Finally! A good take on that paper. I saw that arstechnica article posted everywhere, and most of the comments are full of confirmation bias, and almost all of them miss the fineprint - it was tested on a 4 layer deep toy model. It's nice to read a post that actually digs deeper and offers perspectives on what might be a good finding vs. just warranting more research.
How do you see that impacting the results? It is the same algorithm just on a smaller scale. I would assume a 4 layer model would not be very good, but does reasoning improve it? Is there a reason scale would impact the use of reasoning?
I feel it is interesting but not what would be ideal. I really think if the models could be less linear and process over time in latent space you'd get something much more akin to thought. I've messed around with attaching reservoirs at each layer using hooks with interesting results (mainly over fitting), but it feels like such a limitation to have all model context/memory stuck as tokens when latent space is where the richer interaction lives. Would love to see more done where thought over time mattered and the model could almost mull over the question a bit before being obligated to crank out tokens. Not an easy problem, but interesting.
> Whether AI reasoning is “real” reasoning or just a mirage can be an interesting question, but it is primarily a philosophical question. It depends on having a clear definition of what “real” reasoning is, exactly.
It's pretty easy: causal reasoning. Causal, not statistic correlation only as LLM do, with or without "CoT".
One thing that LLMs have exposed is how much of a house of cards all of our definitions of "human mind"-adjacent concepts are. We have a single example in all of reality of a being that thinks like we do, and so all of our definitions of thinking are inextricably tied with "how humans think", and now we have an entity that does things which seem to be very like how we think, but not _exactly like it_, and a lot of our definitions don't seem to work any more:
Reasoning, thinking, knowing, feeling, understanding, etc.
Or at the very least, our rubrics and heuristics for determining if someone (thing) thinks, feels, knows, etc, no longer work. And in particular, people create tests for those things thinking that they understand what they are testing for, when _most human beings_ would also fail those tests.
I think a _lot_ of really foundational work needs to be done on clearly defining a lot of these terms and putting them on a sounder basis before we can really move forward on saying whether machines can do those things.
> Because reasoning tasks require choosing between several different options. “A B C D [M1] -> B C D E” isn’t reasoning, it’s computation, because it has no mechanism for thinking “oh, I went down the wrong track, let me try something else”. That’s why the most important token in AI reasoning models is “Wait”. In fact, you can control how long a reasoning model thinks by arbitrarily appending “Wait” to the chain-of-thought. Actual reasoning models change direction all the time, but this paper’s toy example is structurally incapable of it.
I think this is the most important critique that undercuts the paper's claims. I'm less convinced by the other point. I think backtracking and/or parallel search is something future papers should definitely look at in smaller models.
The article is definitely also correct on the overreaching, broad philosophical claims that seems common when discussing AI and reasoning.
This paper I read from here has an interesting mathematical model for reasoning based on cognitive science. https://arxiv.org/abs/2506.21734 (there is also code here https://github.com/sapientinc/HRM) I think we will see dramatic performance increases on "reasoning" problems when this is worked into existing AI architectures.
When Using AI they say "Context is King". "Reasoning" models are using the AI to generate context. They are not reasoning in the sense of logic, or philosophy. Mirage, whatever you want to call it, it is rather unlike what people mean when they use the term reasoning. Calling it reasoning is up there with calling generating out put people don't like hallucinations.
"The question [whether computers can think] is just as relevant and just as meaningful as the question whether submarines can swim." -- Edsger W. Dijkstra, 24 November 1983
Mathematical reasoning does sometimes require correct calculations, and if you get them wrong your answers will be wrong. I wouldn’t want someone doing my taxes to be bad at calculation or bad at finding mistakes in calculation.
It would be interesting to see if this study’s results can be reproduced in a more realistic setting.
I feel like the fundamental concept of symbolic logic[1] as a means of reasoning fits within the capabilities of LLMs.
Whether it's a mirage or not, the ability to produce a symbolically logical result that has valuable meaning seems real enough to me.
Especially since most meaning is assigned by humans onto the world... so too can we choose to assign meaning (or not) to the output of a chain of symbolic logic processing?
Edit: maybe it is not so much that an LLM calculates/evaluates the result of symbolic logic as it is that it "follows" the pattern of logic encoded into the model.
we should be asking if reasoning while speaking is even possible for humans. this is why we have the scientific method and that's why LLMs write and run unit tests on their reasoning. But yeah intelligence is probably in the ear of the believer.
