every single expert knew carbon fiber was a bad idea (and why) beforehand. it's not a Chesterton's Fence if it's painted "DO NOT REMOVE" in large scary letters and a followup explanation in short easy-to-read words stapled underneath
The thing that I find amazing about this sub, is that the final hull survived all those trips, and then before the final one let everyone know it was toast, and Stockton ignored it. He was careless with peoples lives, but his sub actually did what he set out to do, and if he listened to the instruments, he'd still be alive, he could have made another hull, and he could be taking more trips down there for better of for worse. The porthole design was poor, the carbon fiber had tons of defects, the controller, everything was cobbled together, yet it held up until it didn't.
> The thing that I find amazing about this sub, is that the final hull survived all those trips, and then before the final one let everyone know it was toast, and Stockton ignored it. He was careless with peoples lives, but his sub actually did what he set out to do, and if he listened to the instruments, he'd still be alive...
I disagree. In fact, I think that's quite unlikely.
First, unlike a metal hull, carbon fiber hulls accumulate subtle damage on compression that's hard to detect. Then, when they fail, they tend to fail catastrophically. So "this hull worked before" isn't evidence of success in this case, as it normally would be, it's evidence that you're getting closer & closer to the disaster.
Second, I think Stockton would have just kept diving, even if this event hadn't failed. He might have even gotten more reckless (though per the report he was already extremely reckless). If you keep playing Russian Roulette, and occasionally add another bullet, eventually the game will end. There is no evidence he was going to stop until he was killed by his own decisions.
None of this takes away the tragedy of it. It's sad, and will remain so.
>The porthole design was poor, the carbon fiber had tons of defects, the controller, everything was cobbled together, yet it held up until it didn't.
Emphasis mine.
Everybody hammers on the controller like using a gaming controller was somehow more indicative of the unseriousness of the endeavor than, you know, the firing of the guy who said the hull was unsafe. Based on what I've read, that was one of the few authentically competent design decisions of the whole bloody thing. Why waste time and resources building, designing, and most importantly lifetime testing something that you can buy off the shelf for $30 US?
The US Navy has been using off-the-shelf game controllers for years now[0], because they work. And as a bonus, the submarine designers can be confident that if Stockton Rush or Seaman Manchild or whoever throws his controller in a fit of rage when his submarine doesn't work right, the controller will still work afterwards.
Absolutely, there were problems with the control scheme (reportedly, the motors were wired into the control board wrong, so the x- and y-axes were reversed). But that's not the fault of some usb controller communicating with the control box. That's the fault of the people working on the actually bespoke portions of the submarine.
> Investigators determined the Titan’s real-time monitoring system generated data that should have been analyzed and acted on during the 2022 Titanic expedition. However, OceanGate did not take any action related to the data, conduct any preventative maintenance or properly store the Titan during the extended off season before its 2023 Titanic expedition.
So, a bunch of giant red warning flags AND they didn't bother to properly store the casket. I feel bad for the passengers, Stockton got the FAFO award he deserved.
The Netflix documentary was great and the thing that I took away from it most was that in fractions of a second all the passengers literally blinked out of existence: They were here and then within a ms, they literally vanished (I assume... they didn't elaborate on it but I can guess!)
The temperature and pressure in that tiny fraction of a second was probably 10s of thousands of degrees and hundreds of jumbo jets smashing into them so fast that their bodies didn't even register the trauma.
Blew my mind.
Nearly forgot that they heard the explosion on the surface ship, 2 miles above the sub... that kinda screws with my head tbh!
James Cameron gave an interview that did a great job explaining the problems. In particular, carbon fiber is great for planes, but a terrible idea for compressive forces like going deep underwater. See: "James Cameron on the OceanGate sub disaster" https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EwSaZfwBrz8
Looking at interview footage of Stockton Rush, it seems he really wanted to be a disruptor and accomplish something which everyone else (i.e., experts) deemed impossible.
He thought he could do what SpaceX did for space, but for underwater exploration.
Problem is anyone can make a boat and kill themselves in it. Hard to hide a Falcon 9 rocket and get astronauts to go on it. It's highly regulated. You can put anyone on a dingy in the ocean and die.
The report has many gems about the tragedy. Basically, there were clear physical causes, which in turn were caused by hubris:
PHYSICAL CAUSES
"4.2.4.4. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Classification Society Background" ... "The ABS Underwater Rules do not permit the use of carbon fiber composites for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy (PVHOs)"
"4.2.4.5. Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL)" ... 4.2.4.5.3. According to a DNV Surveyor, carbon fiber has not been accepted as suitable material for the construction of submersible PVHOs, especially when subject to external pressure experienced at ocean depths. According to DNV GL, carbon fibers are not considered suitable for significant compressive loading conditions."
"5.1. Inadequacy of Structural Engineering Analysis.
