>So you'd need lots of guards Can't edit my other reply. The operator in the OP runs 68 nodes. I did not look at each one, but it looks like most, if not all of them are guard nodes. This article mentions someone…
>Some combination of obfuscation, encryption, mixing, and plausible deniability seems to be the best bet. Go on.
>But it's disingenuous to claim that even using a private guard (which isn't possible, as far as I know) I have been thinking about this for a while, too. There is some Tor fork which allows non-exit nodes to exit. It…
I'm not sure about their security either, see my other post below.
A malicious guard is just a malicious node. It can also be used as some other hop, or there can be non malicious nodes without a guard flag. I think there has been at least one publication taking a closer look at what…
>Wouldn't your onion service uptime become correlated with the guard's uptime? Yes. This is happening on a fairly regular basis. ddos against a tor node in most cases is just trying to figure out someones IP address or…
This has been mentioned on the tor irc several times and also on some other places. No one cared ...
>They wouldn't go through the trouble to identify and blacklist exit nodes and present users with a captcha otherwise. Do you really think they care about that 1% (made up number) of Tor users using their service…
That's a good question indeed. I don't have an answer but some people got similar results when pointing out some issues internally. Only when publishing those on the mail list where everyone can read it things started…
They could still figure out your guard and attack it directly.
>While Tor browser is very well hardened, relative to Firefox Some say it is one of the most attacked browser ... >However, we have no clue how many users in authoritarian regimes have been pwned by similar malware,…
It depends on who runs these attacks. Some law enforcement agency could use those attacks to put you in jail. Mapping out Tor users can be interesting to other entities, too ... As you can see from the original article…
> but Tor users are much harder to discover, because Tor clients don't change guards frequently. I don't get that. Every guard can discover users because the users directly connect to guard nodes. As a guard you can…
> Unless you have hundreds of these There are single operators that run dozens of nodes. Just take a look at the article. Anyone can setup nodes and give no contact info or just change it to something else. I could spin…
>So you'd need lots of guards Can't edit my other reply. The operator in the OP runs 68 nodes. I did not look at each one, but it looks like most, if not all of them are guard nodes. This article mentions someone…
>Some combination of obfuscation, encryption, mixing, and plausible deniability seems to be the best bet. Go on.
>But it's disingenuous to claim that even using a private guard (which isn't possible, as far as I know) I have been thinking about this for a while, too. There is some Tor fork which allows non-exit nodes to exit. It…
I'm not sure about their security either, see my other post below.
A malicious guard is just a malicious node. It can also be used as some other hop, or there can be non malicious nodes without a guard flag. I think there has been at least one publication taking a closer look at what…
>Wouldn't your onion service uptime become correlated with the guard's uptime? Yes. This is happening on a fairly regular basis. ddos against a tor node in most cases is just trying to figure out someones IP address or…
This has been mentioned on the tor irc several times and also on some other places. No one cared ...
>They wouldn't go through the trouble to identify and blacklist exit nodes and present users with a captcha otherwise. Do you really think they care about that 1% (made up number) of Tor users using their service…
That's a good question indeed. I don't have an answer but some people got similar results when pointing out some issues internally. Only when publishing those on the mail list where everyone can read it things started…
They could still figure out your guard and attack it directly.
>While Tor browser is very well hardened, relative to Firefox Some say it is one of the most attacked browser ... >However, we have no clue how many users in authoritarian regimes have been pwned by similar malware,…
It depends on who runs these attacks. Some law enforcement agency could use those attacks to put you in jail. Mapping out Tor users can be interesting to other entities, too ... As you can see from the original article…
> but Tor users are much harder to discover, because Tor clients don't change guards frequently. I don't get that. Every guard can discover users because the users directly connect to guard nodes. As a guard you can…
> Unless you have hundreds of these There are single operators that run dozens of nodes. Just take a look at the article. Anyone can setup nodes and give no contact info or just change it to something else. I could spin…