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Yeah I don't think enough people talk about this. AI makes your existing process faster, but it doesn't make a broken process correct. We've seen this at every inflection point — cloud, agile, microservices, now AI. My…
One thing that jumps out in these incidents is how quickly we shift from "package integrituy" to "operator integrity." Once an LLM is in the loop (even as a helper0, its effectevly acting as an operator that can…
One downstream effect of "agents can publish code" is that the trust signals weve relied on for years (stars, maintainer reputation, issue history...etc) got noisier. I don't think that means the ecosystem collapses,…
This is how I've come to think about it. It's less a "clever string that bypasses prompts" and more "untrusted parties are participating in your control plane." That's why purely linguistic defenses feel unsatisfying.…
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I like that everyone keeps separating "capability" from "authority" because they get conflated in a lot of agent-centered tooling. CLI vs MCP choice mostly changes the HOW as a side effect. It doesn't answer the bigger…
I think this gets a lot worse when we look at it from an agentic perspective. Like when a dev person hits a compromising package, there's usually a "hold on, that's weird" moment before a catastrophe. An agent doesn't…
Initially I rally had a bad taste in my mouth. It had forced me to close a business (video editing). Recently its gone a different direction so I would say the "interest" part got a resurgence for me. I'm seeing all of…
The web of trust question is the right one. The hard part isn't flagging obviously malicious knowledge units — it's establishing verifiable authority for the agents contributing them. Like...Who authorized agent-1238931…
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Yeah I don't think enough people talk about this. AI makes your existing process faster, but it doesn't make a broken process correct. We've seen this at every inflection point — cloud, agile, microservices, now AI. My…
One thing that jumps out in these incidents is how quickly we shift from "package integrituy" to "operator integrity." Once an LLM is in the loop (even as a helper0, its effectevly acting as an operator that can…
One downstream effect of "agents can publish code" is that the trust signals weve relied on for years (stars, maintainer reputation, issue history...etc) got noisier. I don't think that means the ecosystem collapses,…
This is how I've come to think about it. It's less a "clever string that bypasses prompts" and more "untrusted parties are participating in your control plane." That's why purely linguistic defenses feel unsatisfying.…
[flagged]
I like that everyone keeps separating "capability" from "authority" because they get conflated in a lot of agent-centered tooling. CLI vs MCP choice mostly changes the HOW as a side effect. It doesn't answer the bigger…
I think this gets a lot worse when we look at it from an agentic perspective. Like when a dev person hits a compromising package, there's usually a "hold on, that's weird" moment before a catastrophe. An agent doesn't…
Initially I rally had a bad taste in my mouth. It had forced me to close a business (video editing). Recently its gone a different direction so I would say the "interest" part got a resurgence for me. I'm seeing all of…
The web of trust question is the right one. The hard part isn't flagging obviously malicious knowledge units — it's establishing verifiable authority for the agents contributing them. Like...Who authorized agent-1238931…