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The fact that it nearly succeeded does not change whether it was a bad idea to try at all. The fact that there was a huge strategic payoff does not matter if the odds of success were too low.

Montgomery may possibly have been right that all the resources behind one thrust would be the best strategy. That doesn't change the fact that he wasn't going to get it. Stubbornly running an attack that needed the resources, without the resources, is not good generalship, even if you were right that the attack should have had the resources. The best you could say about that is that Montgomery was plausibly right on the larger strategic question, and was willing to waste all those lives in order to prove it. That is not remotely a positive statement.

The airborne operation was well done, even with little time to prepare? That's great. It really is. It still remains true that this is bad preparation. The troops nearly miraculously pulled it off, but commanders should not require miracles for operations to work.

This article seems to be trying too hard to spin things the other way. It is not a sober assessment; it is taking everything in the best possible light (often unwarranted).