> It seems like we can’t just necessarily leave it up to companies – or their ragtag teams of crackpot lawyers rewriting privacy policies every few months – to keep our private data private.
It's not a medical requirement from a doctor, so just keep a diary if you want to. Not everything needs to be an app. All the money spent on regulations and regulators to cover increasingly niche opt-in services that are entirely unnecessary is a waste.
I don’t have the right configuration of equipment to use an app like this, but does anyone know why this needs to be a service-driven app? What piece of functionality requires a server to track your health?
If we didn't have these shitty mobile OS ecosystems, we would have sensible apps to do that. But people then throw something up about "modern" security in operation systems. As if this data exfiltration isn't more or less the worst case of a security problem.
Why would anyone think that a non-HIPPA compliant app would keep medical information private to the level of security needed for medical data? Flo has definitely breached user trust, but that trust seems misplaced from the get-go.
its crazy to me that Flo is used so widely, as its started by Russian men and their treatment of data has bee public for a while, it just hasnt spread fast enough. I know theres at least one other option called Calessa (http://Calessa.app)
Does anyone happen to know if Meta and Google have ever recovered these judgements from the app developers? All of the industry terms of service specifically forbid SDK licensees from sending sensitive personal data to the platforms, and they require the licensee to indemnify the platform against any judgement that arises from violating those terms. See Meta's statement on this verdict, which seems pretty reasonable to me. This 100% looks like the fault of the app developer:
“User privacy is important to Meta, which is why we do not want health or other sensitive information and why our terms prohibit developers from sending any.” Meta maintains that any transmission of sensitive health data is due to a failure to comply with its terms of use.
I don't have a period, so I'm not the best person to do it, but there really needs to be a solid FOSS alternative to flo. If GNU had more women, it'd probably already exist
This one seems clear cut as a HIPAA violation. Glad to hear that interpretation was upheld.
However, regardless, we really need to just kill the data broker business model.
Speaking as someone who implemented GDPR for my startup when the law first came into effect, there were certainly rough edges.
But the core premise that you simply cannot sell user data to sub-processors without consent is a powerful one that I believe would fix a lot of broken things in the US system.
(Not least because the USG buys private data that would be unconstitutional for it to directly collect, but also things like the incentives for your cell phone provider to sell your location data to advertisers.)
- around since 2023. Last updated 2 years ago.
- iOS
- Swift
EDIT: Someone else pointed out this closed-source alternative that got a 92% by ORCHA: https://www.my28x.com/
I think the biggest thing I'd like to see is a data format standard defined. You should be able to "take your data with you" and go anywhere you like. If you decide an app is unethical or if your favorite OSS app stops being updated, it should be simple to switch. Many apps let you export your data. Maybe someone can make a converter between popular proprietary apps and a common data structure spec
At this point, if you don't trust that they share your data with third parties with the AI tools available and open-source LLMs, just vibe-code your own health apps and keep them stored on a Mac mini or something else for the female devs here.
I will say, with codex/cc access and a free weekend you could make an app that covers like 99% of this app’s purpose. The harder part would be the art/making it cutesy, as some other commenters have pointed out. Plain SwiftUI or compose just isn’t eye catching enough
I can't accept that premise. They'll take any revenue they can get, including reselling that same data to Palantir or to RFK Jr's health department. Did you skip several periods and then suddenly start having them again? Sounds like you've had an illegal abortion. SWAT raid on your home, incoming. And so on.
If the app could make another $0.05 selling your location to kidnapping gangs, they'd do it. There's no such thing as an app that cares about your privacy or your interests.
That's what I'm really trying to convey to many people (I work in privacy products) but people keep talking to me about "trust" which is non-sense, I keep arguing that if the data is on the server of someone, you must always assume that they'll use it somehow, it's a bit ridiculous imo to think otherwise, imagine you are a company and you sit with literal gold in a sqlite DB and you are like hmmm no let's not do this query, that makes no sense from a business standpoint.
I get where this comes from, but I don’t think it’s that absolute.
There are apps that are designed so they literally can’t access your data not because they’re more trustworthy, but because the architecture removes that possibility.
The problem is those approaches don’t map well to common business models (ads, subscriptions tied to engagement, etc.), so they’re much less common.
Yikes - selling "When did I last Orgasm" to Mark Zuckerberg's team seems like an undesirable "leak" of information.
.. To be clear, "wired app to standard ad-tech surveillance plumbing, sending concepts like user logged period and pregnancy mode entered, through its pipes, to improve ad revenues through Meta's targeting platform" .. ad-events .. this is the kind of behavior that happened, in plain-ish speaking terms, per what I read in my non-expert capacity.
