As an outsider this was fun to watch. Namely, the dozens of l33t haxors including so-called "professionals" who claimed they'd be able to solve this in a jiffy with their magic exploits, yet couldn't.
The only professional I saw making that claim was the CEO of trailofbits who is a former NSA TAO member and doesn’t have anything to prove by talking a big game.
It wasn’t that difficult of an exploit, to be honest. I myself am not the leetest of the leet but I was most of the way there, having been set back by the downtime and my time zone. It’s definitely a fiddly, tricky exploit as most memory exploits are but I think the initial alarm was justified.
While waiting for the server to come back up, it took me about 3 hours with LLM assistance to write a php2shell RCE for nginx and mediawiki on the same version of php as TFA.
The biggest win, as others have also observe, was the demonstration that there aren’t swarms of automated pwnbots out there that will insta-root your server.
Considering the amount of downtime, I think that flag got got pretty quickly.
> there aren’t swarms of automated pwnbots out there that will insta-root your server
There are, they just didn't have a working exploit. Anyone with a honeypot can tell you attempts were widespread going back to early last week, but it wasn't until Saturday that we started to see successes.
The OP shows that it was, in fact, solved in a jiffy (a few hours work done largely by an LLM) with a magic (generally applicable) exploit. Given that, I suspect the reputable security experts in the thread who claimed they could solve it were telling the truth.
To be fair, the person who created the challenge stated that is was a fairly standard setup, replicating something outside a lab, but in reality is was something completely different, and not anywhere near how PHP is usually used.
It used the development server in PHP, and did not even run requests with fpm or mod_php. Instead, it used the built in dev server of PHP, and just proxied requests from nginx to the php dev server.
Literally the first thing on top of the PHP docs about the dev server used here is this:
"Warning
This web server is designed to aid application development. It may also be useful for testing purposes or for application demonstrations that are run in controlled environments. It is not intended to be a full-featured web server. It should not be used on a public network."
That is not something people do, and it also explains why the site was down all the time, cause the dev server is super slow, as it's not meant for this in any way shape or form. A real setup would add a few zeros to the requests per second a server could handle.
So all in all, this was very pointless, as it was nothing like real php sites. A shame, cause a realistic setup woild be more interesting and relevant to answer the question of how hard is it really to gain RCE on a normal site.
Not GP, but both. Exploiting the bug requires you to hit the same worker with multiple requests, which gets a lot easier if the number of workers is 1.
> "It is not intended to be a full-featured web server. It should not be used on a public network."
Behind nginx or similar isn't exactly on a public network. I don't think I'd run it that way, but I could see someone else doing it if they read the docs a certain way.
Namely that the vulnerability was not that easy to exploit, meaning that the myriads of servers that stayed unpatched during those initial days are probably not all members of botnets now. (Contrary to what the discourse might have made it seem like.)
I would take the opposite conclusion: the initial exploiting took _only_ 19 hours due the non-standard setup, but now the setup can be trivially exploited by tuning the PoC. By now, bad actors will probably have tools that can exploit most common setups.
It took 2-3 hours, not 19. The first version was a static index.HTML file and was not exploitable. People found out and contacted the challenge author. After the fix was public it has been exploited in a couple of hours.
I was sick when the news about php2shell broke, so ended up leaving two of my personal sites that use php un-patched for about 48 hours until my fever broke and I patched them. I didn’t get hacked. Was I just lucky? Probably.
Another theory is your server got compromised but they cleared their tracks. Not every hacker wants to make a quick few cents from a miner that gets shut down in a day or two.
Where do you get the two hours from? Did this attacker spend two hours on it, after 17 hours of others failing to break in?
> The fact that people are still in denial over this is crazy.
Maybe you misunderstand what I say.
Imagine the tens of millions of personal or small business websites running php. What's your guess, what portion of the unpatched ones is already pwned? Is it 1%? 5%? 15%? 50%? 95%?
A bunch of folks tried to say the challenge was dubious at best and that the vulnerability was a legitimate concern, and were told by commenters here that they were fearmongering or shills.
Evidence has shown they were pretty spot on about the first part (the test originally served static html, the php code wasn’t actually as vanilla as described, and the bitcoin key wasn’t actually there).
I’d have hoped this kind of clear vindication on the first point might have caused folks to revisit their stance on whether to trust the expert stance on the second. But maybe I’ve been overly optimistic.
It’s been going on for far longer, people want to believe all OpenAI and Anthropic are doing is pure marketing. When the first Fable results were released, everybody was skeptical (which is rational), but with every third party confirmation of the capabilities they doubled down that this must be even more marketing instead of admitting that they were wrong. To the point that they are no longer skeptical but in pure denial about what is happening.
