Since it’s speculation at this point, I’d say we deal with it if and when it happens. I also don’t see how this doesn’t apply even worse to doing cloud side scanning, like companies otherwise do. Is that out of control?…
None of this makes the system useless or harmful. Also, it’s not Apple’s algorithm. The actual hash list Apple will use is not accessible to the device.
Best for whom? (Also, we don’t know the exact hash list Apple will use).
> The whole discussion seems to center around what Apple intends to do on-device, ignoring what others are already doing in the cloud. Isn't this strange? Very strange. Especially when this on-device technique means…
> Are you actually arguing in good faith here at all? Are you? Because you just seemed to claim that it could match against innocent pictures of your naked children, but this tells me that you don’t understand that this…
Technical nitpick: the hashes are not hashed (again), but rather cryptographically blinded. This is not reversible, so seems like a hash, but computations can be done on it which result can in some cases be seen by the…
Apple says they expect to use 30 as the threshold.
Security researchers and hackers routinely look at the code on the device, though.
> China-hosted China-decryptable datacenters. China hosted, yes, but Apple denies China-decryptable, so that’s speculation unless you have a good source.
I’d say that it’s not, and that many people think it is is because they haven’t fully read or understood the technical description of the system. But what you should do is read the documents yourself.
Apple doesn’t “call the police”, though, they contact the center for child abuse or whatever it’s called, who will then presumably verify the picture.
> The amount of misinformation in this thread (and in the other responses to you) is out of control. True it’s not perfect here, but you should see Reddit, then :p. People there hardly even know what they are mad about.
The hash table is blinded on the device, and the device never knows if a given image is a hit or not. This is well documented.
It seems to me that the vast majority of people in forums don’t actually know how this system is implemented. Although people definitely seem more informed here than on Reddit.
Maybe we can worry about things when and if they are implemented? If you don’t trust Apple it’s a moot discussion anyway.
All major cloud photo library providers do this scan server side, yes. This way offers more privacy for the end user… but evidently most people don’t realize that.
That’s a different scenario. That’s for it happening by chance, not on purpose. At any rate, the “matching” images are reviewed (or a “visual derivative” is).
I hope not, since doing the scans like this offers much more privacy for the user. Even when the user is too ignorant (sorry) to realize this. But this will be evident by reading and understanding the technical…
This system could still work with an e2e encrypted cloud library. However, it’s currently not e2e.
Yes, and if you read (and understand) the technical implementation, it certainly does offer more privacy. But yeah for people who don’t, it often seems much worse.
We can take that discussion if and when that happens.
There is a lot of speculation about things that haven’t happened in that comment.
I’d argue that #2 is good, since it offers much more privacy than scanning in the cloud. This is based on reading and understanding the technical summary and paper linked from there.
No. Only pictures being uploaded to iCloud Photo Library are being scanned.
How have they demonstrated that they will compromise your privacy? They compromise it less than the systems scanning on the cloud, since like this most of the match is only known to the device and not the cloud. If you…
Since it’s speculation at this point, I’d say we deal with it if and when it happens. I also don’t see how this doesn’t apply even worse to doing cloud side scanning, like companies otherwise do. Is that out of control?…
None of this makes the system useless or harmful. Also, it’s not Apple’s algorithm. The actual hash list Apple will use is not accessible to the device.
Best for whom? (Also, we don’t know the exact hash list Apple will use).
> The whole discussion seems to center around what Apple intends to do on-device, ignoring what others are already doing in the cloud. Isn't this strange? Very strange. Especially when this on-device technique means…
> Are you actually arguing in good faith here at all? Are you? Because you just seemed to claim that it could match against innocent pictures of your naked children, but this tells me that you don’t understand that this…
Technical nitpick: the hashes are not hashed (again), but rather cryptographically blinded. This is not reversible, so seems like a hash, but computations can be done on it which result can in some cases be seen by the…
Apple says they expect to use 30 as the threshold.
Security researchers and hackers routinely look at the code on the device, though.
> China-hosted China-decryptable datacenters. China hosted, yes, but Apple denies China-decryptable, so that’s speculation unless you have a good source.
I’d say that it’s not, and that many people think it is is because they haven’t fully read or understood the technical description of the system. But what you should do is read the documents yourself.
Apple doesn’t “call the police”, though, they contact the center for child abuse or whatever it’s called, who will then presumably verify the picture.
> The amount of misinformation in this thread (and in the other responses to you) is out of control. True it’s not perfect here, but you should see Reddit, then :p. People there hardly even know what they are mad about.
The hash table is blinded on the device, and the device never knows if a given image is a hit or not. This is well documented.
It seems to me that the vast majority of people in forums don’t actually know how this system is implemented. Although people definitely seem more informed here than on Reddit.
Maybe we can worry about things when and if they are implemented? If you don’t trust Apple it’s a moot discussion anyway.
All major cloud photo library providers do this scan server side, yes. This way offers more privacy for the end user… but evidently most people don’t realize that.
That’s a different scenario. That’s for it happening by chance, not on purpose. At any rate, the “matching” images are reviewed (or a “visual derivative” is).
I hope not, since doing the scans like this offers much more privacy for the user. Even when the user is too ignorant (sorry) to realize this. But this will be evident by reading and understanding the technical…
This system could still work with an e2e encrypted cloud library. However, it’s currently not e2e.
Yes, and if you read (and understand) the technical implementation, it certainly does offer more privacy. But yeah for people who don’t, it often seems much worse.
We can take that discussion if and when that happens.
There is a lot of speculation about things that haven’t happened in that comment.
I’d argue that #2 is good, since it offers much more privacy than scanning in the cloud. This is based on reading and understanding the technical summary and paper linked from there.
No. Only pictures being uploaded to iCloud Photo Library are being scanned.
How have they demonstrated that they will compromise your privacy? They compromise it less than the systems scanning on the cloud, since like this most of the match is only known to the device and not the cloud. If you…