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This is not necessarily true for social apps where number of active users are actually a feature. Your app itself might be great, but if you don't have active users, say good bye to ever growing big. This is also true on the contrary. If you happen to have started some service before others (Craigslist, dare I say Hacker News), even though the app itself might not be as good, because of the people you have on the site, it will win out against superior apps that have smaller number of people.
I think this is a little bit of a trap. Sure the number of people on the service are a feature and almost a meta-feature since it usually enables or multiplies the fun of other features. However the real value is number of active people on the service (which you did write). Those people were enchanted before I, as a new user, showed up. Therefore there is some orthogonal benchmark of quality or delight is required. These features I believe are what make someone get excited and share your app which then makes it amazingly social and draw in "the good people"
You have to look at it at a different level. Build something customers want is implicitly 'something they want more than the current options they have'. If the thing they don't have is clearly inferior, then no problem. This applies to completely new ideas.

When you have a site like Facebook or Craigslist which has very large network effects, to bust into that you have to produce something people want more than those. That is a very difficult - though not impossible - thing to achieve.

I agree with this firmly and have often doubted if it made me a naive "non-marketer". When discussing with marketers I would often point to the idea that our funnel was already resulting in so few long term customers, why would we spend money to pour more people into such a tiny funnel? I think a really good and "enchanting" (to steal from another front-page article) first impression is necessary particularly when demoing to end users due to the large amount of products they're being bombarded with on a daily basis.

So while I agree with your overall stance, I'm worried about the implied advice to wait until your product is good enough. Since the phrase by definition is difficult to assess otherwise everyone would succeed.

> All companies that grow really big do so in only one way: people recommend the product or service to other people.

This is a bad opening premise. Time Warner and Comcast are huge and they don't seem like word of mouth companies to me. Boeing is pretty huge and they don't sell anything directly to ordinary consumers. I would never run around marketing Pfizer products to my friends.

Take a scan down the Fortune 500 and "viral" growth companies are in the minority.

Even limiting yourself to tech companies, which I presume is all that the author was thinking of, the principle is no less general. Epic is a gargantuan EHR vendor and they grew via acquisition of other vendors, not word of mouth. Cisco did much of the same, and consider Oracle. The list goes on and on.

Right. I suspect the post is mostly valid to "consumer" type companies.
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He explicitly excludes monopolies, like TW and Comcast.
This comment needs to be stressed. Altman's article simply doesn't make it clear enough that he's excluding companies such as Time Warner.

Military contractors are a whole other issue, of course.

A more realistic title, "Here's One of Many Ways a Some Companies can Grow, or Not", probably wouldn't have made the front page.

This is a few paragraphs mentioning a fairly obvious point about growing companies, but trying too hard to seem groundbreaking.

You cannot become a monopoly without having a better product at one point, unless you are friends with a dictator.
Or you can take the route of Standard Oil: negotiate special rates with railroads (through rebates, a process later made illegal), force out your competition, and where that failed, literally blow them up.

Microsoft got itself lucky with an exclusive licensing arrangement then played that hand for all it was worth. Court documents largely from the Novell lawsuit (though there were numerous others) reveal just how cut-throat the company was.

In general, finding some initial advantage and leveraging it is what has tended to work. Government contract, sweetheart deal with an existing major player (Google's search deal with Yahoo early on, for example), patents, strategic lawsuits, FUD, and others.

Altman's premise really doesn't hold water.

Yes, this article seems to live within the silicon valley echo chamber.
On the contrary, it is absolutely correct. You forget these huge companies were once small upstarts. As upstarts, their growth was propelled by buyers recommending the product to other buyers. (You can substitute users for buyers here if it is an app). So his point is valid.

If you go back to the early days of Oracle for example, they were providing a highly flexible database and would do it on (mostly) any computer platform you had. The competition was databases that were glorified flat files on mainframes, and IBM dominated that market. It took a few to take the plunge, but the others followed.

