The document exchange site isn't hosted by each individual company, that would obviously be ridiculous. There's only one and it's hosted by the government. I already said that in my previous comment but you chose to attack a straw man instead.
Ran an LE request desk for a while and the whole thing was PDFs from .gov-ish email addresses. Only real control we had was calling the agency back on a number we looked up ourselves, not the one on the letterhead.
I would sincerely hope .gov addresses use SPF/DKIM/DMARC. That makes spoofing impossible. In Revolut's case, the sender's email system had been compromised.
Is it uncommon/impossible to ask for the federally-brokered in-person procedure in the US?
(The way I know it: Local court or police officer shows up at our office later that day and hands over a printout matching the request that we had been unable to confirm, on request of federal authority, in turn on request of the authority demanding we hand over some customers data. Those two requests utilizing government agency-internal auth mechanisms we do not need to know or care about.)
You'd still want to verify that with the court or authority? I've been served before and sometimes it's just a person in street clothes who hands you an envelope. And even if it's a court bailiff or officer or something like that, would you be able to distinguish a real uniform, ID and badge from a fake one?
The uniformed woman with the pistol is whatever the stitching on the chest pocket say she is. Is that not true just the same even in places where other people may routinely open-carry?
I was thinking about exactly that and then I found this comment.
One spoofs an email domain and then is able to get trust from a "modern global fintech"? Absolutely ridiculous. Having worked for several global scale tech companies, I've seen first hand how security is at the absolutely bottom of the list. It does not translate to $$$ so it is uncared for.
Revolut keeps pestering me with requests for interviews and I keep running away from it. One more con (pun intended) to the list.
In the countries you are licensed in you are legally required to reply to law enforcement requests. In most places there is no official channel for this. It is literally stuff like LE@Fintech.com. Emails come from all over and random domains that appear official-ish. Most official domains do not have DKIM or SPIF setup, very easy to spoof. LE by and large do not take security seriously, they do not take data transfer seriously.
Most requests are digitally signed PDFs that come via email, require a response sent to another email.
But that's the thing, they have the money to have people chasing down the official channels of whatever email that comes from to confirm their authenticity.
Cybersecurity 101: Call back the bank at the official number and all that yada yada.
Breach yes, but if they cannot 100% sure identify if your data was given out falsily, then they cannot say. They're not allowed to disclose that they provide your information to LE. So they can only inform you directly if they're 100% sure the specific information request response was sent to false entity. This is very hard to do.
This was a targeted attack towards specific individuals, probably carried out by a state actor or someone after data of very valuable individuals. Unless you're one of those (oligarch, etc), you're probably fine.
How can this happen to a modern fintech... Esp. handling identity verification so poorly?
> A Revolut spokesperson confirmed to TechCrunch that a “limited” number of customers were impacted and said the company had contacted those customers directly. Revolut, however, did not disclose the exact number of impacted individuals. It also did not answer whether the incident was limited to a specific market and declined to disclose the government agency involved.
Is the lack of transparency here about protecting the doxxed HNWIs or are they just trying to hide the incompetence?
This can happen with modern fintech because of greed. There's a reason they can offer such cheap services. The customer takes a risk in return. Now that risk has materialized.
You could argue that the government agency is at fault. 1 for their breach, 2 more importantly: for mandating that personal information get handed over without an official court order which would have involved a far more stringent process with multiple parties involved.
I've processed government requests at a FinTech before. Some are pretty good and there are bespoke channels for them so that you can be sure their genuine. Other are literally random emails you get that you are required to reply to, many of them demanding information to be sent in the clear. We always declined to reply to those even though we legally had to, we offered them to set up PGP if they wanted the data via email, or we offered other secure mechanisms for them. Most of these (who I know were from real agencies) stopped asking for the data once we stood firm that we could only deliver it over an encrypted channel.
Note: This is now 5+ years ago so things have probably changed since then.
I am not surprised at all that fake requests receive real responses, happens probably way more than anyone thinks.
For a while, Comcast/XFinity required the FBI to show up at their offices and present their badge. No emails. But I'm guessing that's changed. At the very least, it's also possible to forge a badge.
