Americans got their ass kicked in Vientam; that's why they can never get over it. Instead they have been supporting dictators, nazi affiliated parties (see Ukraine) and islamist extremists who destroy 2000+ years of civilizations (see Syria). Then they talk about democracy as if it's part of their culture. Democracy was never a part of America. Capitalism is: Let's make a million dollars no matter who dies. So much hypocrisy prevalent in American culture is disgusting.
Well, Tet showed that the USG had either consistently lied or was consistently misinformed about the actual strength of the North Vietnamese forces, so it shook public confidence in Washington; the US casualties were far higher than confident military forecasts; and the American public found the US airpower tactics horrifying and the wanton brutality of ARVN "allies" reprehensible. (North Vietnamese forces were no less brutal, they just didn't have embedded reporters in their units.)
In many ways, the Tet Offensive just reinforced the lessons of Ia Drang, from half a decade prior: US forces could use vertical envelopment, precision artillery and CAS to do a hell of a number on North Vietnamese units (though I Corps was almost completely cut off logistically by NVA activity, forcing a major airlift to keep operations going); but the Viet Cong/NLF forces could, operating autonomously in the countryside and even in cities (as seen by the NLF siege of the Saigon AMEMB), still inflict significant casualties on US forces by using ambushes, traps and rush-to-close engagement tactics to neutralize US technology.
Arguably, had the US "held the line" instead of engaging in theatre force reductions, then perhaps the North Vietnamese threat could have been contained, and perhaps even rolled back -- but at the cost of decades of combat, massive American casualties, the utter desolation of most of Vietnam, and domestic unrest in CONUS. And, even then, the ineffective, delegitmized and corrupt South Vietnamese military and government would have faced decades more of revolutionary violence that it was unequipped to face militarily, socially or politically. Saigon had as good a chance of long-term survival as Rhodesia or French Algeria did, and the US was simply wasting youth and treasure trying to keep the Communists out.
Depends on the location; there were slightly more PAVN battalions in the field than VC, and some on-paper VC units were actually reflagged NVA (e.g., the 808th battalion). Actions in Saigon and other southern battles were with infiltrated Viet Cong, but Hue was mostly a PAVN action with VC support.
There was a lot of MOUT-style urban fighting (5 major cities and 36 regional capitals were targets of the Northern forces, plus around 70 smaller towns and various military bases like Long Binh and Bien Hoa near Saigon), but most of it was relatively short, and US forces took advantage of airmobile capabilities and reasonably good control of major roads to move forces quickly and decisively. Hue was the infamous exception, running for (IIRC) some 25 days of grinding, brutal urban combat with soldiers, Marines and South Vietnamese units clashing with the largest concentration of PAVN forces.
After Tet, the North figured out that dispersing their forces was a more effective method of confronting the US (again, IIRC, I think the US suffered more casualties from ambushes and booby traps than conventional assaults in the years after Tet), though they didn't entirely abandon conventional engagements (the 29th PAVN's defense of Hill 937, or "Hamburger Hill," against a determined 101st ABN attack is an example). Even during the war in Cambodia, NVA forces chose to conduct fighting withdrawals, luring South Vietnamese forces far past their logistical limits, and simply relocating their own logistics bases deeper in the country. It wasn't until the disaster of Lam Son 719, when NVA forces stopped the ARVN offensive in Laos, that the North Vietnamese fought a standing battle.
"In many ways, the Tet Offensive just reinforced the lessons of Ia Drang, from half a decade prior:"
For those unfamiliar with, 'the lessons of Ia Drang' see and read Joe Galloway images and descriptions. Galloway was a combat correspondent on the ground during the battle: http://weweresoldiers.net/campaign.htm
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[ 0.22 ms ] story [ 21.3 ms ] threadActually in purely military terms the USA didn't get beaten on the field TET was a disaster for the VC not that the NVA minded that much.
In many ways, the Tet Offensive just reinforced the lessons of Ia Drang, from half a decade prior: US forces could use vertical envelopment, precision artillery and CAS to do a hell of a number on North Vietnamese units (though I Corps was almost completely cut off logistically by NVA activity, forcing a major airlift to keep operations going); but the Viet Cong/NLF forces could, operating autonomously in the countryside and even in cities (as seen by the NLF siege of the Saigon AMEMB), still inflict significant casualties on US forces by using ambushes, traps and rush-to-close engagement tactics to neutralize US technology.
Arguably, had the US "held the line" instead of engaging in theatre force reductions, then perhaps the North Vietnamese threat could have been contained, and perhaps even rolled back -- but at the cost of decades of combat, massive American casualties, the utter desolation of most of Vietnam, and domestic unrest in CONUS. And, even then, the ineffective, delegitmized and corrupt South Vietnamese military and government would have faced decades more of revolutionary violence that it was unequipped to face militarily, socially or politically. Saigon had as good a chance of long-term survival as Rhodesia or French Algeria did, and the US was simply wasting youth and treasure trying to keep the Communists out.
There was a lot of MOUT-style urban fighting (5 major cities and 36 regional capitals were targets of the Northern forces, plus around 70 smaller towns and various military bases like Long Binh and Bien Hoa near Saigon), but most of it was relatively short, and US forces took advantage of airmobile capabilities and reasonably good control of major roads to move forces quickly and decisively. Hue was the infamous exception, running for (IIRC) some 25 days of grinding, brutal urban combat with soldiers, Marines and South Vietnamese units clashing with the largest concentration of PAVN forces.
After Tet, the North figured out that dispersing their forces was a more effective method of confronting the US (again, IIRC, I think the US suffered more casualties from ambushes and booby traps than conventional assaults in the years after Tet), though they didn't entirely abandon conventional engagements (the 29th PAVN's defense of Hill 937, or "Hamburger Hill," against a determined 101st ABN attack is an example). Even during the war in Cambodia, NVA forces chose to conduct fighting withdrawals, luring South Vietnamese forces far past their logistical limits, and simply relocating their own logistics bases deeper in the country. It wasn't until the disaster of Lam Son 719, when NVA forces stopped the ARVN offensive in Laos, that the North Vietnamese fought a standing battle.
For those unfamiliar with, 'the lessons of Ia Drang' see and read Joe Galloway images and descriptions. Galloway was a combat correspondent on the ground during the battle: http://weweresoldiers.net/campaign.htm