Overall his point is very valid.

Agreed. All the companies @pak mentioned have matured past the rapid growth stage.
> You forget these huge companies were once small upstarts. As upstarts, their growth was propelled by buyers recommending the product to other buyers. (You can substitute users for buyers here if it is an app). So his point is valid.

That's pretty forced.

There are plenty of ways for companies to grow, and word-of-mouth is just one of them. For example, a company can grow by getting a military contract, thus being infused with cash and lots of credibility. You don't get a government contract because Sally told Jim at the DoD about how great you are.

Edit: I noticed many of the comments that share my sentiment are being downvoted. Why?

My experience with government contracts differs from that. Most of the contracts we get are because we have worked with the Contracting Officer previously and had done good work, or were introduced to them by a mutual contact. Of course that's just my experience, and one anecdote does not make good data.
Is that how enterprise sales work? I don't have any experience there but given how highly paid sales sharks seem to be inextricably linked to ES as opposed to social sharing buttons, I'd say no.

There is always more than one way to skin a cat.

Actually in the enterprise market Sam's point is even more true. The greater power of incumbents means that you can't get customers unless your product is better by a large margin.
Incumbents do have an advantage, but the other key in enterprise markets is that you have to recognize you're selling to executives who won't generally use your product, so you have to sell based on they perceive important, but deliver what the company actually needs. I have a lot of stories (those funny/ironic/sad ones) that I won't go into!
It is much, much easier to sell something that the buyer has already heard about from industry peers and generally sees the value of than to cold-call prospects and push products on them that they're indifferent to.

Companies can limp along for a few years with the latter strategy (I worked at one once), but they don't grow, and eventually they get sick of selling stuff that nobody wants to buy and close up shop. For the examples given (Cisco, Oracle), everybody who's in a purchasing position in the industries they serve has heard of them, and they go into a sales cycle "warm". The salesperson's job is to iron out the details and explain how to integrate the product into a customer's existing workflows to make them more efficient.

Reference customers are absolutely critical in the enterprise.
Another broken premise is his implication that in order to be "a great company", a company needs to be a "really big" company.
Cable absolutely became huge as a result of word of mouth. It's been a mature business for 25 years so you may not be old enough to remember, but when it started people were pretty excited about 50 clear channels instead of 2 staticky ones. They told their friends and invited them over to watch shows they otherwise couldn't get.

Boeing became huge in the 1920s and 30s. I imagine pilots talked to each other a lot about what planes they liked flying, and they could not have succeeded if those conversations didn't favor them.

I'm an almost 25-year veteran of the cable industry and I can tell you that Comcast and Time-Warner didn't grow huge via word-of-mouth. The benefits of cable service grew community systems by word-of-mouth, then Comcast and Time-Warner grew by acquiring and consolidating systems.

For example, Time Warner Cable Oceania now provides cable service to the entire Hawai'ian island chain, but they had just bought out the last two systems (by island) in 2002 when I visited. Where I live, Comcast acquired Adelphia, who had acquired AT&T, who had acquired TCI, who had acquired Telemedia.

The Robber-Barons of the 1920s consolidated steel, railroads and banking. Edison and Westinghouse (with Tesla's AC) consolidated small utility companies AND supplied most of the equipment.

I think acquisitions played a huge part in the growth of airplane companies too (McDonnell-Douglas was originally two companies) ... there are very few car companies now compared to the early part of the 1900s and most recently we've watched banks become huge through acquisitions.

Unfortunately, I think the premise of the article is completely wrong, but I wasted my time reading until the end and wondered how so little content could consume so many words. You grow big by knowing a market could be huge and then having the confidence to buy when the price is right (even if the indicators aren't in your favor at the moment).

Most of the companies you mention are not counterexamples, because they were already big when they started acquiring and merging with other companies.
At Wharton I interviewed the founder of Jerrold electronics.