Revolut has a history of being both halfarsed and shady
in 2018 they turned off basic money laundering detection
in 2019 they used job applicants as free labour to get people to sign up.
in 2023 they didn't freeze accounts they were supposed to when asked by the NCA (the uk's equivalent of the FBI, kinda)
again in 2024 they came bottom in the league table for reported fraud(action fraud). They had 10k reports, ahead of barclays, which at the time had a much large amount of active users.
Again in 2024, they also had the highest push payment fraud reports. now, this _could_ be bad controls, user incompetence, or data leak. it could be argued that they were part of the reason for the rule changes, meaning that banks are now 50/50 liable for this kind of fraud.
Either way, they have a history of being shady/incompetent/bastards. They've also only been a fully licensed bank for ~6 months.
My speculative mental model so far was was: They fired the dept which was handling those "emails" and did let some agents handle it. Which backfired and seems to fit that history you presented.
Only one of them is directly harmful to users (the job applicant scheme). Everything else is enabling their own users to break the law only if they want to, and I think that is a good public service.
Of course it might hurt legit users by making other banks treat Revolut as suspicious but im not sure if thats enough to outweigh the positive. Data breaches and cancelation fees, on the other hand...
It’s a modern fintech that’s most likely to be vulnerable. Banks tend to have a long history (either themselves or with the infrastructure they buy) of security, from physical to electronic. It’s what makes them often so clunky…there’s little incentive to streamline too much, and their insurance providers are reluctant to insure anything excitingly new.
Hell, banking is so conservative that their language is frozen in 14th century Italian from when banks were personally owned by rich families: the words “debit” (“give”) and “credit” (“take”) are from the bank owner’s perspective, not the customers’. But you tend not to see the kinds of breaches you see in modern fintech.
Here is one of the replies I got during my conversation with their agent (unsure if human or automated):
"Your personal data must be held until it is permissible to erase it in accordance with the law. Rest assured, it is totally secure and only held for this purpose."
This was in the same conversation where I sent them the article.
> "I have checked our records and can confirm that you have not received any notifications or communications regarding any security incidents or data breaches in the past 30 days.
> We take your privacy extremely seriously. All data transmissions between our mobile apps, servers, and third parties are fully encrypted, and your personal information is stored in secure data centres with restricted access. If there is ever any security incident that impacts your account, we will always contact you directly with instructions.
> Are you asking because you recently received a suspicious email, text message, or noticed an unusual transaction on your account? Let me know, and we can investigate that together."
At the end of the day, a government request for private, sensitive information is ultimately a form of a backdoor, and there is no such thing as a backdoor only the good guys can use.
The funny thing about Revolut is, that they send you from the same "no-reply" address your payment receipts and a ton of spam. There is no link in the spam do stop it and no obvious scheme in the header which would allow to filter the spam from the relevant mails. Good luck recognizing this breach notification as an important one...
If an email was authenticated with DKIM, you cannot really blame Revolut. The attacker would have had to compromise the government email server, making it the government's fault.
However, if the email relied solely on SPF, the situation is less clear. An attacker could potentially spoof SPF by compromising any service on a server sharing the same public IP address via NAT.
This is a reminder about what happens to people happily uploading their passport and selfies into the app. Do not do it if you do not want to end up in a Russian underground forums.
What else are you supposed to do? All bank require BYC and will ask you to control your identity. We shouldn’t blame customers for the fintech company mistakes
Not necesary, it might be an internal system. And no selfie. For example, in Russia it probably would be illegal to send personal and biometric data abroad. But of course in the West the rules might be different and it is ok to send citizens' data to shady foreign companies.
Also I am surprised people do not see the different between isolated internal "old school" systems built on owned servers located at the bank property and modern vibe-coded microservices in kubernetes in a rented cloud with the widest attack surface possible.
Yes, but it might go to an internal system, and internal bank systems are protected relatively well compared to mobile apps. And you don't have to do a selfie.
Storing identification data (like a scanned passport) is not necessary. The question is “did you check the customer identity?” And if the answer is Yes, then you can mark it as such. You don’t need to store these scans at all.