Chain of thought is just a way of trying to squeeze more juice out of the lemon of LLM's; I suspect we're at the stage of running up against diminishing returns and we'll have to move to different foundational models to see any serious improvement.
I'm unconvinced by the article criticism's, given they also employ their feels and few citations.
> I appreciate that research has to be done on small models, but we know that reasoning is an emergent capability! (...) Even if you grant that what they’re measuring is reasoning, I am profoundly unconvinced that their results will generalize to a 1B, 10B or 100B model.
A fundamental part of applied research is simplifying a real-world phenomenon to better understand it. Dismissing that for this many parameters, for such a simple problem, the LLM can't perform out of distribution just because it's not big enough undermines the very value of independent research. Tomorrow another model with double the parameters may or may not show the same behavior, but that finding will be built on top of this one.
Also, how do _you_ know that reasoning is emergent, and not rationalising on top of a compressed version of the web stored in 100B parameters?
> The first is that reasoning probably requires language use. Even if you don’t think AI models can “really” reason - more on that later - even simulated reasoning has to be reasoning in human language.
That is an unreasonable assumption. In case of LLMs it seems wasteful to transform a point from latent space into a random token and lose information. In fact, I think in near future it will be the norm for MLLMs to "think" and "reason" without outputting a single "word".
> Whether AI reasoning is “real” reasoning or just a mirage can be an interesting question, but it is primarily a philosophical question. It depends on having a clear definition of what “real” reasoning is, exactly.
It is not a "philosophical" (by which the author probably meant "practically inconsequential") question. If the whole reasoning business is just rationalization of pre-computed answers or simply a means to do some computations because every token provides only a fixed amount of computation to update the model's state, then it doesn't make much sense to focus on improving the quality of chain-of-thought output from human POV.
I don't think that the concept of "real reasoning" vs simulated or fake reasoning makes any sense... LLM reasoning can be regarded as a subset of human reasoning, and a more useful comparison would be not real vs fake but rather what is missing from LLM reasoning that would need to be added (likely in a completely new architecture - not an LLM/transformer) to make it more human-like and capable.
Human reasoning, and cortical function in general, would also appear to be prediction based, but there are many differences to LLMs, starting with the fact that we learn continuously and incrementally from our own experience and prediction failures and successes. Human reasoning is basically chained what-if prediction, based on predictive outcomes of individual steps that we have learnt, either in terms of general knowledge or domain-specific problem solving steps that we have learnt.
Perhaps there is not so much difference between what a human does and an LLM does in, say, tackling a math problem when the RL-trained reasoning-LLM chains together a sequence of reasoning steps that worked before...
Where the difference come in, is in how the LLM learned those steps in the first place, and what happens when its reasoning fails. In humans these are essentially the same thing - we learn by predicting and giving it a go, and learn from prediction failure (sensory/etc feedback) to update our context-specific predictions for next time. If we reach a reasoning/predictive impasse - we've tried everything that comes to mind and everything fails, then our innate traits of curiosity and boredom (maybe more?) come to play and we will explore the problem and learn and try again. Curiosity and exploration can of course lead to gain of knowledge from things like imitation and active pursuit (or receipt) of knowledge from sources other then personal experimentation.
The LLM of course has no ability to learn (outside of in-context learning - a poor substitute), so is essentially limited in capability to what it has been pre-trained on, and pre-training is never going to be the solution to a world full of infinite ever-changing variety.
So, rather than say that an LLM isn't doing "real" reasoning, it seems more productive to acknowledge that prediction is the basis of reasoning, but that the LLM (or rather a future cognitive architecture - not a pass-thru stack of transformer layers!) needs many additional capabilities such as continual/incremental learning, innate traits such as curiosity to expose itself to learning situations, and other necessary cognitive apparatus such as working memory, cognitive iteration/looping (cf thalamo-cortical loop), etc.
> The first is that reasoning probably requires language use. Even if you don’t think AI models can “really” reason - more on that later - even simulated reasoning has to be reasoning in human language.
I'd claim that this assumption doesn't even hold true for humans. Reasoning in language is the most "flashy" kind of reasoning and the one that can be most readily shared with other people - because we can articulate it, write it down, publish, etc.
