Some version at least will be yes. RE: RoT + RISV-V, cache isolation appears missing here, so sidechannel attacks using cache timing and other methods still work
Isn't this highly similar to MIT's Sanctum from 2015, also open source and ignoring the hardware changes needed to make meaningful guarantees about sidechannel attack robustness? Useful if you want to avoid hardware…
The T2 is utilizing a physically unclonable function (PUF) and TRNG to create a public/private device key pair on die. At manufacturing, the T2 exposes the device public key to Apple, Apple signs with a group key posted…
Some version at least will be yes. RE: RoT + RISV-V, cache isolation appears missing here, so sidechannel attacks using cache timing and other methods still work
Isn't this highly similar to MIT's Sanctum from 2015, also open source and ignoring the hardware changes needed to make meaningful guarantees about sidechannel attack robustness? Useful if you want to avoid hardware…
The T2 is utilizing a physically unclonable function (PUF) and TRNG to create a public/private device key pair on die. At manufacturing, the T2 exposes the device public key to Apple, Apple signs with a group key posted…