Iirc (this was a long long time ago) his Philadelphia connection to Ralph Roberts (comcast) was how he built Jerrold (they made cable boxes).

Comcast of course grew large by starting and getting it's first cable franchise in a small town in Mississippi. Nobody chooses their cable company the cable company chooses you.

(I actually have an audio tape of that interview that I made.)

Big but I wouldn't say "huge" ... and they did tend to be bigger than the companies they were acquiring (Time-Warner was huge in other businesses before the acquisition spree really started). I mentioned "aggression" in your market as a requirement for becoming huge, but was it also something that led to them being big in the first place? I think there are people who act convincingly larger than they are, and the world grows to fit them.

There are a whole host of business requirements that can sink the process of becoming big. Adelphia failed because the Rigas family aggressively expanded the company, took it public but continued to treat it as though it was still family owned (I shouldn't say more). So the business acumen to run an enterprise at different sizes is important - I've seen leaders fail to hire appropriately, then delegate kill promising companies too. I think we could make a long list of reasons for failure.

larrys:

I'd love to hear your audio ... Jerrold was purchased by General Instruments who was in turn purchased by Motorola. Motorola added Jerrold's set-top boxes, to GI's trunk amplifier and line extenders (and other head-end equipment), then Motorola added both to their cable modem business and that conglomerate was ultimately bought by Google. Cisco purchased Scientific Atlanta who was the main competitor.

I will try to dig it up. Another person I interviewed was Ed Moldt who ended up years later being the head of the Wharton Entrepreneurial Center. At the time he was working on telemedicine a way that doctors could remotely diagnose patients by video.
Time Warner is Time magazine, Warner Bros, HBO and TBS. All having massive word of mouth spread.
"I imagine pilots talked to each other a lot about what planes they liked flying, and they could not have succeeded if those conversations didn't favor them."

With respect to Boeing one of the first things actually was a government contract that they received for the war effort. Then they nearly went bust after the war ended.

This is some of the story. There is also an excellent documentary on Boeing.

http://www.boeing.com/boeing/commercial/boeing_bio/chapter3....

I'm curious if there was actually (implicit) word of mouth between businesses. I don't think of Cisco being good because of their marketing, I think of Cisco because I see their successes within other companies.
I think many of your examples are wrong.

Time magazine, Warner Bros, TBS and HBO all benefitted immensely from excellent products and word of mouth.

Regarding Comcast, I know you're hung up on the use of "only" but being a government-issued monopoly probably makes it a less interesting example for this topic. Despite that, we would need to go back in Comcast's history to really understand how it grew.

Oracle and Cisco are terrible examples since they originally produced market-leading products and gained very strong word-of-mouth.

From a cursory reading of Epic history, it also sounds like a bad example for you since it relied heavily on reference customers.

Drugs obviously have huge word-of-mouth spread.

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One major exception: distribution. You can also grow big off the backs of other companies. In the tech world, this has become fairly common in the advertising space. Retargeting companies, for example, can grow quickly by signing up only a few large e-commerce sites.

It's worth noting that in this scenario you often don't see regular monthly growth. Instead you get huge spikes when new customers/partners are on-boarded.

This is a great article, but really only applies to a small subset of companies for whom organic growth is the only way to grow huge.

An abbreviated list of counterarguments:

Epic, CenturyLink, NBC, Waste Management, Honda, Vanguard.

Honda and Vanguard absolutely grew through word of mouth, and NBC probably did too but it was before I was born. I compare notes with friends when buying a car, and people are not shy about recommending Honda or Toyota. Very few of them recommend GM or Ford.

I also heard about Vanguard through word-of-mouth, where everybody gave the general advice that indexing funds are much more sane than other investing systems, and Vanguard was the leader in that space.

This doesn't really contradict your point, but I was more thinking about the arc from 'small to huge', not the arc from 'huge to ginormous' -- after all, how did Vanguard become the leader in the space? Honda competed on price and efficiency to secure government industrial contracts; for Vanguard's first five years its only investors were institutional[^1], where their success laid much more in being a (massively successful) niche fund that no other firm offered than having any household success.