OceanGate’s TITAN submersible design was a complex, high-risk, deep-sea submersible. The design and testing processes for TITAN did not adequately address many of the fundamental engineering principles that are considered crucial for ensuring safety and reliability for operations in such an inherently hazardous environment..."
"5.6 Insufficient Understanding of Carbon Fiber Material Properties for Deep-Sea Application.
The TITAN’s pressure hull was constructed using carbon fiber, a material chosen by Mr. Rush for its “impressive” strength-to-weight ratio. [However] the use of carbon fiber in deep-sea environments remains unproven—unlike the materials with established safety records. There are currently no recognized national or international standards that approve of the use of carbon fiber pressure hulls for submersibles. Carbon fiber has demonstrated its effectiveness in other applications where the material is primarily under tension (e.g., aircraft hulls where the pressure inside the passenger compartment is pressing outwards). However, in deep-sea conditions, the pressure hull experiences extreme compressive forces, a scenario for which carbon fiber has no established track record and is generally understood to be less effective."
* * *
HUMAN DECISIONS
The physics is just the physics. There was no law of nature that forced them to take the steps they took. Instead, we have points like these:
"5.12. OceanGate’s Toxic Safety Culture.
OceanGate’s operational and safety practices were critically flawed, which contributed to the catastrophic implosion of the TITAN submersible. At the core of these failures was a disconnect between the company's stated safety protocols and its actual practices. ... This highlighted systemic issues where submersible safety protocols were either egregiously inadequate or willfully disregarded, leaving critical risks unmitigated.
The analysis reveals a disturbing pattern of misrepresentation and reckless disregard for safety in OceanGate's operation of the TITAN submersible, with Mr. Rush seemingly using inflated numbers to bolster the perceived safety and dive count of the final TITAN hull...
Examples of OceanGate CEO’s disdain for traditional submersible safety protocols were abundant. For example... This dismissive approach to safety culture was not limited to engineering decisions. OceanGate’s management actively retaliated against employees who raised legitimate compliance related concerns..."
This was a tragedy, because people died and this was all completely avoidable. It's the only event like this in many, many decades. I hope others will leran and avoid making similar mistakes.
I don’t know why he insisted on sticking with Carbon fiber when multiple tests over and over again the strands would snap during tests. There is a reason other deep water submersible use Titanium.
Assume I have the money to go on a trip, am I supposed to do background checks on people and technology by myself?
From this report I gather that either the sea industry is completely unregulated, or this guy ignored all rules and nobody did a check even after something like 80 dives.
Fiber-reinforced composites are basically analogous to spaghetti dispersed in glue. Really strong in tension, when the (in this case, carbon) fibers are taking nearly all of the load. In compression, the fibers have nearly zero resistance to flexure, and the load is mainly being taken up by the glue (the matrix, in composite-speak). When the fiber/matrix interface fails due to fiber flex-induced shear force, you're done.
I just can't imagine why a submersible structural designer would select composites for this application. IMHO, this project was doomed from the moment of that design decision, even setting aside all the other idiocy.
Death by business model. The company was based on the concept that existing regulations and design constraints were overly conservative, and their customers paid the price.
This seems like the logical conclusion of move fast and break things + regulation is evil culture. Most regulation is there for a reason and most safety rules are written in blood. You don’t get to pretend that’s not true because they would slow you down. You’re not built different.
It seems insane to me that anyone would ever consider relying on carbon fiber strands in a structure subject to massive compression. Pushing on rope, is after all, the canonical example of futility.
It really was, in essence, an epoxy tube with titanium end caps.
24 comments
[ 2.7 ms ] story [ 47.0 ms ] threadhttps://www.newsweek.com/oceangate-employee-resigned-co-foun...
https://www.youtube.com/live/AvAw9YFW2i0&t=782
I disagree. In fact, I think that's quite unlikely.
First, unlike a metal hull, carbon fiber hulls accumulate subtle damage on compression that's hard to detect. Then, when they fail, they tend to fail catastrophically. So "this hull worked before" isn't evidence of success in this case, as it normally would be, it's evidence that you're getting closer & closer to the disaster.
Second, I think Stockton would have just kept diving, even if this event hadn't failed. He might have even gotten more reckless (though per the report he was already extremely reckless). If you keep playing Russian Roulette, and occasionally add another bullet, eventually the game will end. There is no evidence he was going to stop until he was killed by his own decisions.
None of this takes away the tragedy of it. It's sad, and will remain so.
Emphasis mine.
Everybody hammers on the controller like using a gaming controller was somehow more indicative of the unseriousness of the endeavor than, you know, the firing of the guy who said the hull was unsafe. Based on what I've read, that was one of the few authentically competent design decisions of the whole bloody thing. Why waste time and resources building, designing, and most importantly lifetime testing something that you can buy off the shelf for $30 US?
