In a way, things like this are a part of the whole bloody point that opponents of the NSA have been making: if you put that much surveillance power into the hands of a relatively small number of humans, then they will abuse it. These sort of incidents reveal through their pettiness some of the ways in which massive surveillance invites abuse.
> And I'm no apologist for the NSA, I just think intellectual honesty is good for our side of the argument.
Pretty much. Every fanciful tale we tell ourselves is another story that can be spun as reinforcement for why we're dismissable.
I tell myself that this kind of tactical thinking isn't the right way to motivate people to actually care about truth, but at this point, I've completely lost faith that hackers are capable of caring about the truth.
NSA said in a statement Friday that there have been "very rare" instances of willful violations of any kind in the past decade, and none have violated key surveillance laws.
So there have been willful violations, but they didn't violate key surveillance laws? How does that work?
Same way a cop who murder's someone in the line of duty doesn't mean the department murdered someone. That part makes sense.
The question(as with cops), is what happened to the people who did violate the rules? It's unlikely they were fired or prosecuted, hopefully they were demoted and lost access to the system.
NSA is loath to fire people(and likely revoke their clearance if it's for cause) with serious classified knowledge since getting a comparable paying job with a revoked clearance and a large gap on your resume would be very hard. The worry is they would simply sell knowledge to a foreign government.
> Most of the incidents, officials said, were self-reported. Such admissions can arise, for example, when an employee takes a polygraph tests as part of a renewal of a security clearance
So of the vague number of reported violations that the NSA will admit to, most of them are found through confessions...and some of these apparently come from the kind of NSA employee who can't fool a polygraph test.
There are so many comical things about this that it's almost hard to be indignant
1. Last week the government's story was that the system had never been abused.
2. The government is most certainly lying about the extent of abuse they know about.
3. The government only knows about instances of abuse that were ordered by superiors or were uncovered during polygraph examinations. There is likely a mountain of abuse they don't even know about.
4. Actual abuse of the system does not have to take place. Any random stranger you meet could work at the NSA or have connections to them. You cannot assume that your communications are private and won't be used against you or sold to someone who will use them against you. Chilling effect.
5. If you're not an American or you associate with someone who is not American or you associate with someone who associates with someone who is not American or if you're an American that lives outside of the United States, the NSA doesn't consider anything to be off limits.
So if an NSA agent is using their access to peek at naked French chicks through their webcams, the government wouldn't consider that abuse.
6. At this point, it's obvious that they capture and store everything forever. So there are limitless opportunities for abuse in the future. Someday someone will be nominated to the supreme court and transcripts of the porn they watched in college will be used against them in senate confirmation hearings.
What are the odds that NSA officers sometimes engage in insider trading?
>Most of the incidents, officials said, were self-reported. Such admissions can arise, for example, when an employee takes a polygraph tests as part of a renewal of a security clearance.
So the only way we catch them is when they admit it. Great.
Seems like this narrative hasn't been explored and could have legs. I'm not holding my breath, but I'd like to see a solid media piece that hammered this idea home for the American-folk.
If anyone wants to discourage bright hackers from working at the NSA, make it creepy to their potential love interests: publish stories at popular sites with titles like, "Is your NSA girlfriend/boyfriend reading your Facebook messages?"
I was going to ask why these agencies even use polygraphs but found an answer on wikipedia: "According to a report to Congress, polygraphy in the security clearance context has little utility in detecting untruth, but significant utility in inducing verbal admissions. That is, polygraphy is mainly useful as a prop in the interrogation process. Further, this likely accounts for its continuing use by government agencies." Sounds real reliable.
It's totally just a prop they use as an interrogation trick, much like the fake phone in Stasi detention centers that the interrogator would pretend to receive timely intel on whoever they were interrogating, or use it to make pretend calls to HQ to go pick up the person's family for questioning if they didn't like the answers. Cops to this day use a lot of those tricks, like the file folder they come into your cell with that's full of scrap paper they claim is 'all the evidence against you, so you better start talking'.
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[ 3.4 ms ] story [ 59.1 ms ] threadAnd I'm no apologist for the NSA, I just think intellectual honesty is good for our side of the argument.
Pretty much. Every fanciful tale we tell ourselves is another story that can be spun as reinforcement for why we're dismissable.
I tell myself that this kind of tactical thinking isn't the right way to motivate people to actually care about truth, but at this point, I've completely lost faith that hackers are capable of caring about the truth.
So there have been willful violations, but they didn't violate key surveillance laws? How does that work?
The question(as with cops), is what happened to the people who did violate the rules? It's unlikely they were fired or prosecuted, hopefully they were demoted and lost access to the system.
NSA is loath to fire people(and likely revoke their clearance if it's for cause) with serious classified knowledge since getting a comparable paying job with a revoked clearance and a large gap on your resume would be very hard. The worry is they would simply sell knowledge to a foreign government.
This is the beauty of phrases like "in the interests of national security".
So of the vague number of reported violations that the NSA will admit to, most of them are found through confessions...and some of these apparently come from the kind of NSA employee who can't fool a polygraph test.
There are so many comical things about this that it's almost hard to be indignant
Btw, "spying on love interest", pardon my English, isn't it just a PC expression for "stalking"?
2. The government is most certainly lying about the extent of abuse they know about.
3. The government only knows about instances of abuse that were ordered by superiors or were uncovered during polygraph examinations. There is likely a mountain of abuse they don't even know about.
4. Actual abuse of the system does not have to take place. Any random stranger you meet could work at the NSA or have connections to them. You cannot assume that your communications are private and won't be used against you or sold to someone who will use them against you. Chilling effect.
5. If you're not an American or you associate with someone who is not American or you associate with someone who associates with someone who is not American or if you're an American that lives outside of the United States, the NSA doesn't consider anything to be off limits.
So if an NSA agent is using their access to peek at naked French chicks through their webcams, the government wouldn't consider that abuse.
6. At this point, it's obvious that they capture and store everything forever. So there are limitless opportunities for abuse in the future. Someday someone will be nominated to the supreme court and transcripts of the porn they watched in college will be used against them in senate confirmation hearings.
>Most of the incidents, officials said, were self-reported. Such admissions can arise, for example, when an employee takes a polygraph tests as part of a renewal of a security clearance.
So the only way we catch them is when they admit it. Great.
Interestingly, this is very illegal for private companies to do under EEPA. Why should government employers get an exception?
It sounds like a load of hork, especially considering the sliding slope of truth they have been pushing lately.
Penn & Teller Bullshit did a good episode on lie detecting pseudoscience: http://youtu.be/8NLf7XwLpyQ