I suspect so, and just a general blowback effect where if what people perceived to be the message is even slightly more dramatic than the reality then there's tendency for many to overshoot reality in the other direction.
I mean what is the world coming to when security researchers cannot release a writeup that is designed to look like slop, and starts with a bunch of cartoons with lame cyberpunk and matrix references, without being ridiculed for taking the piss ...
Not long ago the opposite would be true and hackers would be ridiculed by their community for being too sterile and corporate, and everyone else would be ridiculed for over-indexing on playful presentation as opposed to the meat of the technical issue.
1. First I hear about it is a heads-up at 5:00 am 21st.
2. Available info then is pretty much, "omg, it's the end of the internet".
3. There are no specifics available on exploitable configurations.
4. Updates are not expected to be available for at least two more hours, so people start deciding to do the Madagascar "shut down everything" meme.
5. Cloudflare says they're seeing exploits in the wild, well, that's not great.
6. I shut down everything, including a national brand, because wtf else am I supposed to do at this point?
7. Updates become available at 0645. Fortunately, I don't run my entire infra on Docker, so I'm immediately deploying the updates to all configurations and bringing sites back online approximately in order of traffic volume.
8. Still no specifics on the exploit.
9. A million vibe-coded PoCs appear on GitHub ... and none of them work.
10. It's late morning local time on the 21st and I'm still bringing things back online, having taken the day off from my regular job.
11. Conversation starts to shift towards, "...oh, did we over-react? How exploitable is this exactly?"
12. Still no specifics available.
13. Somebody on the internet gets as fed up as I am with the whole chaos vortex of idiocy and stands up a site saying, "okay, here's some money if you can exploit it."
14. Hours pass.
15. Still no specifics available.
16. Zeitgeist becomes, "I guess it's not exploitable after all."
17. The test site gets 'sploited.
18. Finally somebody actually posts the damn specifics -- namely, the person that grabbed the $2k.
19. Late morning local time on the 26th, and the conversation becomes, "well, obviously this was exploitable!" <-- we are here
Coincidentally, I just started reading Crisis Engineering, which seems like an excellent and applicable book, but I'm not sure who to beat with it.
It’s worth noting that while folks were getting busy with 11 and 13, plenty of experts in the field were saying ~“yes, we do have viable exploits here, but we’re not sharing them at this time. This is a big deal.” And that the person who spun up 13 spun up a static html page at first and also misrepresented how vanilla the stack was.
We could have skipped from 7 to 19 if folks had just taken seriously the guidance from experts in the field.
many common nginx setups and hardening suggestions would make it very difficult to exploit. as well as any sort of distributed architecture that doesn't pin requests.
there could be other undiscovered paths to exploit this vulnerability though. the PoC here uses the disclosed path for exploiting on patch day, minus mod_php.
I actually had GLM 5.3 run against the site on the day, but it was around 2 am and I was pretty sleepy by 3. GLM found the memory overflow vulnerability but I stopped it before it could continue into retrieving something useful from it.
In retrospect, I should have just given it a /goal and let it run overnight.
I used Kimi K3.1 Pro to figure it out as soon as cloudlandsdev put php-version.php live. The exploit worked just like this in a local Docker lab. But the terms page of the contest prohibited "resource exhaustion," so it stopped there. Showing Kimi the PoC, it says:
"The winning chain deliberately used per-request memory exhaustion, which appears to violate the literal no-resource-exhaustion rule, although the organizer accepted the win."
63 comments
[ 0.30 ms ] story [ 10.4 ms ] threadIt wasn’t that difficult of an exploit, to be honest. I myself am not the leetest of the leet but I was most of the way there, having been set back by the downtime and my time zone. It’s definitely a fiddly, tricky exploit as most memory exploits are but I think the initial alarm was justified.
While waiting for the server to come back up, it took me about 3 hours with LLM assistance to write a php2shell RCE for nginx and mediawiki on the same version of php as TFA.
The biggest win, as others have also observe, was the demonstration that there aren’t swarms of automated pwnbots out there that will insta-root your server.
Considering the amount of downtime, I think that flag got got pretty quickly.
Ok but a mediawiki page is obviously not comparable
People were complaining that originally it was just using php to serve a static index.html file
It looks like after 18-19hours they updated it to serve a real .php file and it was hacked less than 2 hours after that
The attack is against the underlying php install, and is application-agnostic, I was merely duplicating the trailofbits POC.
There are, they just didn't have a working exploit. Anyone with a honeypot can tell you attempts were widespread going back to early last week, but it wasn't until Saturday that we started to see successes.
It used the development server in PHP, and did not even run requests with fpm or mod_php. Instead, it used the built in dev server of PHP, and just proxied requests from nginx to the php dev server.