But I know for sure that I'm not constantly narrating my life in my head, like the reasoning traces of LLMs.
A lot of reasoning happens visually, I.e. by imagining some scene and thinking how it would play out. In other situations, it's spontaneous ideas that "just pop up" - I.e., there are unconscious processes and probably some kind of association involved.
I mostly agree with the point the author makes that "it doesn't matter". But then again, it does matter, because LLM-based products are marketed based on "IT CAN REASON!" And so, while it may not matter, per se, how an LLM comes up with its results, to the extent that people choose to rely on LLMs because of marketing pitches, it's worth pushing back on those claims if they are overblown, using the same frame that the marketers use.
That said, this author says this question of whether models "can reason" is the least interesting thing to ask. But I think the least interesting thing you can do is to go around taking every complaint about LLM performance and saying "but humans do the exact same thing!" Which is often not true, but again, doesn't matter.
Yes, it's a mirage, since this type of software is an opaque simulation, perhaps even a simulacra. It's reasoning in the same sense as there are terrorists in a game of Counter-Strike.
Current thought, for me there's a lot of hand-wringing about what is "reasoning" and what isn't. But right now perhaps the question might be boiled down to -- "is the bottleneck merely hard drive space/memory/computing speed?"
I kind of feel like we won't be able to even begin to test this until a few more "Moore's law" cycles.
Currently it feels like it's more simulated chain-of-thought / reasoning, sometimes very consistent, but simulated, partially because it's statistically generated and non-deterministic (not the exact same path to the similar or same each response run).
I think LLM's chain of thought is reasoning. When trained, LLM sees lot of examples like "All men are mortal. Socrates is a man." followed by "Therefore, Socrates is mortal.". This causes the transformer to learn rule "All A are B. C is A." is often followed by "Therefore, C is B." And so it can apply this logical rule, predictively. (I have converted the example from latent space to human language for clarity.)
Unfortunately, sometimes LLM also learns "All A are C. All B are C." is followed by "Therefore, A is B.", due to bad example in the training data. (More insidiously, it might learn this rule only in a special case.)
So it learns some logic rules but not consistently. This lack of consistency will cause it to fail on larger problems.
I think NNs (transformers) could be great in heuristic suggesting which valid logical rules (could be even modal or fuzzy logic) to apply in order to solve a certain formalized problem, but not so great at coming up with the logic rules themselves. They could also be great at transforming the original problem/question from human language into some formal logic, that would then be resolved using heuristic search.
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[ 3.2 ms ] story [ 59.4 ms ] threadHow do you see that impacting the results? It is the same algorithm just on a smaller scale. I would assume a 4 layer model would not be very good, but does reasoning improve it? Is there a reason scale would impact the use of reasoning?
It's pretty easy: causal reasoning. Causal, not statistic correlation only as LLM do, with or without "CoT".
Reasoning, thinking, knowing, feeling, understanding, etc.
Or at the very least, our rubrics and heuristics for determining if someone (thing) thinks, feels, knows, etc, no longer work. And in particular, people create tests for those things thinking that they understand what they are testing for, when _most human beings_ would also fail those tests.
I think a _lot_ of really foundational work needs to be done on clearly defining a lot of these terms and putting them on a sounder basis before we can really move forward on saying whether machines can do those things.
I think this is the most important critique that undercuts the paper's claims. I'm less convinced by the other point. I think backtracking and/or parallel search is something future papers should definitely look at in smaller models.
The article is definitely also correct on the overreaching, broad philosophical claims that seems common when discussing AI and reasoning.
It would be interesting to see if this study’s results can be reproduced in a more realistic setting.
The author has a curious idea of what "reasoning" entails.
Whether it's a mirage or not, the ability to produce a symbolically logical result that has valuable meaning seems real enough to me.
Especially since most meaning is assigned by humans onto the world... so too can we choose to assign meaning (or not) to the output of a chain of symbolic logic processing?
Edit: maybe it is not so much that an LLM calculates/evaluates the result of symbolic logic as it is that it "follows" the pattern of logic encoded into the model.
[1] https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Logic
> I appreciate that research has to be done on small models, but we know that reasoning is an emergent capability! (...) Even if you grant that what they’re measuring is reasoning, I am profoundly unconvinced that their results will generalize to a 1B, 10B or 100B model.
