Key quote:
"Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk. For any country potentially facing future sanctions, the calculus of holding large dollar reserve positions shifted."
My only critique here is that Russia is an outlier, along with China, because they both hold large dollar reserves and have a contentious relationship with the US. You have to go pretty far down the list to find another nation that is likely to face US sanctions - and those nations, like Libya and Iran, are already heavily sanctioned!
You're right that Russia was an outlier in 2022; but as others already said, the landscape has shifted considerably since then. The argument isn't that most countries face immediate sanctions risk, but that the uncertainty itself changes the risk calculation. Even traditional US partners are now hedging (or considering their options) gold holdings at central banks recently surpassed US Treasury holdings for the first time in 30 years. It's less about countries thinking 'we'll definitely be sanctioned' and more 'the tail risk is now visible and needs to be managed.' That calculus might drive gradual diversification even among countries with good US relationships.
Awesome read. I always love Poszar's work, it's a shame that these days he's no longer working at CS - since most of his work is now stuck behind a paywall.
Pozsar assigns far too much weight to Russia. It’s an economically small country. He should be focused a lot more on large American companies that carry actual heft.
this is a really good article. it makes none of the mistakes of thinking Bretton Woods I was a political choice (it uses the words "collapse") while separating the difference of the financial inevitabilities and political agencies in so called Bretton Woods III (that elected leaders do indeed have a choice to withhold funds from Russia, but on the other hand, there are inevitable financial & economic effects to war, like having to commit more money for credit of shipping oil).
someone on here is saying that Russia is an "economically small country." This is like saying the learning loss during COVID was "not very big." You are not appreciating the consequences of how big of a deal war and pulling kids out of school are, all the same.
IMHO the fundamental problem is that the world wanted dollars so they gave the US gold or stuff for those dollars. If that flow ever reverses then there's problems. Bretton woods solved the gold issue. The plaza accords solved it when Japan was the problem.
Today the solution is that foreign countries but government debt. That will last as long as everyone is willing to roll it over. It's not clear how or why that stops. But if/when it does it's not going to involve the US sending out trillions worth of stuff
"Pozsar’s argument: the moment Western nations froze Russian foreign exchange reserves, the assumed risk-free nature of these dollar holdings changed fundamentally. What had been viewed as having negligible credit risk suddenly carried confiscation risk."
This has nothing to do with dollar. Almost all of the confiscated currency was in Europe, and it has to do with invading your bank's ally. No country in the world ever assumed that's risk free, it wasn't being priced back then and isn't now, because nobody except from Russia is stupid enough to do that.
Good point about Europe holding most of the frozen assets (~$300B vs ~$5B in the US). But that actually reinforces rather than contradicts Pozsar's framework; it's not specifically about the dollar versus other currencies, but about Western-controlled financial claims generally (whether USD, EUR, or other G7 assets) versus 'outside money' that can't be frozen by institutional decision.
The key insight imp isn't 'dollars are risky,' it's 'any financial claim on a Western institution now carries confiscation risk if your geopolitical interests diverge.' Whether those claims are denominated in dollars or euros doesn't change the fundamental calculus for reserve holders. That's why we're seeing (and might see more) diversification toward gold and commodities—assets with less/different counterparty risk rather than just EUR-for-USD swaps.
Trump’s tirades on tarrifs show that even despite him and his stupidity the American economy is still the buyer everyone wants. Even despite alienating allies and trading partners with tarrifs countries are still playing ball so to speak. This all tells that the dollar is more resilient than we think.
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[ 5.9 ms ] story [ 35.4 ms ] threadMy only critique here is that Russia is an outlier, along with China, because they both hold large dollar reserves and have a contentious relationship with the US. You have to go pretty far down the list to find another nation that is likely to face US sanctions - and those nations, like Libya and Iran, are already heavily sanctioned!
someone on here is saying that Russia is an "economically small country." This is like saying the learning loss during COVID was "not very big." You are not appreciating the consequences of how big of a deal war and pulling kids out of school are, all the same.
Today the solution is that foreign countries but government debt. That will last as long as everyone is willing to roll it over. It's not clear how or why that stops. But if/when it does it's not going to involve the US sending out trillions worth of stuff
This has nothing to do with dollar. Almost all of the confiscated currency was in Europe, and it has to do with invading your bank's ally. No country in the world ever assumed that's risk free, it wasn't being priced back then and isn't now, because nobody except from Russia is stupid enough to do that.
The key insight imp isn't 'dollars are risky,' it's 'any financial claim on a Western institution now carries confiscation risk if your geopolitical interests diverge.' Whether those claims are denominated in dollars or euros doesn't change the fundamental calculus for reserve holders. That's why we're seeing (and might see more) diversification toward gold and commodities—assets with less/different counterparty risk rather than just EUR-for-USD swaps.