These malicious npm packages often “phone home” during install or runtime, opening C2 channels, exfiltrating env vars, or beaconing quietly in the background. Static checks and SBOMs rarely catch that kind of dynamic…
kernel state maps vs event buffering is an interesting choice. We've been seeing more in-memory malware in our CI/CD pipelines lately that never touches disk or network - any thoughts on extending this to userspace…
Does it allow to integrate directly into the action runner?
These malicious npm packages often “phone home” during install or runtime, opening C2 channels, exfiltrating env vars, or beaconing quietly in the background. Static checks and SBOMs rarely catch that kind of dynamic…
kernel state maps vs event buffering is an interesting choice. We've been seeing more in-memory malware in our CI/CD pipelines lately that never touches disk or network - any thoughts on extending this to userspace…
Does it allow to integrate directly into the action runner?