Q: (answered) Now I want to know who runs (ran?) Flo - can we find their Board of Directors & C-level people on LinkedIn to profile what kind of industries lead to this kind of (I believe) privacy violating behaviors? It's a biased question on my part, as Correlation is not Causality! Onwards ..
My limited, biased, AI-driven research suggests the violating behavior ran from June 2016 through February 2019, and that generally the Company was designed to be consumer-app with subscriptions and is healthcare-adjacent, targeting an unregulated non-HIPPA market.
- INVESTORS = consumer subscription apps with ad-driven growth loops
- BUSINESS MODEL =
(1) free or freemium consumer apps where
(2) growth depends on paid acquisition through Meta/Google/TikTok ad platforms, which
(3) requires sending conversion events back to those platforms to optimize ad spend, and
(4) the SDKs that do this are designed by ad networks to hoover up everything by default.
- EXECUTIVE =
* No Privacy / Data Protection C-level officers during violating period
I don't really give a shit at this point. In Toronto it's legal to even record into your condo neighbor's unit 24/7 and livestream your recording to the Internet, unbeknownst to the inhabitants. It has been demonstrated that nobody will enforce anything.
At this point I am a privacy nihilist, and I expect all information about anyone to be exploited all the time. Everyone should do the same.
39 comments
[ 3.5 ms ] story [ 59.4 ms ] threadIt's not a medical requirement from a doctor, so just keep a diary if you want to. Not everything needs to be an app. All the money spent on regulations and regulators to cover increasingly niche opt-in services that are entirely unnecessary is a waste.
If you put data onto a networked device it may be sent to some place else.
If you don't want your data being shared:
Use a device that does not have any networking capability (both hardware and software wise)
Use a pen and paper, you can shred and destroy as you see fit.
If you're using an application on a mobile device with mobile data/wifi, the chances are, your data is being uploaded.
https://bloodyhealth.gitlab.io
A secure open source period tracking app.
“User privacy is important to Meta, which is why we do not want health or other sensitive information and why our terms prohibit developers from sending any.” Meta maintains that any transmission of sensitive health data is due to a failure to comply with its terms of use.
However, regardless, we really need to just kill the data broker business model.
Speaking as someone who implemented GDPR for my startup when the law first came into effect, there were certainly rough edges.
But the core premise that you simply cannot sell user data to sub-processors without consent is a powerful one that I believe would fix a lot of broken things in the US system.
(Not least because the USG buys private data that would be unconstitutional for it to directly collect, but also things like the incentives for your cell phone provider to sell your location data to advertisers.)
I think the biggest thing I'd like to see is a data format standard defined. You should be able to "take your data with you" and go anywhere you like. If you decide an app is unethical or if your favorite OSS app stops being updated, it should be simple to switch. Many apps let you export your data. Maybe someone can make a converter between popular proprietary apps and a common data structure spec
I can't accept that premise. They'll take any revenue they can get, including reselling that same data to Palantir or to RFK Jr's health department. Did you skip several periods and then suddenly start having them again? Sounds like you've had an illegal abortion. SWAT raid on your home, incoming. And so on.
https://www.labaton.com/cases/frasco-v-flo-health-inc
There are apps that are designed so they literally can’t access your data not because they’re more trustworthy, but because the architecture removes that possibility.
The problem is those approaches don’t map well to common business models (ads, subscriptions tied to engagement, etc.), so they’re much less common.
.. To be clear, "wired app to standard ad-tech surveillance plumbing, sending concepts like user logged period and pregnancy mode entered, through its pipes, to improve ad revenues through Meta's targeting platform" .. ad-events .. this is the kind of behavior that happened, in plain-ish speaking terms, per what I read in my non-expert capacity.
Q: (answered) Now I want to know who runs (ran?) Flo - can we find their Board of Directors & C-level people on LinkedIn to profile what kind of industries lead to this kind of (I believe) privacy violating behaviors? It's a biased question on my part, as Correlation is not Causality! Onwards ..
My limited, biased, AI-driven research suggests the violating behavior ran from June 2016 through February 2019, and that generally the Company was designed to be consumer-app with subscriptions and is healthcare-adjacent, targeting an unregulated non-HIPPA market.
- INVESTORS = consumer subscription apps with ad-driven growth loops
- BUSINESS MODEL =
(1) free or freemium consumer apps where
(2) growth depends on paid acquisition through Meta/Google/TikTok ad platforms, which
(3) requires sending conversion events back to those platforms to optimize ad spend, and
(4) the SDKs that do this are designed by ad networks to hoover up everything by default.
- EXECUTIVE =
* No Privacy / Data Protection C-level officers during violating period
At this point I am a privacy nihilist, and I expect all information about anyone to be exploited all the time. Everyone should do the same.