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(this is new, not any of the previous incidents)

"Investigation and response

Incident timeline:

9:50:23 a.m. The agent made the DNS tool call that received an external response.

10:02:11 a.m. The monitoring system raised a P0 alert.

10:05:06 a.m. A human reviewer acknowledged the alert.

12:34:30 p.m. The run was killed.

Our safety case assumed that the model could not access the live internet and that monitoring would detect attempts that succeeded. The incident exposed a gap in our controls over network restrictions. We therefore stopped the affected training run and have subsequently decided to pause all other training, evaluation, and inference with tool-use (defined broadly) for our most capable models until we have both validated that the gap is resolved and performed additional red-teaming of the system. When training restarts, we will begin a fresh run with additional alignment improvements, including more comprehensive misalignment interventions. We will not resume training this particular model, even though the existing reward signal already correctly penalized this behavior."