Actually you do have to store those, as proof (but MUST be destroyed after 10 years). This is very typical in AML (Anti Money Laundering) laws.
Good thing there's, at least EU wide, EUDI (EU Digital Identity Wallet) around the corner which legally allows using cryptographic proofs instead of just storing as much data as possible of the user.
This addresses exactly this issue of having to disclose this amount of information solely as proof.
I had an interesting experience with my Revolut card. I only top it up when traveling, and the rest of the time it sits nearly empty, with like $3-4. At some point I started getting occasional notifications about transactions declining. Stuff like video game points and random little online shops. Clearly my card's been skimmed or otherwise leaked somehow. Bummer.
Since Im months away from my next trip I didnt immediately cancel the card and just left it on out of curiosity. I started blocking every attempted merchant. At some point, I started getting Netflix subscription attempts, and when I tried to block it, it said "We can't block payments to Netflix. If you have a subscription with them, you can cancel it directly." Makes me wonder what kind of rube goldberg machine their backend runs on.
What kind of financial institution has a special deal with Netflix to prevent blocking their charges? Did Netflix threaten to block Revolut or something?
If a merchant gets a lot of charge backs from a specific card issuer or acquirer, they can block them specifically. A company at Netlifx's size could be doing this, but I've heard specific instances of it happening with grocery stores, gas stations and convenience stores.
It's very common for neobanks to have a high rates of fraud, but also lower negotiating leverage with merchants because they're not chase, Wells, etc.
So a specific arrangement with a specific merchant seems within the realm of normal to me.
My card issuer just gives me a credit when I want to chargeback. They're like, oh you don't want to deal with a real chargeback, just have your money back for free. I would've pressed it since I kinda wanted the company to regret ripping me off, but I already got my money back so it wasn't worth the extra effort.
That's how chargebacks often work. Then they ask the merchant for evidence the charge was legitimate. If convinced, they will retract that initial quick refund.
the great thing about Revolut is that a) you can create multiple free virtual cards (with numbers different than the physical card) b) you can attach spending limits on each c) you never use the physical card details online d) you can cancel a card as soon as you notice a suspicious transaction which you have not done yourself - for this you can even use the virtual disposable card number. If a subscription was authorised previously on a card, you should have the track record from the transaction history, too.
I lost access to my Revolut account a while back and recovery did not work after losing access to my primary email address and MFA. They also removed the ability to deposit checks on their mobile app. For these reasons I can not treat it like a real bank anymore as much as I love their 4% APY savings account rate. Unlike gmail, which had recovery options with a secondary email address. They could have implemented something similar.
Here in Latvia, anything the government ever sends you of any importance is cryptographicaly signed. Not bulletproof, but that should be a baseline we demand in this age.
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[ 7.6 ms ] story [ 292 ms ] threadWhy do they even keep those?
(The way I know it: Local court or police officer shows up at our office later that day and hands over a printout matching the request that we had been unable to confirm, on request of federal authority, in turn on request of the authority demanding we hand over some customers data. Those two requests utilizing government agency-internal auth mechanisms we do not need to know or care about.)
Most likely:
> and the whole thing was PDFs from .gov-ish email addresses
One spoofs an email domain and then is able to get trust from a "modern global fintech"? Absolutely ridiculous. Having worked for several global scale tech companies, I've seen first hand how security is at the absolutely bottom of the list. It does not translate to $$$ so it is uncared for.
Revolut keeps pestering me with requests for interviews and I keep running away from it. One more con (pun intended) to the list.
Most requests are digitally signed PDFs that come via email, require a response sent to another email.
Revolut are known to be a bit shady but in this case they're damned if they do and damned if they don't
Cybersecurity 101: Call back the bank at the official number and all that yada yada.
What you're referring to is that a bank does not require to tell you whether your account is going through specific checks (anti laundering and such).
> A Revolut spokesperson confirmed to TechCrunch that a “limited” number of customers were impacted and said the company had contacted those customers directly. Revolut, however, did not disclose the exact number of impacted individuals. It also did not answer whether the incident was limited to a specific market and declined to disclose the government agency involved.
Is the lack of transparency here about protecting the doxxed HNWIs or are they just trying to hide the incompetence?
