6 comments

[ 2.8 ms ] story [ 21.1 ms ] thread
This article is either AI-authored slop, or handwritten by people too mired in slop to write normal prose anymore.

It’s painful to read, regardless of the topic’s impact.

This sounds very AI written and buries the lede, but my understanding is if you control the repo in a way that you can set the default branch state for a git repo and get a victim to install a plugin with the same git sha as that branch state you can RCE them?

Pretty bad for a package manager, but this seems like something I would unfortunately expect from a harness/agent.

It’s worse than that.

A user installs a completely safe plugin through a marketplace, the marketplace pins a vetted commit for the plugin, trusting it is safe and will stay safe. If the “safe” plugin’s repo is controlled by an attacker - he can now set the default branch to a malicious version and anyone who installs will get the malicious version, exactly what the SHA pinning exists to protect from.

It gets worse when you consider agents auto-upgrade plugins from marketplaces. The attacker can have a new version, also benign, and open a PR to change the pinned SHA in the marketplace to the new version. Once the marketplace owner approves - do the said rug-pull and now anybody who installed the plugin gets an auto-upgrade to the malicious version.