The US Navy has been using off-the-shelf game controllers for years now[0], because they work. And as a bonus, the submarine designers can be confident that if Stockton Rush or Seaman Manchild or whoever throws his controller in a fit of rage when his submarine doesn't work right, the controller will still work afterwards.
Absolutely, there were problems with the control scheme (reportedly, the motors were wired into the control board wrong, so the x- and y-axes were reversed). But that's not the fault of some usb controller communicating with the control box. That's the fault of the people working on the actually bespoke portions of the submarine.
0. https://www.cnet.com/science/us-navy-launches-submarine-mane...
So, a bunch of giant red warning flags AND they didn't bother to properly store the casket. I feel bad for the passengers, Stockton got the FAFO award he deserved.
The temperature and pressure in that tiny fraction of a second was probably 10s of thousands of degrees and hundreds of jumbo jets smashing into them so fast that their bodies didn't even register the trauma.
Blew my mind.
Nearly forgot that they heard the explosion on the surface ship, 2 miles above the sub... that kinda screws with my head tbh!
Water carries sound really well. Whale songs can still be detected what, thousands of miles away or something ridiculous?
It is kinda freaky to think about.
PHYSICAL CAUSES
"4.2.4.4. American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) Classification Society Background" ... "The ABS Underwater Rules do not permit the use of carbon fiber composites for Pressure Vessels for Human Occupancy (PVHOs)"
"4.2.4.5. Det Norske Veritas and Germanischer Lloyd (DNV GL)" ... 4.2.4.5.3. According to a DNV Surveyor, carbon fiber has not been accepted as suitable material for the construction of submersible PVHOs, especially when subject to external pressure experienced at ocean depths. According to DNV GL, carbon fibers are not considered suitable for significant compressive loading conditions."
"5.1. Inadequacy of Structural Engineering Analysis. OceanGate’s TITAN submersible design was a complex, high-risk, deep-sea submersible. The design and testing processes for TITAN did not adequately address many of the fundamental engineering principles that are considered crucial for ensuring safety and reliability for operations in such an inherently hazardous environment..."
"5.6 Insufficient Understanding of Carbon Fiber Material Properties for Deep-Sea Application. The TITAN’s pressure hull was constructed using carbon fiber, a material chosen by Mr. Rush for its “impressive” strength-to-weight ratio. [However] the use of carbon fiber in deep-sea environments remains unproven—unlike the materials with established safety records. There are currently no recognized national or international standards that approve of the use of carbon fiber pressure hulls for submersibles. Carbon fiber has demonstrated its effectiveness in other applications where the material is primarily under tension (e.g., aircraft hulls where the pressure inside the passenger compartment is pressing outwards). However, in deep-sea conditions, the pressure hull experiences extreme compressive forces, a scenario for which carbon fiber has no established track record and is generally understood to be less effective."
* * *
HUMAN DECISIONS
The physics is just the physics. There was no law of nature that forced them to take the steps they took. Instead, we have points like these:
"5.12. OceanGate’s Toxic Safety Culture. OceanGate’s operational and safety practices were critically flawed, which contributed to the catastrophic implosion of the TITAN submersible. At the core of these failures was a disconnect between the company's stated safety protocols and its actual practices. ... This highlighted systemic issues where submersible safety protocols were either egregiously inadequate or willfully disregarded, leaving critical risks unmitigated. The analysis reveals a disturbing pattern of misrepresentation and reckless disregard for safety in OceanGate's operation of the TITAN submersible, with Mr. Rush seemingly using inflated numbers to bolster the perceived safety and dive count of the final TITAN hull...
Examples of OceanGate CEO’s disdain for traditional submersible safety protocols were abundant. For example... This dismissive approach to safety culture was not limited to engineering decisions. OceanGate’s management actively retaliated against employees who raised legitimate compliance related concerns..."
This was a tragedy, because people died and this was all completely avoidable. It's the only event like this in many, many decades. I hope others will leran and avoid making similar mistakes.
Put "Moved Fast and Broke Stuff" on Rush's tombstone.
Assume I have the money to go on a trip, am I supposed to do background checks on people and technology by myself?
From this report I gather that either the sea industry is completely unregulated, or this guy ignored all rules and nobody did a check even after something like 80 dives.
Both options sound kinda insane to be honest.
Can anyone more knowledgeable elaborate?
I just can't imagine why a submersible structural designer would select composites for this application. IMHO, this project was doomed from the moment of that design decision, even setting aside all the other idiocy.
It really was, in essence, an epoxy tube with titanium end caps.
Yikes
So simple thinking could view this as some wreckless narcissist CEO defrauding some naive customers, and hence a "tragedy".
But alternatively, since the CEO's attitude and the safety record was publicly known, you could instead interpret it as an elaborate suicide pact.