Considering where Firefox and Chrome overall stand on sandboxing, two libraries isn't substantial. Chrome has consistent, extensive sandboxing, and Firefox has sandboxing here and there as an afterthought. I looked into…
> if Chrome doesn't have it, it must be useless Those Chrome CVEs are for single-digit version numbers from 10 years ago. I'm sure they sandbox FFmpeg more extensively now.
Site Isolation can mitigate Spectre attacks: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/07/mitigating-spectre-w...
> not an innocent-looking convenience syntax for flirting with the UB I agree, but C++ uses this pattern in so many places that I think it is less confusing to be consistent. When I see a nice, concise syntax or…
The deliberate omission of std::span::at() is annoying. The paper that introduced std::span was titled "span: bounds-safe views for sequences of objects," but there is actually no bounds checking in the standard. It's…
Considering where Firefox and Chrome overall stand on sandboxing, two libraries isn't substantial. Chrome has consistent, extensive sandboxing, and Firefox has sandboxing here and there as an afterthought. I looked into…
> if Chrome doesn't have it, it must be useless Those Chrome CVEs are for single-digit version numbers from 10 years ago. I'm sure they sandbox FFmpeg more extensively now.
Site Isolation can mitigate Spectre attacks: https://security.googleblog.com/2018/07/mitigating-spectre-w...
> not an innocent-looking convenience syntax for flirting with the UB I agree, but C++ uses this pattern in so many places that I think it is less confusing to be consistent. When I see a nice, concise syntax or…
The deliberate omission of std::span::at() is annoying. The paper that introduced std::span was titled "span: bounds-safe views for sequences of objects," but there is actually no bounds checking in the standard. It's…