Other commenters have argued that repeated success in an RFP environment comes from reputation (and thus word-of-mouth), but I think that's stretching too far from the original thrust of the article.

[^1] I read this in a book but Wikipedia says that its first index fund in 1976, was available to individual investors, so I'm not 100% on this.

Not true for marketing-oriented companies that grew huge by having a really good salesforce and managing to become the go-to name in slow, bureaucratic markets such as governments.
Good marketing and advertising can cover up a bad product. A prime example is GoDaddy.

When their product is not growing like it should, Silicon Valley startups always hire more engineers to add more features. Oftentimes, the product is good enough they just need put in more marketing efforts.

It almost feels like marketers and business dev people are second rate employees compare to engineers when their job is could be more important after the initial launch.

An alternate take, using your example: good marketing and advertising can make a bad product good. In GoDaddy's case, by reaching a segment of the market that is unaware of the options. For this segment, it's not GoDaddy vs. Namecheap; it's GoDaddy vs. not knowing how to put up a website.
Really? Plenty of sub-standard products do huge business despite higher quality competitors. Microsoft is only the most obvious example in the software world.
Looking at the comments here, most of them would be nullified if the article wasn't "the only way to grow huge", but instead "one way to grow huge". So far it's looking like this item will soon incur the controversy penalty. I enjoyed the post; simply making something good is the growth strategy that is most applicable to a random kid reading this, but it's not the only way.
The controversy penalty would be perfect for an article like this that features and builds off a linkbait title, which I now feel a little duped for reacting to.

But after finding out Sam Altman is a YC partner, and reading more about how the controversy penalty and other arbitrary penalties actually work, I don't really buy into anything scoring equitably on this site (https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6844169) in the long term...

This is grossly simplistic view of the world. Enterprise sales does not work this way at all. And no financial company/banker will recommend your super-duper product to anyone; in fact, some purchasing officers will ask you to NOT sell your product to their competition before they consider buying from you. In industrial supplies business, some factories require you to not sell their product to anyone one else in their target market region.
> in fact, some purchasing officers will ask you to NOT sell your product to their competition before they consider buying from you.

Which companies have become huge by doing that?

There's a lot to this that rings true. I think the core idea here is that growing slowly, with your customers, is how you get big.

In those early days of running a business, spending money on marketing is no way to guarantee new revenue. Word of mouth almost always is. Plus, it's a hell of a lot cheaper.

I agree with his initial premise that a good company - that offers a good product - first becomes well known through word of mouth. That is a given for any situation, hype will, whether false or not, bring people to your door steps; what you present to them afterwards is another story. But having them visit/try your product for the first time is essential.
Read this with interest earlier. Personally, I think the author is spot on.

We've been launching a new product quietly, building a simple landing page[1] that asks subscribers to tweet or share the page by email after they enter their business name/email. I thought I was wasting my time but didn't want to just leech away the engagement.

The very first business that signed up immediately brought others.

We hadn't even got a prototype yet, it's how we framed the problem and offered a solution that made it compelling enough to share. OK, it's important to make it easy to do so but if you're not compelling who'll bother?

I wish I'd done this the first time round. Of course not every business in every industry can do it with social media but the principle applies. Looking at some of my friends launching businesses in competitive sectors I immediately started wondering how they could do it and, if not, why they weren't already. I suppose it's good peripheral validation as well. If your product isn't enough to make people talk what can you do to make it so?

1: http://events.shiftdock.com

Note to Sam: It's possible to anticipate ways HN readers will misunderstand you, and tweak what you write to pre-empt them. It takes some practice, but I'd guess I'm now able to do it maybe 3/4 of the time.

In this case the most common misunderstanding seems to be not to realize that present day big companies were once small. You could have pre-empted that by reminding readers that once companies reach a certain size they don't have to rely on making something great to grow bigger, but that if you look back at the earliest history of those companies, you'll find most did.

