Once institutions, especially powerful ones like NATO, urge businesses and economic agents to prepare for war, they are signaling a shift in the geopolitical and economic landscape that increases the likelihood of conflict. The mobilization of economic forces is a double-edged sword: while it may be intended to bolster resilience and deter aggression, it also makes war increasingly difficult to avoid. As economic forces and preparations for conflict are set in motion, they create a momentum that increases the costs of demobilization and makes peace harder to maintain, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of war.
Putin will never go peacefully, you can only contain until he moves on. He is chasing status and legacy, against a light cone of success that is beyond his grasp due to age, health, and the condition of the Russian economy.
We can control what we do, but not what other parties do. Anyone who has been following along is well aware that the other side has already been doing. We can choose to be prepared, or to be unprepared. We are watching the consequences of being unprepared play out on social media, in politics, and economically. In reality, there is no choice and we've already been far, far too willing to defer preparation to "avoid escalation", and yet the escalation has occurred all the same. The hesitancy has been interpreted as validation that we will not respond to escalation. This is history rhyming.
> ... intended to bolster resilience and deter aggression, it also makes war increasingly difficult to avoid. As economic forces and preparations for conflict are set in motion, they create a momentum that increases the costs of demobilization and makes peace harder to maintain, leading to a self-fulfilling prophecy of war.
Really can't follow you there. Is this your very personal opinion or are there political science/ economic sources to back this up?
War is primarily a means of politics as Clausewitz stated in 'On War'.
Economics cannot deter aggression if it is politically so desired.
Never has.
What it can do, and what it did in any war, even the Cold War is that short of any one party purely overwhelming another by sheer force, the party who can sustain economic troubles and losses longer wins.
And this is what this is about.
Economic divestment does not in any way, shape or form become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" for war.
But if it came to war, one side is gonna run out of money and production capacity first.
>>Is this your very personal opinion or are there political science/ economic sources to back this up?
There is relevant literature discussing the high costs of demobilization *before* a hot war sets in, specifically in terms of the preparation and shifting of an economy toward wartime conditions even before active combat begins. These costs are often referred to as the "pre-war mobilization" phase, where the economy is being reoriented, military readiness is increased, and industries start transitioning to war production in anticipation of conflict. This can be an expensive and disruptive process, even before the actual war begins, and it has been studied from various perspectives, including economics, defense policy, and historical analysis.
### Key Themes and Citations:
1. *The Costs of Pre-War Mobilization:*
- When economies begin to adopt a "wartime attitude" or prepare for war before actual hostilities begin, there are substantial costs involved in shifting production, reorganizing industries, and preparing infrastructure. This "mobilization for war" includes reallocating resources to defense industries, stockpiling critical materials, and preparing logistical networks—all of which can be economically burdensome, especially if war does not materialize immediately.
- **Source:** The book **"The Economic Costs of World War II"** by Hugh Rockoff discusses the process of economic preparation during peacetime and the transition to wartime production. The high costs of mobilizing industries and adjusting civilian production to military needs, even before war breaks out, are explored in this context.
2. *Historical Context of Pre-War Mobilization Costs:*
- In the lead-up to both World Wars, countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany began mobilizing their economies for potential conflict long before any formal declaration of war. For example, during the period leading up to World War II, the U.S. ramped up military production in response to growing global tensions, shifting factories and labor forces to support defense needs. This process was costly, as it involved both industrial reconversion and large government expenditures on armaments and military infrastructure.
- **Source:** In **"The Origins of the Second World War"** by A.J.P. Taylor, the author explains how economic mobilization efforts, such as retooling factories and increasing military production, were undertaken by major powers well before war broke out. The financial and economic disruption caused by these efforts is acknowledged, even though war had not officially begun.
3. *Wartime Planning and Costs of Pre-Conflict Adjustments:*
- Governments often begin to implement wartime economic strategies even before any "hot war" begins, such as stockpiling goods, adjusting trade policies, and increasing military spending. These anticipatory measures can be costly in both direct expenditures and the disruption they cause to normal economic activities.
- *Source:* The book *"War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000"* by J.F. Meiselman touches on the economic consequences of pre-war mobilization, including the cost of preparing economies for wartime conditions. The author examines the disruptions that occur even before the first shot is fired and how costly it is to prepare an economy for potential conflict.
4. *The Economic Costs of Wartime Attitude:*
- Economic historians note that adopting a "wartime attitude" involves shifting the focus of the economy, including military readiness, defense spending, and increased state control. This is a costly process, especially when the possibility of war is not yet certain.
- *Source:* *"Economics of War and Peace"* by Peter W. Wilson explores the economics of war preparation, including the shifts in policy and production undertaken even when the likeliho...
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Really can't follow you there. Is this your very personal opinion or are there political science/ economic sources to back this up?
War is primarily a means of politics as Clausewitz stated in 'On War'.
Economics cannot deter aggression if it is politically so desired.
Never has.
What it can do, and what it did in any war, even the Cold War is that short of any one party purely overwhelming another by sheer force, the party who can sustain economic troubles and losses longer wins.
And this is what this is about.
Economic divestment does not in any way, shape or form become a "self-fulfilling prophecy" for war.
But if it came to war, one side is gonna run out of money and production capacity first.
>>Is this your very personal opinion or are there political science/ economic sources to back this up?
There is relevant literature discussing the high costs of demobilization *before* a hot war sets in, specifically in terms of the preparation and shifting of an economy toward wartime conditions even before active combat begins. These costs are often referred to as the "pre-war mobilization" phase, where the economy is being reoriented, military readiness is increased, and industries start transitioning to war production in anticipation of conflict. This can be an expensive and disruptive process, even before the actual war begins, and it has been studied from various perspectives, including economics, defense policy, and historical analysis.
### Key Themes and Citations:
1. *The Costs of Pre-War Mobilization:* - When economies begin to adopt a "wartime attitude" or prepare for war before actual hostilities begin, there are substantial costs involved in shifting production, reorganizing industries, and preparing infrastructure. This "mobilization for war" includes reallocating resources to defense industries, stockpiling critical materials, and preparing logistical networks—all of which can be economically burdensome, especially if war does not materialize immediately.
2. *Historical Context of Pre-War Mobilization Costs:* - In the lead-up to both World Wars, countries like the United States, the United Kingdom, and Germany began mobilizing their economies for potential conflict long before any formal declaration of war. For example, during the period leading up to World War II, the U.S. ramped up military production in response to growing global tensions, shifting factories and labor forces to support defense needs. This process was costly, as it involved both industrial reconversion and large government expenditures on armaments and military infrastructure. 3. *Wartime Planning and Costs of Pre-Conflict Adjustments:* - Governments often begin to implement wartime economic strategies even before any "hot war" begins, such as stockpiling goods, adjusting trade policies, and increasing military spending. These anticipatory measures can be costly in both direct expenditures and the disruption they cause to normal economic activities. - *Source:* The book *"War and the World: Military Power and the Fate of Continents, 1450-2000"* by J.F. Meiselman touches on the economic consequences of pre-war mobilization, including the cost of preparing economies for wartime conditions. The author examines the disruptions that occur even before the first shot is fired and how costly it is to prepare an economy for potential conflict.4. *The Economic Costs of Wartime Attitude:* - Economic historians note that adopting a "wartime attitude" involves shifting the focus of the economy, including military readiness, defense spending, and increased state control. This is a costly process, especially when the possibility of war is not yet certain. - *Source:* *"Economics of War and Peace"* by Peter W. Wilson explores the economics of war preparation, including the shifts in policy and production undertaken even when the likeliho...