A fundamental part of applied research is simplifying a real-world phenomenon to better understand it. Dismissing that for this many parameters, for such a simple problem, the LLM can't perform out of distribution just because it's not big enough undermines the very value of independent research. Tomorrow another model with double the parameters may or may not show the same behavior, but that finding will be built on top of this one.
Also, how do _you_ know that reasoning is emergent, and not rationalising on top of a compressed version of the web stored in 100B parameters?
That is an unreasonable assumption. In case of LLMs it seems wasteful to transform a point from latent space into a random token and lose information. In fact, I think in near future it will be the norm for MLLMs to "think" and "reason" without outputting a single "word".
> Whether AI reasoning is “real” reasoning or just a mirage can be an interesting question, but it is primarily a philosophical question. It depends on having a clear definition of what “real” reasoning is, exactly.
It is not a "philosophical" (by which the author probably meant "practically inconsequential") question. If the whole reasoning business is just rationalization of pre-computed answers or simply a means to do some computations because every token provides only a fixed amount of computation to update the model's state, then it doesn't make much sense to focus on improving the quality of chain-of-thought output from human POV.
Human reasoning, and cortical function in general, would also appear to be prediction based, but there are many differences to LLMs, starting with the fact that we learn continuously and incrementally from our own experience and prediction failures and successes. Human reasoning is basically chained what-if prediction, based on predictive outcomes of individual steps that we have learnt, either in terms of general knowledge or domain-specific problem solving steps that we have learnt.
Perhaps there is not so much difference between what a human does and an LLM does in, say, tackling a math problem when the RL-trained reasoning-LLM chains together a sequence of reasoning steps that worked before...
Where the difference come in, is in how the LLM learned those steps in the first place, and what happens when its reasoning fails. In humans these are essentially the same thing - we learn by predicting and giving it a go, and learn from prediction failure (sensory/etc feedback) to update our context-specific predictions for next time. If we reach a reasoning/predictive impasse - we've tried everything that comes to mind and everything fails, then our innate traits of curiosity and boredom (maybe more?) come to play and we will explore the problem and learn and try again. Curiosity and exploration can of course lead to gain of knowledge from things like imitation and active pursuit (or receipt) of knowledge from sources other then personal experimentation.
The LLM of course has no ability to learn (outside of in-context learning - a poor substitute), so is essentially limited in capability to what it has been pre-trained on, and pre-training is never going to be the solution to a world full of infinite ever-changing variety.
So, rather than say that an LLM isn't doing "real" reasoning, it seems more productive to acknowledge that prediction is the basis of reasoning, but that the LLM (or rather a future cognitive architecture - not a pass-thru stack of transformer layers!) needs many additional capabilities such as continual/incremental learning, innate traits such as curiosity to expose itself to learning situations, and other necessary cognitive apparatus such as working memory, cognitive iteration/looping (cf thalamo-cortical loop), etc.
I'd claim that this assumption doesn't even hold true for humans. Reasoning in language is the most "flashy" kind of reasoning and the one that can be most readily shared with other people - because we can articulate it, write it down, publish, etc.
But I know for sure that I'm not constantly narrating my life in my head, like the reasoning traces of LLMs.
A lot of reasoning happens visually, I.e. by imagining some scene and thinking how it would play out. In other situations, it's spontaneous ideas that "just pop up" - I.e., there are unconscious processes and probably some kind of association involved.
None of that uses language.
That said, this author says this question of whether models "can reason" is the least interesting thing to ask. But I think the least interesting thing you can do is to go around taking every complaint about LLM performance and saying "but humans do the exact same thing!" Which is often not true, but again, doesn't matter.
I kind of feel like we won't be able to even begin to test this until a few more "Moore's law" cycles.
Unfortunately, sometimes LLM also learns "All A are C. All B are C." is followed by "Therefore, A is B.", due to bad example in the training data. (More insidiously, it might learn this rule only in a special case.)
So it learns some logic rules but not consistently. This lack of consistency will cause it to fail on larger problems.
I think NNs (transformers) could be great in heuristic suggesting which valid logical rules (could be even modal or fuzzy logic) to apply in order to solve a certain formalized problem, but not so great at coming up with the logic rules themselves. They could also be great at transforming the original problem/question from human language into some formal logic, that would then be resolved using heuristic search.