I usually put these pre-emptive replies to probable misunderstandings in footnotes, because I don't want to clutter the text with things that are obvious.

Even Microsoft (presented as a possible counterexample) had a great relationship with developers in the early years that sustained its incredible growth.
Where would MS be today if not for the luck of Digital Research turning away IBM? Maybe wind up like Lotus or Ashton-Tate?
Now put it in an algorithm that detects any mention of "only, always, never" or any other absolute. Then insert a boilerplate at the top of such discussions, saying there are always exceptions, but the gist of the argument is still valid ;)
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I can't help but feel that if fuzzy logic was taught more widely in computer science courses, people would be more sanguine about "only, always, never" as linguistic qualifiers.

... not that I am without guilt on this ...

The funny thing is that I come from a physics degree background and hence have a tendency to stick with the more scientifically accurate "I think, maybe, probably, possibly, almost always", rather than going for absolutes. However, when you enter into the business world, you tend to find that this kind of language comes across as weak and uncertain. Even though you are merely trying to be correct and not give false impressions!

So now I actually appreciate more confident, strong language, because when I read a blog post or article like this, I can take the caveats as being there, but unsaid.

I sometimes think that if everyone took this assumption, Hacker News would decimate its comment count!

So, you got me to thinking.

As a side-effect of his work on expert forecasting[1], Tetlock discovered that people put more stock in those who made confident predictions than those who qualified their predictions. To the point that he basically says: if a person is a famous pundit, they are more likely to be wrong, because the media prefers bold predictions to maybes and perhapses.

In business you can be bold or not bold. If you're not bold, you are at a social disadvantage.

Then you can be right or wrong. If you are right, everyone hails you as a visionary. If you are wrong, nobody remembers.

So in fact, in business, the rational strategy for an individual is to speak confidently and let the dice fly high.

[1] I reviewed his book a while back. http://chester.id.au/2012/07/29/review-expert-political-judg...

Yes it's actually quite an awkward point for me at the moment. I have a side-project that I've been developing for a while. My attachment to it means that I know every single bug and flaw within the product. But at the same time I know that if I add caveats to any marketing (it's a bit alpha/beta, etc.), then it will come across as unconfident. On the other hand, if I just say it's amazing and will change your life, I'll probably (can't resist the language even now...), do far, far better.
I know how you feel. The way I deal with it is to find the claims I can confidently make and stick with those. A lot of the time you can do that by looking at the business value side of things.

For example, I can't truthfully say that my code is bug free or the best or whathaveyou. But I can say "My product improves <business problem>."

I guess the trick is to have two hats. The first hat is the problem domain hat. This is where you make confident, accurate claims about your product.

The second is the solution domain hat. This is where you park your professional anxieties about whether you've crossed and dotted everything.

That reminds me of a story I heard about doctors who are asked to determine the gender of a baby during a pregnancy scan. They will announce the gender to the parents verbally (It's a boy!), but put the other gender in their files. If you do end up having a boy, it doesn't go further. If you end up having a girl, and question the doctor, he/she points to the file and says "You must have misunderstood what I said".
People don't care much if pundits are right or wrong. Instead people care that pundits are clear (confident statements help with clarity).

Qualifiers are substituted by getting multiple opinions from different pundits.

I suppose I should have added that the confident pundits were usually wrong because they tended to make more extreme predictions. Most of the time, stuff doesn't change dramatically. Predicting big shifts all the time means that your overall hit rate is terrible, because big shifts are not the most common case.

Luckily there's an extreme predictor for every extreme event, so simple selection happily promotes some loudmouths to guru every now and then.

Edge cases seem to be where all the fun is, tho... =D
What I like about fuzzy logic is that it pushes a lot of paradoxes down a level. Instead of having paradoxes bubble up to the top level and derailing discussion, you instead turn fuzziness into an abstract object which is polymorphic to other logical objects.