Literally the first thing on top of the PHP docs about the dev server used here is this: "Warning This web server is designed to aid application development. It may also be useful for testing purposes or for application demonstrations that are run in controlled environments. It is not intended to be a full-featured web server. It should not be used on a public network."
That is not something people do, and it also explains why the site was down all the time, cause the dev server is super slow, as it's not meant for this in any way shape or form. A real setup would add a few zeros to the requests per second a server could handle.
So all in all, this was very pointless, as it was nothing like real php sites. A shame, cause a realistic setup woild be more interesting and relevant to answer the question of how hard is it really to gain RCE on a normal site.
At first glance, this wouldn't affect demonstration of the vuln.
Nitter mirror: https://nitter.netbub.com/LiveOverflow/status/21144120728052...
I'm skeptical of the value of such setups, unless it's clear it's an out of the box setup, and we already know those are totally broken.
I don't understand who these people think they are really fooling. Is this some AI denial?
Behind nginx or similar isn't exactly on a public network. I don't think I'd run it that way, but I could see someone else doing it if they read the docs a certain way.
Apparently the wallet key wasn't on the server, like some in the original thread suspected, but perhaps not due to maliciousness after all.
Namely that the vulnerability was not that easy to exploit, meaning that the myriads of servers that stayed unpatched during those initial days are probably not all members of botnets now. (Contrary to what the discourse might have made it seem like.)
The fact that people are still in denial over this is crazy.
> The fact that people are still in denial over this is crazy.
Maybe you misunderstand what I say.
Imagine the tens of millions of personal or small business websites running php. What's your guess, what portion of the unpatched ones is already pwned? Is it 1%? 5%? 15%? 50%? 95%?
What would you guess?
https://x.com/LiveOverflow/status/2114412072805208237
I don't understand why people in this thread are hating on me.
Apparently the challenge was dubious so I’m not sure what to draw from it in the end.
Evidence has shown they were pretty spot on about the first part (the test originally served static html, the php code wasn’t actually as vanilla as described, and the bitcoin key wasn’t actually there).
I’d have hoped this kind of clear vindication on the first point might have caused folks to revisit their stance on whether to trust the expert stance on the second. But maybe I’ve been overly optimistic.
https://calif.io/php2shell/#patch-the-planet
I mean what is the world coming to when security researchers cannot release a writeup that is designed to look like slop, and starts with a bunch of cartoons with lame cyberpunk and matrix references, without being ridiculed for taking the piss ...
1. First I hear about it is a heads-up at 5:00 am 21st.
2. Available info then is pretty much, "omg, it's the end of the internet".
3. There are no specifics available on exploitable configurations.
4. Updates are not expected to be available for at least two more hours, so people start deciding to do the Madagascar "shut down everything" meme.
5. Cloudflare says they're seeing exploits in the wild, well, that's not great.
6. I shut down everything, including a national brand, because wtf else am I supposed to do at this point?
7. Updates become available at 0645. Fortunately, I don't run my entire infra on Docker, so I'm immediately deploying the updates to all configurations and bringing sites back online approximately in order of traffic volume.
8. Still no specifics on the exploit.
9. A million vibe-coded PoCs appear on GitHub ... and none of them work.
10. It's late morning local time on the 21st and I'm still bringing things back online, having taken the day off from my regular job.
11. Conversation starts to shift towards, "...oh, did we over-react? How exploitable is this exactly?"
12. Still no specifics available.
13. Somebody on the internet gets as fed up as I am with the whole chaos vortex of idiocy and stands up a site saying, "okay, here's some money if you can exploit it."
14. Hours pass.
15. Still no specifics available.
16. Zeitgeist becomes, "I guess it's not exploitable after all."
17. The test site gets 'sploited.
18. Finally somebody actually posts the damn specifics -- namely, the person that grabbed the $2k.
19. Late morning local time on the 26th, and the conversation becomes, "well, obviously this was exploitable!" <-- we are here
Coincidentally, I just started reading Crisis Engineering, which seems like an excellent and applicable book, but I'm not sure who to beat with it.
We could have skipped from 7 to 19 if folks had just taken seriously the guidance from experts in the field.
many common nginx setups and hardening suggestions would make it very difficult to exploit. as well as any sort of distributed architecture that doesn't pin requests.
there could be other undiscovered paths to exploit this vulnerability though. the PoC here uses the disclosed path for exploiting on patch day, minus mod_php.
In retrospect, I should have just given it a /goal and let it run overnight.
"The winning chain deliberately used per-request memory exhaustion, which appears to violate the literal no-resource-exhaustion rule, although the organizer accepted the win."
echo 'PID: ' . getmypid();