40 million, according to the article at the moment.
Edit: Thinking it might be because they limited the variable to a specific number of bits, I checked to see if any maxed out around that number. 25 bits max out at 33,554,431 and 26 bits at 67,108,863.
Who the hell would design a system involving 911 calls with a limit that could be reached in a couple years of calls? I can't imagine how I would go about being stupid enough to not understand the nature of the requirement to not have 911 calls fail. This isn't cobol with a fixed field limit of N digits someone specified in 1964.
Haven't they ever heard of a UUID? Or if they are worried about potential collisions at least make the number 128bit (since you have an obscenely large max value to increment to).
You should do that anyway. Calling 911 from a mobile phone is likely to take you to a regional dispatch center, not your local police department [1].
I've called 911 twice from my mobile phone to report an accident I passed on the highway. Once nobody picked up, even after several attempts with perfect service. The second time I spoke to someone who obviously wasn't a 911 operator but assured me she'd pass my message to right people.
I do not see the '40 million' number mentioned in that document, but there are a lot of other legal documents which may be important here.
The key problem is that these states offloaded their 911 calls to Intrado, a company which specializes in looking up the closest actual agency which can respond (called a "PSAP" in the jargon). Intrado had to engineer for two time-domain multiplexed (TDM) systems, basically one normal and one legacy. The legacy system served a CAMA[1] system of 911 PSAPs, CAMA just means that the system automatically logged every number and time.
Because it was servicing this system which had log numbers, it wrote that CAMA's information to some sort of database. (It's a little more complicated than that but basically they needed to make unique IDs as part of the CAMA's protocol.) The counter could only generate N entries. When it tried to handle more entries, some warning-level notification was raised by software, severe enough to crash the application but not severe enough to emit a warning that would alert Intrado's IT staff. All CAMA-routed destination traffic from this Intrado server was affected.
It took several hours before they figured out what was wrong, in part because some other 911 system went down at the same time for an unrelated reason and they figured wrongly that they were related. Once they realized what was going on, they rerouted to a backup server which didn't have a full log file. This second server was able to handle 911 calls while the original bug was fixed. About 6,600 calls did not make it through the system and were dropped (in the form of a busy signal?) rather than routed. They could have switched over to the backup server immediately, but (a) they missed the warnings that their software was emitting, and (b) they didn't understand that the server was the problem.
If my personal negligence causes someone to die, I face serious legal and civil ramifications. Infrastructure providers should be similarly subject to something more than a commission investigation.
Didn't open-source systems like SSL take quite some time before vulnerabilities like heartbleed surfaced as code-bugs/code-vulnerabilities?
Also to directly address the issue of critical systems and robustness, am not sure how far reaching open-sourcing might be in tending to issues.Are there projects that have made the transition for good?
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[ 3.6 ms ] story [ 35.2 ms ] threadEdit: Thinking it might be because they limited the variable to a specific number of bits, I checked to see if any maxed out around that number. 25 bits max out at 33,554,431 and 26 bits at 67,108,863.
I've called 911 twice from my mobile phone to report an accident I passed on the highway. Once nobody picked up, even after several attempts with perfect service. The second time I spoke to someone who obviously wasn't a 911 operator but assured me she'd pass my message to right people.
[1] http://www.theverge.com/2014/10/3/6414949/911-call-failures-...
http://transition.fcc.gov/Daily_Releases/Daily_Business/2014...
I do not see the '40 million' number mentioned in that document, but there are a lot of other legal documents which may be important here.
The key problem is that these states offloaded their 911 calls to Intrado, a company which specializes in looking up the closest actual agency which can respond (called a "PSAP" in the jargon). Intrado had to engineer for two time-domain multiplexed (TDM) systems, basically one normal and one legacy. The legacy system served a CAMA[1] system of 911 PSAPs, CAMA just means that the system automatically logged every number and time.
Because it was servicing this system which had log numbers, it wrote that CAMA's information to some sort of database. (It's a little more complicated than that but basically they needed to make unique IDs as part of the CAMA's protocol.) The counter could only generate N entries. When it tried to handle more entries, some warning-level notification was raised by software, severe enough to crash the application but not severe enough to emit a warning that would alert Intrado's IT staff. All CAMA-routed destination traffic from this Intrado server was affected.
It took several hours before they figured out what was wrong, in part because some other 911 system went down at the same time for an unrelated reason and they figured wrongly that they were related. Once they realized what was going on, they rerouted to a backup server which didn't have a full log file. This second server was able to handle 911 calls while the original bug was fixed. About 6,600 calls did not make it through the system and were dropped (in the form of a busy signal?) rather than routed. They could have switched over to the backup server immediately, but (a) they missed the warnings that their software was emitting, and (b) they didn't understand that the server was the problem.
[1] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Automatic_message_accounting
Didn't open-source systems like SSL take quite some time before vulnerabilities like heartbleed surfaced as code-bugs/code-vulnerabilities?
Also to directly address the issue of critical systems and robustness, am not sure how far reaching open-sourcing might be in tending to issues.Are there projects that have made the transition for good?