, the man behind the curtain.
I think there is no utility of using ICBM for targeting anything using conventional warhead. CEP is 100m and more, it is just waste of military resources.
So my guess is a test / show of force / terror bombing. Probably all 3 at the same time.
I wonder if that view has become obsolete already.
https://www.cnn.com/world/live-news/ukraine-russia-war-11-21...
Also: https://www.reuters.com/world/ukraine-war-live-updates-kyiv-...
and I assume this was to make sure that it was not misinterpreted as a nuclear attack: "US official says it was 'pre-notified' by Moscow about strike"
Asking just out of curiosity.