This website does such a colossal disservice for what is apparently an actual IETF draft that it should just be taken down. Don't do this. AI slop landing pages entirely mask credibility.
Plus, Microsoft never actually supported it: despite KB articles outlining "this is how you trust remote ARC signers for your O365 tenant", enabling these options did literally nothing: inbound mail would continue to be Forefront-disappeared with the exact same (excessive-yet-meaningless) headers as before.
Up to this day, there is no documented/supported way to configure an O365 tenant to "always accept all messages from this sender", despite customer demand.
So, yeah, another mark in the "unchallenged anti-competitive behavior" column against MSFT. Maybe the recent "O364" outage will give rise to a victims' movement, but, yeah, I sort-of doubt it.
Great yet another pile of moving parts mantainence burden that everyone except the megacorp will be held to. And who's implementations will in no way assure acceptance by the said walled gardens. DKIM is the worst of them since it requires signing which means some active running piece of software and not just some DNS records.
It really feels like all this is proof-of-system-administrator-work more than anything else.
And, despite claims to the contrary, DKIM2 isn't widely supported yet, and it's as-of-now unclear if it ever will be. But, with SEO-stuffing-LLM-muppets like https://stalw.art/blog/dkim2-dmarcbis/ poisoning the well, it's becoming very hard to tell which is which.
Spoiler: DMARCbis is even less "there" than DKIM2.
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[ 0.23 ms ] story [ 10.3 ms ] threadPlus, Microsoft never actually supported it: despite KB articles outlining "this is how you trust remote ARC signers for your O365 tenant", enabling these options did literally nothing: inbound mail would continue to be Forefront-disappeared with the exact same (excessive-yet-meaningless) headers as before.
Up to this day, there is no documented/supported way to configure an O365 tenant to "always accept all messages from this sender", despite customer demand.
So, yeah, another mark in the "unchallenged anti-competitive behavior" column against MSFT. Maybe the recent "O364" outage will give rise to a victims' movement, but, yeah, I sort-of doubt it.
It really feels like all this is proof-of-system-administrator-work more than anything else.
No, it really isn't. Besides breaking forwarding, it's sort-of OK, and steps are being taken to address the remaining painpoint(s).
If you want email to survive, enthusiastically embracing DKIM and SPF, and grudgingly accepting DMARC are the only options...
And, despite claims to the contrary, DKIM2 isn't widely supported yet, and it's as-of-now unclear if it ever will be. But, with SEO-stuffing-LLM-muppets like https://stalw.art/blog/dkim2-dmarcbis/ poisoning the well, it's becoming very hard to tell which is which.
Spoiler: DMARCbis is even less "there" than DKIM2.
[0]: https://www.ietf.org/archive/id/draft-thain-ipv8-00.html