> the fundamental misunderstanding of encryption technology continues to plague policy discussions across Europe.
> Client-side scanning, the technical approach favored by Chat Control advocates, attempts to circumvent this limitation by analyzing messages on users’ devices before encryption or after decryption. While this might sound like a clever workaround, it fundamentally breaks the security model of encryption.
It's not a misunderstanding, it's deliberate circumvention. It doesn't do anyone any good to pretend that they just don't understand.
Comparing electronic chats to former communication methods... Would people have objected to the government scanning all of their physical postal letters for keywords that might suggest something illegal? Don't they need some legal ground to do this in advance of the act?
Great news. Now maybe we can go on the offense for once. Work to enable constitutional protections against this sort of thing, and develop systems that can work around it if and when this comes back again.
There are places in the world today where only sneakernet communication has any semblance of privacy, so we need non-specialist tools that can provide privacy and secrecy regardless of local conditions. (I’d love to see more communication tools that don’t assume an always-on connection, or low latency, or other first world conditions.)
People, as I reasoned on reddit - do not trust those who want
to push for it. Several mega-corporations want it. See how lobbyists
continue to fight for this.
Watch them carefully. They will 100% try again. The enemy is the general
public.
People should be ashamed to support such chat control proposals. It should become as socially taboo as racism or sexism, and people who transgress such social norms should be tarnished with the same social stigma.
This was just another terrorist attack attempt by white collar autocrats. EU failed to recognise it as such. Groups proposing such mass assault at the public belong behind bars, not to be given consideration. If someone proposed legislation for compulsory mass rape, would European Commission take it through legislative process? Unlikely.
So they have a massive blind spot, or are working together to move Overton window and eventually this will pass.
Dangerous times.
I really don’t think this has anything to do with pressure from the 10% of the public that can afford to care about this.
Politicians, and more importantly influential people, also rely on the same tech as we do and they have infinitely more to lose if their communications leak.
I don’t get how this debate keeps cropping up. Is there not some career disincentive/consequence where if you try to push Encryption back doors, you get demolished in your re-election
The first thing to check in new versions of the proposal is whether they include an exception for the government, as they always do. If the proposers think the scanning is so safe, why don't they want the government to use it too? As soon as it says the government is exempted, you know that the rest can be tossed in the trash without much further examination.
United States should revoke visas for individuals and their family members who engage in talks of such proposals, and remove maritime protection for ships registered in countries doing likewise.
If you're going to do this, I wish people would go the other way. Don't work to prevent the worst from happening.
Write a law that end-users have an unlimited right to execute their own programs on their own devices, on par with the producers of said devices, just any code they want. A device doesn't support that? No selling in the EU for you ...
Such a right would make chat control impossible and unworkable as well, for the same reason that open source encryption can't be hacked. It will be impossible to prevent secure messengers to be installed.
The question is not whether or not it will pass, but when. There are no limits to the times something can be proposed or voted on, and it is only required to pass that voting/proposal loop once. And this brute-force method has been proven to work in Europe and in the EU.
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[ 2.8 ms ] story [ 45.1 ms ] threadThis thing is 280px tall! I clicked it for shits and giggles and upon returning it showed a popup XD
https://files.catbox.moe/sv7hb7.png
> Only 2 Steps (thx)
> Click "Download"
> Add Privacy Guard for Chrome™
Don't worry why I'm not using ad block
> Client-side scanning, the technical approach favored by Chat Control advocates, attempts to circumvent this limitation by analyzing messages on users’ devices before encryption or after decryption. While this might sound like a clever workaround, it fundamentally breaks the security model of encryption.
It's not a misunderstanding, it's deliberate circumvention. It doesn't do anyone any good to pretend that they just don't understand.
Why are chats different?
There are places in the world today where only sneakernet communication has any semblance of privacy, so we need non-specialist tools that can provide privacy and secrecy regardless of local conditions. (I’d love to see more communication tools that don’t assume an always-on connection, or low latency, or other first world conditions.)
Watch them carefully. They will 100% try again. The enemy is the general public.
Politicians, and more importantly influential people, also rely on the same tech as we do and they have infinitely more to lose if their communications leak.
Who is driving it?
Who wants this so much that they have gone to the massive expense and effort?
Whoever it is - they know thet defeat is only temporary, and if they keep bringing it back from the dead, eventually it will succeed.
Write a law that end-users have an unlimited right to execute their own programs on their own devices, on par with the producers of said devices, just any code they want. A device doesn't support that? No selling in the EU for you ...
Such a right would make chat control impossible and unworkable as well, for the same reason that open source encryption can't be hacked. It will be impossible to prevent secure messengers to be installed.