Both this event as well as the Iranian campaign expose the low stock piles that most NATO countries are facing.
But it's also exposing the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare. A single patriot missile, a single one, costs around $ 4 million, and its the only weapon that may intercept missiles that cost 1.5 up to 40 times less.
Even when taking the major Russian ballistic missiles like the Kh101, the Iskander and Kalibr the economics are better for the Russians between 4 and 1.5 ratio.
Moreover NATO has no weapon that can intercept the Iskanders which have had so far a 90% effectiveness. Good thing that Russia cannot mass produce them.
But here's the most interesting part: what you launch to intercept is not based on the cost of what's attacking you, but on the potential damage of not intercepting it.
If a 50k Shahed drone is on course to hit your command center or expensive aircraft you may still have to launch a Patriot to intercept it, you can't risk your high command being eliminated because the attacking weapon was cheap.
Ukraine deal with the "50k Shahed drone is on course to hit your command center" stuff by having a lot of cheaper interceptors to take them out - some drones, some cheaper SAMs, some aircraft.
It was a bit of a mistake of the US not to use that stuff for Iran which the Ukrainians would have been delighted to supply.
ABMs are very slow to build, expensive, and doubtfully effective red herrings. PAC-3 manufacturing: regardless of having perfect, prioritized intellectual property sharing arrangements, it would still involve competing with limited quantities from monopoly critical suppliers and delay from deep levels of supply chain parts and assemblies vendors.
It would be better to catch SSM launchers on roads, rails, and inland waterways and dismantle the supply chain that produces/imports them and their parts with long range kinetic sanctions. (Kill the archer and arrow maker, not the arrows.)
Incidentally, someone in Russia may have believed they had a surplus of S-400's because it was using them as SSMs in nightly strikes on civilians rather than as SAMs and ABMs even though its last reported manufacturing capacity was only 40 units/month.
Fedorov only wants to be the big chief and is unreasonably unable to accept any other title. This sort of ego and intransigence doesn't convey wisdom, modesty, flexibly, or intelligence; it conveys entitlement and stupidity. Thus, Zelensky made a wise choice regardless that people demand their young, brash celebrity who fought the old but brave, Soviet-trained general. "It takes two to tango" and both possible sources of personality conflict were removed equally, eventually, under public pressure as a concession. Defensive war strategy and HR decisions cannot be made by direct democracy or public opinion.
Either Zelenskyy is the wartime boss and has the authority to make decisions after some input or not, but he needs to make the final say and not be second-guessed constantly. Rule by committee at the very top doesn't scale, and it doesn't scale in wartime especially. People are free to have and express opinions though, even if they maybe projecting anger from other matters towards something trivial (bikeshedding).
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[ 0.17 ms ] story [ 18.5 ms ] threadBut it's also exposing the effectiveness of asymmetric warfare. A single patriot missile, a single one, costs around $ 4 million, and its the only weapon that may intercept missiles that cost 1.5 up to 40 times less.
Even when taking the major Russian ballistic missiles like the Kh101, the Iskander and Kalibr the economics are better for the Russians between 4 and 1.5 ratio.
Moreover NATO has no weapon that can intercept the Iskanders which have had so far a 90% effectiveness. Good thing that Russia cannot mass produce them.
But here's the most interesting part: what you launch to intercept is not based on the cost of what's attacking you, but on the potential damage of not intercepting it.
If a 50k Shahed drone is on course to hit your command center or expensive aircraft you may still have to launch a Patriot to intercept it, you can't risk your high command being eliminated because the attacking weapon was cheap.
It was a bit of a mistake of the US not to use that stuff for Iran which the Ukrainians would have been delighted to supply.
ABMs are very slow to build, expensive, and doubtfully effective red herrings. PAC-3 manufacturing: regardless of having perfect, prioritized intellectual property sharing arrangements, it would still involve competing with limited quantities from monopoly critical suppliers and delay from deep levels of supply chain parts and assemblies vendors.
It would be better to catch SSM launchers on roads, rails, and inland waterways and dismantle the supply chain that produces/imports them and their parts with long range kinetic sanctions. (Kill the archer and arrow maker, not the arrows.)
Incidentally, someone in Russia may have believed they had a surplus of S-400's because it was using them as SSMs in nightly strikes on civilians rather than as SAMs and ABMs even though its last reported manufacturing capacity was only 40 units/month.
SAM - Surface-to-Air Missile
SSM - Surface-to-Surface Missile
ABM - Anti-Ballistic Missile (Anti-SSM)
Either Zelenskyy is the wartime boss and has the authority to make decisions after some input or not, but he needs to make the final say and not be second-guessed constantly. Rule by committee at the very top doesn't scale, and it doesn't scale in wartime especially. People are free to have and express opinions though, even if they maybe projecting anger from other matters towards something trivial (bikeshedding).