Oh.. https://edition.cnn.com/2024/02/04/asia/deepfake-cfo-scam-ho...
Note: This is now 5+ years ago so things have probably changed since then.
I am not surprised at all that fake requests receive real responses, happens probably way more than anyone thinks.
in 2018 they turned off basic money laundering detection
in 2019 they used job applicants as free labour to get people to sign up.
in 2023 they didn't freeze accounts they were supposed to when asked by the NCA (the uk's equivalent of the FBI, kinda)
again in 2024 they came bottom in the league table for reported fraud(action fraud). They had 10k reports, ahead of barclays, which at the time had a much large amount of active users.
Again in 2024, they also had the highest push payment fraud reports. now, this _could_ be bad controls, user incompetence, or data leak. it could be argued that they were part of the reason for the rule changes, meaning that banks are now 50/50 liable for this kind of fraud.
Either way, they have a history of being shady/incompetent/bastards. They've also only been a fully licensed bank for ~6 months.
My speculative mental model so far was was: They fired the dept which was handling those "emails" and did let some agents handle it. Which backfired and seems to fit that history you presented.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wirecard_scandal
They had an EU license in Lithuania for years.
And they clearly figured that was easier than going through the UK where they had previously been licensed
but compare that to their competitors who got a license at the very start
Of course it might hurt legit users by making other banks treat Revolut as suspicious but im not sure if thats enough to outweigh the positive. Data breaches and cancelation fees, on the other hand...
You do understand what push fraud is right? One person lost ~£160k, a large chunk of it waiting for a human to answer.
also, its not like there aren't alternatives.
That's "legacy old bank stuff they will disrupt along all the regulations".
It’s a modern fintech that’s most likely to be vulnerable. Banks tend to have a long history (either themselves or with the infrastructure they buy) of security, from physical to electronic. It’s what makes them often so clunky…there’s little incentive to streamline too much, and their insurance providers are reluctant to insure anything excitingly new.
Hell, banking is so conservative that their language is frozen in 14th century Italian from when banks were personally owned by rich families: the words “debit” (“give”) and “credit” (“take”) are from the bank owner’s perspective, not the customers’. But you tend not to see the kinds of breaches you see in modern fintech.
But, you know, move fast and break things, right?
But yeah there is always a downside when moving fast, oops
"Your personal data must be held until it is permissible to erase it in accordance with the law. Rest assured, it is totally secure and only held for this purpose."
This was in the same conversation where I sent them the article.
> Hi, me affected by your breach?
Them:
> "I have checked our records and can confirm that you have not received any notifications or communications regarding any security incidents or data breaches in the past 30 days.
> We take your privacy extremely seriously. All data transmissions between our mobile apps, servers, and third parties are fully encrypted, and your personal information is stored in secure data centres with restricted access. If there is ever any security incident that impacts your account, we will always contact you directly with instructions.
> Are you asking because you recently received a suspicious email, text message, or noticed an unusual transaction on your account? Let me know, and we can investigate that together."
... bot stuffs.
However, if the email relied solely on SPF, the situation is less clear. An attacker could potentially spoof SPF by compromising any service on a server sharing the same public IP address via NAT.
Also I am surprised people do not see the different between isolated internal "old school" systems built on owned servers located at the bank property and modern vibe-coded microservices in kubernetes in a rented cloud with the widest attack surface possible.
Good thing there's, at least EU wide, EUDI (EU Digital Identity Wallet) around the corner which legally allows using cryptographic proofs instead of just storing as much data as possible of the user.
This addresses exactly this issue of having to disclose this amount of information solely as proof.
Since Im months away from my next trip I didnt immediately cancel the card and just left it on out of curiosity. I started blocking every attempted merchant. At some point, I started getting Netflix subscription attempts, and when I tried to block it, it said "We can't block payments to Netflix. If you have a subscription with them, you can cancel it directly." Makes me wonder what kind of rube goldberg machine their backend runs on.
It's very common for neobanks to have a high rates of fraud, but also lower negotiating leverage with merchants because they're not chase, Wells, etc.
So a specific arrangement with a specific merchant seems within the realm of normal to me.