This gives you the handles you need to grasp and wrestle with the vagueness of the actual world without either needing to give up rigour or rely on hacks and undocumented conventions about the mapping from the real world into the logical world.

If you've got the patience, I can give as an example a long review I wrote of Sidney Dekker's Drift into Failure, where in part I argued that his argument largely vanishes if reframed in terms of fuzzy logic: http://chester.id.au/2012/04/09/review-drift-into-failure/

Edit: Hmm, I really look like a spammer in this thread. Not intentional. No more than usual, anyhow.

For an example of this, look at the sibling comment by pak (made after yours) =)

https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=6844169

To which I say, what is the point of words like "only" and "all", if they do not mean what they are supposed to?

I'm not trying to be a stickler. Granted, I work mostly in science research, where broad claims are discouraged and quantifying confidence in a hypothesis is expected. Extraordinary claims require extraordinary evidence.

At best, I think this rule could apply to (maybe) 80% of "huge" tech companies. 80% is a disingenuously long distance from "all companies".

Because humans are not logical inference engines; language is flexible, nuanced and complex. A blog post is not a industry research paper.
I think one of the issues with short form writing where you don't take the time (or have the room) to qualify things is that you are going to open up what you write to multiple interpretations of (what you call) "misunderstanding".

Take this statement at the opening:

"All companies that grow really big do so in only one way: people recommend the product or service to other people."

The statement "all companies" and "only one way" is pretty complete and absolute by my reading.

When obviously there are plenty of large companies that have not relied on word of mouth. For example Boeing. Or Asplundh a large privately help tree contractor. Or haliburton. Etc. Even "in the beginning". Or Fedex is another.

Of course there is a subset of "all companies" for which this statement is true. So a footnote would have helped or a few words as qualifiers to the original thought.

> In this case the most common misunderstanding seems to be not to realize that present day big companies were once small. You could have pre-empted that by reminding readers that once companies reach a certain size they don't have to rely on making something great to grow bigger, but that if you look back at the earliest history of those companies, you'll find most did. (emphasis mine)

It's hard to call it a misunderstanding when the title of the post starts boldly with "The Only" and the first paragraph starts with "All companies". The premise of there being some universal rule for growth is absurd and requires only a few counterexamples, of which there are certainly many to consider (this page now contains dozens), to be demonstrably false.

By reinterpreting the author's argument with a requalification of most, you've already reached a much more sane argument. But you know as well as I do that this post would never frontpage if it had been called "The Best Way to Get Huge" or "The Way Most Companies Become Huge".

Edit: Or maybe it would have anyway? Sam Altman is a partner at YC [1] and I can't help but wonder if such content gets a boost to frontpage no matter what. After all, people have shown that penalties are applied to a hidden list of phrases and domains which boots them off the frontpage [2], so the same principle might be applied in reverse to certain things. For example, the controversy penalty might be removed for certain domains. I'm sorry, but after reading [2] my faith in the scoring system here is at an all-time low.

[1]: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sam_Altman

[2]: http://www.righto.com/2013/11/how-hacker-news-ranking-really...

With all due respect to Sam I have no idea what qualifies Sam to even be opining on this subject without a bit more of a circumspect attitude.

If he was a professor of business or had a long standing knowledge of business that would be one thing. The word "most" would certainly be better but even that goes a bit to far with a subject as large as "business" and "companies".

To be blunt, people who've done consistently well in the startup world run circles around "professors of business".
This is probably true at the averages, but at the topside of the scale for both populations, I wonder if it still applies.

Do the Peter Druckers and Clayton M Christensens of the world really not know more than the Steve Jobs and Bill Campbell types? I choose those names rather than Bill Gates or Larry Page because those guys have done multiple companies, which seems to be an important criteria for doing "consistently well". I find it difficult to believe that such prolific thinkers as Drucker or Christensen would get circles run around themselves.

