> The security-correctness proof of bitcoin doesn't depend on "honest nodes reliably receiving all honest nodes' blocks". Actually bitcoin is simple in that it doesn't try to distinguish between honest vs malicious, the…
> [1] e.g. page 17 "the honest player associated with the third slot is shown a chain of length 1 produced by the adversarial player of slot 2" but is unable to see the other (2) node, that eventually forms the ^t chain…
> The security-correctness proof of bitcoin doesn't depend on "honest nodes reliably receiving all honest nodes' blocks". Actually bitcoin is simple in that it doesn't try to distinguish between honest vs malicious, the…
> [1] e.g. page 17 "the honest player associated with the third slot is shown a chain of length 1 produced by the adversarial player of slot 2" but is unable to see the other (2) node, that eventually forms the ^t chain…