TommyTran732
No user record in our sample, but TommyTran732 has activity below (stories or comments). Likely we have partial data — the full bulk-load will fill profiles in.
No user record in our sample, but TommyTran732 has activity below (stories or comments). Likely we have partial data — the full bulk-load will fill profiles in.
To be completely fair, any kind of sandboxing inside of Qubes's VMs do not mean much, because it is on X11. Any app can pwn any other app lol. With that being said, yeah, he's being disingenuous as per usual for sure.…
> what Purism is doing is moving the non-auditable part of the OS onto a separate storage device so that they can claim that the OS is "Fully Auditable" and FSF certified even though the non-auditable and non-free part…
> I see no effort from your side to come to some understanding or to clarify anything. Accusing me of your own sins. > What do you mean by "tampering" here? Is uploading firmware to peripherals a "tampering"? Why is…
Yeah, why are you selectively reading? This is after he admitted what I said was true. His only contention is that he thinks it's hard to know what the PCR values should be to fake, so he calls that "security". You are…
Why do you copy paste the same thing over and over a bunch of times? Linking to an irrelevant post doesn't change how it works. Read the code posted above.
Since you copy pasta your response, I will link to my other comment and do a bit of copy pasta here: https://news.ycombinator.com/item?id=47953726 It is exactly how it works. Read the actual code for yourself:…
Because it's true, and I know what he said, I am not confused at all. Did you not read anything at all? On the Librem laptop, the tampering is done by PureBoot and inject into /run/firmware. The other user was linking…
It's basically taking the blobs that would be normally shipped with the OS in a sensible manner, shuffle it around, then calling it "free" while the same blobs would still be there, just on different flash storage chips.
The SOC still has firmware baked in as per usual. And the firmware for Bluetooth/Wifi is loaded in by having the initramfs read it from the NOR flash, mount it in /lib/firmware, then it is business as usual like a…
> It's just physically impossible to defend from tracking, when the phone has networking connections on. Not even on all-mighty GrapheneOS. I can use GrapheneOS with the global mic toggled off and sensors toggled…
The developer of Heads admitted that if someone tampers with the boot block and falsifies the measurements Heads cannot protect the device right on the Qubes forum. Why won't you listen to him then? Is he not…
Which blobs are running on the Librem 5 CPU? Which blobs are running on GrapheneOS CPU? Both the Pixel and Librem 5 have firmware baked into the SoC that is executed. On GrapheneOS, the firmware is signed and updated…
Quite frankly, the whole Librem ecosystem is significantly less "open" than GrapheneOS or any desktop Linux variant to anyone who look at things objectively instead of using weird FSF semantics. Instead of loading…
> You never could answer to them. I did reply to them plenty of times. Here you go doing the exact same thing again - ignoring 100% of what's being said, then claiming "no one can respond". > You only talk about the…
Man, if this entirely thread of people calling out how ridiculous the implementation is and the killswitch not actually working in practice isn't enough to convince you, nothing ever will. I don't even feel like arguing…
Not entirely sure if the chip they are using (WM8962) can be reconfigured as a mic or not... it probably can't. But yes, the speaker is still active even when the mic is toggle off. Everything else is pretty much the…
Oh he's already done that when I explained to him how stuff like PureBoot has circular logic and doesn't actually work on Qubes forum already. Unfortunately he will just ignore every single counter argument ever made…
And what good is the phone when 3 switches are off? You think that people buy a phone with a "mic killswitch" expects to have to turn off practically everything including internet to make sure that their mics aren't…
Important to note that users only stopped getting updates, the phones were not bricked and they can reinstall the OS signed with the new key. CopperheadOS was always's Micay's project and used his own signing key. The…
> Their microphone kill switch also doesn't prevent audio recording It doesn't prevent audio recording in the super paranoid "oh, the whole phone has been compromised" scenario because it is bypassable via the sensors.…
> I said multiple times that I exclusively run trusted apps on the phone. I use Qubes for untrusted staff. Do you understand that threat models can vary? By that logic, you might as well just not have the killswitch at…
You have been saying this sort of stuff on the Qubes forum and a bunch of other places for awhile now. Hardware kill switches are nice-to-have, but they are significantly less important than the OS actually protecting…
So what exactly would you have done? Risk the key being taken over by a shady entity? Does the alternative really scream "mature, stable, and thoughtful" to you?
Oh wow. I will update the post later today. Thanks for pointing it out!
Are you TAJ? The only people who refer to me as B0risGrishenko (my old Reddit account for a few months) are either TAJ or the crazy people on r/privatelife who have no idea what they are talking about. Quite frankly,…