For the bottom of both populations, I'd even venture to guess that the professors of business are more knowledgeable than the startup founders. Come on, you've met some pretty bad startup founders, and you know it. Although I suppose it also depends on how one defines the criteria because it's always easy to cull the population to suit one's conclusions.

> those guys have done multiple companies, which seems to be an important criteria for doing "consistently well"

That's an interesting question. It depends on the size of the population, I guess. If we acknowledge that a minority of people can start a successful company by chance, why don't we acknowledge that an even smaller minority can do it multiple times, also by chance?

He's founded a company. It was talent-acquired, but that's more than most professors of business ever achieve.

Aside from the specific situation - I'm kinda curious what HN readers think "qualifies" a person to give advice. My girlfriend's doing an MBA. I read her coursework sometimes. Some of it is useful with the appropriate grain of salt applied, but I find that blog postings from people who have actually run businesses (or listening to Larry, Urs, Amit, Milo, Andy etc. at Google-internal presentations and trying hard to read between the lines) are far more informative. There is the theory and there is the reality when it comes to running businesses, and most of the theory is bunk.

I agree with what you are saying. I went to Wharton but I also have started and run two businesses not including things during high school and college. I am referring to specifically statements that Sam made which would have been something that someone who was either practicing for a longer time or had knowledge of business history would know about more than Sam. That was my point. I am well aware of "book" knowledge. And theory. My dad used to joke about that all the time when I was at Wharton. (I was in the entrepreneurship program.)
Sam is precisely one of the few people whose opinion I would never want to miss on the subject of how to grow "huge". Loopt was in the original YC batch, and so he has had a bird's eye view of hundreds of startups, most of which have or will fail to grow huge .. but also a few that will succeed. That's nearly 10 years of seeing things very few others (in the world) will get the chance to see.

Plenty of other very impressive business people, including the likes of pg, peter thiel etc lend a careful ear to what Sam has to say .. so, with all due respect, I think you'd be a fool to disregard his thoughts.

That is a DH1 argument. Anyone is "qualified" to talk about anything.

Idea: A social news aggregator that scores people on the disagreement hierarchy, and penalizes people who score poorly by not letting them comment and post (or at least gives a lower weight to their comments and posts) (not trying to single you out larrys, just throwing it out there because I think it's a valuable idea)

Slashdot had/has a qualifier attached to up and downvotes.
Sam understands startups better than almost anyone else I know. I defer to him on many topics. E.g. if any YC startup has a difficult fundraising problem, I give them my opinion but then send them to Sam for the last word.
I am not questioning that Sam knows about startups.

But Sam made an all inclusive statement regarding business and not just startups and startups that would be (I'm guessing) the type that YC would fund. I would send someone to Sam for that as well.

In the comments on this thread (in response to me) I am being taken to task over suggesting that he is not a business school professor (who has studied many types of businesses over many years) or an experience businessman (who has observed businesses over many years). Consequently his knowledge of business is almost certainly limited to what he has seen since college (mid 00's) and in a particular niche in the business world. Which was my point. His statement didn't reflect the niche that he knows about. And as you pointed out he didn't use any qualifiers or footnotes.

As far as business school professors I am quite aware of the limitations and the idea of "that who can do those who can't teach". (And exception might be someone like Steve Blank who I have worked with in the past.)

As an example I was sent a document to review by a business school professor that had already been distributed to students and found several obviously inaccurate statement about a subject that I know more than the professor does simply because I have been involved in the subject since 1996. And I work with it every single day. When the professor heard my comments they invited me to speak to the class.

Universal qualifiers aren't absurd for headlines pitched at HN. They seem to work as intended.
'Best' vs 'Only' should be a title-fight deathmatch

    Why "Best" is Best

    How "Only" Got Me To the Front Page of HN
The most accurate version of the title would be something like "The Only Way You Can Grow Huge." There may be occasional edge cases where companies start out big. I'm hesitant even to offer an example, because there are so few, but perhaps Fannie Mae. But these edge cases don't matter to the readers this essay is aimed at, because they can't replicate them.

