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It basically bans use of "automatic license plate readers" and "captured license plate data" by the Federal Government unless authorized by Congress or used for solely to "assess, bill, collect, audit, dispute, or enforce the payment of a toll".

In the case of use for tolling there are 4 pages of restrictions, disclosure, retention limits and deletion requirements, and security and accountability requirements.

Then a few pages on inadmissibility of evidence obtained in violation of this bill and various means of relief if this is violated.

Next is a section cutting off funding from various agencies to states and local governments unless they have a law or policy in effect against ALPRs at least as strong as this bill.

Finally a section that prohibits using Federal funds directly or indirectly to purchase ALPRs except for use in tolling.

The definition of ALPR seems a bit broad:

    (1) AUTOMATIC LICENSE PLATE READER.—The
  term ‘‘automatic license plate reader’’ means a sys-
  tem that—

        (A) uses cameras, sensors, software, data-
    bases, or a combination of technologies to cap-
    ture, record, analyze, and store vehicle license
    plate information;

        (B) identifies, locates, and tracks a vehicle
    through the license plate or other persistent vis-
    ual identifier of the vehicle; or

        (C) compares license plate numbers
    against databases to generate alerts and create
    records of vehicle activity.
Note that the coordinating conjunction for that list is "or". When an officer pulls a car over for speeding and manually enters the license plate into the squad car computer and that tells them the car is stolen that seems like it would count as using an automatic license plate reader, even if the plate was manually entered into the database from the hand written police report from the officer who responded to the call about a stolen car.

This bill defines "captured plate data" as

> any plate number, image, date, time, location, direction of travel, vehicle characteris- tics, confidence score, associated photographs or video, and any information derived from those records

and

> data produced by or derived from fixed cameras, mobile readers, police vehicles, trail- ers, drones, tolling infrastructure, parking sys- tems, private security networks, homeowners’ associations, commercial parking operators, and data brokers

This also seems a bit broad and likely to cover cases not intended.

The problem is that modern ALPR cameras are actually doing much more than just ALPR.

So, you can’t just band the ALPR part.

You also have to ban the pervasive panopticon 24x7x365 recording of all pedestrians and everything else that passes by those cameras, and then constantly feeding all that data into the LLMs to identify everything that has ever been recorded, everywhere.

Wonder about states switching to automated per-mile vehicle taxation.
What about reading (federally mandated, unencrypted) TPMS sensors
Can you elaborate?
I don’t mean to speak for him, but I believe what he’s saying is that if they can’t track us with flock cameras, they’ll just do it by reading our TPMS sensors as we drive down the street
Thats exactly right. Flock cameras allegedly listen for these sensors.
TPMS "Tire Pressure Monitoring System" is federally mandated (49 CFR § 571.138).

In many TPMS implementations, each tire has a sensor which broadcasts a short range signal to the ECU. Those signals include sensor identifiers (sent in the clear) so the ECU knows which tire is low.

Those signals can be picked up from 50m away. A set of 4 identifiers can be mapped to a specific car.