(And incidentally, there are no upward boosts for comments or stories, and even the penalties Ken described in that post are much simpler than he thinks. E.g. there is only a single penalty for lightweight domains, not a range of penalties chosen by us.)

Your footnote isn't even right. There are large companies that are large just because they were the only player, got a government contract, funded because someone wanted a visa or had family connections, etc.. Anyone who brings up the exception will usually have interesting anecdotes, if not data to bring it up, or experience making them say it. So your comment is kind of a waste of space whereas theirs will actually be useful. I consider your comment the same as adding sometimes to the end of every sentence. Maybe true, but useless.
For example, this comment would have made a lot more sense had it had a footnote reminding everyone that Sam is a partner at YC, and therefore does have reason to keep HN in mind as an audience when writing.

I had to figure that out from other comments, because my first reaction was, "Why is pg taking the time to tell some random blogger how to tailor their writing to this audience?"

(I'm a casual HN user, and don't keep up with YC, maybe the identity of the partners is more common knowledge in the larger population.)

> All companies that grow really big do so in only one way: people recommend the product or service to other people.

Yeah, I recommend all my friends to get Exxon gas and buy GE lightbulbs...

There are some things essential to us(inelastic), and those are the things where we'll see really big changes-- Invent things that everyone uses all of the time, not something that some people use some of the time.

This reminds me of an article I recently read in the Harvard Business review.

"The Three Rules for Making a Company Great."

The three rules are basically:

1. Increase Revenue

2. Increase Quality.

3. Only rules 1 and 2 matter.

I've following these rules since I read about them, and I do think they are very, very, helpful. Even though we grow mostly through direct response marketing, our brand value has been increasing, as has readership loyalty and revenue per unique subscriber. We are starting to get to the point where we're producing the type of quality that nobody else produces, anywhere. This easily solves one of the biggest marketing questions: What is your unique position? Eventually, the answer will be simple: We're simply better than all of our competitors. By a lot.

http://hbr.org/2013/04/three-rules-for-making-a-company-trul...

At the recent growth hacker conference, essentially every speaker dedicated time to idea that product quality matters. I certainly did when talking about the Dropbox referral program. You can see a version of my talk here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ECvLsimoSjU
"When you are still small, you can spend a lot of money marketing or advertising and have a big impact on usage growth. But eventually, you get so big you simply can't spend enough money to move the needle..."

Well, that depends. Specifically, it depends on how scalable your advertising channel is. If your customer acquisition cost through that channel remains below your customer lifetime value, the only limit on your scaling is the working capital you have available to spend on advertising.

Advertising can take you a very long way in some cases.

I wonder why. There are plenty of ways to get growth, why is this one so important?

I can think of one reason off the top of my head:

Perhaps it's because many organizations that grow very large do so by creating a market, or largely shaping it in some way. It seems that in that case, word of mouth is even more important.

As an example, I tell my friends about gyro food trucks all the time. But most of them have decided whether or not they're going to eat greasy falafel. On the other hand, if there's a new type of food vendor they've never heard of before, it will count for a lot more, because their opinion hasn't been formed yet.

I suppose the other explanation is that word of mouth is only a signifier of high quality, but I'm not sure that's all of it.

> Having a growth team is still a good idea--you almost always need to jumpstart things. But don't forget about what you actually have to accomplish.

Maybe it's better not to jumpstart things. One strategy could be to fail faster by purposely not marketing, to quickly find out whether a product is intrinsically viral.

Most products are not intrinsically viral, and they have no reason to be such.
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Author mentions _product_ a few times without consideration to the problem it's meant to solve. Sometimes the problem being solved just isn't big/important enough for users to risk the social capital of making a recommendation; even when the product solves it perfectly
I was really hoping for some viagra jokes.